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SUMMARY 
 
Love, Ethics, and Emancipation 
 
Charlie Thame  
Aberystwyth University, 2012    
 
This thesis is an original contribution to critical international relations 
theory. Responding to Hartmut Behr's call for the development of more 
universalistic trajectories of ontological inquiry for contemporary (global) politics 
and ethics, our original contribution is to establish a 'critical' approach to 
international theory on a more universalistic meta-theoretical foundation. 
Proceeding from a philosophical analysis of 'ontological' foundations in influential 
normative, meta-theoretical, and critical approaches to international theory, we 
argue for a shift from international theory’s reliance on a shallow ontology of 
'things that exist' to a fuller ontology of being, and of human being in particular. 
After identifying with the left-Hegelian tradition of thought, and establishing that 
the most compelling and promising advocate of a 'critical' approach to international 
theory, that of Andrew Linklater, rests on a limited conception of human existence 
and a thin understanding of human freedom, we explore the implications of 
conceptions of human being and freedom in the work of Martin Heidegger and 
Georg W. F. Hegel for critical international theory. Offering an epistemological 
defence of our universalism through Hegel's phenomenological constructivist 
approach to knowledge, then demonstrating how this allows us to transcend the 
schism between foundationalist and anti-foundationalist approaches to normative 
theory, we premise our own emancipatory cosmopolitanism on a commitment to 
the human being conceived as 'singularity' rather than subject. Proceeding from a 
discussion of 'what it means to be' a free human being according to Heidegger and 
Hegel, we then foreground two aspects of human freedom that have hitherto been 
obscured in critical international theory and develop a praxeological emancipatory 
cosmopolitanism on this basis. Rather than rejecting Linklater's emancipatory 
cosmopolitanism, we call for its 'overcoming,' and demonstrate ways that our 
meta-theoretical argument can effect international practice by offering 'love' as a 
guide for ethical and emancipatory praxis and an evaluative tool for critical social 
theory. 
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Preface  
 
 
 
 
Like all pieces of scholarly work this thesis has a personal history. In the 
first semester of my second year as an undergraduate at Cardiff University, I took 
David Boucher's course History of Ideas in International Relations, during which I 
was introduced to both Francis Fukuyama's The End of History and the Last Man 
and Samuel Huntington's The Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of World 
Order.1 I chose to write an essay comparing and contrasting these approaches as a 
component of my coursework. This of course required me to engage in the 
secondary literature on these texts; yet I found something quite unsatisfactory 
about engaging with these discourses on their own terms. This is because it was not 
their theoretical inadequacies that I found troubling, but the potentially pernicious 
effects of these theoretical interventions. Against the backdrop of the post-Cold 
War era, Fukuyama's thesis appeared to warrant the expansion of neo-liberal 
political and economic ideology, whilst Huntington's seemed to risk making 
potential sources of conflict actual, reinvigorating the military-industrial complex 
and vivifying an oppositional sense of American identity through the perpetuation 
of discourses of danger that serve to recreate imagined communities.2 It seemed to 
me then that these were far from being politically neutral pieces of scholarship, and 
that these scholars had a fundamental responsibility for the consequences of the 
political imaginaries that they forged and lent credibility to. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1. Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Harper Perennial, 1993). 
Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: 
Simon & Schuster, 1997). 
2. On the use of foreign policy and collective identity formation see David Campbell, Writing 
Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1998).; Michael J. Shapiro, Violent Cartographies: Mapping Cultures of War 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997).; Iver B. Neumann, “Self and Other in 
International Relations,” European Journal of International Relations 2, no. 2 (1996): 139-74; Iver 
B. Neumann, Uses of the Other: “the East” in European Identity Formation (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1999). 
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 It was for this reason that theoretical approaches to politics with a 
specifically 'normative' intent resonated with me as an undergraduate; Mervyn 
Frost's case for normative theory against 'value-free' social inquiry was particularly 
influential, and I consistently found ethical questions in international relations to 
be the most intriguing ones. 3  Yet I soon found the consequentialist and 
deontological frameworks to which I was introduced to be talking at cross-
purposes. It became clear that these general moral conceptions were fundamentally 
incompatible, and ultimately rested upon assumptions or commitments that were 
neither transparently evident nor appropriately defended: assumptions and 
commitments regarding the highest good, what is right, and the nature of human 
beings and their place in the world, all of which provide the conditions of 
intelligibility for these approaches. It seemed that the application of these 
approaches to the cosmopolitical realm, such as the now-classical interventions 
from Peter Singer or Charles Beitz, for instance, would simply serve to multiply 
and intensify disagreements between competing perspectives on what properly 
ethical relations between people might involve, since the international realm is the 
realm where human differences are most pronounced.4 It seemed sensible then that 
theories aspiring to a global purview should explicitly defend these underlying 
assumptions before proceeding.  
 
 For this reason meta-theoretical discussions about the importance of 
epistemology and ontology in my first year in Aberystwyth struck home. My 
exposure to post-positivist and 'critical' theorising led me closer to being able to 
coherently articulate what it was that I had found troubling about the range of 
political theories that I had encountered: it was the ontological commitments that 
remained implicit therein. While sharing the normative theorist's deduction that 
value-free inquiry was impossible, critical theorists recognised the importance of 
defending their own ontological and epistemological commitments: their 
commitment to the ontological priority of the individual over the state, or to human 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3. See Mervyn Frost, Ethics in International Relations: A Constitutive Theory (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996)., especially pp12-40 
4. Peter Singer, “Famine, Affluence, and Morality,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 1, no. 1 (1972): 
229-43. Charles R. Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1979). 
 	   xi 
freedom, for instance. Despite the strengths of their positions, I felt that normative 
theorists such as Frost, Walzer and Rawls relied on such commitments without 
adequately defending them.5  
 
 During my masters studies I was introduced to the work of Andrew 
Linklater and Ken Booth, two of the most prominent and influential theorists 
working in the critical tradition of international thought. I felt encouraged and 
inspired by their explicit commitment to political analysis that aimed to contribute 
to the progressive transformation of international practices and institutions in the 
name of human freedom. I was also impressed by the scholarly breadth and 
historical depth of their work, and the contributions that both had made to the study 
of world politics.6 Yet in spite of this, I could not entirely shake the feeling of 
discontent that had earlier characterised my reaction to Fukuyama and Huntington, 
and I soon became uneasy about their own meta-theoretical commitments and the 
conceptions of freedom that appeared to underwrite their arguments; this disquiet 
has motivated and informed the character of my postgraduate studies.  
 
 For instance, Booth discusses 'the meaning of freedom' as part of a defence 
of his commitment to emancipation in his 2007 magnum opus, Theory of World 
Security. 7  An immediate issue to confront, he claims, is the idea of 'false 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5. This point will of course be elaborated on shortly. 
6. See for instance: Ken Booth, et al., eds. How Might We Live? Global Ethics in a New Century 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Ken Booth, and Timothy Dunne, eds. Worlds in 
Collision: Terror and the Future of Global Order (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002); Ken Booth, ed. 
Critical Security Studies and World Politics (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2005); Ken Booth, Theory of 
World Security (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Ken Booth, ed. Realism and 
World Politics (London: Routledge, 2011); Ken Booth and Timothy Dunne, eds. Terror in Our 
Time (London: Routledge, 2012); Andrew Linklater, Men and Citizens in the Theory of 
International Relations, 2nd ed. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1990); Andrew Linklater, 
Beyond Realism and Marxism: Critical Theory and International Relations (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 1990); Andrew Linklater, The Transformation of Political Community: Ethical 
Foundations of the Post-Westphalian Era (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998); Andrew Linklater, “The 
Harm Principle and Global Ethics,” Global Society 20, no. 3 (2006): 329-43; Andrew Linklater, 
“Global Civilizing Processes and the Ambiguities of Human Interconnectedness,” European 
Journal of International Relations 16, no. 2 (2010): 155; Andrew Linklater and Hidemi Suganami, 
The English School of International Relations: A Contemporary Reassessment (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006); Andrew Linklater, The Problem of Harm in World Politics. 
Vol. 1, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011. 
7. Ken Booth, Theory of World Security. 
 	   xii 
consciousness.'8 Influential in Gramscian-inspired critical theory, this is 'the idea 
that a person or group cannot grasp their true interests because of indoctrination or 
traditionalist socialisation.'9 As a result, knowledge, enlightenment is central to 
freedom, because 'one cannot have one's own understanding (looking at a matter 
with some critical distance) under conditions of indoctrination, traditionalist 
socialisation, and inadequate relevant knowledge.'10 Booth then proceeds by stating 
that 'we freely choose when our noumenal selves control our phenomenal selves; 
in other words, when our actions are not the result of error or passion, but are fully 
voluntary, founded on understanding and reason.'11  
 
 It struck me that Booth's position here involves a whole raft of 
philosophical assumptions regarding the relationship between human 
understanding, theoretical reason, freedom, and ethical and epistemological 
particularity, which are simply not recognised as contestable (and essentially so). 
Furthermore, it appeared that the rhetorical force of a phrase such as 'false 
consciousness' is likely geared towards smuggling in contestable assumptions 
about the world as fact, elevating the world-view of the proponent and de-
legitimising dissenting voices. In short, whilst ostensibly committed to freedom, 
my sense was that Booth's approach to world politics might betray a vanguardist or 
contradictory understanding of human freedom, where 'backward-looking' 
individuals might ultimately be 'forced to be free' or have their best interests 
dictated to them. I found this troubling. My initial reaction to these critical 
approaches to world politics, then, was one of deep ambivalence: while profoundly 
sympathetic to their aims, I remained suspicious of the meta-theoretical 
commitments that underwrote them and of the conceptions of freedom that drove 
them, both of which could potentially have profound effects on political practice.  
 
 A similar contradictory combination of sympathy for the overarching 
argument, coupled with a suspicion of the underlying conception of freedom, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8. Ibid., 112. 
9. Ibid. emphasis added 
10. Ibid. 
11. Ibid., 113. emphasis added 
 	   xiii 
characterised my reading of Andrew Linklater's work; yet Linklater's conception of 
freedom was harder to identify than Booth's and thus more intriguing to me. Whilst 
receptive to some of the challenges to Linklater's position, I found none wholly 
convincing, and I thought the readiness of some critics to simply reject the goal of 
emancipation somewhat petulant. 12  However, equally unsatisfactory was 
Linklater's tendency to respond to criticism with a 'gesture of embrace,' a 
characteristic response that appeared to indicate a blind-spot to the nature of the 
challenges to his position.13 Given that such challenges often align according to the 
divergent intellectual inheritances of various 'critical' approaches to politics, I came 
to suspect that Linklater's blind-spot might be essentially related to the influence of 
Kant and Marx on his position, and I thought it possible to trace an alternative 
trajectory of thinking about freedom that might contribute to an even richer critical 
approach to world politics. What follows is an attempt to shed light on this blind-
spot and an attempt to embolden and develop further a critical and emancipatory 
approach to world politics. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12. In a graduate seminar that followed the publication of Theory of World Security Ken Booth 
recounted an exchange with a prominent IR scholar, possibly Rob Walker, whom he credited with 
claiming that ‘emancipation is the problem.’ 
13. The term ‘gesture of embrace’ is Martin Weber's. Martin Weber, “Engaging Globalization: 
Critical Theory and Global Political Change,” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 27, no. 3 
(2002), 302. 
1 
Introduction 
 
 
 
 
Political and Historical Contexts 
 
 World politics, in the modern era at least, has primarily been conceived as 
relations between states. As Rob Walker notes, that the academic study of world 
politics should be referred to as International Relations suggests that what happens 
inside states is quite different from what happens outside states. 1  Yet the 
distinction between domestic order and international anarchy, which has been 
foundational to the discipline of International Relations but has always been 
problematic, has become increasingly untenable over the past forty years as 
dynamics of globalisation have placed increasing pressures on the nation-state as 
an effective institution for managing the vicissitudes of contemporary political life.  
 
 Globally we confront shared crises such as climate change, resource 
scarcity, the militarisation of cyberspace, the vicissitudes of financial markets, 
along with the proliferation and intensification of the means of violence, the 
movement of peoples, and drastic inequalities in power and wealth, to which the 
nation-state has become increasingly unable to effectively mitigate its 
vulnerability. These material developments have been accompanied by shifts away 
from the nation-state as the principal locus of authority, legitimacy, and 
community; we feel less estranged from the experiences of others beyond our 
traditional communities and yet, especially in more diverse and multicultural 
societies, there is often a perceived gulf between citizens of the same state. On one 
hand, the development of security communities, such as the zone of liberal 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1. In what follows, when 'international relations' is not capitalised, I am referring to relations 
between states. When capitalised, as in 'International Relations,' I am referring to the field of study 
concerned with the study of those relations; usually shortened simply to 'IR.' 'World politics' 
includes both, referring to politics viewed from a broader vantage. 
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democratic peace and the project of European integration, along with expressions 
of cosmopolitan solidarity during the Arab Spring and in the Occupy movement, in 
addition to the development of cosmopolitan norms such as R2P, appear to indicate 
forms of community developing beyond the nation-state. On the other, the rise of 
the far right in Europe, religious extremism, and the characterisation of some 
conflicts as 'civilisational' seem to indicate the fragmentation of communities and 
the realignment of forms of identity that might be regarded as constitutive of 
individual human beings as political subjects.  
 
 These developments testify to the fact that political life is becoming 
increasingly decoupled from its traditional territorial location in the nation-state. 
While the loss of the steering capacity of the state was underlined as early as 1976 
during the first wave of the globalisation debate, more recently scholars have 
argued that these are signs of the transformation of international relations into 
something more akin to world politics.2 In light of these transformations, and in the 
interests of peace, security, human freedom, and ethics, many have argued that the 
task faced at our current historical juncture is to recreate the norms of the polis at a 
global level: norms such as the non-violent resolution of conflict, dialogue, co-
operation for mutual benefit, collective security, and the collective management of 
resources. Mark Neufeld, for instance, suggests that: 
 
In a context in which the factors which will determine whether the human species will 
survive or perish, suffer or prosper, operate on a global scale, a good case can be made that 
the polis which is ‘coterminous with the minimum self-sufficient human reality’ is the 
planet itself. In short, the problems presently faced by the human species call out for the 
identification of the idea of the polis with the planet as a whole: a truly global polis.3 
 
 Similarly Richard Beardsworth has argued that 'the material conditions of 
an integrated world capitalist economy create an array of global problems,' 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2. See Susan Strange, The Retreat of the State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976).; 
John Ruggie, Constructing the World Polity: Essays on International Institutionalisation (London: 
Routledge, 1998), 174-175,195-197.; R.B.J. Walker, Inside/Outside: International Relations as 
Political Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 183. Heikki Patomäki, After 
International Relations: Critical Realism and the (Re)Construction of World Politics (London: 
Routledge, 2002), 1. 
3. Mark A. Neufeld, The Restructuring of International Relations Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995), 11. 
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including '[m]igration, human trafficking, climate change mitigation and adaption, 
global macroeconomic and financial stability, global health regulation, regional 
resource-conflict,' all of which are political issues stemming from increasing 
dependence among states and between people; the resolution of which requires 
effective decision-making at the global level.4 These shared international, and 
often global, problems mean that, just as the thinkers of the Scottish and European 
Enlightenment stood towards a material actuality of the middle to end of the 
eighteenth century that required the invention of the polis at a level that could 
embed or transform the social consequences of capitalisation, the level of the 
nation-state, 'so we today have to re-invent the political at a level and in terms that 
will appropriate the planetarisation of these same relations'.5  
 
 Echoing such a view, Fred Dallmayr suggests that we presently sit at the 
twilight of the so-called Westphalian system, where the juncture of radical state 
autonomy and a state of true and increasing human interdependence, wrought by 
dynamics of globalisation, has given rise to 'two opposing tendencies: on one side, 
ambitions to subject globalisation to global sovereignty (a global Leviathan)' and, 
on the other, ambitions towards 'a democratic cosmopolis achieved through the 
subordination of sovereignty to global interdependence.'6 Painting a starker picture, 
this juncture is characterised by Barry Gills as a struggle between 'Cosmopolis' and 
'Empire,' suggesting that global politics is today embroiled in a 'clash of 
globalisations' between these two opposed approaches to world order, both 
struggling to define the character of globalisation, where the experience of the 
global community is drawing us to imagine a world characterised either by greater 
collective human responsibility or one that remains ensnared in the naked pursuit 
of power and wealth.7  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4. Richard Beardsworth, “Assessing Cosmopolitan Theory in World Politics,” e-International 
Relations, http://www.e-ir.info/2012/05/27/assessing-cosmopolitan-theory-in-world-politics/ 
(accessed 25/06/2012, 2012). 
5. Richard Beardsworth, “The Future of Critical Philosophy and World Politics,” Millennium-
Journal of International Studies 34, no. 1 (2005), 210, 212. 
6. Fred R. Dallmayr, Small Wonder: Global Power and Its Discontents (Oxford: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 2005), 55. 
7. Barry K. Gills, “Introduction,” in The Global Politics of Globalization: “Empire” Vs 
“Cosmopolis”, ed. Barry K. Gills (London: Routledge, 2007). 
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 In short, the modern political imaginary, where a person's primary fealty is 
to his state, and his interactions with others presupposes a political and cultural 
background that does not differ drastically from his own, is being profoundly 
unsettled. Yet this imaginary has had a remarkably profound influence, not only on 
the field of International Relations, but also on political theory. Although its 
precise influence is subject of debate, and despite being couched in broader 
historical dynamics such as the capitalisation of economic and social relations and 
divisions in Christianity, the Peace of Westphalia, comprised of the Treaty of 
Münster and the Treaty of Osnabrück, is commonly recognised as a landmark in 
the evolution of the European state and state system.8 The principles of state 
sovereignty and territorial integrity associated with it have had an enormous and 
lasting impact on human political and social relations, not least for the disciplining 
effect that it has had on political thought and practice. That this was to initiate 'the 
international problematic' of domestic order/international anarchy is well known, 
but it was also to have a lasting impact on the canon of political theory. Suggesting 
that the principle of state sovereignty embodies the formalisation of political space 
that has functioned as a spatio-temporal resolution of questions of political 
community, Rob Walker has argued that the emergence of modern political theory 
was coterminous with the emergence of the national, territorial state, both of which 
conspiring to produce a vision of politics that would be contained within the state.9 
 
 It is both necessary and profoundly challenging to at least partially extirpate 
ourselves from this modern political imaginary. The practice of state sovereignty 
and the system of sovereign states has embodied what Walker identifies as 'an 
historically specific articulation of the relationship between universality and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8. On the historical significance of '1648' see Benno Teschke, The Myth of 1648: Class, Geopolitics 
and the Making of Modern International Relations (London: Verso, 2003).; Daniel Philpott, 
Revolutions in Sovereignty: How Ideas Shaped Modern International Relations (Princeton.: 
Princeton University Press, 2001).; Heikki Patomäki, After International Relations: Critical 
Realism and the (Re)Construction of World Politics, 26-36.; R.B.J. Walker, Inside/Outside, 125-
40.; Beardsworth defines 'capitalisation' as: 'an economic process whereby increasing parts of 
nature and life are subordinated to the law of value: exchangeability and valorisation (the process, 
in turn, by which value is added to an object).' Richard Beardsworth, “The Future of Critical 
Philosophy and World Politics,” 208.; on the interaction between capital and state formation in the 
evolution of the European states system see: Charles Tilley, Coercion, Capital and Western States: 
Ad 990-1992 (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1992). 
9. See R.B.J. Walker, Inside/Outside., especially p63 
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particularity in space and time'.10 In simpler terms what is meant by this is that 
differences between human beings (religious, political, ethical, etc.), differences 
that have often led to violence or the forceful submission of one to another have for 
the past few hundred years been managed through a spatial resolution where they 
have essentially been treated as if they were the internal affairs of any given state. 
Such a resolution was historically specific because it was established as a way to 
resolve competing claims to fealty in Europe of the late middle ages, involving 
what Jens Bartelson has called a 'sublimation of otherness' whereby order grows 
out of disorder, harmony out of conflict, and identity out of difference.11 In 
summary then, the Westphalian system of sovereign states has essentially 
functioned as a way of escaping the problem of difference rather than confronting 
it, a strategy that Naeem Inayatullah and David Blaney refer to as the 'Westphalian 
deferral:' 
 
With the emergence of the states system, the differences constituting and complicating 
each state as a particular political community are kept separate and managed within the 
territorial boundaries of the state. This demarcation and policing of the boundary between 
the 'inside' and 'outside' of the political community defines the problem of difference 
principally as between and among states; difference is marked and contained as 
international difference. This construction of difference allows us to claim to 'solve' the 
problem by negotiating a modus vivendi among political communities.12  
 
 Given the material transformations discussed above, such a deferral is no 
longer as effective as it might once have been; this calls for a reassessment of the 
relationship between universality and particularity with a view to developing more 
universalist, less parochial, tendencies that may already be latent within the status 
quo in order that we may challenge the spatial resolution of the problem of 
difference, a modus vivendi that is gradually disintegrating under the force of 
contemporary material and ideational challenges. Standing as an obstacle to this, 
however, is that the overwhelming trajectory of thought since the eighteenth 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10. Ibid., 176. 
11. Jens. Bartelson, A Genealogy of Sovereignty (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 
24-28. 
12. Naeem Inayatullah and David L. Blaney, International Relations and the Problem of Difference 
(London: Routledge, 2004), 6-7. Inayatullah and Blaney discuss another prevalent strategy 
deployed in the response to difference, the temporal strategy, whereby difference would be 
mitigated as traditional societies modernise. 
INTRODUCTION/ Love, Ethics, and Emancipation 
6 
century has been geared towards recognising the radical particularity of ontological 
and epistemological interests.  
 
 Such a trajectory is demonstrated by Hartmut Behr in his recent Ontologies 
of the International, a study of the interplay of universal and particular interests 
embedded within the ontological and epistemological commitments that have 
underwritten various conceptions of 'the world' in generations of political thinkers 
from Western antiquity to the present.13 Behr demonstrates that there was a shift in 
thought in the eighteenth century, most prominently reflected in the thought of 
Georg W. F. Hegel, from universal and universalistic ontologies to particularist 
ontologies, and argues that this shift was instrumental in the emergence of 
nationalistic, particularist moralities that have since contributed to the loss of ethics 
in international political thought and international theory in the twentieth century.14 
 
 Echoing an argument made by Heikki Patomäki in After International 
Relations Behr makes the case that, as a consequence of the prominence of 
particularistic ontologies and epistemologies, a distinctive positivist methodology 
evolved throughout the nineteenth century, influencing international political 
theory to come.15 '[I]n contrast to traditional hermeneutic, interpretative, and 
speculative metaphysics,' this positivist methodology 'considered "external 
realities" and thus structures of inter-national politics in general, as objective and 
objectifiable, measurable, and quantifiable.'16 Disputing the myth of a perennial 
'realist' tradition then, Behr contends that it was this shift to particularist ontology, 
epistemology, and methodology that represents the legacies in which the 
establishment of IR as an academic discipline, especially its neo-realist 
mainstream, is embedded.17 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13. Hartmut Behr, A History of International Political Theory: Ontologies of the International 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010). 
14. Ibid., 2. 
15. Patomäki's argument, however, is that the modern study of 'International Relations' is a 
descendant of Hume's empiricist ontology/epistemology. See Heikki Patomäki, After International 
Relations: Critical Realism and the (Re)Construction of World Politics, 21-41. Hartmut Behr, A 
History of International Political Theory: Ontologies of the International, 2-3. 
16. Ibid. 
17. Ibid., 3. Realists often claim descent from Thucydides, but this claim has been challenged 
elsewhere. Cf. Nicholas J. Rengger, “Realism, Tragedy, and the Anti-Pelagian Imagination in 
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 Behr's persuasive conclusion is that, given the conditions of twenty-first-
century politics, the challenges and requirements for a contemporary theory of the 
international 'lie in the study of ontological and epistemological dynamics' with a 
view to providing a groundwork with which to overcome 'the cemented 
frameworks and aporias of particularism to establish renewed ontology(ies) and 
respective epistemologies for contemporary and future politics and ethics.'18 He 
then suggests that the guiding question for these attempts might be formulated as 
follows: 'how should we (re)create the transcendental principle/principles that 
recognize and socialize plurality and diversity while not expecting "the other" to 
assimilate and/or not violating "the other" through logo- and egocentric 
epistemologies?'19 The problem, as Behr concludes and we will demonstrate, is that 
there is both a lack of universalist, global ontologies, and reluctance among 
contemporary international theorists to engage in new ontologies. 
 
 
Our Problematic and Conceptual Remarks 
 
 This is the problematic to which we respond. Given the material 
transformations of human life on the planet, our increasingly international and 
global political condition, and in order that we might gradually extirpate ourselves 
from the aporias and contradictions of particularist thought that have been 
bequeathed to us by modern political and international theory, more universalistic 
trajectories of ontological inquiry are needed for contemporary politics and ethics.  
 
Ontology 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
International Political Thought,” in Realism Reconsidered: The Legacy of Hans Morgenthau in 
International Relations, ed. Michael C. Williams (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 134-
135n6.; Richard Ned Lebow, “Texts, Paradigms, and Political Change,” in Realism Reconsidered: 
The Legacy of Hans Morgenthau in International Relations, ed. Michael C. Williams (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2007). 
18. Hartmut Behr, A History of International Political Theory: Ontologies of the International, 246. 
19. Ibid. 
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 Ontology, from the Greek 'ὄντος' (being), present participle of the verb 
'εἰµί' (to be), and -λογία, (-logia) science, study, or theory, can be understood as a 
form of philosophical inquiry into existence: about what exists, and about the 
nature of existence, or, what it means to exist. Ontology can be deployed in 
different ways but in IR it has tended to mean something quite facile, usually 
interpreted simply as relating to what 'objects' are seen to exist in international 
relations, whether those objects are states (realists), individuals (liberals), social 
structures (Marxists), or 'intransitive objects' (critical realists). Besides the fact that 
talking about 'ontology in IR' already limits ourselves to one small corner of the 
empirical world, the elevation of some international phenomena over others to a 
level of foundational objectivity often tells us more about the political/theoretical 
commitments of the advocate than it does about the (empirical) world of 
international relations. Indeed, since it ignores or leaves implicit the question of the 
nature of the existence of those entities, what we consider to 'exist' in world 
politics is hardly an ontological question at all, but rather a mere matter of 
articulating our own (subjective) images of 'the world.'  
 
 As a branch of philosophical speculation, ontology only really begins after 
we realise that the question is not merely about 'what exists,' but is about the 
question of existence itself: when we start to question the nature of the existence of 
the entities (or phenomena) that we encounter in world politics, or, more 
pertinently, the nature of the entity (i.e., the human being) that encounters such 
entities (states, individuals, social structures) as 'objects.'20 We therefore take 
'ontology' to mean a philosophical analysis of, or investigation into, 'existence;' 
specifically, 'human existence,' and thus what it means 'to be' a human being. As a 
result, we will not be focussing on an ontology of 'things' in world politics, states, 
intransitive objects or causal powers, for instance - but an ontology of being: an 
inquiry into the nature of (human) existence rather than what exists. For reasons 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20. Torsten Michel has recently made this argument very forcefully in relation to the treatment of 
'ontology' by critical realists such as Alexander Wendt and Colin Wight. Torsten Michel, “In 
Heidegger’s Shadow: A Phenomenological Critique of Critical Realism,” Review of International 
Studies 38 (2012): 209-22. See also Torsten Michel, “Shrouded in Darkness: A Phenomenological 
Path Towards a New Social Ontology in International Relations” (Ph.D Thesis, St Andrews, 2008); 
Torsten Michel, “Pigs Can’t Fly, Or Can They? Ontology, Scientific Realism and the Metaphysics 
of Presence in International Relations,” Review of International Studies 35 (2009): 379-419. 
INTRODUCTION/ Love, Ethics, and Emancipation 
9 
that will become apparent, we are especially concerned with the concept of 
'freedom' associated with the nature of human existence, and therefore, what it 
means to be a free human being. It is on this understanding of ontology that we 
proceed, and it is in this sense that we interpret Behr's call for more universalistic 
ontological inquiry.  
 
 
Universality 
 
 At the time of revising this introduction, the plight of so-called 'boat people' 
seeking asylum in Australia, is, once again, in the news. There are a number 
reasons for this: two weeks ago the Australian parliament enacted tough new laws 
seeking to deter asylum seekers, often originating from war-torn countries such as 
Afghanistan, Iraq and others in the Middle East, the second season of the popular 
and award winning SBS documentary series Go Back to Where You Came From is 
currently being aired, and a search and rescue operation is presently underway for 
a boat carrying 150 asylum seekers, including women and children, which issued a 
distress signal a few days ago off the coast of Indonesia.21  
 
 These tough new measures, coming into effect in September 2012, involve 
the mandatory deportation of new asylum seekers arriving in Australia by boat to 
the Pacific atoll of Nauru or Papua New Guinea. Besides over 300 lives being lost 
on the same passage between Java (Indonesia) and Christmas Island (Australia) 
since December 2011, the cost to detain asylum seekers since 2000 - removing the 
costs for deterrence and anti-people smuggling activities - totalled over Aus$2bn.22 
During this period just over 18,000 people arrived by boat, which meant that 
Australian taxpayers spent around Aus$113,000 simply to detain each asylum 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21. Neil Hume, “Australia Searches for Missing Boat People,” Financial Times. Thursday 30th 
August 2012., http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/6a87bd78-f270-11e1-ac41-00144feabdc0.html 
(accessed 30th August, 2012). 
22. Ibid.; Bernard Keane, “Cost of Detention? $113,000 Per Asylum Seeker,” Crikey. 17th August, 
2012 http://www.crikey.com.au/2011/08/17/detention-centre-cost-of-asylum-seekers/ (accessed 
30th August, 2012). 
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seeker, on average, across the period.23 Not long after a popular Australian radio 
talk-show host, Bob Francis, was publicly censured for telling his radio audience 
'bugger the boat people, I say. As far as I'm concerned, I hope they bloody drown 
out there on their way over here [sic.],' an Australian Commonwealth minister was 
reported as saying that 'the only acceptable policy to my electorate would be for 
the Navy to sink asylum boats on sight.'24  
 
 Our ways of thinking about such issues are outdated, partly because the 
ways that we organise our political lives at a global scale are too. The Australian 
case is indicative of a broader contemporary malaise that runs deep and betrays 
some of the essential limitations of particularist thought. States are predicated on 
the violent exclusion of others, and a global system organised around national 
citizenship is simply not designed to deal with mass migrations of people. That 
governments spend vast amounts of money on harsh policies of detainment and 
deterrence is paradoxical, and such callous disregard for the lives of non-citizens 
betrays an abhorrent solipsism that is, sadly, not uncommon.25  
 
 Cosmopolitans will often respond to these sorts of issues by insisting that 
there are certain moral obligations owed to other human beings qua human beings, 
pointing to some shared human property or trait, such as rationality or 
vulnerability, in order to provide some neutral ground upon which shared 
principles of international coexistence might be established. 26  Alternatively 
cosmopolitans might insist that states should live up to their obligations and duties 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23. Ibid. 
24. Michael Owen, “Radio ‘King’ Slammed Over Boatpeople Tirade,” The Australian. June 8th , 
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/immigration/radio-king-slammed-over-
boatpeople-tirade/story-fn9hm1gu-1226388100400 (accessed 30th August 2012, 2012).; Allan 
Asher, “The Lies We Feed Ourselves to Paint Refugees as Villains,” The Punch. 27th August. 
2012, http://www.thepunch.com.au/articles/The-lies-we-feed-ourselves-to-paint-refugees-as-
villains/ (accessed 28th August, 2012). 
25. It the perception of difference that is key here, after all there are nearly 500,000 New 
Zealanders living and working in Australia, who need no visa to do so. 
26. Habermas's reformulation of the Kantian principle of universalisation is an example of a 
contemporary application of the principle of universal respect. He writes: 'A norm is valid when the 
foreseeable consequences and side effects of its general observance for the interests and value-
orientations of each individual could be jointly accepted by all concerned without coercion.' Jürgen 
Habermas, The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory (Cambridge, MA: The MIT 
Press, 1998), 42. 
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under international law, such as those to 'respect, protect, and fulfil' human rights.27 
Although echoing these sentiments, our universalism, our cosmopolitanism, 
pursues a different line of argument. We will not simply insist that people or states 
must live up to some preconceived subjectivity and act as if they were good moral 
or legal subjects, nor will we be relying on the evocation of a common human 
community, as if we already faced such a collective singularity, 'mankind' as 
such.28  
 
 Our approach to universality is of a different kind; it is not one of moral 
principles, but of ethical outlook. In essence we are offering a non-foundational 
cosmopolitanism; reflecting the understanding of 'ontology' discussed above, our 
cosmopolitanism amounts to questioning 'what does such an incident tell us about 
the nature of the being of those entities that encounter refugees as others to be 
excluded or detained?' Does their prerogative to do so as citizens and agents of a 
sovereign state amount to an exercise of their freedom as human beings, or simply 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27. By virtue of their membership, states are bound under the United Nations charter to respect 
human rights, and through their ratification of successive human rights treaties they assume further 
obligations as principal duty-bearers to protect such rights. See 
http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/preamble.shtml 
28. This common cosmopolitan supposition of a foundational 'human' subjectivity or collective 
singularity ('humanity as such') is misguided for three reasons. Firstly, a pre-established 
foundational subjectivity is controversial and contestable. Such a controversy is documented in a 
recent special issue of International Politics on ethics and world politics, where the central point of 
divergence between contributors to this special issue was the problem of referring to a human 'we.' 
While Smith, Linklater and Erskine explore the possibility of extending ethical frameworks so that 
suffering in world politics might be mitigated, 'Elden, Zehfuss, Hutchings and Vaughan-Williams 
inveigh that ethical frameworks produce the world they seek to reform.' James Brasset and Dan 
Bulley, “Ethics in World Politics: Cosmopolitanism and Beyond?,” International Politics 44 
(2007), 14-15. This 'we' problem derives from the problematic supposition that subjectivity is in 
some sense foundational or primordial: that it can be drawn upon to justify the extension of ethical 
frameworks rather than being produced by those frameworks themselves. Secondly, such a 
supposition runs into difficulties when it comes to the character of our encounter the ‘other’: 
whether the other is encountered simply as a mirror image of ourselves, or whether they are 
recognised as truly independent and singular beings. This is a point regularly made by so-called 
'poststructuralist' approaches to politics and ethics. For examples, see D. Campbell, and M.J. 
Shapiro, eds. Moral Spaces: Rethinking Ethics and World Politics (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1999).; Thirdly, responding to his discourse theory of morality, Benhabib rightly 
objects to Habermas’s evocation of a common humanity by arguing that 'a collectivity is not 
constituted theoretically, but is formed out of the moral and political struggles of fighting actors.' 
Consequently, a common humanity is something that is constructed in an ongoing process, and the 
deployment of the language of an anonymous species subject, 'humanity,' 'preempts the experience 
of moral and political activity as a consequence of which a genuine "we" can emerge.' Seyla 
Benhabib, Critique, Norm, and Utopia: A Study of the Foundations of Critical Theory (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1986), 331. See also Seyla Benhabib, “The Utopian Dimension in 
Communicative Ethics,” New German Critique 35 (1985), 95-96. 
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as political subjects? Does an ethical relation to non-citizens consist in the non-
contravention of cosmopolitan norms?  
 
 
Love, Ethics, and Emancipation: An Overview of Our 
Argument 
 
The Nature of the Complaint:  
The 'Ontological' Foundations of Normative International Theory 
 
 Ontological assumptions and commitments underwrite our understandings 
of 'the world' and what it consists of, and serve as the (often unacknowledged) 
premises of our political and ethical thought; yet normative international theory has 
either tended to be too shallow or conservative with its 'ontological' foundations, or 
else it has mis-recognised the partisanship upon which it is based - claims that we 
illustrate in Part I with reference to Mervyn Frost, John Rawls, and Andrew 
Linklater.  
 
 
Rawls and Frost 
 
 Keen to avoid contestable meta-theoretical commitments and recognise the 
particularity of their own ethical claims, we will see that Rawls' and Frost's 
respective foundational ethical commitments to the basic structures of a 
constitutional democracy and the system of sovereign states lend credence to 
Walker's claim that modern political theory has tended to produce visions of 
politics that remain essentially caught within the embrace of the nation-state and to 
Behr's claim that there has been a reluctance amongst political and international 
theorises to engage in more universalistic forms of ontological inquiry.  
 
 By circumscribing their approaches to world politics and ethics in this way, 
both Rawls and Frost shy away from interrogating the ontological nature of their 
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foundational commitments; commitments that reflect a shallow interpretation of 
the nature of 'ontological foundations' simply as the existence of 'objects' 
presupposed as the conditions of any ethical theory, rather than as the nature of the 
existence of that entity that encounters such foundations as objects. The upshot is 
that neither can pose much of a challenge to the violent and questionable practices 
associated with the continued existence of the system of sovereign states, nor can 
they contribute to an overcoming of the international problematic, outlined above.  
 
 
Left-Hegelian Thought 
 
 In response to Frost we explicitly situate ourselves within a left-Hegelian 
tradition of thought. From a Hegelian point of view, it is simply not sufficient for 
us to encounter such ethical foundations as 'objective,' since for Hegel what it 
means 'to be' is to be free: it is the self-actualisation of freedom in the world that 
serves as the ontological foundation (in the fuller sense of the term) of human 
existence, and this allows us to criticise practices and institutions that fail to live up 
to this normative ideal. It is this foundational commitment to human freedom that 
underwrites the left-Hegelian tradition of thought, from Marx all the way down to 
contemporary critical theory and critical international relations theory (CIRT). 
 
 Defending the view that the future of critical theory lies in CIRT, we learn 
that CIRT has developed along two paths since first making inroads into IR in the 
early 1980s: a historical/sociological path, inaugurated by Robert W. Cox, that 
highlights different futures for international politics, and a philosophical/normative 
path, inaugurated by Richard K. Ashley, that uses freedom as a critical standard 
with which to criticise the theory and practice of world politics and to indicate 
ways forward. We see that the most comprehensive and compelling advocate of 
CIRT, Andrew Linklater, has developed a 'twin-track' approach that is reflected in 
his insistence of the necessarily 'tripartite structure' of critical theory, where any 
critical theory is seen to remain incomplete unless it contains 
philosophical/normative, sociological, and praxeological elements.  
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Andrew Linklater's Critical Approach to International Relations Theory 
 
 Not content to remain caught within the solipsistic particularism that 
characterises much modern political and international thought, Linklater confronts 
the international problematic head-on with a self-consciously universalistic 
argument that aspires to be sensitive to particularity. Far from taking modern 
institutions such as the system of sovereign states as 'objective' ethical foundations, 
Linklater adopts a broad and historically, sociologically, and philosophically 
informed vantage on contemporary international institutions and practices; one that 
is explicitly concerned with ongoing transformations of the Westphalian system 
and with possibilities for emancipatory political change latent within it. For these 
reasons, and more besides, we maintain that Linklater offers a far more promising 
approach to theorising contemporary world politics than do Rawls and Frost. 
 
 However, we later find Linklater's emancipatory cosmopolitanism, the 
philosophical defence of his CIRT and the justification of his subsequent 
sociological and praxeological analyses, to be predicated on the existence of an 
ethical subject: an interpretation of the being of human beings that serves as a 
foundational ethical commitment: a (subjective) interpretation of the being of 
human beings that is treated as if it were a general ontology of being. 
 
 Largely a consequence of his reliance on Kant, Marx, and Habermas, this 
commitment is reflected in Linklater’s conception of emancipation, which is 
presented as a process of the historical self-actualisation of the ethical subject, and 
in his defence of universalism against Richard Rorty's anti-foundationalism, which 
amounts to the projection of ethical subjectivity on 'the other' and on other others. 
Our contention is that this involves Linklater submitting to a form of metaphysical 
dualism based upon a foundational subject-object split, where individual human 
beings are simultaneously treated as (ethical) subjects and (mind-independent 
cognitive) objects. This dualism is metaphysical because ethical subjectivity is 
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treated as if it were the essential nature of human beings qua human beings, 
applying to human beings 'as such' and to human beings as a whole.  
 
 There are two essential components to Linklater's dualism: an ontological 
dualism and an epistemological dualism.29 He commits himself to an ontological 
dualism by virtue of his treatment of ethical subjectivity as the essential being of 
human beings (whose objects are universal principles), and to an epistemological 
dualism because the human being (conceived as ethical subject) is treated as if it 
were as a mind-independent cognitive object that is known by the epistemic 
subject (i.e., Andrew Linklater). This mind-independent object (the ethical subject) 
is what serves as the 'ontological' foundation of Linklater's universalist normative 
claims. 'Ontological' is placed in scare quotes to indicate that we do not consider 
such a foundation to be ontological in the full sense of the term; this is because, 
despite his left-Hegelian commitment to human freedom, by thinking this freedom 
as the freedom of the ethical subject Linklater falls back onto a foundational 
ontology of 'things,' since the ethical subject is the object presupposed by his 
emancipatory cosmopolitanism. 
 
 In light of this objection to Linklater’s critical theory we make the broader 
claim that, although critical theory professes a high degree of reflexivity regarding 
the relation between subject and object, this concern is limited to the role of 
knowledge in the recreation of reality and in the emancipatory purposes of theory, 
rather than with any possible implications of any foundational commitments to 
subjectivity or objectivity; since these implications concern our mode of being in 
the world, they are referred to as 'ontological implications.' This omission, we 
argue, leads to what we call a 'politics of subjectivity': ethico-political practices 
that are ultimately incompatible with a commitment to an ethical and emancipatory 
politics.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29. Following Heidegger, we understand metaphysics as a speculative activity that goes beyond 
that which is immediately accessible to human beings, seeking to grasp the essence of entities (such 
as human beings) in order that general claims may be made about them. Martin Heidegger, The 
Essence of Human Freedom: An Introduction to Philosophy (London: Continuum, 2002), 106. 
Although such a brief definition is inadequate, we request the reader's patience until Chapter 4 
when a more thorough explanation will be given. 
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A Non-Dualist Approach to the Human Being: the Meta-Theoretical 
Condition of an Emancipatory Cosmopolitanism 
 
 By the end of Part 1 we demonstrate that Linklater's emancipatory 
cosmopolitanism, the philosophical defence of his approach to CIRT, is riven by 
an internal contradiction, and may ultimately fail by its own standards. We 
therefore find the most potent defence of a universalistic, ethical and emancipatory 
approach to contemporary world politics to be hamstrung by a foundational 
commitment to ethical subjectivity. The deeper problem indicated by this 
commitment, we suggest, is both a shallow (and insufficiently universalistic) 
philosophical ontology of the human being and a thin conception of human 
freedom, where freedom is conceived simply as the freedom of the human being 
qua ethical subject. We conclude Part 1 by arguing that a non-dualist approach to 
the human being is the meta-theoretical condition of an ethical and emancipatory 
politics.  
 
 
Research Question 
 
 Our contention is that Heidegger and Hegel present two potent defences of 
a non-dualist approach to the relation between self and world. Since both proceed 
from non-dualist premises, both reject any foundational commitments to 
subjectivity or objectivity, which they consider to contribute to an alienation of self 
from world, and as serving to 'un-live' human existence. Consonant with our earlier 
identification with the left-Hegelian tradition of thought, both Heidegger and Hegel 
are motivated by foundational ontological commitments (in the fuller sense of the 
term) to human freedom and, in contrast to Linklater's rationalist cosmopolitanism 
where the relationship between self and world is ultimately mediated by moral 
reason, both Heidegger and Hegel (respectively) are concerned with developing 
pre- and post-theoretical, phenomenological, relations to reality, and their 
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arguments in this regard help us to develop an alternative, praxeological 
emancipatory cosmopolitanism. We thus proceed into Parts 2 and 3 with the 
research question: 
 
What are the implications of conceptions of human existence and freedom in 
Heidegger and Hegel for critical international theory? 
 
 
Part 2: Worlds and World Politics 
 
 As we proceed, our two principal concerns in Part 2 are to deepen the 
ontological foundations (in the fuller sense of the term) of CIRT and to begin our 
task of developing a fuller understanding of human freedom upon which an 
alternative emancipatory cosmopolitanism might be based. To this end, Chapter 4 
engages with Heidegger's Being and Time, where we discuss Heidegger's 
existential analytic of human existence. This offers us a firmer (more 
universalistic) ontological ground from which to proceed, and we defend the claim 
that any attempt to contribute to a more universalistic ontological inquiry for 
contemporary politics and ethics must proceed from a recognition of the 
ontological difference between entities and the being of entities. Such recognition 
would involve resisting the (characteristically dualist) temptation to regard our 
own interpretation of the being of beings as the only interpretation, and thus 
forgoing an approach to politics and ethics that is predicated on some universal 
foundation (such as ethical subjectivity). The upshot is that emancipation cannot be 
grounded on the self-actualisation of the ethical subject, as it is by Linklater, but 
must be premised on what Heidegger calls 'resolute solicitous being-with,' which is 
to be characterised by a de-centred receptivity to the existence of others.  
 
 After offering an alternative account of the individual as a world-relating 
creature rather than ethical subject, Chapter 5 explores Heidegger's account of 
freedom in greater depth. We establish that, before it is associated with any form of 
subjectivity (ethical subjectivity, or the political subjectivity associated with 
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citizenship, for instance) freedom must be recognised as the condition of any 
interpretation of the being of beings; as the 'ground' of the ontological difference.30 
In short, this amounts to repositioning freedom so that freedom is no longer 
principally seen as the property of a subject but is recognised as the existential 
condition of world-disclosure. It is for this reason that Linklater's projection of 
ethical subjectivity (an interpretation of the being of human beings) as a general 
ontology of human being involves the abrogation of a central aspect of human 
freedom. 
 
 We start exploring the ethical and political implications of our position 
towards the end of Chapter 5, where we resound calls from the likes of Jean-Luc 
Nancy and Jacques Derrida for a 'politics of singularity;' this, we suggest, should 
displace the politics of subjectivity that we argued in Part I characterises 
Linklater's emancipatory cosmopolitanism. The reason for this, which will become 
clearer in Chapter 5, is that the recognition of the ontological difference heralds a 
fundamental discontinuity between ethics and politics: while politics is the process 
of projecting and contesting interpretations of the being of beings as a whole, 
ethics concerns a relation to the other as singularity (rather than as foundational 
subject). For this reason we argue that, by predicating his emancipatory 
cosmopolitanism on an interpretation of the being of human beings as ethical 
subjects, Linklater mistakenly treats his politics as an ethics.  
 
 
Part 3: Life, Love, and Emancipation 
 
 Developing Heidegger's account of resolute solicitous being-with through 
Hegel's account of inter-human recognition, the aim of Part 3 is to develop a more 
universalistic approach to contemporary politics by outlining the contours of an 
ethical and emancipatory politics of love and praxis. Our rationale for turning to 
Hegel is fourfold. One of the conclusions to Part 2 is that a central weakness of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30. For Heidegger freedom is the ‘Abgrund’ (groundless ground / abyss) upon which the 
ontological difference rests. ‘Ground’ is therefore placed in inverted commas here as it is an 
inaccurate translation of ‘Abgrund’. This terminology will be explained in Chapters 4&5. 
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Heidegger's lies in his failure to explore for the interpersonal aspects of freedom 
and individuality, a mistake he might have avoided had he been a better student of 
Hegel; secondly, the discontinuity between politics and ethics heralded by 
Heidegger's fundamental ontology is already there in Hegel's distinction between 
Sittlichkeit (ethical life) and Moralität (ethical/moral reason), and Hegel gives a far 
more adequate account of ethics than does Heidegger; thirdly, the 
phenomenological impulse, an attempt to develop a non-theoretical relation to 
reality, although foregrounded by Heidegger, is already there in Hegel (this has 
unfortunately been obscured by more rationalist interpretations of Hegel); and 
finally, Hegel offers us a phenomenological approach to epistemology that is more 
persuasive than the renewed emphasis on the nature and function of language in 
post-Husserlian phenomenology, and this provides us with the epistemological 
defence of our emancipatory cosmopolitanism.  
 
 We initiate Part 3 with a discussion of the subject-object relation from Kant 
to Hegel in Chapter 6, where we explore the nature of Hegel's completion of Kant's 
critical philosophy and his argument that (ethical or epistemological) subjectivity 
is essentially an ongoing social and historical achievement.31 As a result, the 
achievement of self-conscious 'subjectivity,' which differs in very significant 
respects from Kantian subjectivity, involves recognising that the subject-object 
split is not foundational but derivative, and that subject-object dualism is 
ultimately overcome through a post-theoretical relationship to reality: a relation 
between self and not-self (world) that Hegel discusses with relation to the 
experience of 'love.' Such a relation amounts to overcoming object-oriented forms 
of consciousness and recognising that the self is fundamentally exposed to the 
existence of others, i.e., realising that we are not essentially Kantian/Fichtean 
subjects. We then argue that mis-recognising the nature of Hegel's self-conscious 
'subjectivity' as a Kantian form of subjectivity (as do Habermas, Linklater, and 
Honneth) leads to deleterious implications for our mode of being in the world, 
‘ontological’ implications that include diremption, reification, and de-reification. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31. Although Linklater also regards subjectivity as a social and historical achievement, by taking an 
essentially Kantian approach to ethics he departs from Hegel in significant ways. The nature and 
significance of this divergence will become apparent in Chapter 6. 
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These are all consequences of conceiving the self as a subject standing in a 
transcendent and assimilatory relation to the objects of its experience: objects that 
include other persons.  
 
 Further exploring the nature of self-conscious 'subjectivity,' in Chapter 7 
we engage with Hegel's account of the master and slave. Based on the experience 
of love, this provides a model of the re-cognitive structure of self-consciousness 
and, as a consequence of this re-cognitive structure, the character of our own 
individuality is radically dependent on the nature of our relations with others. 
Consequently, the achievement of self-conscious 'subjectivity,' the attainment of a 
mature personality, requires that we recognise the 'interruptive condition of 
subjectivity:' that we are bound together with others in a 'community of fate.' This 
leads us to a characteristically Hegelian approach to human freedom: a form of 
freedom as an entirely immanent form of transcendence that follows from the 
concrete of between persons participating in the dynamic of ethical life. Following 
Nancy, we refer to this freedom as 'the crossing of love.'  
 
 Our last chapter, Chapter 8, picks up on this latter point, honing in on the 
ethical aspect of our argument through a discussion of the distinction drawn by 
Hegel between ethical life (Sittlichkeit) and moral reason (Moralität), and the 
nature of the relation between these two approaches to society. Ethical life 
(Sittlichkeit), we discover, operates according to an 'ethical logic of love,' while 
moral reason (Moralität) proceeds according to general laws given through the 
exercise of practical reason and is associated with a Kantian approach to ethics. 
Learning that ethical society requires the recognition of the mutual dependency of 
both perspectives, we demonstrate that, as a result of their foundational 
commitments to ethical subjectivity, both Habermas and Linklater mistreat the 
notion of ethical life (Sittlichkeit) by asserting the dominance of moral reason over 
ethical life. Attempting to rebalance this bias we conclude by advocating the 
importance of ethical life and engaged conscientious activity for an ethical and 
emancipatory politics. 
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Conclusions: Love, Ethics, and Emancipation 
 
 In light of our argument that a genuinely ethical relation to the other would 
involve resisting the (characteristically dualist) tendency to project an 
interpretation of the being of human beings onto others and engaging with others 
as others (as unique singularities rather than as ethical subjects) and having learnt 
that there are two aspects of human freedom obscured by Linklater's emancipatory 
cosmopolitanism - freedom as the existential condition of any interpretation of the 
being of human beings (as ethical subjects, for instance) and freedom as 'the 
crossing of love,' where any given subjectivity is transcended through interactions 
with others - we conclude that, in order to reflect the fact that human beings are 
neither foundational ethical subjects, nor mind-independent cognitive objects, a 
more universalistic approach to contemporary (global) politics and ethics must be 
predicated on non-dualist meta-theoretical commitments.  
 
 Having demonstrated the inadequacies of Linklater's philosophical defence 
of CIRT, which depends on a conception of emancipation as the historical self-
actualisation of the ethical subject and an ethical universalism that is predicated on 
the universal projection of ethical subjectivity - both of which betray dualist meta-
theoretical premises - we suggest that a more universalistic philosophical defence 
of CIRT, an alternative emancipatory cosmopolitanism, might instead be 
predicated on what it means 'to be' a free human being. Following Heidegger and 
Hegel, this would involve foregrounding resolute solicitous being-with and the 
ethical and emancipatory aspects our participation in the dynamic of ethical life; 
from a global perspective, we argue that this would involve the cultivation of a 
nascent international ethical life.  
 
 Recalling Linklater's insistence that any critical theory must include 
philosophical/normative, sociological, and praxeological aspects, we conclude that 
Linklater's reliance on Habermas's normative ideal of a universal discourse 
community as an evaluative tool for critical social theory is no longer sufficient, as 
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it rests on a limited conception of freedom that equates freedom with the exercise 
of ethical subjectivity, and is ethically deficient since ethical recognition is 
extended to human beings qua ethical subjects. Instead, we argue that a fully 
ethical and emancipatory approach to contemporary (global) politics and ethics 
would involve self-consciously identifying with others beyond our immediate 
circles of concern, taking their interests as not wholly distinct from our own, and 
acting accordingly. To this end, displacing Linklater/Habermas's normative ideal of 
universal communication, we outline ways in which love can be deployed as an 
evaluative tool for critical social theory; how it can be deployed as a non-dualist 
normative standard with which to indict forms of ethical habituation (institutions 
and practices) that generate and sustain forms of indifference towards others.  
 
 Although affirming the praxeological aspects of Linklater's argument in his 
The Transformation of Political Community, where he argues that states are 
obliged to contribute to the development of forms of community beyond the state 
and create new forms of citizenship, we suggest a second practical application of 
our argument by proffering love as a guide for ethical and emancipatory praxis. 
Not dissimilar to the notion of cosmopolitan citizenship advocated by Linklater 
and others, this amounts to a form of cosmopolitan solidarity where the existence 
of others (where others are not confined to compatriots or fellow believers) comes 
to be seen as part of a deeper fabric of our own self-understandings, and whose 
interests are then taken as not wholly distinct from our own. In contrast to 
Linklater, whose praxeological arguments are directed primarily towards states and 
their agents, the praxeological aspect of our emancipatory cosmopolitanism is 
explicitly geared towards individuals and locates the emancipatory project in the 
experiences of individual human beings themselves (in the real lives of Bob 
Francis's audience, or the Commonwealth minister's constituents), rather than in 
civilising processes taking place above them.32  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32. On this point we follow Shannon Brincat. Shannon Brincat, “Towards an Emancipatory 
Cosmopolitanism: Reconstructing the Concept of Emancipation in Critical International Relations 
Theory” (Ph.D Thesis, University of Queensland, 2011), 312,314-315. 
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 In brief then, our aim is to effect an 'overcoming' of Linklater's essentially 
rationalist cosmopolitanism with a praxeological cosmopolitanism. 33  While 
Linklater relies on a conception of the human being as ethical subject as a mind-
independent foundation for his emancipatory cosmopolitanism, we argue that such 
a dualism is an inappropriate basis for an emancipatory cosmopolitanism. It is 
worth making it clear at the outset that, despite our ardent criticisms of his 
emancipatory cosmopolitanism, we are not rejecting Linklater's approach to CIRT. 
Ours are not opposing viewpoints. Rather, we are attempting to establish CIRT on 
a firmer meta-theoretical foundation; essentially, on what it means to be a free 
human being. This is our original contribution to a critical approach to 
international theory; one that, we hope, can provide us with a more universalistic 
approach to contemporary (global) politics and ethics than one based on a 
foundational commitment to an interpretation of the being of human beings as 
ethical subjects.  
 
 
Aim, Scope and Limitations 
 
 Our discussion is a meta-theoretical response to ethical and emancipatory 
approaches to IR - one that seeks to provide a sounder basis for an emancipatory 
cosmopolitan politics than Linklater's. Our focus lies on the ontological aspects of 
ethical and political theory, yet our project is necessarily limited in its scope. We 
do not engage in a thorough overview of the tradition of critical international 
thought, this has already been provided by Rengger and Thirkell-White.34 Neither 
do we engage in an overview of the diverse range of approaches to cosmopolitan 
thought, a task that has been engaged by many other scholars, most recently 
Richard Beardsworth.35  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33. Our use of the verb 'overcoming' will be explained shortly. 
34. See Nicholas J. Rengger, and Ben Thirkell-White., ed. Critical International Relations Theory 
After 25 Years (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
35. Richard Beardsworth, Cosmopolitanism and International Relations Theory (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 2011). 
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Furthermore, although our cosmopolitanism is practically relevant, we shall 
not be concerned with demonstrating this relevance beyond the arguements offered 
in the concluding chapter. There is already a wealth of literature dealing with 
concrete proposals for cosmopolitan reform in world politics, and many critical 
theoretical approaches to world politics have already demonstrated the practical 
relevance of this position; CIRT already has a well-established empirical research 
agena that this thesis does not immediately contribute to.36 On the latter point see 
Booth, Krause and Williams's influential calls for the restructuring of security 
studies, Cox's arguments in international political economy for the examination of 
world order and global hegemony, or indeed any application of constructivism, 
which is (not unproblematically) considered by Price and Reus-Smit as 'the applied 
wing' critical theory.37 In summary, as Linklater notes, 'even a brief analysis of the 
evolution of the empirical research agenda over the past fifteen years reveals that 
contemporary critical theorists have no reason to apologise to the allegedly more 
empirically minded for any failure to deliver concrete analysis.'38  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36. On cosmopolitan proposals for reform see David Held's arguments for the reform of the 
Security Council, the creation of a second chamber in the UN, the enhancement of political 
regionalisation, the use of trans-national referenda, the creation of a new human rights court, the 
foundation of a new co-ordinating economic agency at regional and global levels, and the 
establishment of an effective, accountable, international military force. In the longer term Held 
suggests such reforms should include the entrenchment of cosmopolitan democratic law in a new 
Charter of Rights, a new Global Parliament, and an interconnected global legal system. Daniele 
Archibugi, and David Held, eds. Cosmopolitan Democracy: An Agenda for a New World Order 
(Cambridge: Polity, 1995); David Held, Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State 
to Cosmopolitan Governance (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995); David Held, “Cosmopolitan 
Democracy and the Global Order: A New Agenda,” in Perpetual Peace: Essays on Kant’s 
Cosmopolitan Ideal, ed. James Bohman and Mattias Lutz-Bachmann (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 
1997). 
37. Ken Booth, “Security and Emancipation,” Review of International Studies 17, no. 4 (1991): 
313-26; Ken Booth, “Security in Anarchy: Utopian Realism in Theory and Practice,” International 
Affairs 63, no. 3 (1991): 527-45; Ken Booth, Theory of World Security (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007). Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams, eds. Critical Security Studies: 
Concepts and Cases (London: UCL Press, 1997). Robert W. Cox, “Social Forces, States and World 
Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies 10, 
no. 2 (1981): 126-55; Robert W. Cox, Production, Power, and World Order: Social Forces in the 
Making of History, vol. 1 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987); Robert W. Cox, 
Approaches to World Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Robert W. Cox, 
“Civil Society At the Turn of the Millennium: Prospects for an Alternative World Order,” Review of 
International Studies 25, no. 1 (1999): 3-28; Richard Price and Christian Reus-Smit, “Dangerous 
Liaisons? Critical International Theory and Constructivism,” European Journal of International 
Relations 4, no. 3 (1998), 264. 
38. Andrew Linklater, “The Changing Contours of Critical International Relations Theory,” in 
Critical Theory and World Politics, ed. Richard Wyn-Jones (Boulder: Lynne Reiner, 2001), 31-32. 
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A Note on Methodology 
 
Sometimes it is hard to know where politics ends and metaphysics begins: when, that is, 
the stakes of a political dispute concern not simply a clash of competing ideas and values 
but a clash about what is real and what is not, what can be said to exist on its own and 
what owes its existence to an other.39  
 
Our argument is an exercise in international meta-theory, an exercise that involves 
responding to the question as to what it is that makes good theory.40 Here we 
respond to the more specific question: what it is that makes good critical theory. It 
is perhaps Horkheimer who provides the sternest defence of a meta-theoretical 
approach to theory when he notes that, although there may be periods when one 
can get alone without meta-theory, 'its lack denigrates people and renders them 
helpless against force.'41  
 
 Horkheimer also supplies what may be the most appropriate response to 
those that would question the practical relevance of meta-theory in his insistence 
that: 'today the whole historical dynamic has placed philosophy at the centre of 
social actuality, and social actuality at the centre of philosophy' and that we should 
therefore regard any hostility directed towards meta-theory as 'really directed 
against the transformative activity associated with critical thinking.'42 Living up to 
the promise of the critical study of world politics requires we recognise 
Horkheimer's statements hold true for International Relations, just as much as any 
other discipline, and perhaps more than most.43  
 
 Our methodology is one of immanent critique, a method that is central to the 
work of Hegel, and is later advocated by members of the Frankfurt School, such as 
Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno. This immanent methodology 'starts with 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39.  J.M. Bernstein, “The Very Angry Tea Party,” New York Times. 13th June. (2010). 
40. 'International meta-theory ... seeks an answer to the question: "what constitutes good theory 
with regard to world politics?"' Mark A. Neufeld, The Restructuring of International Relations 
Theory, 2. 
41. Cited by Ibid., 1. 
42. Cited by Ibid. 
43. Mark A. Neufeld, “What’s Critical About Critical International Relations Theory?,” in Critical 
Theory in World Politics, ed. Richard Wyn Jones (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001), 144. 
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the conceptual principles and standards of an object, and unfolds their implications 
and consequences. Then it re-examines and reassesses the object [...] in light of 
these implications and consequences. Critique proceeds, so to speak, 'from 
within.'44 CIRT is explicitly committed to a high degree of reflectivity about the 
relationship between subject and object, to the process of human emancipation, and 
to the justification of its position according to universalist and universalistic 
ontologies; these are the standards in light of which our immanent critique assesses 
CIRT. Our mode of reception is closer to Walter Benjamin's 'redemptive 
hermeneutic' than it is to an Adornian 'absolute negation,' in that our aim is to 
redeem and retain what we consider to be most valuable in Linklater's approach.45  
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44. Adorno and Horkheimer, quoted in Mark A. Neufeld, The Restructuring of International 
Relations Theory, 5. 
45. Mark A. Neufeld, “What’s Critical About Critical International Relations Theory?”, 128-29. 
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Part 1.  
International Theory  
 Chapter 1.  
'Ontological' Foundations in Contemporary 
Approaches to International Thought 
 
 
 
 
Introduction. 
 
 In light of our aim to contribute to the development of more universalistic 
trajectories of ontological inquiry necessary for contemporary (global) politics and 
ethics, this chapter is primarily concerned with the role that ontology and 
'ontological' foundations have played in international theory. To this end, we 
survey influential contemporary 'normative,' meta-theoretical, and 'critical' 
approaches to international theory. Maintaining that no theory is possible without 
ontological and epistemological (meta-theoretical) assumptions and commitments, 
and recalling our explanation that 'ontology' is a form of philosophical inquiry into 
what exists and the nature of existence, our central claim is that the dominant 
voices in each of the approaches that we survey rely on a shallow ontology of 
'things,' rather than an ontology of being, as their ontological foundation. 
 
 Lending support to both Behr's claim that the overwhelming trajectory of 
thought since the eighteenth century has been geared towards the recognition of the 
particularity of ontological interests, and Walker's claim that modern political 
theory has overwhelmingly produced visions of politics and ethics that remain 
framed by the sovereign state, we shall see that normative international theorists 
such as Rawls and Frost attempt to sidestep important philosophical (ontological 
and epistemological) questions by taking dominant practices and institutions 
associated with the sovereign state as foundational ethical commitments. However, 
despite their best attempts, philosophical questions invariably arise due to their 
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treatment of such ethical foundations as the 'objects' presupposed as the conditions 
of their normative claims. 
 
 This leads us to a brief discussion of Hegel, for whom institutions such as the 
state do not in themselves have an 'objective' existence, as their objectivity is 
conditional upon the nature of the being of the being that encounters such entities 
as 'objects.' Put differently, for Hegel the 'objectivity' of dominant practices and 
institutions remains dependent upon the extent to which such institutions 
contribute to the freedom of the human being: to the self-actualisation of freedom 
in the world. We suggest that such a foundational ontological commitment (in the 
fuller sense of the term) might represent a more universalistic ontological 
foundation for contemporary (global) politics and ethics.  
 
 However, mainly due to the prominence and ascendency of critical realism in 
contemporary international theory, attempts to bring ontological reflection into IR 
have overwhelmingly been confused and facile. This is largely the consequence of 
a questionable philosophical commitment to a mind-world dualism, which permits 
Wendt and critical realists to separate epistemology from ontology and to prioritise 
ontological questions; these commitments have led to an overvaluation of the role 
of scientific inquiry in world politics and a marginalisation of alternative 
'philosophical ontologies' from debates in international theory. Fortunately 
however, the dualist commitments underwriting these approaches to international 
meta-theory have recently been subjected to persuasive challenges from Patrick 
Thaddeus Jackson and Torsten Michel; the latter pointing to Heidegger's 
distinction between entities and the being of entities and arguing that proper 
ontology concerns the latter.  
 
 In light of this survey, we return to a discussion of left-Hegelian thought, 
which is represented by 'critical' approaches to international theory. By refusing to 
encounter (currently) dominant practices and institutions in world politics as 
'objects,' these approaches overcome the weakness of Rawls and Frost's approaches 
to normative international theory. Nonetheless, we suggest that the most persuasive 
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advocate of a critical approach to international theory, Andrew Linklater, might not 
overcome the weakness common to the normative theorists and the critical realists; 
that is, to rely on a shallow ontology of 'things' rather than an ontology of being. 
The 'thing' presupposed by Linklater's CIRT is the ethical subject, which is treated 
as if it were a mind-independent object and serves as the 'ontological' foundation 
(in the shallow sense of the term) of his critical approach to international theory, 
claims that we corroborate in Chapter 2.  
 
 We conclude Chapter 1 by affirming Michel's suggestion that deeper 
reflection regarding notions of subjectivity and objectivity is called for in 
international theory. However, while Michel has shown us that Heidegger can lead 
us to a deeper ontological appreciation of subjectivity and objectivity, since he is 
apparently uninterested in the problem of knowledge, he can only get us so far. We 
therefore conclude by outlining Hegel's phenomenological constructivist approach 
to epistemology: a more fruitful phenomenological approach to knowledge than 
that can be found in post-Husserlian phenomenology and the approach to 
knowledge according to which our argument proceeds.  
 
'Ontological' Foundations in Normative (International) 
Political Theory  
 
 As Habermas explains, ontological assumptions and commitments serve as 
the (often unacknowledged) premises of our political and ethical thought: 
 
Ontological commitments, whether philosophical or scientific, logically precede 
substantive claims, and serve as the often-unacknowledged basis on which empirical 
claims are founded. In this sense, ontological commitments are 'foundational'--not in the 
sense that they provide unshakable grounds that universally guarantee the validity of 
claims that are founded on them, but 'foundational' in the sense that they provide the 
conditions of intelligibility for those claims. In that way, ontological commitments are 
world-disclosing, since they make a particular kind of tangible world available to a 
researcher.1   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1. Jürgen Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures (Cambridge, 
Mass.: The MIT Press, 1990), 321. 
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 Indeed, the theoretical divergence in the hugely influential 
cosmopolitan/communitarian debates in political theory and normative 
international theory in the 1980s and 1990s might largely be attributed to an 
underlying (and often implicit) disagreement about what the ultimate ground, i.e., 
what the subject, of justice is taken to be: whether that is the individual (the 
rational individual/the vulnerable individual/the 'free' individual) or the collective 
(the nation/state/polis/religious community).2 In each case these act as foundational 
'ontological' commitments: the 'objects' presupposed as the conditions of any 
subsequent normative claims. 
 
 Given the theoretical divergence in normative international theory, an 
intelligent way ahead is to engage in meta-theoretical analysis of the 
epistemological and ontological presuppositions underwriting these positions: 
evaluating the (ontological) nature of their foundations, and the (epistemological) 
status of the claims that follow.3 The latter task is taken up by Molly Cochran in 
her Normative Theory in International Relations, an impressive study of the ethical 
foundations underwriting a range of approaches to normative international theory, 
including Rawls, Walzer, Frost, and Linklater, which results in an appraisal of the 
epistemological status of the normative claims that follow from their respective 
ethical foundations.4 
 
 Situating the cosmopolitan/communitarian debate in normative 
international theory within the context of a larger debate in the social sciences 
about modernist, foundationalist epistemologies, Cochran argues that the question 
of whether moral claims are universal or particular is a tension not primarily about 
the scope of moral claims, 'but about how those claims are made [...], about how 
claims to ethical judgement in IR are grounded or justified.' Consequently, she 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2. There is a huge secondary literature on these debates. For exemplary discussions see Stephen 
Mulhall and Adam Swift, Liberals and Communitarians, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996). Chris 
Brown, International Relations Theory: New Normative Approaches (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1992). Molly Cochran, Normative Theory in International Relations: A Pragmatic 
Approach (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 
3. This is the strategy deployed by Kenneth Waltz in relation to causal theories of war. Kenneth N. 
Waltz, Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2001). 
4. Molly Cochran, Normative Theory in International Relations: A Pragmatic Approach. 
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claims that although the cosmopolitan/communitarian debate is principally 
concerned with 'ontological questions,' it 'leaves untheorized the rival foundational 
assumptions upon which these ontologies stand.'5 As a result of her evaluation of 
the epistemological aspects of different normative theories, Cochran concludes that 
'in order to offer a criterion for ethical judgement,' the 'burden of an ethics' is 
'shifted back onto ontology.'6  
 
 Recalling our earlier explanation that ontology is a form of inquiry into 
what exists and into the nature of existence, or what it means to exist, in as much 
as these foundational ethical commitments are commitments to entities that are 
presupposed as the conditions of any normative claim, disputes about whether the 
individual or the community is a more appropriate ethical foundation might be 
considered an 'ontological' debate in a shallow sense of the term. That said, since 
the 'objectivity' of such foundations is often presupposed, such debates are very 
superficial (ontologically speaking) and the ontological questions raised by such 
foundational commitments are commonly left unanswered: whether such 
foundations can be considered to have objective existence, and what it means to 
treat such ethical foundations as objects, for instance.  
 
 Supporting Behr's claim that the overwhelming trajectory of thought since 
the eighteenth century has been geared towards recognising the particularity of 
epistemological and ontological commitments, the root of the problem is that 
political theorists usually try hard to evade the ontological questions that invariably 
arise from their foundational commitments. Moreover, since a common strategy of 
evasion is to take dominant practices and institutions as foundational ethical 
commitments, the upshot of this humility is that dominant practices and institutions 
are treated as if they were 'objective,' thus lending uncritical ideological support to 
the status quo and reinforcing visions of politics and ethics that remain framed by 
the sovereign state.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5. Ibid., xvi. 
6. Ibid. 
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 Since both approaches rest upon foundational ethical commitments to 
institutions and practices associated with the modern state, we will explore these 
questions in the following section with reference to John Rawls's 'Political 
Liberalism' and Mervyn Frost's 'secular Hegelianism.' Although leading to 
undeniably persuasive and practical approaches to normative international theory, 
as approaches to contemporary (global) politics and ethics they are fundamentally 
limited by these foundations. We further argue that such foundations cannot in 
themselves be considered 'objective' and must themselves be subject to evaluation; 
our suggestion is that these ethical commitments must themselves be underwritten 
by a deeper, more foundational ontological commitment to human freedom.  
 
 
Ethical Foundations in The 'Political Liberalism' of John Rawls 
 
 Responding to criticisms of his seminal publication A Theory of Justice 
(1971) in an article titled Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical (1985), a 
precursor to his Political Liberalism (1993), Rawls asserts the particularity of his 
normative claims by explicitly limiting his conception of 'justice as fairness' to a 
political conception of justice that applies only to the 'basic structure' of a modern 
constitutional democracy.7 Rawls's clarification that his normative theory is only 
meant to apply to the political, social, and economic institutions of a modern 
constitutional democracy is basically an attempt to sidestep philosophical disputes 
regarding the essential nature of persons, since he only intends for his theory to 
apply to human beings qua subjects (i.e., citizens) of a constitutional democracy, 
and to likewise avoid claims about universal truth, since he does not suppose that 
his normative claims apply universally, but only on the condition of a prior 
acceptance of these ethical foundations and therefore only within the jurisdiction of 
the state. He writes:  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7. See: John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999)., and 
Michael J. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1982).; Alasdair C. MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (London: Duckworth, 2007).; 
Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality (New York: Basic Books, 
1983).; John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: Political Not Metaphysical, vol. 14(3), Philosophy & 
Public Affairs (1985), 224. 
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In this discussion I shall make some general remarks about how I now understand the 
conception of justice that I have called ‘justice as fairness’ (presented in my book A 
Theory of Justice). I do this because it may seem that this conception depends on 
philosophical claims I should like to avoid, for example, claims to universal truth, or 
claims about the essential nature and identity of persons. 
[...] 
Thus, the aim of justice as fairness as a political conception is practical, and not 
metaphysical or epistemological. That is, it presents itself not as a conception of justice 
that is true, but one that can serve as a basis of informed and willing political agreement 
between citizens viewed as free and equal persons.8  
 
 Rawls thus leaves the question open as to whether 'justice as fairness' can 
be extended to different societies existing under different historical and social 
traditions.9 Reasserting his particularism in his The Law of Peoples (1999), Rawls 
explicitly states that his conception of international justice does not claim universal 
scope, but applies only to the foreign policy of a liberal people: 
 
[I]t is important to see that the Law of Peoples is developed within political liberalism and 
is an extension of a liberal conception of justice for a domestic regime to a Society of 
Peoples. I emphasize that, in developing the Law of Peoples within a liberal conception of 
justice, we work out the ideals and principles of the foreign policy of a reasonably just 
liberal people. This concern with the foreign policy of a liberal people is implicit 
throughout. The reason we go on to consider the point of view of decent peoples is not to 
prescribe principles of justice for them, but to assure ourselves that the ideals and 
principles of the foreign policy of a liberal people are also reasonable from a decent 
nonliberal point of view. The need for such assurance is a feature inherent in the liberal 
conception. The Law of Peoples holds that decent nonliberal points of view exist, and that 
the question of how far nonliberal peoples are to be tolerated is an essential question of 
liberal foreign policy.10 
 
 Although Rawls is correct to recognise and emphasise the particularity of his 
normative claims, by taking the basic structures of a constitutional democracy as a 
foundational ethical commitment he effectively treats these structures as if they 
were 'objective.' This requires that we accept that these institutions are essentially 
'good' (because they are subject to no further evaluation), and that they are here to 
stay. Moreover, since his theory of 'justice as fairness,' only applies within states, 
and (later) to the outward-directed foreign policy of a liberal state, it serves to 
reinforce what Jens Bartelson identifies as the 'parergonal' (framing) logic of 
sovereignty, taking sovereignty itself as an unproblematic good and remaining 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8. Ibid., 223,230. 
9. Ibid., 225. 
10. John Rawls, The Law of Peoples (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999), 9-10. 
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blind to both the contemporary transformations of the Westphalian states-system 
and the possibilities of progressive change.11 We will return to these issues shortly. 
 
 
Ethical Foundations in Mervyn Frost's Constitutive Theory  
 
 By taking the state, the system of sovereign states, and global civil society 
as his foundational ethical commitments, Mervyn Frost's 'secular' interpretation of 
Hegel provides us with a second illustration of the tendency in modern political 
theory to try to evade ontological questions and thereby reinforce visions of 
politics and ethics that remain contained within the sovereign state.12  
 
 Building on the original articulation of his 'constitutive theory of 
individuality' as developed in Ethics in International Relations, in his later work 
Constituting Human Rights, Frost argues for the centrality of human rights in 
international relations, which leads him to explore the apparent conflict between 
the rights practices associated with global civil society and those of the society of 
democratic states.13 Distinguishing between the rights we have as citizens and the 
rights we have as civilians, Frost argues that as participants within global civil 
society we claim for ourselves and constitute each other as civilians with first 
generation human rights. Similarly, as participants in the global society of 
democratic and democratising states, we claim for ourselves and constitute each 
other as citizens, as holders of the second and third generation rights that we 
associate with citizenship.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11. Bartelson argues that sovereignty functions according to the same logic as the paregon. The 
parergon is a problem discussed in aesthetics, centring on the relationship between a frame, a work 
of art itself, and its background. The solution, as explained by Bartelson is that: 'a frame, a line of 
demarcation, an ontological divide, or geographical or chronological boundary all assert and 
manifest class membership of a phenomena, but the frame or line itself cannot be a member of 
either class. It is neither inside, nor outside, yet it is the condition of possibility of both. A parergon 
does not exist in the same sense as that which it helps to constitute; there is a ceaseless activity of 
framing, but the frame itself is never present, since it is itself unframed.' Jens. Bartelson, A 
Genealogy of Sovereignty (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 51. 
12. On Frost's 'secular' Hegelianism see: Mervyn Frost, Ethics in International Relations: A 
Constitutive Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 143-58. 
13. Ibid.; Mervyn Frost, Constituting Human Rights: Global Civil Society and the Society of 
Democratic States (London: Routledge, 2002). 
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 We only 'have' human rights by virtue of our participation within these two 
practices, and the context and scope of different types of rights claims therefore 
correspond with the context and scope of these respective practices. First 
generation rights such as freedom of speech, conscience, and the right not to be 
killed or assaulted are negative rights that claim universal scope, applying 
universally to all those who participate in global civil society, while second and 
third generation rights, such as rights to employment, housing, health-care, 
economic and social development, and group and collective rights, are positive 
rights that depend on our participation in concrete political institutions such as the 
state. Since these institutions are necessary for their provision, these positive rights 
can only apply within their jurisdiction. 
 
 Although Frost's argument provides a convincing account of the generation 
of human rights, and it clarifies the nature and scope of our commitments to these 
rights, his normative theory, like Rawls's, is predicated on our acceptance that 
practices and institutions such as the sovereign state, the system of sovereign 
states, and global civil society, are foundational ethical goods. While such 
practices and institutions are the conditions of human rights, which are 
undoubtedly a significant historical and political achievement, they are themselves 
far from unproblematic; yet by taking them as the ethical foundations of this 
normative theory Frost also effectively treats these foundations as if they were 
'objective:' they have to be taken as givens, subject to no further evaluation, no 
higher court of appeal. 
 
 
The Return of the Repressed (Ontology)  
 
 In her analysis, Cochran rightly disputes the 'objectivity' of these 
foundations and refers to them instead as 'weak foundations' that lead to 
contingently held normative claims. 14  Such a conclusion reflects the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14. Molly Cochran, Normative Theory in International Relations: A Pragmatic Approach, 113-14. 
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epistemological focus of her analysis: she is primarily concerned with the status of 
normative claims. However, Cochran recognises that this shifts the burden of an 
ethics back onto ontology. 15  Ironically then, despite attempting to evade 
philosophical questions by emphasising the particularity of their normative claims 
and taking dominant practices as their ethical foundations, treating such 
commitments as 'objects' presupposed as the conditions of their normative claims 
invites an ontological evaluation of such commitments. A properly ontological 
evaluation of Rawls and Frost's ethical foundations would not simply consist in 
debating which represents the better ethical foundation, but must involve 
questioning the 'objectivity' of such foundations themselves: whether such 
foundations have objective existence, what it means to take these ethical 
foundations as objective, and what it says about the being of the entity that 
encounters such institutions as objects. 
 
 Cutting to the chase, our contention is that it is not sufficient to encounter 
such foundations as objects and that ontologically speaking we need to dig a little 
deeper. This does not require that we reject Rawls or Frost's normative theories but 
it does require that we subject their foundational ethical commitments to further 
evaluation before accepting their normative claims. It should not be too 
controversial to suggest that human freedom might provide a normative ideal with 
which to evaluate these ethical commitments. Such a deeper commitment to human 
freedom might involve the contention that these practices and institutions could be 
considered historical achievements in virtue of their contribution to our self-
actualisation as free beings: for example, that the state might be considered an 
achievement to the extent that it provides a sphere in which and through which we 
are able to provide ourselves with positive rights, such as those to education, 
health-care, and social security. In this way, such a foundational commitment to 
human freedom might then underwrite Rawls and Frost's (previously foundational) 
ethical commitments, so that the state and the system of sovereign states are no 
longer themselves taken as foundational ethical goods but are evaluated against a 
normative ideal of human freedom. In this way the ethical claims that follow from 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15. Ibid., xvi. 
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their normative theories would hold only on the condition that they contribute to 
human freedom.  
 
 
The Actual and the Rational  
 
 This is Hegel's position. For Hegel it is not sufficient for us to encounter 
institutions, such as the state, as 'objects;' the 'objectivity' of these entities must 
itself be evaluated against a more foundational commitment to human freedom. 
Such is the idea behind his (in)famous (and enigmatic) dictum 'what is rational is 
actual and what is actual is rational,' for when Hegel talks of 'actuality' he is not 
talking about the purely contingent, that which has (empirical) existence, he is 
talking about that which is infinite (unconditioned) and free. As H. B. Nisbet 
points out, the fact that Hegel is not uncritically validating the status quo becomes 
clearer in his Lectures on the Philosophy of Right, where his formulation of the 
dictum as 'what is actual becomes rational, and the rational becomes actual,' 
emphasises the dynamic and progressive aspect of reason that becomes actual in 
the world.16 
 
 On Hegel's account then, rather than taking practices and institutions 
associated with the modern state as 'objective' ethical foundations, it is a particular 
understanding of human freedom that justifies the settled order. As Allen Wood 
helpfully explains: 
 
The actual is always rational, but no existing social order is ever wholly actual. In its 
existence, the rational Idea of an ethical order is always to some extent disfigured by 
contingency, error, and wickedness.17 The present social order must be measured not by a 
timeless standard, but by its own ethical Idea [...] There is plenty of room in Hegel’s 
ethical theory for criticism of the existing order as an immature or imperfect embodiment 
of its own Idea [...] The principles of an ethical order are valid only so long as that order is 
rational [...] The foundation of the ethical is its actualisation of spirit's freedom. The cause 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16. G. W. F. Hegel, Vorlesungen Über Rechtsphilosophie (Lectures on the Philosophy of Right) 
(Stuttgart: Frommann Verla, 1974), 19 51. emphasis added. G.W.F. Hegel, Elements of the 
Philosophy of Right, trans. H.B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 389-
390n22. 
17. The Idea is freedom. On the understanding of 'Idea' in Hegel see Glenn Alexander Magee, The 
Hegel Dictionary (London: Continuum, 2010), 111-15. 
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of that freedom is served not only by the structure of a rational social order, but also by the 
destruction of an order that has lost its rationality [...] Inevitably Hegel's ethical theory 
focuses critical attention on prevailing social institutions: Does the existing social order 
actualise its Idea? Is the ethical order itself rational, or has it lost its foundation in spirit's 
struggle to actualise freedom?18 
 
 From a Hegelian perspective then, ontologically speaking, practices and 
institutions such as the state do not in themselves have an 'objective' existence, but 
must be evaluated with relation to the being of that entity that encounters these 
institutions as objects; since for Hegel the human being is a free being, the 
'objectivity' of these foundations is conditional upon their contribution to the 
freedom of the human being. Put differently, it is the self-actualisation of freedom 
that provides the underlying standard by which practices and institutions, Rawls 
and Frost's foundational ethical commitments, are to be evaluated.  
 
 Hegel's Philosophy of Right is a defence of the view that the ethical state is 
the most rational modern form of the actualisation of objective freedom: the state's 
rationality is dependent on it being effective at actualising human freedom; when it 
no longer serves human freedom it will (presumably) be subject to revision.19 This 
is the critical purchase of Hegel's argument. His attempts to show in the 
Philosophy of Right how the institutions of modern society, such as the family, 
civil society, and the state, actualise freedom in the modern world all presuppose 
the possibility that modern society might fail to meet these critical standards: this is 
the radical dimension of his ethical theory; the possibility of a radical Hegelian 
'left' is immanent in his thought, as is an apologetic Hegelian 'right.'20  
 
 As Wood notes, the historical Hegel himself was a moderate, reformist 
'centrist,' but to know which Hegel to deploy presupposes the prior judgement as to 
whether modern society is really rational.21 By taking the settled norms of state 
sovereignty and human rights as foundational goods, Frost has to presume that 
these norms are both rational (and have to be reconciled), yet without an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18. Allen W. Wood, Hegel’s Ethical Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 
256. Emphasis added. 
19. G.W.F. Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right. 
20. Allen W. Wood, Hegel’s Ethical Thought, 257. 
21. Ibid. 
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underlying (foundational) commitment to human freedom Frost cannot claim the 
'actuality' of human rights or of the system of sovereign states, and hence is only 
able to offer an account of the rationality of the contingent. Insodoing Frost divests 
himself of the critical purchase of Hegel's ethical theory: he cannot evaluate these 
practices with anything other than the yardstick of their own internal coherence 
and thus leaves himself at risk of being charged with being an ideologue of the 
status quo, an apologist for the practices of violence and exclusion implicated in 
the continued existence of the system of sovereign states.22  
 
 
Reviving the Philosophical & Confronting the Ontological 
 
 With regards to the basic structures of a constitutional democracy and the 
liberal state, a similar criticism might be levelled against Rawls's theory of 'justice 
as fairness.' The central weakness of both approaches is that by treating them as 
foundational, they treat their ethical commitments as objective, rather than 
ensuring that the 'objective' status of these ethical commitments is itself conditional 
upon the historical self-actualisation of the human being as a free being. Both do so 
in order to sidestep metaphysical questions, contestable philosophical (ontological 
and epistemological) questions about the nature of human beings. Yet the upshot of 
this evasion is that they divest themselves of the necessary resources with which to 
counter claims that their foundational commitments are simply the artefacts of 
military might or capital, for instance, and that their normative theories are 
anything other than ideological justifications of the sovereign state (as historical 
materialists might argue).  
 
 Moreover, by taking such foundations as 'objective,' both largely preclude 
the possibility of ethical and emancipatory change pertaining to these foundations. 
Frost is unable to envisage movement beyond the current state of affairs, such as 
the potential reform of global institutional arrangements so as to extend the scope 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22. On more than one occasion I have heard Chris Brown say that, when asked, Frost cannot decide 
whether he is a 'left' or 'right' Hegelian. Based on the evidence given here, I would suggest he is a 
right Hegelian. 
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of the provision of second and third generation rights more universally, while the 
'parergonal' logic of Rawls's theory of justice, its sharp inside/outside distinction, 
means that 'outsiders' have few ethical claims on 'insiders,' and we must therefore 
acquiesce to the violent and exclusionary practices associated with the exercise of 
state sovereignty.  
 
 Both Rawls and Frost thereby reinforce visions of politics and ethics that 
remain framed by the state, and offer inert approaches to contemporary (global) 
politics and ethics that neglect the historical nature of (currently) hegemonic social 
and political institutions, which are unable to provide any guide for future-directed 
action, save for the effective management of the status quo. Despite both offering 
eminently persuasive and practical approaches to normative questions in 
international relations when accepted on their own terms, these terms themselves 
rest upon questionable ontological assumptions that remain unresponsive to the 
contemporary transformations of the Westphalian system, and leave us impotent in 
the face of potentially progressive transformations of our political and social 
arrangements.  
 
 These essential limitations of Rawls and Frost's approaches to 
contemporary (global) politics and ethics are consequent of their attempts to evade 
philosophical questions by asserting the particularity of their claims, attempts that 
are ultimately unsuccessful. Since normative international theory has so far lacked 
ontological reflection (in the fuller sense), we might then suggest that the 
conditions of contemporary (global) politics and ethics call for us to confront such 
ontological questions, and to do so with more self-consciously universalistic intent; 
preferably proceeding from a left-Hegelian commitment to human freedom. In 
contrast to the particularism of Rawls and Frost's approaches to normative theory, 
such an approach to contemporary (global) politics and ethics would be more 
universalistic because it would apply to human beings qua human beings, rather 
than to human beings qua participants in global civil society, or qua subjects of a 
constitutional democracy. However, as we shall discover in the next section, a 
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central obstacle to such a task is that attempts to bring ontological reflection into 
international theory have, so far, overwhelmingly been superficial.  
 
 
'Ontological' Foundations in International Theory 
 
 The previous section provided us with confirmation of both Walker's claim 
that modern political theory has overwhelmingly reproduced visions of politics and 
ethics that remain framed by the nation-state, and Behr's claim that, although more 
universalistic forms of ontological inquiry are required for contemporary (global) 
politics and ethics, the overwhelming trajectory of political thought has been 
geared towards the recognition of the particularity of its claims. Conseqently, 
although indelibly marked by ontological and epistemological, meta-theoretical, 
presuppositions and commitments, normative political theorists have attempted to 
elude such commitments by conservatively taking dominant practices and 
institutions as their ethical foundations, insisting that their claims only apply on the 
condition that these foundations are accepted.  
 
 International thought has not similarly retreated from confronting the meta-
theoretical aspects of political and social inquiry. This may in part be attributable 
to the fact that IR is a derivative discipline that applies insights from other 
disciplines such as political science, philosophy, sociology, economics, history, 
linguistics, etc., but also because the increasingly heterodox and trans-disciplinary 
nature of various studies of war, peace, order and change in the field might have 
forced a greater degree of meta-theoretical reflexivity.23 However, owing to the 
influence of dualist philosophical commitments on these meta-theoretical debates, 
until very recently ontological debates in international theory have overwhelmingly 
remained either very basic, or confused; concerned only with an ontology of 
'things' that exist, rather than an ontology of being. Notable exceptions to this rule, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23. On IR as a derivative discipline see Ronen Palan, “Transnational Theories of Order and 
Change: Heterodoxy in International Relations Scholarship,” in Critical International Theory After 
25 Years, ed. Nicholas Rengger and Ben Thirkell-White (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2007). 
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which will be discussed in due course, are relatively recent contributions from 
Patrick Thaddeus Jackson and Torsten Michel.24  
 
 
The Third Debate 
 
 Meta-theoretical concerns came to prominence in IR during the 'fourth 
great debate' between positivism and post-positivism, somewhat confusingly 
referred to in the literature as the 'Third Debate.'25 Positivism involved a unified 
conception of science and the adoption of the methodologies of the natural 
sciences to explain phenomena in the social realm, and it dominated the academic 
study of IR in the latter half of the twentieth century.26 From the early 1980s a 
plethora of 'critical' approaches to IR emerged, principally Critical Theorists 
inspired by the Frankfurt School and/or Gramsci, normative theorists, 
'postmodernists', 'post-structuralists', and feminists.27  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24. See Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, “Foregrounding Ontology: Dualism, Monism, and IR Theory,” 
Review of International Studies 34, no. 1 (2008): 129-53; Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, The Conduct 
of Inquiry in International Relations: Philosophy of Science and Its Implications for the Study of 
World Politics (London: Routledge, 2011). and Torsten Michel, “Shrouded in Darkness: A 
Phenomenological Path Towards a New Social Ontology in International Relations” (Ph.D Thesis, 
St Andrews, 2008); Torsten Michel, “Pigs Can’t Fly, Or Can They? Ontology, Scientific Realism 
and the Metaphysics of Presence in International Relations,” Review of International Studies 35 
(2009): 379-419; Torsten Michel, “In Heidegger’s Shadow: A Phenomenological Critique of 
Critical Realism,” Review of International Studies 38 (2012): 209-22. 
25. Yosef Lapid coined the term 'Third Debate' to refer to the debate between positivist and post-
positivist theories of IR. Earlier debates in international theory are referred to as the 'First Great 
Debate' (between Realism and Idealism) and the Second Great Debate (between scientific and 
classical approaches to IR); what is considered to be the 'Third Great Debate' in IR (between 
realism, liberalism and radical approaches) is also sometimes referred to as the 'Inter-Paradigm 
Debate.' Consequently, what Lapid terms the 'Third Debate' would be considered to be the 'Fourth 
Great Debate.' Yosef Lapid, “The Third Debate: On the Prospects of International Theory in a Post-
Positivist Era,” International Studies Quarterly 33 (1989): 235-54. 
26. For a concise yet illuminating overview of the history of positivism and its influence on IR see 
Steve Smith, “Positivism and Beyond,” in International Theory: Positivism and Beyond, ed. Steve 
Smith, et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 14-18,31-35. 
27. Habermas and Gramsci influenced the two pivotal texts in this debate, from Richard K. Ashley 
and Robert Cox respectively. See Richard K. Ashley, “Political Realism and Human Interests,” 
International Studies Quarterly 25 (1981): 204-36; Robert W. Cox, “Social Forces, States and 
World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory,” Millennium: Journal of International 
Studies 10, no. 2 (1981): 126-55. For a retrospective discussion of their influence see Nicholas J. 
Rengger and Ben Thirkell-White., eds. Critical International Relations Theory After 25 Years 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
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 What united these approaches was not so much anything substantive as 
much as their shared rejection of the assumptions associated with positivism. On 
one hand critical approaches challenged the dominance of the neo-realist and neo-
liberal emphasis on technical questions, and on the other they attempted to 
introduce social-theoretical concerns in order to move the discipline in a radically 
different direction.28 Since international theory underpins and informs international 
practice, far from being exercises in 'navel gazing,' the stakes in these debates were 
high, since 'once established as common sense theories become incredibly 
powerful since they delineate not only what can be known but also what it is 
sensible to talk about and suggest[; hence ...] what is at stake in debates about 
epistemology is very significant for political practice. Theories do not simply 
explain or predict, they tell us what possibilities exist for human action and 
intervention; they define not merely our explanatory possibilities but also our 
ethical and practical horizons.'29  
 
 Indeed, one of the reasons that positivism was dominant for so long lay in 
the fact that by determining 'what kinds of things existed in international relations' 
its empiricist epistemology had determined what could be studied in IR.30 In order 
to challenge this orthodoxy, post-positivist debates were necessarily 
epistemologically oriented. 31  And yet, despite highlighting the importance of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28. Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, The Conduct of Inquiry, 72. I am aware that this account of the 
development of 'the discipline' is not entirely neutral. However, it is a commonly accepted narrative 
and it serves the purpose of situating the thesis as a contribution to meta-theoretical debates in IR. 
For an alternative history of the discipline see Craig Murphy, “Critical Theory and the Democratic 
Impulse: Understanding a Century-Old Tradition,” in Critical Theory and World Politics, ed. 
Richard Wyn Jones (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001); Craig Murphy, “The Promise of Critical 
IR, Partially Kept,” in Critical International Relations Theory After 25 Years, ed. Nicholas Rengger 
and Ben Thirkell-White (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
29. Steve Smith, “Positivism and Beyond,” 13. emphasis added. On the links between international 
theory and practice, see also Marysia Zalewski, “’All These Theories Yet the Bodies Keep Piling 
Up’: Theory, Theorists, Theorising,” in International Theory: Positivism and Beyond, ed. Ken 
Booth, Steve Smith, and Marysia Zalewski (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
30. Steve Smith, “Positivism and Beyond,” 11. 
31. Ashley and Cox's interventions are good examples of this. Richard K. Ashley, “Political 
Realism and Human Interests.”; Robert W. Cox, “Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond 
International Relations Theory.” The 'great debates' in the discipline's history, between realism and 
idealism in the 1930s and 1940s, between the 'scientific' and 'classical' (alternatively, 'traditional') 
approaches in the 1960s, or the inter-paradigm debate between realism, pluralism and 
globalism/structuralism, did not involve questions of epistemology. As Smith notes, 'the discipline 
has tended to accept implicitly a rather simple and, crucially, an uncontested set of positivist 
assumptions which have fundamentally stifled debate over both what the world is like and how we 
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theory and bringing dissident voices from out of the margins of the discipline, it 
could be argued that the emphasis placed on the reflexive importance of 
epistemology as constructive of the world of objects (of states and the states-
system, for instance) coupled with the diversification of epistemological 
approaches to the study of IR, a degree of epistemological radicalism emerged 
from the Third Debate. This, and increasingly unproductive epistemological 
debates, were to occasion a shift back to 'ontology,' most prominently heralded by 
Alexander Wendt in the mid-1990s.32 
 
 
The Turn to 'Ontology' 
 
 Given the epistemological orientation of the Third Debate, and the 
positivist empiricism that had previously determined 'what kind of things existed in 
international relations,' this 'turn to ontology' was always likely. Yet this is not to 
suggest that ontological concerns arose only after the Third Debate, since this 
would clearly be wrong.33 There have long been approaches that challenged the 
foundational commitments of neo-realism, that have stood at variance with those 
associated with positivism, and ontological claims permeated the Third Debate. 
Nevertheless, it was only after this 'great debate' that IR became explicitly and self-
consciously reflexive about the 'ontological' aspects of social and political 
inquiry.34  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
might explain it.' Although those working in the 'English School' or on the intersection of 
international theory and political theory never really bought into the positivist assumptions that 
dominated the discipline, it has been positivism that has dominated the overwhelming character of 
the discipline of International Relations. Steve Smith, “Positivism and Beyond,” 11. 
32. Alexander Wendt, “Constructing International Politics,” International Security 20, no. 1 (1995): 
71-81; Alexander Wendt, “The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory,” 
International Organization 41, no. 3 (1987): 335-70; Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is What States 
Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” International Organization 46, no. 2 
(1992): 391-425; Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999). 
33. On Richard Falk and the World Order School, and peace studies/peace research, see Ken Booth, 
Theory of World Security (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 58-69. On dissident 
traditions of IR in the USA also see Craig Murphy, “The Promise of Critical IR, Partially Kept.” On 
ontological commitments in political thought pre-dating the dominance of positivism or realism see 
Hartmut Behr, A History of International Political Theory: Ontologies of the International 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010). 
34. Steve Smith, “Positivism and Beyond,” 11. 
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 By arguing that 'what really matters is what there is rather than how we 
know it,' Wendt's proposal was that the IR debate should move away from 
epistemological questions (specifically, whether the methods of the natural 
sciences could be validly applied to social reality) to questions concerning what 
kind of things existed in world politics.35 The logic here is that if what really 
matters is what kinds of things exist in world politics, then how we know those 
things is not important. Wendt's compromise thus warranted an epistemological 
pluralism, promising to accommodate positivists and dissidents alike. However, 
such a compromise came at the cost of accepting a critical realist philosophy of 
science, and it is this critical realist approach to IR that is currently ascending.36 
 
 Wendt's (contentious) distinction between 'epistemological' and 
'ontological' questions allows him to argue that ontological questions take priority 
over epistemological ones, and allows him to suggest that we look 'beyond given 
appearances to the underlying social relationships that generate (in a probabilistic 
sense) phenomenal forms.'37 Drawing on Anthony Giddens's structuration theory 
and Roy Bhaskar's epistemology of scientific realism, Wendt engages with the 
'agent-structure problem.' His most recognisable argument, captured in the pithy 
phrase 'anarchy is what states make of it,' is the social constructivist claim that 
ideational factors play a role in the recreation of the anarchical structure of the 
international system that neo-realists claim govern state interaction, and that this 
anarchical system is therefore a phenomenon that is socially constructed and 
reproduced by states.38  
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35. Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, 40.; Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, The 
Conduct of Inquiry, 73. 
36. See, for instance, a recent forum on critical realism in the Review of International Studies 38(1) 
January 2012. See also the forum 'Scientific and Critical Realism in International Relations' 
Millennium-Journal of International Studies 35(2) 2007 
37. We will explain why such a distinction is contentious in due course. Ibid. Alexander Wendt, 
“The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory,” 362. 
38. Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power 
Politics.” See also Alexander Wendt, “The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations 
Theory.”; Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics. 
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Critical Realism 
 
 Arguing that 'the intersubjective merely represents one important and 
necessary part of the social', critical realists strive to gain deeper access to reality 
than that offered by Wendt's social constructivism.39 Whereas Wendt emphasises 
the 'reality' of ideational factors (for Wendt the intersubjective nature of social 
structures makes ideas 'real'), critical realists consider these factors relatively 
superficial, and strive to uncover the 'objective,' 'causal' processes that undergird 
the problematics that Wendt argues are intersubjectively constructed.40 Citing the 
example of North-South relations, Wight and Joseph claim these are simply not 
reducible to intersubjective relations, as Wendt would have us believe, but are 
phenomena (appearances) that are underwritten by the 'objective' structure of the 
global capitalist system.41 The implication is that we are thus able to make 
scientific, objective claims about 'material' structures, 'intransitive objects' that 
structure and condition human relations; herein supposedly lies the emancipatory 
potential of critical realist inquiry.42 
 
 The central critical realist objection to both positivism and post-positivism 
is that both are embedded within a philosophical discourse of anti-realism.43 In 
contrast, their own position rests upon an ontological commitment to 'depth 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39. Heikki Patomäki and Colin Wight., “After Postpositivism? The Promises of Critical Realism,” 
International Studies Quarterly 44 (2000), 217-18. 
40. 'What makes these ideas (and thus structure) 'social' [. . .] is their intersubjective quality' 
Alexander Wendt, “Constructing International Politics,” 73. 
41. Jonathan Joseph, and Colin Wight, “Scientific Realism and International Relations,” in 
Scientific Realism and International Relations, ed. Jonathan Joseph and Colin Wight (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2010). 
42. We use the term 'supposedly' because it does not question whether encountering these entities 
as 'objects' is a contribution to human freedom or an abrogation of it. Moreover, there is a level of 
correspondence here with Booth's questionable claim, discussed in the Preface, that 'one cannot 
have one's own understanding ... under conditions of indoctrination, traditionalist socialisation, and 
inadequate relevant knowledge.' In other words, that knowledge, enlightenment, is central to 
freedom. This equation of theoretical, scientific, knowledge, with freedom is more problematic than 
it is commonly treated, as Horkheimer and Adorno demonstrate. Ken Booth, Theory of World 
Security, 112. Theodor W. Adorno, and Max Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment (London: 
Verso, 1986). 
43. Patomäki and Wight cite Martin Hollis's observation that the 'empiricist theories of knowledge 
(upon which positivism is based) are 'anti-realist at bottom,' and David Campbell's claim that 
'nothing exists outside of discourse,' in support of this claim. David Campbell, National 
Deconstruction: Violence, Identity, and Justice in Bosnia (Minneapolis: Minnesota University 
Press, 1998), 24-25. Heikki Patomäki and Colin Wight, “After Postpositivism? The Promises of 
Critical Realism,” 216-19. 
PART 1/ Ch.1. ‘Ontological’ Foundations in International Theory 
46 
realism,' the view that objects exist independently of our knowledge of them.44 As 
Wight explains: 'A commitment to depth realism presupposes that there are things, 
entities, structures and/or mechanisms that operate and exist independently of our 
ability to know or manipulate them.'45 As a result of this 'ontological' commitment 
to the existence of objects that lie beyond our comprehension: 
 
One of the basic tenets of a critical realist approach to explanation is that good theories 
refer to a mind-independent world, and that this world therefore exercises a limiting effect 
on those theories. Both Searle's 'brute facts' and Bhaskar's 'intransitive' objects of 
knowledge serve to mark the role played by an external world in realist philosophy of 
science: the world is out there, outside of human knowledge practices, and it stubbornly 
resists efforts to conceptualise it in ways sharply at variance with itself.46 
 
 However, despite offering robust defences of the importance of 'ontology' 
in social inquiry, due to their dualist philosophical commitments, Wendt and other 
critical realists often misunderstand or misrepresent the nature of their own 
ontological commitments; consequently, their deployment of 'ontology' is confined 
to a shallow ontology of 'things' that exist, which in turn leads to a 
misunderstanding of the status of scientific inquiry in world politics, and the 
marginalisation of alternative 'philosophical ontologies' in IR. Given the 
prominence of critical realism and its influence on meta-theoretical debates in IR, 
and in order that our conceptual terminology is not confused with theirs, it is worth 
addressing these issues before proceeding. 
 
 
The Marginalisation of 'Philosophical Ontology' in IR Theory 
 
 Critical realists take their cue from the 'ontological turn' in IR, from 
Wendt's counter-ontology to structural realism.47 The aim of Wendt's intervention 
into the postpositivist debate was to shift focus away from epistemological 
questions to 'the kinds of things that exist' in world politics. However, such a move 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44. Ibid., 217-18. 
45. Colin Wight, Agents, Structures and International Relations: Politics as Ontology (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006), 29. 
46. Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, “Foregrounding Ontology: Dualism, Monism, and IR Theory,” 138. 
47. Torsten Michel, “In Heidegger’s Shadow,” 211. 
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requires the acceptance of a critical realist epistemology, and in particular 'its twin 
presuppositions that knowledge reaches out to a mind-independent world, and that 
knowledge can go beyond experience to grasp deeper levels of reality.' 48 
Consequently, although Wendt's solution to the Third Debate lent credibility to 
non-conventional philosophical approaches to the study of world politics, this 
pluralism came with two related costs: 'the widespread promulgation of terms such 
as "ontology" and "epistemology" with conceptually specific definitions that 
preclude other alternatives, and the virtual disappearance of philosophical ontology 
from IR debates.'49  
 
 As a result, the very terms of recent debates in IR about 'epistemology' and 
'ontology' have 'been set by critical realists starting with Wendt.' 50  Debates 
regarding the relation between epistemology and ontology, as well as the 
conceptual terminology according to which they have proceeded, are, 'not 
surprisingly, critical realist in orientation.'51 These debates arose as a consequence 
of Wendt's adoption of critical realism, and it is along critical realist lines that 
'epistemological' and 'ontological' questions are defined; yet 'critical realism is 
itself a philosophical ontology first and foremost.' 52  Since all ontology is 
philosophical, Jackson's distinction here between 'philosophical' and 'scientific' 
ontologies is somewhat problematic. However, since critical realism tends to be 
treated as a scientific ontology, i.e., as if it were above philosophical contestation, 
this distinction serves to highlight the fact that critical realism itself rests upon a 
philosophical argument, a mind-world dualism that allows them to separate 
ontology from epistemology and to then prioritise ontological questions.53 This fact 
has been obscured in recent debates, resulting in the marginalisation of alternative 
'philosophical ontologies.'  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48. Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, The Conduct of Inquiry, 73. 
49. Ibid. 
50. Ibid., 74. 
51. Ibid., 74,73. 
52. Ibid., 73. 
53. For a defence of the scientific realism that informs critical realism see Roy Bhaskar, A Realist 
Theory of Science (London: Verso, 1997). For a discussion of the relation between scientific 
realism and critical realism see Jonathan Joseph and Colin Wight, “Scientific Realism and 
International Relations.” 
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The Challenge to Dualism 
 
 Critical realism's dualist philosophical commitments thus raise an old 
question: the status of scientific inquiry in world politics.54 Specifically, the 
problem is the status of the social scientific findings derived from critical realist 
debates, or, as Jackson puts it: 'the issue of whether the knowledge that academic 
researchers produce is in some sense a reflection of the world, or whether it is 
irreducibly a perspective on the world.'55 After surveying approaches associated 
with a dualist approach to social science, including neopositivism, critical realism, 
and Habermasian approaches, Jackson argues that social science must be 
considered 'an irreducibly partial and perspectival endeavour;' that there is an 
inescapably perspectival character to the knowledge that researchers produce.56 As 
a result, he suggests, it might be more useful to explore the possibility of a social 
science built on monistic premises, as exemplified by Max Weber's conception of 
social science.57 He argues that this kind of social science would embrace its 
perspectival character and refrain from claims to have captured the objective 
essence of anything in the world: 'a monistic social science would serve as a kind 
of disciplined process of world-construction, whereby a perspective was first 
elaborated in ideal-typical fashion and then used as the baseline from which to 
rigorously produce an account.'58  
 
 A similarly sophisticated and persuasive criticism of the nature and role of 
'ontology' found in Wendt and Wight can be found in the recent work of Torsten 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54. For a discussion of this point, see Friedrich Kratochwil, “Constructing a New Orthodoxy? 
Wendt’s ‘Social Theory of International Politics’ and the Constructivist Challenge,” Millennium-
Journal of International Studies 29, no. 1 (2000): 73-101. 
55. Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, “Foregrounding Ontology: Dualism, Monism, and IR Theory,” 130. 
Jackson's use of 'perspective' here is also problematic. 'Per-spective' means 'seeing through,' i.e., a 
particular filter/angle/conceptual scheme through which we can see an aspect of the world as it is in 
itself. I thank Hidemi Suganami for a discussion on this point. With this caveat, I will continue to 
use the term 'perspective.' 
56. Ibid., 131,130. 
57. Ibid., 146. 
58. Ibid. 
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Michel.59 Despite welcoming the trajectory of taking ontology more seriously, he 
highlights how the specific conceptualisation of ontology in critical realist thought 
leads to a common problem regarding the lack of 'a deeper appreciation of the 
ontological significance of science and language as human activities and 
potentialities.'60 Michel demonstrates that this is an intrinsic problem with the 
critical realist reading of ontology: while overcoming epistemological 
foundationalism on the one hand, it does so through the affirmation of an 
ontological foundationalism due to the apodictic positing of 'intransitive objects' 
that exist outside and independent of the human mind. Michel's explanation is 
worth reproducing at length: 
 
The crux in Wendt's and Wight's arguments lies with the fact that they commit themselves 
willingly or not to a foundationalist enterprise and whether based on ontology or 
epistemology this move is indeed a very modern one. Wendt, of course would counter this 
argument and insist that his re-conceptualisation is thoroughly anti-foundationalist. He 
says: "... realism is anti-foundationalist. Thus, although it is common to conflate the two, 
the correspondence theory of truth does not entail epistemological foundationalism. What 
makes a theory true is the extent to which it reflects the causal structure of the world, but 
theories are always tested against other theories, not against some pre-theoretical 
'foundation' of correspondence." (Wendt, 1999: 58-9) 
 
What Wendt shows here is not that his theory is anti-foundationalist but that his 
epistemology is not monistic. For his whole account to work, as he admits and we have 
shown, there must be a mind-independent ontological ground which does not depend on 
any epistemological conception. If this ground exists independent of any epistemology, his 
epistemology might be anti-foundational but his ontology is not. Apart from that, scientific 
realism in the form Wendt and Wight present is not able to confirm the existence of this 
ontologically given reality beyond human existence. As was shown by reference to 
examples from the natural as well as social sciences above, any attempt to grasp these 
"intransitive" objects unavoidably draws them into a web of linguistic meanings dependent 
on social practices. Ontology and epistemology are always intertwined and cannot be 
conceptualised independent of one another. Their attempt just to say and rely on what "is" 
and then devise ex post epistemological tools to establish knowledge is as misguided as 
any attempt to devise epistemological devices in order to discern what "is." Any 
conceptualisation of what "is" already takes place within a system of social meanings and 
knowledge in the same way as any conceptualisation of what can be known already exists 
within a framework of assumptions about what "is."61 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59. Torsten Michel, “Shrouded in Darkness.”; Torsten Michel, “Pigs Can’t Fly, Or Can They? 
Ontology, Scientific Realism and the Metaphysics of Presence in International Relations.”; Torsten 
Michel, “In Heidegger’s Shadow.” 
60. Ibid., 210. 
61. Torsten Michel, “Shrouded in Darkness,” 53-54. 
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The Ontological Difference 
 
 Michel proposes that Heidegger offers a path towards an engagement with 
ontological matters in a different and more fruitful way.62 Enlisting Heidegger's 
notion of the ontological difference, the difference between entities and the being 
of entities, Michel argues that the whole debate about what comes prior 
(epistemology or ontology) seems to be mistaken, because it rests on a conflation 
of entities and the being of entities: of whether an entity might be said to ‘exist’ or 
not, and of the nature of this existence.63 He demonstrates that, for Heidegger, 
traditional ontological approaches have conflated these two in different ways: 
while realists rightly observe that entities exist independently of the human 
understanding of them, for them this implied that the being of these entities also 
lies outside of human understanding; idealists, on the other hand, have maintained 
that the being of entities resides in human understanding, but they then make the 
problematic assumption that this means that the entities themselves are also 
dependent upon human understanding.64  
 
 Recognising that there is a difference between entities and the being of 
entities is therefore 'the crucial point through which Heidegger establishes his 
transcendent move beyond the realist/anti-realist chasm.'65 It is the conflation of 
the ontological difference between entities and the being of entities that leads us to 
the stalemate in the realism/anti-realism debate.66 Proceeding from a recognition of 
the ontological difference, Heidegger teaches us that 'entities are indeed 
independent [of] human understanding (the realist element) but their being as 
entities can only be realised through a specific form of being which is human being 
(in Heidegger's jargon Dasein). For Heidegger then, any position that ignores the 
ontological difference already commits a fallacy before even entering any 
realist/anti-realist exchange.'67 Importantly, Heidegger reveals to us that the debate 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62. Torsten Michel, “In Heidegger’s Shadow,” 210. 
63. Ibid., 213. 
64. Ibid. It is worth noting that the debate between realism and idealism discussed here is one in the 
philosophy of social science, rather than in international theory. 
65. Ibid. 
66. Ibid., 214. 
67. Ibid., 213. 
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between realists and anti-realists 'rests on a very specific interpretation of ontology 
which posits the "problem of reality" as a problem in the first place.'68 In other 
words, the 'problem of reality' only arises because dualists posit a foundational 
split between 'seemingly ontologically primitive distinct entities of “subject” and 
“object.”'69  
 
 
The Meaning of Being: Shrouded in Darkness 
 
 Heidegger's notion of the ontological difference means that the fundamental 
ontological question is not 'what objects exist independent of our knowledge of 
them' or 'what entities are there in world politics,' but is 'what is the meaning of the 
being of the entity that encounters these entities as objects?' Put differently, 
Heidegger is not interested in entities thought of as 'objects' or 'external realities' as 
much as he is in the underlying current of the being that encounters these entities; 
that is, with the being of beings. 'Heidegger's thought is therefore projected 
towards the sine qua non for entities.'70 By inquiring as to the understanding of 
Being of the being that encounters entities as 'intransitive objects,' Heidegger's 
thought 'goes one step deeper into the matter than CR with its initial focus on 
beings.'71 Michel's central point then is that critical realism is 'not proposing a 
renewed focus on ontology (in the sense of scrutinising the meaning of being relied 
upon in IR) but exhibits an always already posited understanding of the meaning of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68. Ibid., 214. 
69. Ibid. Michel quotes Heidegger, who regards the 'problem of reality' as the "scandal of 
philosophy": 'The ''scandal of philosophy'' does not consist in the fact that this proof [of an external 
world] is still lacking up to now, but in the fact that such proofs are expected and attempted again 
and again. Such expectations, intentions, and demands grow out of an ontologically insufficient 
way of positing what it is from which, independently and ''outside'' of which, a ''world'' is to be 
proven as objectively present.' However, as we will see in Chapter 8 the same point is made 
differently by Hegel in the first paragraph of the Phenomenology of Spirit, where he tries to make 
us anxious about the idea of epistemology as first philosophy. Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, 
trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 1962), 249; G.W.F. 
Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A.V. Miller (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), §73. 
70. Torsten Michel, “In Heidegger’s Shadow,” 221. 
71. Ibid. 
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being manifested in scientific enquiry which itself is never questioned or 
scrutinised.'72  
 
 In other words, although critical realism is interested in ontology in as much 
as it is concerned with things that exist, this ontological interest is itself based upon 
a prior ontological presupposition; that is, a mind-world dualism and a 
commitment to the problematic assumption that scientific inquiry can grasp the 
reality of a world that is external to our experience. Through Heidegger's notion of 
the ontological difference, Michel thus establishes that 'the focus on ontology as 
the ground of theorising is itself under-conceptualised in many instances of CR,' 
and that 'a specific commitment to seemingly ontological primitives such as 
subjectivity and objectivity is itself in need of deeper and more differentiated 
reflection.'73 By demonstrating that the scientific disposition involves a specific 
mode of comportment towards the world that presupposes that entities, beings, 
appear to us as 'objects,' the heart of Michel's phenomenological critique of critical 
realism is the (Heideggerian) contention that the epistemological focus of 
philosophical thought in the twentieth century has left ontology, the 'meaning of 
being,' 'shrouded in darkness.'74  
 
 The central problem with epistemological and ontological foundationalisms, 
such as those found in Wendt and Wight, is that the split between subject and 
object is not foundational, as they treat it, but always already proceeds from a prior 
interpretation of existence, upon which ground subsequent theorising is based. This 
'meaning of being' is the pre-understanding that we bring to the world: it is that 
which 'opens spaces of being and reveals specific objects in the world in a specific 
way but at the same time through its specific horizon conceals others from our 
view. This is not a neutral description of the world but a recognition that human 
involvement only allows for the deconcealment of a world not the world.'75  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72. Ibid., 218. 
73. Ibid., 220. 
74. Torsten Michel, “Shrouded in Darkness.”; Torsten Michel, “In Heidegger’s Shadow.” 
75. Ibid., 221-22. 
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 Owing to their dualist assumptions then, Michel concludes that critical 
realism does not lead to a new and better conception of ontology, but simply 
'reifies the same biases of Cartesian subjectivity, the designative nature of 
language, a correspondence theory of truth and the problem-laden concept of 
freedom as it was conceived in Kant's third antinomy.'76 In order to transcend these 
problems, we need to overcome these dualist commitments and challenge the being 
of the entity that encounters things as 'objects,' which for Michel involves 'radically 
challenging the way that beings are apprehended in the sciences as we understand 
them today.'77 
 
 
'Ontological' Foundations in Critical International Thought 
 
 During our survey of the treatment of 'ontological' foundations in normative 
international theory we established that, despite their best attempts, normative 
international theorists are unable to sidestep ontological questions, since treating 
their ethical foundations as 'objects' presupposed as the condition of their ethical 
claims invites questions concerning the nature of the being of that being that 
encounters such entities as objects, and lends those practices and institutions 
philosophical credibility, rather uncritically. We then suggested that a more 
foundational left-Hegelian commitment to human freedom, to the freedom of the 
being that encounters such institutions as 'objects,' might represent a more 
compelling foundational commitment for contemporary (global) politics and 
ethics, since the objectivity of these ethical foundations might then be regarded as 
conditional upon the historical self-actualisation of the human being as a free 
being. Applying to human beings qua human beings, rather than simply to human 
beings qua subjects of dominant practices and institutions, such a foundation might 
represent a more universalistic foundational commitment for contemporary 
(global) politics and ethics. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76. Torsten Michel, “Shrouded in Darkness: A Phenomenological Path Towards a New Social 
Ontology in International Relations [Abstract]” (Ph.D Thesis, St Andrews, 2008). 
77. Torsten Michel, “Shrouded in Darkness,” 59. 
PART 1/ Ch.1. ‘Ontological’ Foundations in International Theory 
54 
 Such a commitment is an ontological commitment in the fuller sense of the 
term; one based upon a commitment to the (free) being of the human being. 
However, due to the nature of Wendt's intervention into the Third Debate, and the 
subsequent ascendance of critical realism, 'ontological' debates in international 
theory have so far proceeded according to a shallow ontology of 'things' that exist 
in world politics, rather than an ontology of the being of the entity that encounters 
such 'things' as objects. This is largely consequent of the dualist philosophical 
commitments underwriting such approaches: commitments that have resulted in 
the conflation of the ontological difference between entities and the being of 
entities, and the virtual disappearance of 'philosophical' ontology from debates in 
IR.  
 
 In this section of the chapter we return to our discussion of left-Hegelian 
thought in light of our survey of the treatment of 'ontology' in international 
thought, synthesising the insights gleamed so far with the aim of situating what 
will principally be a contribution to critical international thought within a broader 
context of 'normative' and 'ontological' approaches to international theory. We 
suggest that, although critical international thought overcomes the weakness of 
other normative international theory by refusing to recognise the foundational 
objectivity of dominant practices and institutions, by virtue of a foundational 
commitment to ethical subjectivity, the most persuasive and promising advocate of 
this position, Andrew Linklater, commits himself to a form of dualism that 
ultimately undermines his own commitment to an ethical and emancipatory 
politics; a claim we substantiate in the next chapter.  
 
 
Critical Theory 
 
 Critical Theory and critical theory are related, though not equivalent, areas of 
inquiry into the social sciences. In the narrow sense, Critical Theory is associated 
with several generations of the west European Marxist tradition, known as the 
Frankfurt School, which includes, but is not limited to, Max Horkheimer, Theodor 
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Adorno, Jürgen Habermas, and Axel Honneth. First defined as such by Max 
Horkheimer in his 1937 essay Traditional and Critical Theory, for Horkheimer, 
theory might be considered 'critical' insofar as it seeks 'to liberate human beings 
from the circumstances that enslave them.'78 Jürgen Habermas, a second generation 
Frankfurt School social theorist, further develops this nascent epistemology in his 
1968 Knowledge and Human Interests wherein he identifies three kinds of 
knowledge - technical, practical, and emancipatory - before claiming that any 
knowledge about society is incomplete if it does not involve an emancipatory 
component.79 
 
 Due to this commitment to criticise and transform all the circumstances that 
enslave human beings, many 'critical theories' in the broader sense have since been 
developed. 80  For this reason, Jay Bernstein's definition of critical theory is 
instructive. 
 
'[C]ritical theory is not a theory of society or a wholly homogenous school of thinkers or a 
method. Critical theory, rather, is a tradition of social thought that, at least in part, takes its 
cue from its opposition to the wrongs and ills of modern societies on the one hand, and the 
forms of theorizing that simply go along with or seek to legitimate those societies on the 
other hand.81  
 
 Critical Theory started making inroads into international theory in the early 
1980s with the publication of seminal articles by Richard K. Ashley and Robert W. 
Cox; Ashley's Political Realism and Human Interests draws on Habermas, while 
Cox's Social Forces, States and World Orders (1981) and his Gramsci, Hegemony 
and International Relations (1983) draw on Gramsci.82 Although both were pivotal 
in the development of critical international relations theory (CIRT), and both draw 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78. Max Horkheimer, Critical Theory (New York: Seabury Press, 1982), 244. 
79. Jürgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests (Boston: Beacon Press, 1972). 
80. James Bohman, “Critical Theory,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. 
Zalta (2012). In what follows, when referring to Critical Theory in the narrow sense, that associated 
with the Frankfurt School, Critical Theory will be capitalised and/or abbreviated to "CT." When 
referring to critical theories in the broader sense, no capitalisation or abbreviation will be employed. 
81. J.M. Bernstein, Recovering Ethical Life: Jürgen Habermas and the Future of Critical Theory 
(London: Routledge, 1995), 11. 
82. Richard K. Ashley, “Political Realism and Human Interests.”; Robert W. Cox, “Social Forces, 
States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory.”; Robert W. Cox, “Gramsci, 
Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in Method,” Millennium: Journal of International 
Studies 12, no. 2 (1983): 162-75. 
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on a tradition of post-Marxist thought, the 'critical' nature of CIRT is best 
conceived in the broader sense of the term described above, since CIRT includes 
approaches that draw on a variety of intellectual sources in order to engage with a 
range of different 'wrongs and ills' in global politics. 
 
 
Critical International Theory   
 
 Given the emancipatory commitments of critical theory and the dominance 
of positivism in IR, critical international theory emerged primarily in response to 
the restrictive understanding of role and purposes of theory as reflected in the 'neo-
neo' orthodoxy. Reacting against the predominance of behaviouralism, where the 
field was largely characterised by methodological assumptions taken over from the 
natural sciences, different areas of contemporary social theory began to be 
deployed in the context of international relations, including Frankfurt School 
critical theory, so-called 'post-structuralism' and 'post-modernism,' neo-
Gramscianism, feminism, and post-colonialism. Whereas positivists would tend to 
regard the purpose of IR to involve the explanation of the workings of the 
international system to policymakers so that they could use that knowledge to their 
own ends, these critical theorists would regard the pursuit of knowledge in IR to 
involve the examination of material and ideational structures that have created and 
sustained the existing order, and to identify alternatives to existing structures in 
order to rid ourselves of its oppressions.83 
 
 For Ronen Palan, writing twenty-five years after the publication of Cox and 
Ashley's articles, one of the principal contributions of CIRT has been to radically 
re-situate the discipline in relation to the other social sciences. He argues that the 
critical tradition abandoned the efforts to establish the study of IR as a separate, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83. For a discussion of the roles of theory and theorists see Marysia Zalewski, “’All These Theories 
Yet the Bodies Keep Piling Up’: Theory, Theorists, Theorising.”. For a critical theoretical account 
of the relation between academics and practitioners see Ken Booth, “A Reply to Wallace,” Review 
of International Studies 23, no. 3 (1997): 371-77; William Wallace, “Truth and Power, Monks and 
Technocrats: Theory and Practice in International Relations,” Review of International Studies 22, 
no. 3 (1996): 301-21. 
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bounded discipline, but sought to situate IR as a component of pan-disciplinary 
studies of global order and change.84 This involved the recognition that IR is 
unlikely to serve as a 'first order discipline,' but will remain a 'derivative 
discipline,' drawing on more fundamental theoretical claims made in other 
disciplines, such as moral philosophy, political economy, sociology, and 
linguistics.85 What it does do, Palan notes, is to address a particular, global, aspect 
of the human condition that tends to be omitted in other social sciences.  
 
 
The Two Key Strands of CIRT 
 
 As Kimberly Hutchings notes, although taking many different forms, critical 
theory 'always distinguishes itself from other forms of theorising in terms of its 
orientation towards change and the possibility of futures that do not reproduce the 
patterns of hegemonic power of the present.'86 She continues that, despite their 
differences, both Ashley and Cox's arguments exhibit the characteristic that makes 
them 'critical' in Cox's terms: 'both are oriented towards the possibility of 
alternative futures, rather than to the perpetuation of the status quo.'87 Since 1981, 
critical international theory has developed in two key ways. Some scholars have 
pursued Cox's historical/sociological path of highlighting different futures for 
international politics, while others have followed Ashley's ethical path, 'in 
particular using the idea of freedom as a vantage point from which to criticise the 
theory and practice of international politics and indicate alternative ways 
forward.'88 Others, such as Andrew Linklater, have operated on a 'twin track' 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84. Ronen Palan, “Transnational Theories of Order and Change: Heterodoxy in International 
Relations Scholarship,” 50. 
85. Ibid., 50,54. 
86. Kimberley Hutchings, “Happy Anniversary! Time and Critique in International Relations 
Theory,” in Critical International Theory After 25 Years, ed. Nicholas Rengger and Ben Thirkell-
White (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 72. 
87. Ibid. Robert W. Cox, “Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations 
Theory,” 87-91. 
88. Kimberley Hutchings, “Happy Anniversary!”, 76. 
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approach, linking historical/sociological, philosophical, and praxeological levels of 
analysis.89  
 
 Straddling both normative and empirical inquiry into world politics, what 
unites these approaches is their commitment to the emancipatory purposes of 
theory and the possibility of alternative global futures. Given its foundational 
commitment to human freedom, to the emancipatory purposes of theory, critical 
international theory can be regarded as a powerful contribution to left-Hegelian 
thought. In contrast to Rawls and Frost, critical international theorists are not 
content to treat dominant practices and institutions as 'objective' ethical 
foundations, but are often motivated instead by the Marxian assumption that 'all 
that is solid eventually melts into air,' and by 'the belief that human beings can 
make more of their history under conditions of their own choosing.'90  
 
 
Andrew Linklater's 'Critical' Approach to International Theory 
 
 Despite articulating critical theoretical concerns in his 1982 book Men and 
Citizens in the Theory of International Relations, which drew on the voluntarist 
tradition of political thought and Hegel's philosophical history, it was not until the 
second edition of the book in 1990 that Linklater explicitly engaged with critical 
theory by adding a postscript on Habermas and Foucault. Following the subsequent 
publications of Beyond Realism and Marxism (1990), two important articles in 
Millennium, and his influential The Transformation of Political Community (1998), 
it is with good cause that Andrew Linklater is considered to be 'the foremost 
critical theorist of international relations.'91 Given transformations in the material 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89. Ibid. Andrew Linklater, “The Next Stage in International Relations Theory: A Critical-
Theoretical Point of View,” Millennium-Journal of International Studies 21, no. 1 (1992): 77-98; 
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Westphalian Era (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998). 
90. Andrew Linklater, “The Achievements of Critical Theory,” in International Theory: Positivism 
and Beyond, ed. Ken Booth Steve Smith, and Marysia Zalewski (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996), 280. 
91. Andrew Linklater, “Dialogue, Dialectic and Emancipation in International Relations At the End 
of the Post-War Age,” Millennium-Journal of International Studies 23, no. 1 (1994): 119-31; 
Andrew Linklater, Men and Citizens in the Theory of International Relations, 2nd ed. (Basingstoke: 
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conditions of human life, and that humanity is increasingly existing in a state of 
true interdependence, it should not be controversial to claim that 'the future of 
critical theory lies with critical international relations theory, a view subscribed to 
by a number of "noninternational" critical theorists as well as - as you might expect 
- by a number of international critical theorists.'92 It therefore 'seems certain that 
Linklater's influence will grow.'93  
 
 Critical international theorists such as Linklater are not content to remain 
caught within the solipsistic particularism that often characterise other normative 
approaches to international theory.94 Although recognising the particularist nature 
of morality, he also realises that the conservative response of modern political and 
international theory is inadequate for our contemporary (increasingly global) 
political condition. For this reason, while keen to balance the claims of 
particularity with a necessary universalism, Linklater refuses to encounter 
dominant practices and institutions as 'objects,' and develops a broad, historically, 
sociologically, and philosophically informed vantage on contemporary institutions 
and practices in world politics; interventions that are motivated by a commitment 
to contribute to a global politics that would be characterised by greater collective 
responsibility, less inequality, and, ultimately, greater levels of human freedom. It 
is not surprising then, that, in the words of one sympathetic critic: 'critical IR 
theory represents one of the most humane and generally hopeful accounts of 
contemporary world politics available. Its insights are profound and its sensibilities 
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far more interesting than much of what passes for reflection (even theory) in 
international relations more generally.'95  
 
 
The Dualist Philosophical Ontology of Linklater's Universalism 
 
 While Linklater is certainly not the only contributor to the critical project in 
IR, the view taken here is that he is the most comprehensive, powerful, and 
ultimately the most promising advocate of this position. However, despite being 
perhaps the most persuasive international theorist writing today, since both his 
conception of emancipation and his defence of moral universalism are predicated 
on a foundational commitment to ethical subjectivity, Linklater might fall foul of 
the same mistake made by Rawls, Frost, and the critical realists: that is, to rely on 
an ontology of 'things' presupposed as the condition of his international theory, 
rather than an ontology of being. Whereas Frost and Rawls treat their foundational 
ethical commitments as the 'ontological' foundation of their normative claims, and 
critical realists rely on a mind-independent 'intransitive object' to provide the 
'ontological' foundation that warrants their prioritisation of scientific claims about 
world politics, we will argue that Linklater relies on the mind-independent 
existence of the individual human being conceived as ethical subject as the 
'ontological' condition of his approach to CIRT, which warrants his prioritisation of 
universal ethical claims.  
 
 If we manage to demonstrate this in the next chapter, Linklater's foundational 
commitment to ethical subjectivity would amount to a conflation of the ontological 
difference between entities and the being of entities (conceived as ethical 
subjectivity), and would submit him to a form of metaphysical dualism: an 
ontological dualism that treats ethical subjectivity as the essential being of human 
beings (although it manifests itself historically), and an epistemological dualism 
where the individual conceived as ethical subject (i.e., the post-conventional 
discourse agent) is treated as if it were an 'intransitive object' existing 	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independently of the subject's (Linklater's) claim to know it. Consequently, 
although keen to balance the claims of moral particularity with a necessary 
universality, Linklater's claims to universality arise out of an always already 
posited meaning of being (as the historical actualisation of ethical subjectivity) and 
its derivative structuring of the ground (what the human being is: an ethical 
subject/post-conventional discourse agent), upon which it proceeds. This, we will 
contend, is a contradictory and inappropriate basis for an ethical and emancipatory 
cosmopolitanism.  
 
 
A Note on Epistemology  
 
 For this reason, as well as the Heideggerian ones he offers, we concur with 
Michel's call for a deeper treatment of 'seemingly ontological primitives such as 
subjectivity and objectivity.' 96  The strength of Jackson's position lies in his 
demonstration that critical realism's approach to ontology, to the 'intransitive 
object,' is premised on a mind-world dualism, a foundational split between the 
subject and object that occurs between mind and world. The strength of Michel's 
position lies in his criticism that dualist approaches to knowledge, approaches that 
rely on an epistemological or ontological foundationalism, conflate the ontological 
difference between entities and the being of entities. While ontological 
foundationalist (realist) approaches treat the object as something that has a mind-
independent existence, epistemological foundationalist (idealist) approaches insist 
that the subject is constructive of the world objects: both dualisms conflate the 
ontological difference between the mind-independent existence of entities and our 
mind-dependent understanding of these entities (the being of these entities).  
 
 As Jackson demonstrates, the dualist separation of ontology from 
epistemology, and the subsequent prioritisation of either ontological or 
epistemological questions, depends on this questionable philosophical commitment 
to a mind-world dualism. Due to the ontological aspects of Heidegger’s argument, 	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we agree with Michel that Heidegger can most certainly can lead us to a deeper 
appreciation of 'seemingly ontological primitives such as subjectivity and 
objectivity.'97 However, since Heidegger claims to be uninterested in the problem 
of knowledge, in what we now call epistemology, he cannot take us much further; 
for that we need Hegel.98  
 
 Michel's criticism of critical realism is that their dualist commitment to the 
'objectivity' of intransitive objects leads it to overestimate the significance of 
science as a human potentiality, as scientific discourse can only lead us to a 
specific kind of knowledge: knowledge about entities, and not the being of entities, 
which is disclosed through language.99 Presumably, since scientific discourse only 
allows the entities under consideration to appear as scientific objects, recognising 
that language is not a neutral toolset for us to make 'objective' statements about the 
world, but is vitally important in making the ontological realm intelligible, means 
that we have to denounce the epistemological relativism that was the result of 
Wendt's intervention into the Third Debate, since more discursively sensitive forms 
of inquiry would be less likely to conflate the ontological difference, and thus 
allow the being of beings to be disclosed more authentically. Whilst not disputing 
Michel's subsequent advocacy of a renewed focus on the nature and function of 
language, this focus reflects the interest in language in post-Husserlian 
phenomenology, especially in Heidegger's later works.100 However, this is to 
overlook a more fruitful phenomenological approach to epistemology, which can 
be found in German idealism; specifically, in Hegel.101 
 
 
Hegel: A Phenomenological Constructivist Approach to Epistemology 
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  Michel's rejection of the representationalist approach to knowledge found in 
critical realism is based upon a critique and solution found in post-Husserlian 
phenomenology. Arguably though, the representationalist approach to knowledge 
'reached a high point in the critical philosophy, where Kant demonstrated the 
inability to show the world as it is rather than how it appears.'102 Kant, who initially 
espouses a representational approach to knowledge, later rejects it and develops a 
constructivist approach in its stead, based upon the claim that in some sense we 
'construct' the object of knowledge. Despite calling for a phenomenological 
epistemology, Kant never developed one; a task that was taken up by Hegel, who 
reformulates Kant's a priori constructivism as a posteriori. 103  As Rockmore 
explains, Hegel’s view of knowledge is constructivist in three senses:  
 
[F]irst, knowledge arises in an ongoing historical process in which we construct 
conceptual frameworks based on prior experience that we test against later experience. 
Second, we routinely alter these frameworks when they fail to fit experience; and to alter 
the framework alters the conceptual object. Third, since cognitive objects depend on the 
conceptual framework, a change in the framework results in a change in the object.104 
 
 In contrast to the representationalist approach, where the split between 
subject and object occurs between mind and world, Hegel's constructivist 
epistemology involves the view that the split between subject and object occurs 
within consciousness, and that we only know cognitive objects because we 
construct them on the basis of phenomena that appear to consciousness: a 
constructive process that is subordinate to the interaction between human beings 
situated within historical processes 'in which we come to know the world and 
ourselves.'105 Importantly then, rather than being established through a simple 
correspondence between mind and world, 'truth,' 'objectivity,' subject-object unity, 
or what Hegel calls 'absolute knowledge,' is never fully achieved, but is perpetually 
deferred in an ongoing process within consciousness whereby increasingly 
adequate accounts of reality emerge.  	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Mind/World and Mind-Independent Real 
 
 According to scientific realism, an approach to knowledge predicated on 
mind-world dualism, the split between subject and object occurs between mind and 
world, where the 'intransitive object' is seen to have a mind-independent 
('objective') existence. In contrast, Hegel's phenomenological constructivism, as it 
has been presented here, calls for a further distinction to be drawn between ‘mind’, 
'world', and the ‘mind-independent real’. Since subject and object are both 
constructed through the activity of consciousness, such a position involves mind-
world monism because mind and world are not independent: cognitive objects are 
constructed historically and are fundamentally dependent on 'mind' (Geist). This 
does not, however, mean that we know nothing of reality; it does not require that 
we subscribe to anti-realism, a charge Wight and Patomäki level against both 
positivism and post-positivism, since there remains a dualism between mind/world 
and the mind-independent real, where the latter 'appears' to consciousness.106 
While we are able to construct increasingly adequate accounts of the mind-
independent real, what we actually know is the mind-dependent cognitive object, 
not the entity that exists in the mind-independent real. It is the appearance of the 
mind-independent real to consciousness that establishes the condition of 
falsifiability, thus enabling the possibility of scientific knowledge.  
 
 This further distinction between mind/world and mind-independent real is 
responsive to the ontological difference. While entities have a mind-independent 
reality, the being of those entities, our understandings of them, which remain 
reliant on mind-dependent conceptual frameworks, are not. From this perspective, 
the problem with dualist approaches to social inquiry is that by taking the subject-
object split as foundational, and occurring between mind and world, they cannot 
recognise the distinction between mind/world and mind-independent real. This 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106. Heikki Patomäki and Colin Wight, “After Postpositivism? The Promises of Critical Realism,” 
216-19. 
PART 1/ Ch.1. ‘Ontological’ Foundations in International Theory 
65 
leads to a collapse of this distinction, the conflation of the ontological difference, 
and the misguided belief that their 'world' largely corresponds to the mind-
independent real: that 'their world' is 'the world.'  
 
 Following a comprehensive survey of phenomenological thought, which, 
despite his claim, does not begin with Husserl, Tom Rockmore has recently 
concluded that Hegel's 'constructivist strategy, which is routinely overlooked in 
phenomenological circles, is arguably the best such approach we currently 
possess.'107 Proceeding from the view that 'knowledge does not concern the world 
in itself but the world for us,' Hegel's approach situates knowledge within the 
historical process and subordinates knowledge construction to the interaction 
between human beings.108 In contrast to Kantian constructivism, a dualist approach 
to knowledge based upon a foundational subject-object split, according to Hegel's 
constructivism, the subject-object split occurs within consciousness; consequently, 
knowledge is not representational, but is socially constructed and arises 
dialectically. Since subject and object are split within consciousness, and not 
between mind and world, neither remain unconditioned. This means that both 
reality (what we consider to be 'real' or 'objective') and knowledge (what the 
epistemic subject knows) emerge out of relations between human beings. There are 
therefore irrevocably plural and historical dimensions to 'subjectivity:' a significant 
point that has not been well-heeded by recent interpretation of Hegel, especially 
ones (like Habermas and Linklater's) that remain closer to Kant.109  
 
 
Conclusions 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
107. Tom Rockmore, Kant and Phenomenology, 213. According to his faculty website at Duquesne 
University, Rockmore is currently preparing a manuscript on Epistemology and Phenomenology 
that will likely explore these themes further. 
108. Ibid., 215. 
109. We will return to an extended discussion of the development of the relation between subject 
and object from Kant to Hegel in Chapter 6, where we also discuss the inadequacy of the concept of 
'subjectivity' in from a Hegelian perspective. 
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 Having began the chapter with Habermas's explanation that ontological 
assumptions and commitments serve as the (often unacknowledged) foundational 
premises of our political and ethical thought, we have surveyed the that role 
ontological foundations play in prominent 'normative' and meta-theoretical 
approaches to international theory. After criticising the dualist philosophical 
commitments that underwrite these approaches, and despite praising Andrew 
Linklater's 'critical' approach to international theory, we suggested that a similarly 
misguided foundationalism might be at play in Linklater's work.  
 
 We established that, by taking dominant practices and institutions associated 
with the sovereign state as foundational ethical commitments, normative 
international theorists often attempt to sidestep controversial philosophical 
questions; an evasive strategy that lends credence both to Behr's claim that the 
overwhelming trajectory of thought since the early eighteenth century has been 
geared towards the recognition of the particularity of ontological and 
epistemological interests, and to Walker's claim that modern political theory has 
overwhelmingly produced visions of politics that would be contained within the 
nation-state.  
 
 However, these normative approaches to international theory cannot evade 
the philosophical questions that are raised by its ethical foundations, since treating 
these commitments as foundational commitments, the 'objects' presupposed as the 
condition of subsequent normative claims, invites the evaluation of such 
commitments; we suggested that an ontological evaluation might involve 
questioning whether such ethical foundations can be said to have 'objective' 
existence, and what it means for us to encounter such ethical foundations as 
objects. We then argued that it was not sufficient for us to treat dominant practices 
and institutions associated with the sovereign state as 'objective,' offering human 
freedom as a more basic ontological commitment that might act as the normative 
ideal according to which we could evaluate the (previously foundational) ethical 
commitments that underwrite different normative approaches to international 
theory.  
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 This brought us to a discussion of Hegel, for whom the 'objectivity' of 
institutions and practices is conditional on the relation between these practices and 
the being of the being that encounters them as 'objects.' Put differently, that for 
Hegel the 'objectivity' of these entities is conditional upon their contribution the 
self-actualisation of the human being as a free being: on the self-actualisation of 
freedom in the world. We argued that this foundational Hegelian commitment to 
human freedom, an ontological commitment to the human being as a free being, 
might serve as a more universalist foundation for contemporary (global) politics 
and ethics. Whereas Rawls and Frost assert the particularity of their normative 
claims by limiting them to apply only to human beings qua subjects of a modern 
constitutional democracy, or qua participants in global civil society, a foundational 
ontological commitment to human freedom would apply to human beings qua 
human beings.  
 
 This ontological commitment is an ontological commitment in the fuller 
sense of the term: an ontology of being, rather than one of things. However, we 
argued, attempts to bring ontological reflection into international theory have so far 
overwhelmingly been facile, confined to a discussion of 'things that exist' in IR. 
This, we saw, was the result of Wendt's intervention into the Third Debate, which 
came at the cost of accepting dualist philosophical commitments to a foundational 
mind-world split. This dualism is the condition of being able to split epistemology 
from ontology, and has led to an overvaluation of the status of scientific inquiry in 
world politics, the marginalisation of alternative 'philosophical ontologies,' and the 
virtual disappearance of philosophical ontology from debates in international 
theory. Fortunately though, these dualist assumptions have recently been 
challenged by the likes of Patrick Thaddeus Jackson and Torsten Michel, with 
Michel pointing out that Heidegger distinguishes between beings and being, and 
that proper ontology concerns the latter.  
 
 We then moved on to discuss 'critical' approaches to international thought. 
We saw that, since originally making inroads into international theory in the early 
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1980s following the publication of Richard K. Ashley and Robert W. Cox's 
seminal Millennium articles, CIRT has followed two key paths: the 
historical/sociological path of highlighting different futures for international 
politics, and the normative/ethical path of using the idea of freedom as a vantage 
point from which to criticise the theory and practice of international politics in 
order to indicate alternative ways forward. We learnt that some, such as Andrew 
Linklater, operate a 'twin-track' approach, linking historical/sociological, ethical, 
and praxeological levels of analysis. 
 
 Taking its cues from the wrongs and ills of modern societies, critical theory 
is often self-consciously motivated by a left-Hegelian commitment to human 
freedom. For this reason, and by refusing to encounter dominant practices and 
instructions such as the state as 'objective,' but treating this objectivity as 
conditional upon human freedom, critical approaches to international theory might 
be seen to overcome the central weakness of other normative approaches to 
international theory. However, we concluded by suggesting that, by virtue of his 
foundational commitment to ethical subjectivity, Linklater might ultimately fall 
foul of the same mistake as Rawls, Frost, and the critical realists: that is, to rely on 
an ontological foundation of 'things' as the condition of his approach to 
international theory, an ontology of the ethical subject, rather than of the human 
being as a free being.  
 
 If we succeed in corroborating this claim in the following chapter, Linklater's 
critical approach to international theory would rest on a conflation of the 
ontological difference between beings that exist (human beings) and being of those 
beings (i.e., as ethical subjects / post-conventional discourse agents). This would 
mean that Linklater submits to a form of metaphysical dualism: an ontological 
dualism based on his treatment of the being of human beings as ethical subjects 
(although subjectivity manifests itself historically), and an epistemological dualism 
that treats the human being conceived as ethical subject as a mind-independent 
intransitive object that serves as the 'ontological' foundation of his critical approach 
to international theory. 
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 For these reasons we concurred with Michel's call for a deeper treatment of 
'subjectivity' and 'objectivity' in international thought; yet we claimed that Michel's 
intervention is based on a critique and solution found in post-Husserlian 
phenomenology, and that this overlooks a more fruitful phenomenological 
approach to epistemology that can be found in Hegel. Since the separation of 
epistemology from ontology is predicated on the questionable dualist commitment 
to a foundational split between mind and world (a split that we will argue must be 
regarded as non-foundational, or derivative), and given that Heidegger is 
apparently uninterested in epistemology, while Heidegger can help us with a 
deeper ontological appreciation of the relation between subject and object, both 
epistemologically and ontologically, Hegel is able to take us further.  
 
 Towards the end of the chapter we introduced Hegel's phenomenological 
constructivist epistemology, and saw that according to this approach to knowledge, 
the split between subject and object occurs within consciousness rather than 
between mind and world, whereby cognitive objects are constructed on the basis of 
the appearance of phenomena to consciousness, a process that is subordinate to 
interactions between human beings situated within historical processes. This 
account of knowledge thus calls for a further distinction to be drawn between 
mind, world, and the mind-independent real: a distinction to which dualists must 
remain blind. We explained that this Hegelian view entails mind-world monism, 
because cognitive subject and object both depend on 'mind' (Geist), yet that it 
avoids subscribing to anti-realism, since entities in the mind-independent real exist 
although they only 'appear' to consciousness. Consequently, what we know is the 
cognitive object, not the mind-independent entity; therefore, 'objectivity,' what we 
consider to be 'real,' emerges out of relations between human beings situated 
within historical processes. As a result, there are plural and historical dimensions 
to subjectivity: a point that is not well-heeded in left-Hegelian thought and critical 
international theory, and one that we aim to develop.  
 Chapter 2.  
Ethical Subjectivity in Andrew Linklater's 
Critical International Theory 
 
 
 
 
Introduction. 
 
 Having surveyed a range of prominent contemporary approaches to 
international theory in the previous chapter, where we defended the view that, by 
virtue of their foundational commitment to human freedom, 'critical' approaches to 
international theory represented the most persuasive of these approaches to 
contemporary world politics, we now turn our attention to a sustained engagement 
with the critical approach to world politics that has been developed by Andrew 
Linklater. Through a sympathetic exposition of several of his key works, our aim is 
to demonstrate that Linklater relies on a foundational commitment to ethical 
subjectivity, and our discussion culminates in a philosophical (epistemological and 
ontological) evaluation of this commitment before turning to an evaluation of its 
ethical and emancipatory credentials in Chapter 3.  
 
 We will recall that Linklater is not the only contributor to the critical project 
in international theory, yet that he might be considered to be the most persuasive 
and promising advocate of this position. We will also recall that since the early 
1980s critical approaches to international theory have developed along two key 
paths: a historical/sociological path inaugurated by Cox, and a 
normative/philosophical path, inaugurated by Ashley; Linklater, we claimed, has 
operated a 'twin track' approach, linking philosophical/normative, 
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historical/sociological, and praxeological levels of inquiry: aspects that he refers to 
as the 'tripartite structure' of critical theory.  
 
Given that Linklater's work covers an impressive breadth of reference, 
spread over many important publications, our engagement with his work is 
necessarily limited in scope. Given our problematic, we confine our engagement to 
an analysis of the philosophical/normative aspect of his theory, which we often 
refer to simply as his emancipatory cosmopolitanism. This aspect of Linklater's 
thought is primarily located in his early works: in Men and Citizens, The 
Transformation of Political Community, and a series of related articles. Our 
rationale for foregrounding this aspect of his critical theory is that it provides the 
philosophical justification for his subsequent praxeological and sociological 
analyses; indeed, Linklater explicitly refers to these works as a 'ground clearing 
exercise' in which he 'sought to overcome challenges to the emancipatory project 
of CIRT through the formulation of a philosophical defence of ethical universalism 
that could offer the justification for the formation of cosmopolitan political 
community.'1 Although already evident in outline in Transformation, Linklater's 
later work turns to a more sociologically based analysis that enlists the process 
sociology of Norbert Elias to explore the problem of harm in world politics. 
Besides the pragmatic necessity to limit the scope of our engagement, the view 
taken here, and shared by another recent doctoral thesis in CIRT, is that the 
emancipatory politics of Linklater's early work is, if not lost, considerably 
weakened by his turn to the process sociology of Elias.2 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1. Mark Hoffman, “Restructuring, Reconstruction, Reinscription, Rearticulation: Four Voices in 
Critical International Theory,” Millennium-Journal of International Studies 20, no. 2 (1991), 173. 
2. Shannon Brincat, “Towards an Emancipatory Cosmopolitanism: Reconstructing the Concept of 
Emancipation in Critical International Relations Theory” (Ph.D Thesis, University of Queensland, 
2011), 312,303. Linklater has also contributed to the English School. However, in the interests of 
brevity we will not be engaging with this work here. See Andrew Linklater and Hidemi Suganami, 
The English School of International Relations: A Contemporary Reassessment (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
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Men and Citizens: the Bifurcated Subjectivity of Modern Man 
 
 Linklater's approach to International Relations emerges in Men and Citizens, 
originally his doctoral thesis and first published in 1982; the aim of which is the 
'[r]ecovery of a critical approach to international politics, initiated by Kant and 
Marx (and marginalised by realism and neo-realism).'3 Writing at a time when 
realism, neo-realism, and pluralist approaches to international society were 
dominant in the study of international politics, Linklater draws on the voluntarist 
tradition of political philosophy, most notably Rousseau, Kant, and Hegel, in order 
to recover a critique of the international states-system and to 'seek a non-rationalist 
foundation for the traditional belief in obligations to humanity.'4  
 
 
Man's Bifurcated Subjectivity 
 
 Central to Linklater's argument is the view that the modern subject leads a 
bifurcated existence, between his simultaneous existence as a political being, a 
citizen of a state, and his existence as a moral being by virtue of his humanity. 
 
A very significant part of the history of modern international thought has centred upon 
what may be termed the problem of the relationship between men and citizens. We may 
characterise this problem in different ways as the issue of the proper relationship between 
the obligations which men may be said to acquire qua men and the obligations to which 
they are subject as citizens of particular associations; or, as the question of reconciling the 
actual or potential universality of human nature with the diversity and division of the 
political community.5 
 
This notion of a bifurcated subjectivity, the division between man and citizen, is 
crucial to understanding Linklater's approach to both international theory and 
political theory, since he regards the moral conflict between the obligations of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3. Andrew Linklater, Critical Theory and World Politics: Citizenship, Sovereignty and Humanity 
(London: Routledge, 2007), 30. 
4. Andrew Linklater, Men and Citizens in the Theory of International Relations, 2nd ed. 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1990), xi. 
5. Ibid., x. 
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citizenship and those to humanity to be fundamental to our experience of the 
modern states-system.6  
 
 Claiming that 'any political theory which ignores the problems created by our 
double existence as men and citizens is no longer adequate to the conditions of 
modern political life; for it fails to attempt to harmonise all aspects of modern 
moral and political experience,' one of Linklater's central contentions, both in Men 
and Citizens and in subsequent work, is that a crucial challenge posed to IR theory 
in an era of globalisation is the need to reconcile this problematic.7 The posing and 
answering of this question is seen to be central to the further development of 
international theory, and it leads to 'the establishment of important connections 
between a consolidated political theory of international relations and that 
remarkable tradition of political thought, beginning essentially with Rousseau, 
which is concerned with the enhancement of human freedom.'8 Linklater thus reads 
the reconciliation of these rights to be a continuation of the emancipatory project of 
the Enlightenment, part of the unfinished project of modernity, because it is in the 
name of human freedom that the gap between the universal moral obligations that 
we have as men, and the particular obligations that we have as citizens, may be 
overcome.  
 
 Drawing on the voluntarist tradition of political theory, in Rousseau and Kant 
Linklater finds the outlines of a nascent critical approach to international politics 
that he seeks to recover. Both Rousseau and Kant addressed the problem of our 
simultaneous obligations to humanity and to our compatriots, and both were 
committed to the transformative potential of social and political theory: 'common 
to each writer was the belief that our experience of living in and among sovereign 
states cannot avoid a sense of moral division and political estrangement.' 9 
Rousseau considered modern man to be 'dragged by nature and by men in opposite 
directions', and that the formation of society, where unity is restored to man's 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6. Andrew Linklater, Critical Theory and World Politics: Citizenship, Sovereignty and Humanity, 
16. 
7. Andrew Linklater, Men and Citizens, 36. 
8. Ibid., x-xi. 
9. Ibid., 25. 
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social relations, comes at the expense of the duties that individuals owe to each 
other as members of the larger society that encompasses the whole human race.10 
Yet, for both Rousseau and Kant, modern men were more than simply members of 
states and possessed the capacity to express their freedom in the fundamental 
reorganisation of their international relations: 
 
Their historical experience was not that of being unchanging and unchangeable insiders 
condemned to live within particularistic social systems, but of being self-developing and 
self-directing beings with the possibility of transforming existing relations of intersocietal 
estrangement into relations of familiarity, so completing a process which had begun in the 
ancient world. An unprecedented political project was made possible by the historically 
developed notion of the rights and duties inherent in humans themselves, a concept which 
produced the possibility of fundamentally extending the boundaries of moral and political 
community.11  
 
 Linklater locates the foundations of a modern theory of international 
relations 'within theories that sought to comprehend the nature of man as an 
historical subject, as a self-developing and self-transforming being realising the 
conditions of his freedom,' and claims that several themes follow.12 The first is the 
argument that the division between citizenship and humanity is 'integral to the 
historical movement from attempting to realise autonomy within states to aiming to 
advance autonomy in relations between them.'13 This leads to the further argument 
that a moral community more inclusive than the sovereign state can be defended on 
the basis of human freedom, 'man's unique capacity for self-determination.'14 
 
 
Emancipation & the Reconstruction of Kantian Freedom.  
 
Kant & Moral Freedom 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10. Andrew Linklater, “Hegel, the State and International Relations,” in Classical Theories of 
International Relations, ed. Ian Clark and Iver B. Neumann (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1996), 
197. 
11. Andrew Linklater, Men and Citizens, 26. 
12. Ibid., xii. 
13. Ibid. 
14. Ibid. 
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 It is in Pufendorf and Vattel's theories of natural law that Linklater finds the 
most adequate philosophical defences of modern realist and pluralist international 
society approaches to international politics respectively. He criticises both, 
however, for failing to provide an adequate account of the relationship between the 
contractual rights and duties of citizenship and the idea of humanity. While Vattel 
overcomes weaknesses in Pufendorf's account, his own account of the state 'fails to 
provide a coherent theory of the relationship between the moralities of men and 
citizens.' 15  The various inconsistencies in both their approaches 'are finally 
overcome in the Kantian theory of international relations.'16  
 
 Famously criticising Grotius, Pufendorf and Vattel in Perpetual Peace as 
'tiresome comforters' for foregoing the ideal unity of mankind, for Kant 
'rationalism required a progressivist understanding of international relations which 
conceived the perfectibility of world political organisation as a sublime historical 
goal.' 17  According to Kant, 'all men were bound together by the necessary 
obligation to so arrange their social and political lives that they could gradually 
realise a condition of universal justice and perpetual peace,' because it is by acting 
in accordance with moral principles prescribed by his own reason that 'man asserts 
independence from the natural world and establishes what is distinctively human in 
his nature [...] his uniquely human characteristics, his non-natural being, his 
freedom.'18 For Kant, what then follows is the necessity of radically transforming 
the political world so that all human beings are able to 'live in conformity with the 
imperatives grounded in their common rational nature.'19  
 
 It is our 'unsocial sociability' that for Kant provides the fillip to lift ourselves 
from out of the state of nature and to establish a new kind of freedom, civil 
freedom; a freedom that is expressed in 'legal guarantees for persons and their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15. Ibid., 60. 
16. Ibid. 
17. Immanuel Kant, “Towards Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch,” in Toward Perpetual 
Peace and Other Writings on Politics, Peace, and History, ed. Pauline Kleingeld (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2006), 79. Andrew Linklater, Men and Citizens, 97. 
18. Ibid., 97,99. 
19. Ibid., 99. 
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property.'20 For Kant, the highest expression of human freedom however, is not in 
the mere fact of choice (natural freedom), nor in the establishment of legal 
constraints upon inclination (civil freedom), but in the capacity to exercise self-
constraint and act in conformity with moral imperatives legislated by human 
reason (moral freedom).'21  
 
 Linklater notes that Kant's typology of human freedoms is influenced by 
Rousseau: for both man is most free when living under political conditions where 
they can obey 'the laws which they themselves make.'22 As he explains: ‘[i]n 
Kantian thought, freedom, if governed by a universal principle, “is the one and 
original right that belongs to every human being by virtue of humanity.”'23 The 
argument of Perpetual Peace and Idea for a Universal History is that, like the 
individuals that had emerged from a prior state of nature, man's moral freedom 
eventually obliges states to relinquish their 'wild, lawless freedom' by entering into 
a federation of states based on international right.24 Linklater concludes that 
rationalism thus reaches its zenith in Kant's rational moral universalism and his 
political cosmopolitanism. 
 
 Linklater subsequently discusses the historicist challenges to Kant's 
rationalism and the social contract theorists of Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau, 
challenges that led to the reconstructed defence of particularism in the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries. Linklater recognises that the historicist critique of 
rationalism means that we must reject the rationalist notion of an immutable, 
universal human reason (as relied upon by Kant) and he concedes that historicists 
are right to say that man is socially and historically shaped. However, historicism 
and the resultant relativism are deemed to be self-defeating, because historicism 
'denied ethical universalism while paradoxically proclaiming cultural diversity as a 
universal ideal.'25 Moreover, Linklater claims, the historicist tradition itself failed 	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to provide an adequate alternative theory of international society. 26  The 
combination of these weaknesses lay the groundwork for his own construction of 
an historicist theory of international society, 'in conjunction with an analysis of the 
historical development of human freedom.'27  
 
 
Hegel, the Historical Development of Freedom, and its Embodiment in the 
Ethical State 
 
 Linklater thus engages in a dialectical reading of rationalism and historicism, 
where the ethical absolutism of rationalism and the ethical relativism of historicism 
are sublated in an approach to international society based upon philosophical 
history. From this rationalist-historicist perspective, which is presented as 
dialectically transcending the rationalist-historicist opposition, human reason has a 
history: 'reason is neither uniform nor inevitably plural and diverse; it is 
developmental [...] Ethical absolutism and relativism appear as sides of a false 
dichotomy. Neither offers an account of the growth and transformation of both 
human subjects and the practices in which they are objectified.'28 Importantly, this 
philosophical history allows Linklater to defend the internationalist dimension of 
Kantian thought along historical lines. Recognising that Kant's 'unqualified moral 
and political individualism' is problematic, he argues that 'with suitable 
modification, the more advanced elements of rationalist thinking can be recovered 
by re-locating them within a theory of history.'29  
 
A theory of the historical development of human freedom offers good reasons for the 
belief in obligations to humanity; it also provides the philosophical resources which enable 
us to present a vision of a unified moral and political experience, one which can 
accommodate the fact of obligations to humanity without permitting these to conflict with 
the roles and responsibilities of other communities.'30 
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 Linklater's dialectical treatment of rationalism and historicism is Hegelian in 
method, and his philosophical history draws heavily on Hegel's philosophy of 
history. In particular he draws on Hegel's criticism of Kant that individualism has 
to be located within different forms of social consciousness.31 Linklater's Hegel 
focusses on the emergence and evolution of societies 'that are based upon rational, 
critical thinking,' where 'the development of human freedom is exhibited in man's 
increasing rational control of his self and his environment,' and where 'the 
culmination of this process in modern history is the modern state.'32 Within the 
state, 'this community of rational law-makers, humans realise the triumph of 
thought over nature, and express those capacities (particularly the potentiality for 
free, rational choice) which are specific to human subjects.'33 Nonetheless, Hegel's 
location of freedom within the state poses a challenge to Kant's cosmopolitanism, a 
cosmopolitanism Linklater wishes to retain. His solution, in Men and Citizens and 
in a later piece, Hegel, the State, and International Relations is to deploy a left-
Hegelian argument and draw out cosmopolitan elements that are immanent in 
Hegel's thought. 
 
 
Freedom Beyond the State 
 
 Linklater notes that Hegel regarded cosmopolitanism as 'simultaneously a 
major Western intellectual achievement and a threat to its principal political 
accomplishment which was the modern state.'34 Hegel's advocacy of the state was 
based on his view that 'the state provided the sole context in which human beings 
could unfold their unique capacity for freedom.'35 The ethical state is regarded as 
centrally important to the cause of human freedom under conditions of modernity 
because it had the capacity to institute the 'synthesis of modern individualistic 
rights proclaimed by reason (Moralität) and the strong affective ties towards 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31. Ibid., 144. 
32. Ibid., 147. Linklater's reading of Hegel is challenged in Part 3. 
33. Ibid. 
34. Andrew Linklater, “Hegel, the State and International Relations,” 200. 
35. Ibid., 194. 
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specific communities (Sittlichkeit).'36 Linklater's criticism of Hegel enlists the help 
of E.H. Carr, for whom Hegel was too complacent about war, and failed to realise 
that the modern state could in fact cancel the freedom of its own citizens: two 
cogent criticisms based in experiences of states in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century that bore witness to a crisis of modern state structures, 
indications of which began emerging in the 1870s, but became most pronounced 
between 1914 and 1939. These experiences rendered the exclusivity of Hegel’s 
‘ethical state’ problematic, and lead Linklater to a defence of the contemporary 
relevance of Hegel based upon a left-Hegelian interpretation of his thought; one 
that rightly notes that Hegel's commitment to freedom meant that we would 
eventually move beyond the sovereign state.37 
 
 As we saw above, Hegel's defence of the ethical state is based upon the view 
that it was the most adequate actualisation of human freedom: this was its 
rationality. However, in the context of international relations, 'the immediate 
problem arises of the apparent contradiction between the principle of human 
freedom, which demands the rational organisation of political life, and the actual 
operations of the international states-system, the coercive or uncontrolled relations 
which pertain to the life of states.'38 For this reason, 'when compared to Kant, 
Hegel has often been accused of failing to support the ideal of a universal 
community which could uphold the freedom of all humanity. The criticism is that 
Hegel failed to acknowledge that the process of recognising the freedom of the 
other could be extended further than he had realised into the domain of 
international relations.'39  
 
 Although he justifiably questions whether Hegel goes far enough, Linklater 
rightly defends Hegel by noting that he did not just detect reason in the domestic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36. Ibid., 195-96. 
37. Andrew Linklater, Men and Citizens, 149. 
38. Ibid., 148. 
39. Andrew Linklater, “Hegel, the State and International Relations,” 199. 
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institutions of the state, but also in the state's external relations.40 He later cites 
more recent Hegelian thought, from Shlomo Avineri and Anne Paolucci, in 
defence of this claim: for Avineri, Hegel envisaged a world in which 'sovereignty 
would diminish and the resort to force would disappear,' while 'Paolucci credits 
Hegel with envisaging a universal international society in which all free peoples 
are treated as equals.'41 He goes on to note that in some accounts, 'Hegel appears as 
a revolutionist precursor of Fukuyama. [For instance,] Smith's recent interpretation 
notes that, for Hegel, history is the process of mankind's progressive emancipation 
from those forces that inhibit the granting of respect to other individuals, peoples, 
and cultures [...] Following Kojève, this interpretation maintains that Hegel 
believed the modern state would come to encompass the whole of humanity, thus 
ending Andersein, otherness.' 42  Linklater's central point is that Hegel looked 
beyond the loosely organised society of states to the possibility of the future 
dialectical development of freedom in international relations, although the form 
and content of how it might happen is not clear. Rather than pursuing this line of 
inquiry, Linklater criticises Hegel for his 'passive philosophical disposition,' and 
swiftly moves onto a discussion of Marx.43  
 
 
Marx & Political Freedom: the Universal Society of Men 
 
 The Marxist challenge to Hegel and Kant draws attention to the fact that a 
focus on legal and political practices in the development of human freedom is 
insufficient, and that we also need to focus on the economic and social conditions 
of freedom. This suggests that we need to investigate the nature of international 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40. 'Among the rational practices developed in the modern world Hegel included the fact that states 
extend recognition to one another and agree to conduct their hostilities without harming 'persons in 
their private capacity' Andrew Linklater, Men and Citizens, 148. 
41. Andrew Linklater, “Hegel, the State and International Relations,” 193,199. 
42. Ibid., 199. 
43. Andrew Linklater, Men and Citizens, 155. If he had pursued this line, we might expect him to 
explore the implications of Axel Honneth's reworking of Hegelian recognition theory for global 
politics, as has been done recently in Brincat's excellent thesis. Axel Honneth, The Struggle for 
Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1996); 
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economic life, and possibly transform the international economic system so that it 
better satisfies the goals of human freedom, for '[i]f freedom refers to that set of 
circumstances in which individuals collaborate to maintain conditions favourable 
to their own development, then it ought to include cooperation to ensure individual 
rights of access to a basic level of economic and social resources. For the freedom 
of individuals or communities is simply formal in the absence of the capacity to 
exercise that freedom.44  
 
 On the Marxist view, 'freedom is understood as global control of social 
relations in order to maximise species-powers [where ...] international relations as 
relations between particularist forms of organisation give way to a universal 
society in which members equalise their access to material resources subject to 
their common ownership and collective control.'45 This is becasue, for Marx, men 
can only realise their freedom within a properly humanised society, where humans 
go beyond intersocietal estrangement and abolish the competitive and conflictual 
types of interaction that have prevailed between particularist social groups. This 
conception of international society is seen by Linklater to overcome the 
shortcomings within the Kantian or Hegelian systems.  
 
 
The 'Scale of Forms' 
 
 By providing a yardstick with which to judge actual historical arrangements 
of international society according to an ascending 'scale of forms,' where different 
social formations are judged according to their realisation of the conditions of 
actualised human freedom, Linklater's philosophical history of the progressive 
development of human freedom is used to provide the foundations of a critical 
theory of international relations.46 In Men and Citizens, freedom is understood as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44. Andrew Linklater, Men and Citizens, 200. 
45. Ibid., 159-60. 
46. Linklater borrows the notion of a 'scale of forms' from Collingwood and, in hindsight, 
recognises that it ‘smacked’ of nineteenth century ideas of civilisational superiority. He later 
abandons it, replacing it with how the harm principle has been reflected in history. Shannon 
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the 'realisation and expression of the notion of self-determination,' which involves 
'overcoming various forms of intersocietal estrangement' and ultimately, the 
'exercise of control over the totality of social and political relations.'47  
 
 The erosion of intersocietal estrangement is regarded the development of a 
nascent international ethical life, whereby international relations are gradually 
humanised, ultimately leading to the realisation of the unity of the species: the 
achievement, in Kantian terms, of a 'universal kingdom of ends.'48 This process 
involves human subjects transcending their citizenship, widening their sphere of 
moral concern, and recognising the claims of humanity upon them. 49  The 
individual thereby develops a 'moral relationship with his species,' achieving 'an 
advanced form of moral consciousness, an intimation of a higher kind of 
international political life' and subsequently 'changes in the structure of political 
life become essential.'50  
 
 Accordingly, Linklater envisages the emergence of a more rational form of 
international political life and the development of universal rules of political co-
existence, where we might have rights against each other as men as well as 
citizens. 51  He argues that this expansion of moral community requires the 
surrender of sovereignty, the dissolution of the state's right to use force, replacing 
the balance of power, and a more centralised and principled form of international 
government; in short, the institutionalised expression of the Kantian idea of a 
universal community of ends.52 Heeding Marx's criticism of Hegel, this would also 
require the transformation of economic and social conditions so that individuals 
would have access to a basic level of economic and social resources.53 Ultimately 
then, it is through the increasing recognition of and adherence to universal 
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47. Ibid., xii. 
48. Ibid., 195,xiii. 
49. Ibid., 188. 
50. Ibid., 199. 
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obligations that Linklater hopes we may overcome 'the bifurcated nature of modern 
moral and political experience,' and thereby lead 'morally unified lives.'54 
 
 
The Triple Transformation of Political Community  
 
Universal Moral Inclusion 
 
 While Men and Citizens was concerned with the problem of citizenship, and 
specifically, how the benefits accrued through citizenship can be reconciled with 
the universal obligations to humanity, Linklater's later work, The Transformation 
of Political Community, is concerned with the problem of community; in 
particular, with the normative, sociological, and praxeological analysis of practices 
of inclusion and exclusion in international society. This move is foreshadowed in 
the second edition of Men and Citizens, published in 1990, in which he adds a 
postscript on Habermas and Foucault. As we saw in the previous chapter, 
following the publication of the first edition in 1982, critical social theories started 
making contributions to international theory, and this postscript explores the debate 
between Critical Theory and anti-foundationalism through the work of Habermas 
and Foucault.  
 
 Linklater is particularly complementary about the empirical nature of 
Foucault’s work, which – in light of CT's concern with methodology, philosophy 
of the social sciences, and communicative action and rationality – he regards as 
outpacing CT in its analyses of constraints on human freedom.55 Nonetheless, he 
considers the work of both Foucault and Habermas to be capable of lending 
support to the original project of Men and Citizens. Foucault’s empirical work is 
seen to complement Habermas’s reconstruction of historical materialism, since the 
latter incorporates moral aspects of human development; both are read as 
extending the themes developed in Men and Citizens, as co-contributors to 'the 	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project of developing a critical sociology of moral development in international 
relations.' 56  Foucault's discussion of moral subjectification in The History of 
Sexuality, for instance, leads Linklater to discuss the possibility of an historical 
analysis of the construction of the 'moral other' in international politics, and how 
the structures and practices of modern international relations might be changed in 
the future 'to include those who have been systematically excluded.'57 This sheds 
light on the basic idea that unites Men and Citizens, Transformation and Linklater's 
later work on harm: the idea of universal moral inclusion and the extension of 
rights to 'outsiders.' 
 
 The last word in Men and Citizens is given to 'the two great exponents of 
moral or political universalism within the tradition of philosophical history,' Kant 
and Marx. 58  Yet the subsequent cosmopolitan/communitarian debate and the 
'postmodern' anti-foundationalism of writers such as Michel Foucault and Richard 
Rorty leads Linklater to recognise that the universalist vision of international 
society presented in Men and Citizens is too substantive and potentially exclusive 
of difference. Responding to these challenges Linklater restates his position in The 
Transformation of Political Community, a 'magisterial work' that is 'not simply the 
best account yet available of the contribution critical theory can make to 
International Relations, [but] the most impressive account of international theory in 
general to have been produced in Britain since Bull's Anarchical Society.'59  
 
 
Restating the Universal Moral Community 
 
 Although moving away from the more substantive aspects of their 
arguments, Kant and Marx remain, and still remain, Linklater's 'two great 
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57. Ibid., 220-221,226. 
58. Ibid., 205. 
59. This acclaim is from Steve Smith and Chris Brown, and can be found on the back cover to 
Transformation. 
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luminaries.' 60  The Kantian ideal of a universal moral community, in which 
humanity might be united 'as co-legislators in a universal kingdom of ends' and the 
Marxist ideal of universal association, with its commitment to the 'critique of the 
realms of alienation, exploitation and estrangement' that obstruct this ideal, are 
both updated and extended through Habermas's discourse ethics and his 
reconstruction of historical materialism. 61  In short, Linklater reconceives his 
cosmopolitanism along communicative lines; the end-point of the emancipatory 
project becoming the realisation of a discursively based cosmopolitan human 
community, where emancipation is understood as freedom from unjustifiable 
forms of exclusion through inclusion within a discursively conceived universal 
human community.62  
 
 The Kantian and Marxian ideal of a universal society of moral and political 
association remains, but Habermas's normative ideal of the universal 
communication community replaces the philosophical history of the development 
of human freedom as the standard of social criticism. Reflecting the dialogic turn 
in critical society theory, which puts the normative ideal of expanding the realm of 
social interaction governed by open dialogue front and centre, the goal of a 
universal communication community, or, a 'universal dialogic community in which 
the justice of all modes of exclusion is tested in open dialogue' is seen to at once 
remain true to Kantian and Marxian ideals, and to do what is necessary to update 
and extend them.63 Although Linklater concedes that such a universal community 
might be an unattainable goal, it nonetheless serves as a standard of social 
criticism, something to aspire to and to approach as nearly as we can.64 The 
ultimate purpose is the goal of a future global society that rests upon the consent of 
each and every member of the human race and furthers 'the autonomy of all human 	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beings,' rather than one perpetually 'determined by considerations of national 
power or by a concern for maintaining order and stability between the most 
powerful or potentially disruptive states.'65 
 
 
A Defence of Universalism 
 
 Responding to anti-foundational criticisms of universalism, which he 
discusses mainly with reference to the challenge posed by Richard Rorty, Linklater 
recognises that a cosmopolitan ethic can itself be exclusive of difference. 
According to Linklater’s interpretation of these anti-foundational challenges to 
universalism, these criticisms of cosmopolitanism centre around a rejection of the 
possibility of an Archimedean viewpoint from which a conception of the good life 
might be identified. 66  Linklater’s solution to this problem is to conceive 
universality as the ideal of universal inclusion within discourse communities, 
where the systematically excluded might be engaged through dialogue. Linklater’s 
rationale for this is as follows: 
 
It is not universalism as such which should be at issue in contemporary debates about 
ethics and difference but one specific form in which it is supposed that individual reason 
can discover an Archimedean moral standpoint that transcends the distortions and 
limitations of time and place. The possibility of occupying an Archimedean standpoint 
which permits objective knowledge of permanent moral truths which bind the whole of 
humanity is a claim that has long been denied - by Hegel's famous critique of the Kantian 
categorical imperative, to cite one of the most influential examples. It is a claim which 
many of the leading strands of contemporary social and political theory are correct to 
deny. Precisely where this leaves moral argument is the intriguing question.67 
 
 Linklater's answer to this 'intriguing question' is to distinguish between thick 
and thin versions of cosmopolitanism and to identify not with a thick 
cosmopolitanism that 'believes in determining the precise content of the good life,' 
but with a thin cosmopolitanism that has 'no fixed and final vision of the future.'68 
His claim is that such a thin cosmopolitanism would be more radical than ones that 	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seek to incorporate all human beings into a single form of life because it would 
‘support the development of wider communities of discourse which make new 
articulations of universality and particularity possible.'69  
 
 By advocating a thin cosmopolitanism Linklater seeks to establish common 
ground – shared by foundationalists and anti-foundationalists alike – which he 
locates in their shared commitment to a philosophical ethos of critique that is 
concerned with problematising the practices of exclusion. 70  The point of 
divergence, however, lies in whether 'our' universals can lay claim to universal 
normative validity and therefore be binding on persons from other cultures. Anti-
foundationalists such as Rorty deny that this is the case. 71  Conversely, 
foundationalists such as Kant and Habermas 'regard the evolution of a critical 
orientation towards exclusion and difference as exemplifying progress towards a 
rational morality with universal significance.'72 It is on this foundationalist belief 
that Linklater proceeds to build his approach to a cosmopolitan community of 
humankind. 
 
 Linklater takes issue with Rorty's argument that analyses of duties to others 
that rest on some notion that others have rights simply by virtue of being human 
are 'weak' and 'unconvincing,' arguing instead that sometimes the strongest defence 
a culture can give for recognising the rights of outsiders involves nothing other 
than an appeal to common humanity.73 Linklater wishes to suggest that there are 
duties that members of states owe to others by virtue of their humanity alone and 
that other cultures might also assent to this claim. He is aware that: 
 
Writers such as Rorty argue that an ethic which is critical of exclusion may be significant 
in the life of the liberal community but it cannot be assumed to have any binding authority 
on the rest of the human race. Each community can work out the logic of its own cultural 
beliefs and some may impose cosmopolitan checks upon the ethnocentric tendencies 
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which reside within their own practices and are the source of profound moral unease. But 
none can issue moral requirements which others are obliged to obey.74 
 
Nonetheless, he wants to argue that certain appeals to shared humanity may indeed 
be able to lay claim to transcultural validity; that there are duties that members of 
states owe to others by virtue of their humanity alone, and that other cultures might 
also assent to this universalist claim.75 Nevertheless, this shared ground could only 
be established through dialogue, because 'what counts as a compelling reason for 
resisting practices of exclusion in a Western society cannot be assumed to hold 
automatically for all forms of life.'76  
 
 Consequently, in Linklater's updated and restated approach to CIRT 
'[u]niversality takes the form of a responsibility to engage others, irrespective of 
their racial, national and other characteristics, in open dialogue about matters 
which impinge on their welfare [... because] transcultural validity can only be 
established by bringing judgements about good reasons for actions before a 
tribunal which is open to all others.'77 His thin universality is thus a defence of the 
ideal that every human being has an equal right to participate in dialogue in order 
to determine the principles of inclusion and exclusion that might govern global 
politics. 78  This, he argues, is 'crucial for the radical intensification of the 
democratic impulses which are inherent in modernity but are frequently stifled or 
cancelled by competing logics of normalisation and control,' and it is in this way, 
following Habermas, that Linklater distinguishes his position from Kant's.79 
 
Kant believed that separate moral agents had a duty to ask if it was possible to universalise 
the maxim underlying any action. Judgments concerning universalisability involved a 
process of private ratiocination for individuals rather than any dialogic encounter with 
others. Habermas argues that the test of universalisability is found not in private reason but 
in associating with others in wider communities dedicated to open and unconstrained 
dialogue.80  
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The Triple Transformation of Political Community 
 
 The Habermasian normative ideal of undistorted dialogue thus sets the 
trajectory of Linklater's mature emancipatory cosmopolitanism. The development 
of dialogic communities in world politics requires, Linklater argues, a radical 
agenda of cosmopolitan reform that he outlines as the 'triple transformation' of 
political community: transformations that would revolve around commitments to 
produce arrangements that are more universalistic, secure greater respect for 
cultural differences, and which entail stronger commitments to the reduction of 
social and economic inequalities, nationally and internationally.81 This is the 
central thesis of Transformation.  
 
 At a minimum this 'triple transformation' of post-Westphalian political 
communities would require promoting more inclusive dialogue in international 
politics so as to promote the transnationalisation of democracy, while maximally it 
would involve the institutionalisation of discourse ethics in global relations by 
establishing international and global institutions conducive to the expansion of 
‘dialogic communities’ in world politics. Both necessitate the transcendence of 
state sovereignty and 'measures to reduce or eradicate the asymmetries of power 
and wealth which exist within states and in the global economic and political 
system.'82  
 
 Such a transformation of political community would lead, not to the demise 
of the state, but to its reconstruction: towards new forms of political authority and 
citizenship where 'sovereignty, territoriality, nationality, and citizenship are no 
longer welded together to define the nature and purpose of political association,' 
where multiple political authorities and loyalties could develop, and where states 
would assume responsibilities that they have avoided in the past.83 Ultimately then, 
the aim is nothing less than the end of the Westphalian era, where societies would 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81. Ibid., 3,106,109. 
82. Ibid., 109. 
83. Ibid., 44,45. 
PART 1/ Ch.2. Ethical Subjectivity in Andrew Linklater’s CIRT 
90 
no longer confront each other as geopolitical rivals in the condition of anarchy, and 
where domination and force is replaced by dialogue and consent, so as to ensure 
that 'global arrangements have the consent of a greater proportion of the human 
race.'84 
 
 
The Tripartite Structure of Critical Theory: Normativity, 
Sociology, & Praxeology 
 
 The emancipatory ethical vision initiated in Men and Citizens and updated 
through Habermas also receives concrete analysis of the prospects of its realisation 
in Transformation. Echoing Kant's recognition of the necessary passage from 
ethics to sociology in his connection of 'the normative defence of perpetual peace 
with a sociological account of the prospects for its realisation' in his essays 
Perpetual Peace and Idea for a Universal History, Linklater argues that there are 
three tasks for any critical theory: the normative or philosophical, the sociological, 
and the practical or praxeological, which he later refers to as the tripartite structure 
of critical theory.85  
 
 We have seen that the normative ideal of dialogue sets the trajectory of 
Linklater's emancipatory cosmopolitanism, but for Linklater critical theory requires 
more; specifically, it requires 'modes of sociological investigation which analyse 
the prospects for achieving progress towards higher levels of universality and 
difference in the modern world' and it requires praxeological reflection on the 
'resources within existing social arrangements which political actors can harness 
for radical purposes.'86 Praxeology, Linklater explains, is not concerned with 
strategy or tactics, 'but with revealing that new forms of political community are 
immanent within existing forms of life,' and turning these progressive dimensions 
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against unnecessary constraints.87 Hedley Bull's discussion of alternatives to the 
states system is enlisted to this end.88  
 
 
A New Medievalism  
 
 Linklater enlists Bull's notion of a 'New Medievalism,' 'a modern and secular 
equivalent of the kind of universal political organisation that existed in Western 
Christendom in the Middle Ages,' as an alternative to the Westphalian state; a 
central characteristic of this form of organisation is 'a system of overlapping 
authority and multiple loyalty.'89 According to Bull, 'we might imagine [...] that the 
government of the United Kingdom had to share its authority on the one hand with 
authorities in Scotland, Wales, Wessex and elsewhere, and on the other hand with 
a European authority in Brussels and world authorities in New York and Geneva, 
to such an extent that the notion of its supremacy over the territory and people of 
the United Kingdom had no force.'90 
 
 Bull suggests that these crisscrossing loyalties and overlapping authorities 
might help avoid the classic dangers of the sovereign states by holding all peoples 
together in a universal society, while at the same time avoiding the problems 
associated with the concentration of power in a world government.91 Given the 
trend towards regionalism in many areas of the world, Linklater proposes this 
neomedievalism as a model of post-Westphalian political organisation that may be 
emulated across the globe, with Europe's neomedievalism providing an ideal of a 
more inclusive polity that has moved from a system of states where rivalry and 
suspicion prevail, beyond even a more solidarist society of states, where states 
increasingly cede exclusive territorial sovereignty and engage in cooperative 
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political frameworks that encourage new relationships between sub-state, national 
and transnational authorities and solidarities.92  
 
  
The Extension of Moral Community 
 
 Linklater argues that one of the central achievements of the Westphalian 
nation-state has been to release societal potentials for achieving levels of 
universality and difference within the state, yet that processes of globalisation and 
fragmentation are eroding the traditional conceptions of the form of community 
within which such a balance has been achieved. He argues that the moral 
significance of national boundaries is being reduced, and that while this is creating 
new threats and challenges relating to deepening material inequality and the 
extreme particularism of ethnic fragmentation, it also creates 'unprecedented 
opportunities' for overcoming the 'moral deficits' of states that have previously 
been insufficiently universalistic. As a result Linklater argues that, by virtue of 
their commitment to the modern conception of citizenship, post-Westphalian era 
states are obliged by that commitment to increase levels of universality and 
diversity through their participation in the creation of institutional frameworks that 
widen the boundaries of dialogic communities beyond the state.93 To this end, 
post-Westphalian states are then obliged to participate in one of three modes of 
international society: 
 
to cooperate with radically different states to establish and maintain a pluralist 
international society; [...] to collaborate with states which have similar conceptions of 
human rights to create a solidarist international society; and they have the more far-
reaching obligation when dealing with like-minded states which expose one another to 
high levels of transnational harm to join them in designing post-Westphalian 
arrangements.94  
 
 This move towards post-Westphalian political organisation is to be 
accompanied by the creation of new forms of citizenship, the task of which is 'to 
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project the achievements of national citizenship out into the sphere of international 
relations.'95 While the transnational citizenship of European states is cited as 
progress in the right direction, we are urged to look beyond transnational 
citizenship rights found in Europe towards a form of cosmopolitan citizenship.  
 
 Although recognising with Falk that 'global citizenship' smacks of the 
sentimental and the absurd, he argues that it is best understood not as subjection to 
a common world political authority, but as a way of uncoupling citizenship from 
the sovereign state so that a sense of moral obligation is felt to all members of the 
species.96 Linking cosmopolitanism and citizenship serves the dual purpose of 
maintaining that states are not the only moral agents in world politics, and that 
individuals and non-state actors have moral duties to the rest of humanity that their 
membership in sovereign communities has consistently overshadowed.97 More 
broadly it links individuals to humanity, and would represent a shift away from our 
cosmopolitan obligations being conceived as charity, to ones of duty.  
 
 Linklater accordingly differentiates between thin conceptions of 
cosmopolitan citizenship, which may lead to action out of compassion for the 
vulnerable, and a thick conception of citizenship that would attempt to influence 
structural conditions of asymmetries of power and wealth, before arguing that 
cosmopolitan citizenship requires latter, and therefore international joint action to 
ameliorate the condition of the most vulnerable in world society.98 By reconciling 
the universal moral commitment to engage all in dialogue with political loyalties to 
nation-states, these praxeological aspects of the post-Wesphalian order would thus 
contribute to the desire originally expressed in Men and Citizens: the reconciliation 
of modern man's bifurcated subjectivity through the promotion of the 'the Kantian 
vision of a universal kingdom of ends, and the parallel enterprise of realising the 
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neo-Marxian ideal of overcoming asymmetries of power and wealth, [which] form 
the essence of cosmopolitan citizenship.'99  
 
 In Linklater's later work the explicit normativity and praxeology of 
Transformation takes a back seat to a historical sociological analysis of practices 
of inclusion and exclusion. This turn to sociology reflects comments made in the 
postscript to Men and Citizens noting that Foucault's empirical analysis outstripped 
the philosophical concerns that preoccupied Critical Theorists. While Habermas 
was originally judged by Linklater as the true inheritor of Kant and Marx for 
developing both the normative ideal of undistorted communication and providing a 
more adequate account of social evolution based on the idea of social learning, in 
his later work this mantle is occupied by Elias.100  
 
 Linklater's later empirical analyses draw on Elias's process sociology of 
civilising processes to develop an historical sociology of the problem of harm in 
world politics, a turn that was influenced by an interest in the emancipatory 
potential of the harm principle that was stimulated by passages in Marx's The 
German Ideology. 101  The significance of this for world politics lies in the 
possibility that the reduction of harm in world politics may lead to the gradual 
pacification of human social relations, but for Linklater it also serves to 
demonstrate the shared human capacity for collective moral learning, and thus the 
potential for moral progress in world politics. As against more positive forms of 
emancipation, Shannon Brincat notes that this focus is surprising, and argues that 
the emancipatory politics of Linklater's early work is lost in this move to Elias, a 
move that consequently represents a weakening of the emancipatory project. This 
view is shared here.102 
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Ethical Subjectivity in Linklater's Emancipatory 
Cosmopolitanism 
 
Linklater's Emancipatory Cosmopolitanism 
 
 An egalitarian universalism that treats individual persons as connected yet 
distinct and morally equal units of the human species provides the élan that drives 
Linklater's approach to CIRT. We see this in the concern to reconcile the 
obligations of citizenship and humanity in Men and Citizens and in the advocacy of 
cosmopolitan dialogic communities as a strategy by which inclusion within a 
universal moral community might be approximated in Transformation.  
 
 Adopting a broad vantage on the issue of moral equality of human beings, 
Linklater's normative commitment leads him to question, what, if anything, 
justifies practices of exclusion that serve to establish a differential equality 
between citizens and individuals qua individuals. While the achievement of 
citizenship rights are defended as an emancipatory political achievement, the 
nature of this achievement remains essentially ambivalent and incomplete until 
these positive freedoms are reconciled with broader obligations owed to humanity 
in general. The freedoms achieved through citizenship remain incomplete if those 
citizens remain bound by the structural constraints of neo-realism, and they are 
ambivalent if they negatively impact on the freedom of those excluded, such as in 
the pursuit of one-sided goals: national defence, or economic growth at another's 
expense, for example. In short, positive freedoms must not come at the expense of 
those excluded. The goal then of CIRT, as Linklater sees it, is to contribute to the 
gradual reconciliation of particularist freedom, embodied in nation-state 
communities, with the universal freedom of moral equals, and to thereby transcend 
the structural limitations of the international states system by uniting the species to 
form a 'universal kingdom of ends.'  
 
 This reconciliation is key to understanding his cosmopolitanism, which takes 
on slightly different guises across his work. In Men and Citizens it appears as the 
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advocacy of more universalistic forms of social organisation than the presently 
existing international states system, while in Transformation it is reconceived 
along communicative lines, with the endpoint of the emancipatory project 
becoming the realisation of a universal discourse community. In this later work 
Linklater shares Habermas's emphasis on moral-practical learning, Habermas's 
reconstruction of Marx's historical materialism - which is based upon the claim that 
human history revolves around interaction as well as labour - and the view that 
human beings determine the principles that make social order possible.  
 
'[I]n this sphere, they are involved in a process of moral-practical learning which differs 
from the realm of technical-instrumental learning in which human beings increase their 
mastery of nature. Moral-practical learning is key to the development of free social 
relations.'103  
 
 In more recent work this emphasis on moral-practical learning is applied as a 
form of historical sociological analysis of what Elias calls the civilising process. 
While Elias identifies long-term social changes regarding the use of violence, 
Linklater also explores whether the notion of the harm principle, the ethical 
injunction to cause no serious bodily or mental harm, may represent an appropriate 
foundation for thinking about progress in world politics. He remains committed 
throughout to an inclusive universalist ethics that may restrict, but does not 
contradict those rights given by the state. 
 
 
Linklater's Foundational Ethical Commitment 
 
 In Chapter 1 we emphasised the foundational role that philosophical 
(ontological and epistemological) commitments play in our approaches to 
international theory. Having explained that an ontological evaluation of such 
foundational commitments would include questioning whether such foundations 
have 'objective' existence, and what it means for us to encounter such foundations 
as 'objects,' towards the end of that chapter we made the suggestion that Linklater's 
critical approach to international theory might commit the same mistake as that 	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made by the other normative and meta-theoretical approaches that we surveyed: to 
rely on a shallow ontology of 'things' rather than an ontology of being as a 
foundational ontological commitment. Our exposition of Linklater's CIRT in this 
chapter means that we are now in a position to defend such a claim.  
 
 Throughout his work, Linklater's emancipatory cosmopolitanism is 
essentially concerned with the progressive establishment of the global political 
conditions of human autonomy, and since it follows the same argumentative 
structure employed by Kant in his essay Perpetual Peace, this is a very Kantian 
move. However, the similarities between Linklater and Kant's approaches to 
international relations go much further. In that essay, it is ultimately man's ethical 
subjectivity, his ability to act according to the categorical imperative, that warrants 
the restructuring of international political life whereby states relinquish their 'wild 
lawless freedom' and enter into a federation of states based upon international 
right.104  
 
 That Linklater constantly uses the term 'human subjects' is not incidental; an 
historically developing ethical subject with significant debts to Kant's original 
formulation undergirds Linklater's CIRT. Linklater's 'Man' is perpetually 
confronted by an objective material reality that negates his autonomy, an autonomy 
that is conceived as the full appropriation of ethical subjectivity. Reminiscent of 
Kant, what persists in Linklater's approach to CIRT is an ethical subject, although 
in contrast to Kant, Linklater's ethical subject manifests itself historically. Across 
his work, this ethical subject is variously negated by irrational social structures, 
exclusionary practices, and parochial ethical discourses.105 In Linklater’s work 
emancipation appears as a large scale historical process by which anything that 
negates this subjectivity is itself progressively negated, ultimately leading to the 
establishment of both the conditions of non-contradiction of ethical subjectivity, 
and the gradual self-realisation of this ethical subject over the course of human 
history. For Linklater, this involves increasing levels of self-consciousness, the 	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rational mastery of self and world, and the development of species-capacities, such 
as that of post-conventional reasoning.  
 
 We see this in Men and Citizens with the concern to reconcile modern man's 
'bifurcated subjectivity,' the reconciliation of his political experience as a citizen 
and his moral experience as a human being in order that he can live a 'morally 
unified life.'106 More importantly though, this reconciliation is seen to be essential 
to the possibility of self-determination. Although also influenced by Rousseau, 
Linklater thus follows a Kantian typology of human freedom where natural 
freedom in the state of nature is transcended by the civil freedom of political 
society, which is itself transcended by the moral freedom of the ethical subject. 
Moral rationality is therefore regarded to be the highest form of human freedom, as 
this rationality allows the human being to transcend the determinism of the natural 
order and act in accordance with universal moral principles. Ultimately then, as 
with Kant, for Linklater men are most free when living under political conditions 
that allow them to obey 'the laws which they themselves make.'107  
 
 Linklater does recognise that Kant's 'unqualified moral and political 
individualism' is problematic, but he invests a great deal in reconstructing the 
notion of the ethical subject that underwrites Kant's moral universalism, initially on 
his own, but later with the aid of Habermas.108 The dialectical treatment of 
rationalism and historicism, for instance, which occupies a large portion of Men 
and Citizens, is essentially an attempt to recover the more advanced elements of 
Kantian thought by locating it within theory of history, where Kantian moral 
freedom is essentially read as an historical achievement.109 
 
 Linklater's reconstruction of Kantian freedom and subjectivity finds its most 
sophisticated articulation in Transformation, where ethical subjectivity is manifest 
in the idea of the post-conventional discourse agent, as reflected in Linklater's 	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reconception of moral universality as the universal responsibility to engage in 
dialogue. Habermas's discursive account of moral reasoning providing Linklater 
with a new way of transcending moral particularity and an updated normative 
standard by which potential and actual transformations of the Westphalian states-
system might be evaluated. Here, Kant's monological account of ethical reason is 
replaced by Habermas's dialogical account: while the idea of the categorical 
imperative is reworked into the structure of discourse, the Kantian ethical subject 
(of universal moral reason) remains, as does the need to reconcile man's bifurcated 
subjectivity. As Linklater writes in the Introduction to Transformation: 'The fact 
that citizens have to reconcile their identity as citizens with their conception of 
themselves as subjects of universal duties and rights is central to the analysis.'110 
 
 In his later work, following his own classification of the 'tripartite structure 
of critical theory' Linklater moves from both the philosophical / normative defence 
of this ethical subject and the praxeological analysis of the possibilities for its 
realisation, to an historical sociological analysis of the development of moral 
subjectivity over the course of human history. Influenced by Habermas's 
reconstruction of historical materialism (and specifically the idea of moral-
practical learning) Linklater engages in his own empirical analysis based upon 
Elias's process sociology of civilising processes and the liberal notion of the harm 
principle. The aim of such an analysis is to demonstrate both the human capacity 
for moral-practical learning, the potential for moral progress in world politics, and 
hence the possibility of the gradual pacification of human relations whereby 
harmful constraints on human autonomy, such as war, might be removed. While 
Kant and Marx's insufficiencies were originally overcome by Habermas's 
reconstruction historical materialism and his cosmopolitan ethical ideal of a 
discourse theory of morality, it is now Elias who takes centre stage as 'the real heir 
to the tradition to which Kant and Marx belonged.111  
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Conclusions 
 
 In light of our exposition of his emancipatory cosmopolitanism, it should be 
clear by now why Linklater is considered to be 'the foremost critical theorist of 
international relations,' and why 'critical IR theory represents one of the most 
humane and generally hopeful accounts of contemporary world politics 
available.'112 His proposals for the 'triple transformation of political community,' to 
involve greater sensitivity to practices of inclusion and exclusion, stronger 
commitments to the reduction of social and economic inequalities nationally and 
internationally, the development of a notion of cosmopolitan citizenship, greater 
international dialogue, and states’ participation in more solidarist conceptions of 
international society to achieve these ends, are cogent. The problem, however, is 
that this radical agenda of cosmopolitan reform is predicated on the 'objective' 
existence of an ethical subject. 
 
 For this reason, although offering us a much more promising approach to 
international theory than those offered by Rawls or Frost, whose ethical 
foundations are tied to an uncritical acceptance of practices and institutions 
associated with the sovereign state, by relying on a shallow ontology of 'things' 
presupposed as the 'ontological' foundation of his critical approach to international 
theory (i.e., the ethical subject), Linklater falls foul of the same mistake as the 
other approaches to international theory that we surveyed in Chapter 1. While 
Linklater is correct to encounter entities in world politics, such as the sovereign 
state, as 'objective' to the extent that they contribute to human freedom, because 
this freedom is conceived simply as the exercise of ethical subjectivity, Linklater's 
critical approach rests upon encountering such practices and institutions 
(phenomena) as 'objective' on the condition that they contribute to the actualisation 
of the human being as an ethical subject, as opposed to the self-actualisation of the 
human being as a free being.  	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 Since it requires of us that we encounter both the ethical subject and ethical 
subjectivity as 'objective' foundations – that is, since it presupposes the ‘objective’ 
existence of the ethical subject – Linklater’s critical approach to international 
theory rests on a conflation of the ontological difference, between entities that exist 
(human beings) and the being of those entities (as ethical subjects). This submits 
him to a form of metaphysical dualism: an ontological dualism by virtue of his 
treatment of ethical subjectivity as the essential nature of the being of human 
beings, and an epistemological dualism whereby the human being conceived as 
ethical subject is treated as if it had a mind-independent ('objective') existence, 
independent of Linklater's claim to know it.  
 
 As a result of this conflation of the ontological difference, Linklater's 
universalism arises out of an always already posited meaning of Being (as the 
historical becoming of the ethical subject) and a derivative structuring of a ground 
(the mind-independent existence of the individual conceived as ethical subject), 
upon which this universalism is founded. Consequently, whereas Rawls and Frost's 
ethical foundations are too conservative due to their desire to recognise the 
particularity of their normative claims, Linklater's ethical foundation is 
insufficiently universalistic because he fails to recognise that his ethical foundation 
is partial, rather than 'objective'.  
 
 We might then suggest that a more universalistic ontological foundation, one 
that is not 'objective' in the sense of having a mind-independent existence but is 
more universalistic because it would apply to human beings qua human beings, 
would be one based upon an account of what it means to be a free human being, 
rather than on a partial interpretation that what it means to be a free human being is 
to be an ethical subject. We shall develop such an argument in Parts 2 and 3 after 
our appraisal of the ethical and emancipatory credentials of Linklater's 
emancipatory cosmopolitanism in the next chapter.  
 Chapter 3.  
Critical International Theory and the Politics of 
Subjectivity  
 	  	  	  
 
Introduction 
 
  In light of our discussion of the importance of philosophical 
(epistemological and ontological) commitments in Chapter 1, Chapter 2 was 
concerned with establishing that Linklater's 'critical' approach to international 
theory is predicated on a foundational commitment to existence of the ethical 
subject; a commitment, we argued, that submits him to a form of metaphysical 
(epistemological and ontological) dualism. Given our foundational left-Hegelian 
commitment to human freedom, a commitment shared by Linklater, this chapter 
evaluates the ethical and emancipatory credentials of Linklater's emancipatory 
cosmopolitanism.  
 
 In order to clarify where we follow and where we depart from Linklater's 
approach to international theory, we begin our discussion with an outline of what 
Linklater claims to be the four main achievements of Critical Theory: its challenge 
to positivism, its challenge to the immutability thesis, its reconstruction of 
historical materialism, and its development of a discourse theory of morality. 
While affirming the first two, we remain sceptical regarding the last two, as we 
consider them dependent on a foundational commitment to ethical subjectivity, 
which we intend to challenge. We turn to a discussion of discourse ethics to 
demonstrate this claim, and explore the nature of this approach to morality along 
with some of the central objections that have been raised to it.  
 
PART 1/Ch.3. Critical International Theory and the Politics of Subjectivity 
103 
 We then highlight what has been the major fault-line of CIRT since the 
1980s: drawn between those proceeding according to a foundational commitment 
to a (potentially) rational, autonomous subject, and those that challenge such a 
commitment. We see that a common weakness amongst dissidents is that, while 
disputing the ontological commitments of foundationalist approaches, they often 
leave their own ontological commitments in the dark. Suggesting that the 
foundationalist/anti-foundationalist debate in normative theory bears striking 
similarities with the realist/idealist dispute in the philosophy of science, we argue 
that a greater degree of reflexivity about the relation between subject and object 
might help us transcend this debate.  
 
 Having surveyed several recent moves in critical international theory, which 
move further and further away from a foundational commitment to ethical 
subjectivity, we reinforce our objection that Linklater's emancipatory 
cosmopolitanism is based on an overvaluation of one human potentiality (ethical 
subjectivity). In short, although both Linklater and Habermas are committed to a 
form of ethical constructivism that, like Hegel, subordinates knowledge 
construction to the historical process and the interaction of human beings (in this 
case knowledge about ethical principles) the problem is that they predicate this 
construction, not on the interaction between human beings qua human beings, but 
on the interaction between human beings qua ethical subjects.1 We learn that not 
only is ethically insufficient, because recognition is extended only to ethical 
subjects, but it also complicates Linklater's commitment to emancipation; 
Linklater's emancipatory cosmopolitanism, we thus conclude, may ultimately fail 
by its own standards. 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1. Shifting this analysis from epistemology to ethics does not entail a huge leap; especially given 
that Habermas's account of discourse ethics insists on 'the cognitive "knowability" or rational 
decidability of ethical principles and metaprinciples.' Fred R. Dallmayr, “Introduction,” in The 
Communicative Ethics Controversy, ed. Seyla Benhabib and Fred Dallmayr (Cambridge MA: The 
MIT Press, 1990), 2-3. On this claim, and for a recent critique of Rawls's constructivist approach to 
justice from an epistemological angle, see Eric Thomas Weber, Rawls, Dewey, and Constructivism: 
On the Epistemology of Justice (London: Continuum, 2010). 
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On the Achievements of Critical International Relations 
Theory 
 
The Challenge to Positivism 
 
 As we saw in Chapter 1, for the greater part of the latter half of the twentieth 
century, positivism dominated the academic study of international relations. Its 
methodological commitments dominated the 'neo-neo' orthodoxy of neo-realism 
and neo-liberalism, both of which subscribed to what Brown calls the Rationalist 
Actor Program, within which mainstream realist and liberal institutionalist scholars 
such as Waltz, Keohane, and Axelrod looked to understand how rational actors 
behave under conditions of anarchy.2 The first achievement of critical theory is to 
take issue with positivism by arguing that knowledge does not arise from the 
subject's neutral engagement with an objective reality, but reflects pre-existing 
social purposes and interests; it then invites observers 'to reflect upon the social 
construction and effects of knowledge and to consider how claims about neutrality 
can conceal the role knowledge plays in reproducing unsatisfactory social 
arrangements.'3 This meta-theoretical intervention has been crucial to both the 
critique of neo-realism and to 'the gradual recovery of a project of enlightenment 
and emancipation reworked to escape the familiar pitfalls of idealism.'4  
 
 
Muting The Immutability Thesis 
 
 Secondly, critical theory stands opposed to empirical claims about the social 
world that assume existing structures to be immutable.5 The central objection is 
that 'notions of immutability support structured inequalities of power and wealth 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2. Chris Brown, “Situating Critical Realism,” Millennium-Journal of International Studies 35, no. 2 
(2007), 413. 
3. Andrew Linklater, “The Achievements of Critical Theory,” in International Theory: Positivism 
and Beyond, ed. Ken Booth Steve Smith, and Marysia Zalewski (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996), 279. 
4. Ibid. 
5. Ibid. 
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which are in principle alterable.'6 The immutability thesis, the idea that human 
actions and social structures are 'natural and unchangeable rather than contingent 
and renegotiable' is particularly important to neo-realism.7 Central to the neo-
realist position, most evident in the work of Kenneth Waltz, is the proposition that 
the international system is made up of sovereign states that interact under a 
condition of anarchy; that this structure of the international system is immutable, 
and that the actions of international political actors are therefore constrained in a 
fundamental way. Most notable in this regard are the constraining effects of an 
immutable anarchy on the moral conduct of states in world politics, putative 
constraints that Linklater notes 'have the consequence of absolving states of the 
moral responsibility for devising practices which will bring more just forms of 
world political organisation into existence.'8 From a Critical Theoretical point of 
view, the problem with perspectives that subscribe to the immutability thesis is that 
they serve to naturalise what is essentially social and historical; Critical Theorists 
find this troubling because of their belief that human beings make their own history 
and can in principle make it differently.9  
 
 Citing forceful challenges to the immutability thesis from Wendt (1987), 
Ruggie (1983), Ashley (1988), Bartelson (1995), and Biersteker and Weber (1996), 
Linklater supplements these assessments by drawing on critical social theory so 
that we may be equipped to distinguish between 'the mutable from the immutable, 
the natural from the contingent, in human affairs.'10 As a result, two robustly 
defended claims of Kenneth Waltz have been challenged: '[t]he first is that the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6. Ibid. 
7. Ibid., 282. 
8. Andrew Linklater, The Transformation of Political Community: Ethical Foundations of the Post-
Westphalian Era (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998), 19. 
9. Linklater gives three examples in support of this belief. The first is Marx's critique of bourgeois 
political economy, which supposed the institution of private property was natural. The second is 
Hegel's critique of the Indian caste-system, which contended that nature decreed that human beings 
be arranged into sharply divided social categories. The third is the feminist critique of the 
patriarchal claim that the nature of womanhood precludes full involvement in the political realm. 
For Marx, private property is not a natural institution but an historical product to be overcome 
within Communist society. For Hegel, caste distinctions are not given in nature but arise within a 
particular ensemble of social relations in which spirit has yet to release itself from nature. For 
feminism, nothing in the nature of womanhood precludes full involvement in a public realm, which 
can be reconstituted in the post-patriarchal state. Andrew Linklater, “The Achievements of Critical 
Theory,” 282. 
10. Andrew Linklater, The Transformation of Political Community, 19. 
PART 1/Ch.3. Critical International Theory and the Politics of Subjectivity 
106 
international system, which has been remarkably similar across whole millennia, 
will endure indefinitely. The second is that the anarchic system will thwart projects 
of reform as in the past.'11 'The neo-realist riposte has been to insist that advancing 
the moral case for a different world order will not prevent the recurrence of old 
patterns of inter-state rivalry and war.'12 Although CT recognises that there are 
constraints on emancipatory change, it avoids the neo-realist advocacy of 
resignation to international political fate by examining prospects for greater 
freedom immanent in existing social relations.13 Linklater's own contribution to 
CIRT is to engage in an historical mode of analysis that aims to undermine the 
neo-realist riposte to critical theory by highlighting philosophical contradictions 
within the states-system, its historical contingency, an account of how we might 
move beyond it, and a sociological analysis of historical processes that 
demonstrates the potential for progressive change in human social relations in the 
international realm. 
 
 
The Reconstruction of Historical Materialism 
 
 The most distinctive aspects of Linklater's own contribution to CIRT, which 
are most prominent in Transformation and in later publications such as The 
Problem of Harm, reflect what he considers to be the third and fourth contributions 
of CT. These involve challenging Marx and Marxism 'in order to develop a more 
adequate account of social evolution and an improved normative standpoint.'14 The 
crucial theme here is the move in critical social theory, inaugurated by Habermas's 
reconstruction of historical materialism (the third achievement of CT), from the 
paradigm of production to the paradigm of communication, and the subsequent 
development of a discourse theory of morality (the fourth achievement of CT). 
These achievements are responses to the perceived weaknesses in Marxism, which 
are reddressed by: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11. Andrew Linklater, “Neo-Realism in Theory and Practice,” in International Relations Theory 
Today, ed. Ken Booth and Steve Smith (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), 241. 
12. Ibid. 
13. Andrew Linklater, “The Achievements of Critical Theory,” 280. 
14. Ibid., 284. 
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developing the idea of undistorted communication, creating a more complex historical 
sociology which is based on the idea of social learning and envisaging the democratisation 
of politics, domestic and international. These important developments rework the Marxian 
analysis of the historical development of species capacities and construct an account of 
human emancipation which is concerned with enlarging the meaning and scope of 
discourse rather than with elaborating the relationship between the species and nature.15 
 
 Habermas's reconstruction of historical materialism recognises that there are 
several axes of social exclusion, of which class power is not necessarily the most 
fundamental form, and that forces including, but not limited to, production shape 
history. In particular, Linklater regards Habermas's emphasis on forms of social 
learning to open new possibilities for the construction of an 'historical sociology 
with an emancipatory purpose,' which Linklater develops in his work on civilising 
processes and the harm principle.16 
 
 
The Discourse Theory of Morality 
 
 Based upon Habermas's general theory of communicative action and 
Lawrence Kohlberg's analysis of individual stages of cognitive development, 
where post-conventional morality is identified as the highest form of morality, 
according to Linklater the fourth contribution of CT is the establishment of 
unconstrained communication as the normative ideal by which the validity of 
moral and political principles may be tested. This entails, inter alia, 'a willingness 
to question all social and political boundaries and all systems of inclusion and 
exclusion.'17 The normative ideal of undistorted communication thus provides an 
evaluative tool for critical social theory, and hence: 
 
[C]ritical theory judges social arrangements by their capacity to embrace open dialogue 
with all others and envisages new forms of political community which break with 
unjustified exclusion [...] Critical theory [...] envisages the use of unconstrained discourse 
to determine the moral significance of national boundaries and to examine the possibility 
of post-sovereign forms of political life.18 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15. Ibid., 284-85. 
16. Ibid., 280. 
17. Ibid., 285-86. 
18. Ibid., 280. 
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 For reasons to be given in what follows, we affirm the first two contributions 
of CT but remain sceptical regarding the third and the fourth. Linklater is correct to 
reflect on the social construction and effects of knowledge, and to challenge the 
immutability thesis in order to provide an opening for progressive and 
emancipatory approaches to International Relations. He is also right to argue that a 
challenging question for international political theory today is how to balance 
between pluralist identities and necessary universalisations.19 The problem is that 
the accounts of universality and freedom that emerge from Habermas's 
reconstruction of historical materialism and the subsequent development of a 
discourse theory of morality are based on a dualist commitment to the ethical 
subject. Turning now to a discussion of discourse ethics, we will explore the nature 
of this approach to morality, highlight some of its weaknesses before 
demonstrating the role that it plays in Linklater's CIRT.  
 
 
On Discourse Ethics 
 
Moral Cognitivism  
 
 Purporting to be a universalistic, democratic form of moral practical 
reasoning guided by justice, discourse ethics depends on Habermas's general 
theory of communicative action, which emphasises the centrality of consent to 
intelligible communication. 20  Reacting against a prevalent mood of moral 
scepticism, and following the linguistic turn in philosophy (the turn from a focus 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19. Andrew Linklater, International Relations: Critical Concepts in Political Science (London: 
Routledge, 2000). cited by Hartmut Behr, A History of International Political Theory: Ontologies of 
the International (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 10. 
20. Richard Devetak, “Critical Theory,” in Theories of International Relations, ed. Andrew 
Linklater Scott Burchill, et al. (London: Macmillan, 1996), 171. Jürgen Habermas, Theory of 
Communicative Action, vol. 1. Reason and the Rationalization of Society (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
1986); Jürgen Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 2: Lifeworld and System: A 
Critique of Functionalist Reason (London: Heinenmann, 1989). See also William Outhwaite, 
Habermas: A Critical Introduction (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994), 68-120.; J.M. 
Bernstein, Recovering Ethical Life: Jürgen Habermas and the Future of Critical Theory (London: 
Routledge, 1995), 35-57,88-135. 
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on subjectivity or consciousness to one on language), Habermas's account of 
discourse ethics insists on 'the cognitive "knowability" or rational decidability of 
ethical principles and metaprinciples.'21 Proceeding from the presumption that 'no 
vantage point other than discourse itself can provide the objectivity once grounded 
in religious authority and metaphysical worldviews,' the aim of discourse ethics is 
therefore 'to recover moral objectivity in a posttraditional world no longer able to 
look to an overarching moral authority agreeable to all.'22 Discourse ethics is thus 
an attempt to provide a non-metaphysical ground for praxis, allied to the 
contention that philosophy can avoid metaphysical accounts of reason by showing 
how rationality is 'embodied not in metaphysical principles, but in the assumptions 
embodied in the activity of discursive communication.'23  
 
 Sharing their commitment to the central role that the exercise of human 
reason plays in relation to the attainment of moral autonomy, public justice and 
progress, discourse ethics owes substantial debts to the philosophies of Kant, 
Hegel, and Marx. Habermas's discourse theory of morality shares with Kant the 
view that human autonomy involves the adoption of a universalist standpoint from 
which to evaluate and justify our actions. However, rather than subjecting maxims 
to monological reasoning to make sure they accord with the categorical imperative, 
for Habermas a universal standpoint may be achieved through linguistically 
mediated inter-subjective communication; his account thus represents a dialogical 
account of moral reasoning.  
 
Integrating Hegel's and Marx's insights that the autonomous subject was not an isolated 
Cartesian ego, but a historically and socially situated, concrete, and embodied self, in the 
early phases of their formulations, they extended this Enlightenment ideal into a general 
critique of the material and social conditions which hindered its realisation. In this task, 
they were inspired by Hegel's critique of Kant, which showed the necessity of developing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21. Fred R. Dallmayr, “Introduction,” 2-3. 
22. William Rehg, Insight and Solidarity: The Discourse Ethics of Jürgen Habermas (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1997), 34. 
23. David Hoy and Thomas McCarthy, Critical Theory (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), 148. 'Praxis, in 
the old Aristotelian sense, referred to a dimension of action which was categorically 'ethical' 
because it could not be separated from a person's essential being or character (ethos); it meant a 
doing which was also a being. It also implied action directed towards a particular end (telos), but an 
end immanent within the very means used to achieve it, the practice of 'virtue'.' John Milbank, 
Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2005), 161. 
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a critique of pure reason into a phenomenology of human spirit - the story of reason's 
historical and cultural becoming. Reason was thus given a historical, developmental core.24  
 
 
Critical Rationalism & the Reconstruction of the Kantian Subject 
 
 Habermas enlists this insight of Hegel's to lend support to the emancipatory 
possibility that human subjects may involve themselves in the creation of their own 
world from a critical rationalist perspective. In so doing, he draws on Kohlberg's 
cognitivist theory of moral development, who in turn draws on Jean Piaget's theory 
of moral education, both of whom adapt and apply Hegel's phenomenology of 
human sprit.25 Distinguishing between pre-conventional, conventional, and post-
conventional stages of morality, Kohlberg identifies the post-conventional stage as 
the highest form of morality.26 As Linklater explains, 'pre-conventional morality 
exists when actors obey norms because they fear that non-compliance will be 
sanctioned by a higher authority; conventional morality exists when norms are 
observed because actors are loyal to a specific social group; post-conventional 
morality exists when actors stand back from authority structures and group 
membership and ask whether they are complying with principles which have 
universal applicability.'27  
 
 As Habermas rightly points out, Kohlberg's empirical data is theory laden; 
indeed, Kohlberg is quite explicit that he wants to follow Kantian practical 
philosophy when he explains that the 'assumptions of our psychological theory are 
naturally allied to the formalistic tradition in philosophic ethics from Kant to 
Rawls. This isomorphism of psychological and normative theory generates the 
claim that a psychologically more advanced stage of moral judgment is more 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24. Seyla Benhabib, Critique, Norm, and Utopia: A Study of the Foundations of Critical Theory 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 344. 
25. Lawrence Kohlberg, “The Claim to Moral Adequacy of a Highest Stage of Moral Judgement,” 
Journal of Philosophy 70 (1973), 632. Jean Piaget, The Moral Judgement of the Child 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1983). 
26. Kohlberg's argument was first presented in his 1958 doctoral thesis under the title of The 
Development of Modes of Moral Thinking and Choice in the Years 10 to 16 
27. Andrew Linklater, “The Achievements of Critical Theory,” 285. 
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morally adequate, by moral philosophic criteria.'28 Taking from Kohlberg the 
moral cognitivism, the belief that moral subjects can approximate knowledge of 
objective moral principles, Habermas modifies Kohlberg's account of post-
conventional morality by situating the procedural conditions of post-conventional 
morality within the dialogical framework of discourse ethics, where subjects are 
required to publicly justify normative claims and convictions in order to assess 
their validity: ratiocination is no longer an individual activity, as in Kant and 
Kohlberg, but a collective one. Nonetheless, the moral cognitivist commitment to 
the possibility of objective moral principles, and the Kantian ethical subject as both 
the ground of such principles and the loci of ethical praxis, remains.29 
 
 
Challenges to the Kantian-Habermasian Subject 
 
 It is these commitments that a range of diverse perspectives from feminist, 
poststructuralist, post-colonial, philosophical hermeneutic, and normative political 
theory variously take issue with. 30  David Campbell, for example, draws on 
Foucault, Heidegger and Nietzsche to make the claim that a 'fundamental 
presumption' that enables Habermas's position is a metaphysics of subjectivity, 
since it 'makes possible ideas of autonomy and rights as the basis of freedom.'31 
Martin Weber disputes this charge, claiming that it 'misses the point of the 
pervasive departure from just this framework in Habermas's turn to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28. Jürgen Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action (Cambridge, Mass.: The 
MIT Press, 1992). Lawrence Kohlberg, “The Claim to Moral Adequacy of a Highest Stage of Moral 
Judgement,” 632. 
29. For an introduction to Habermas's moral and political theory, and Habermas's roots in, and 
differences from Kant, see Thomas McCarthy, “Kantian Constructivism and Reconstructivism: 
Rawls and Habermas in Dialogue,” Ethics 105 (1994): 44-63. 
30. Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993). David 
Campbell, “Why Fight? Humanitarianism, Principles, and Post-Structuralism,” Millennium-Journal 
of International Studies 27, no. 3 (1998), 504-10. Naeem Inayatullah and David L. Blaney, 
International Relations and the Problem of Difference (London: Routledge, 2004), 122-23. Richard 
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31. David Campbell, “Why Fight? Humanitarianism, Principles, and Post-Structuralism,” 504. 
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intersubjectivity, as well as a carefully crafted account of autonomy that does not 
rely on a Kantian account of 'unencumbered selves.'32 
 
 Nonetheless, turning from subjectivity to intersubjectivity does not extricate 
ourselves from a commitment to subjectivity. As Richard Shapcott demonstrates, 
in its requirement that discursive agents accept the rational presuppositions of 
discourse, discourse ethics relies on participants adopting a post-conventional form 
of agency. The problem, as he sees it, is that the account of the kind of 
consciousness that is required to engage in conversation 'equates individual human 
development with the awareness of the possibility of universality and equates 
universality with maturity.'33 Since it presupposes that discourse is only possible 
between agents that have transcended their pre-conventional or conventional 
moralities, the consequence is that '[t]he other's equality is only realised when they 
are emancipated, when they become modern, reflexive unalienated individuals, 
when they are assimilated.'34 This puts the discursive objective of assessing the 
validity (i.e., the rationality) of claims in tension with objective of universal 
inclusion, and gives rise to the possibility of legitimating either the exclusion of 
certain agents, or their assimilation.  
 
 
The Dual Context of Moral Maturity 
 
 Another important challenge to discourse ethics arises out of Carol Gilligan's 
criticism that Kohlberg's theory of moral development is one sided, since his 
account of moral maturity leaves no room for human relationships and care for 
others.35 One of Gilligan's central contentions is that there is a dual context of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32. Martin Weber, “Engaging Globalization: Critical Theory and Global Political Change,” 
Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 27, no. 3 (2002), 308. 
33. Richard Shapcott, Justice, Community and Dialogue in International Relations, 119. 
34. Ibid., 119-120,126. 
35. Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice, xii. In fairness to Habermas, he also claims that there must 
be something more to moral maturity than Kohlberg account suggests, but his solution is to move 
from monologue to dialogue, and strive for a dialogic relation founded on a universal ethics of 
speech. Jürgen Habermas, Communication and the Evolution of Society, trans. Thomas McCarthy 
(Boston: Beacon, 1979), 89-90. Jürgen Habermas, “Justice and Solidarity: On the Discussion 
Concerning Stage 6,” in The Moral Domain: Essays in the Ongoing Discussion Between 
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moral maturity: between care and justice; an insight that has led to the 
development of both a feminist, and a phenomenological, ethics of care.36 A 
comparable notion is also supported by both Paul Ricoeur and Axel Honneth in 
their respective essays Love and Justice and Love and Morality.37 That this insight 
has resonated so profoundly with moral theorists is unsurprising, after all: 
 
Most of us would consider such a person very odd who bases his or her morality solely on 
the Kantian notion of duty and justice, like Abraham who would sacrifice his son in the 
name of duty. Likewise, most of us would consider immature a person who always listens 
to his or her moral sentiments and never considers duty, impartiality, and validly agreed 
rules and laws.38 
 
 From this perspective, what is objectionable about post-conventional 
morality is its emphasis on the supremacy of moral rationality. For Benhabib this 
requires that moral subjects abstract from lived experience and adopt the 
perspective of what she calls the 'generalised other.'39 From this perspective our 
interaction with other people is governed by the norm of formal reciprocity, where 
'each is entitled to expect and to assume from us what we can expect and assume 
from him or her [...] If I have a right to 'x,' then you have the duty not to hinder me 
from enjoying 'x,' and vice versa. In treating you in accordance with these norms, I 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Philosophy and the Social Sciences, ed. Thomas E. Wren (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 
1990). 
36. Nel Noddings, Caring: A Feminist Approach to Ethics and Moral Education (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1984). Seyla Benhabib, Situating the Self: Gender, Community and 
Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics (Oxford: Polity, 1992). Joan C. Tronto, Moral Boundaries: 
A Political Argument for an Ethic of Care (London: Routledge, 1993). Virginia Held, Feminist 
Morality: Transforming Culture, Society, and Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1993). Joanna Hodge, Heidegger and Ethics (London: Routledge, 1995). Patricia Benner, “The 
Quest for Control and the Possibilities of Care,” in Heidegger, Coping, and Cognitive Science: 
Essays in Honour of Hubert L. Dreyfus, ed. Mark Wrathall and Jeff Malpas (Cambridge, MA: The 
MIT Press, 2000). John Paley, “Heidegger and the Ethics of Care,” Nursing Philosophy 1, no. 1 
(2000): 64-75. 
37. Paul Ricoeur, “Love and Justice,” in Paul Ricoeur: The Hermeneutics of Action (Thousand 
Oaks: Sage, 1996). Axel Honneth, Disrespect: The Normative Foundations of Critical Theory 
(London: Polity, 2007), 174. 
38. Leena Kakkori and Rauno Huttunen, “The Gilligan-Kohlberg Controversy and Its 
Philosophico-Historical Roots,” Encyclopaedia of Philosophy of Education (accessed 26th June, 
2012), 19. As we shall see in Chapter 8 these arguments are both foreshadowed and outshone by 
Hegel's simultaneous response to Kant's moral formalism and theories of moral sentiments from 
members of the Scottish Enlightenment. 
39. Seyla Benhabib, Critique, Norm, and Utopia, 340-41. 
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confirm in your person the rights of humanity, and I have a legitimate claim to 
expect that you will do the same in relation to me.'40  
 
 This perspective is contrasted with that of the 'concrete other,' where each 
and every human being is treated as 'an individual with a concrete history, identity, 
and affective-emotional constitution,' and our relations are governed by the norm 
of 'complimentary reciprocity,' where 'each is entitled to expect and to assume 
from the other forms of behaviour through which the other feels recognised and 
confirmed as a concrete, individual being with specific needs, talents, and 
capacities.'41 The characteristic norms of such interaction are those of solidarity, 
friendship, love and care, where our interactions go beyond what is strictly 
required of us as rights-bearing persons.42 Treating each other in this way confirms 
not just our respective humanity, abstractly conceived, but our individuality.43 
 
 
Interpretive Presuppositions of Consensus and Convergence  
 
 Further compounding the problems with discourse ethics are presuppositions 
regarding the nature of interpretation that are embedded within Habermas's theory 
of communicative action, upon which discourse ethics depends. While Habermas 
recognises that we live in different 'life-worlds,' and that our understandings of the 
world are conditioned by different background contexts that cannot be completely 
represented in theory, he maintains that consensus is still possible, since he 
believes that conflicts between first-order theories about object domains are 
resolvable in the long run because they 'necessarily presuppose convergence on a 
single focus imaginarius, a focal point that is beyond the present field of vision.'44 
Consequently, his universalist approach to human interpretation 'posits two rational 
presuppositions of rational discourse and inquiry: consensus and convergence.45 It 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40. Ibid. 
41. Ibid. 
42. Ibid. 
43. Ibid. 
44. David Hoy and Thomas McCarthy, Critical Theory, 201. 
45. Ibid. 
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remains to be seen whether these 'rational presuppositions' are warranted; after all, 
we can engage others in rational discussion without presupposing that there is 
ultimately one true interpretation of morally correct conduct; yet these are the 
conditions of Habermas's moral cognitivism and his commitment to the ethical 
subject: without them moral principles cannot be considered 'objective.'  
 
 
The Logocentrism of Discourse Ethics 
 
 To recap, discourse ethics requires: i) the adoption of a post-conventional 
form of agency that puts the objectives of universal inclusion and the rational 
validation of norms in tension; ii) a one-sided perspective of moral maturity, and 
iii) questionable presuppositions regarding the nature of human interpretation. 
Alone and together, these objections challenge the suitability of discourse ethics 
for an emancipatory cosmopolitanism, yet they are all implied in Linklater's 
approach to CIRT. For this reason Blaney and Inayatullah are correct to criticise 
Linklater for embracing pluralism in only a very truncated form.46 They realise that 
'Linklater would surely protest that what he proposes is really nothing more than a 
set of "procedural universals" that work to support dialogue by breaking sharply 
“with any substantive vision of a good [global] society,”' but rightly recognise that 
this response would be deceptive: 
 
as is the similar appeal to a 'thin' proceduralism in liberal thinking generally, including that 
in Grotius, Hobbes, and Locke. Rather than being neutral and thereby capable of being 
embraced by all, regardless of ethical or political view, it is clear that procedural liberalism 
entails a particularly liberal vision of the individual and the cultivation of a peculiarly 
liberal set of virtues that may be at odds with and threaten alternative modes of life (see 
Galston, 1986; Nandy, 1990; and Hopgood, 2000). Iris Marion Young (1996:123-124) 
would also add that the idea of a dialogic community as a deliberative device also 
presumes and privileges certain ways of speaking (formal, general, and rationalistic) [...] 
Thus, the claim of neutrality or universal consent ‘misrecognizes the partisanship on which 
it rests’ (Connolly, 1995:124), and Linklater’s universalism appears as only a particular 
(relatively thick and substantive) vision among many. Interestingly, Linklater is quite 
aware of this critique (see Linklater, 1996a:290-292; and 1998: 87-100), but he seems to 
mostly brush such concerns aside as he returns to his single-minded pursuit of a 
cosmopolitan view. Thus [...] Linklater's (global) liberal modernization appears, in 
Nandy's terms, as the hegemonic framework within which all other forms of cultural life 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46. Naeem Inayatullah and David L. Blaney, International Relations and the Problem of 
Difference, 110. 
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are judged. And [...] deviations from the global liberal vision are judged (at least 
implicitly) as backward, regressive, or corrupt unless assimilated to the dominant vision.47  
 
 This criticism is on the right track, but it is a little overzealous and somewhat 
lacking in nuance. In essence though, the problem with both Habermas’s discourse 
theory of morality and Linklater’s adoption of it, is the relation of subject to 
subject necessary for the rational reconstruction of universal norms – since this 
subject-subject relation presupposes a faith in the reconciliatory potential of human 
reason, a ‘thin’ conception of the subject regarding the communicative competence 
to engage in discussion, and the subject’s inclination to both engage in such an 
activity and to act according to principles thus derived.48 These presuppositions are 
all implicated in Linklater’s emancipatory cosmopolitanism, and are necessary for 
his defence of freedom and universality; yet it remains to be seen whether they are 
necessary for, or even conducive to, an emancipatory cosmopolitanism. 
 
 
Linklater’s Defence of Universality 
 
 We saw in Chapter 2 that the basic theme uniting Men and Citizens, 
Transformation and Linklater’s later work on harm is the idea of moral inclusion 
and the extension of rights to ‘outsiders,’ and that in Transformation this leads to 
the normative, sociological and praxeological analysis of practices of exclusion in 
international society – in short, that Linklater’s normative commitment to universal 
inclusion is what drives his approach to CIRT, as it is this that leads him to 
problematise practices of exclusion. While affirming his problematisation of 
practices of exclusion, the problem with this strategy is that it is predicated on the 
inclusion/exclusion of the subject. For practical and philosophical reasons 
universal inclusion was not conceived politically, after all states are predicated on 
the differential treatment of citizens and non-citizens, and Linklater’s argument 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47. Ibid., 111-12. 
48. On this point see the dispute between Schiller and Kant on the relation between duty and 
inclination Friedrich Schiller, Werke. Nationalausgabe, vol. 1-42 (Weimar: Böhlau, 1943), 357. 
Henry E. Allison, Kant’s Theory of Freedom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 180-
184,275n3. 
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about post-Westphalian forms of community led not to the demise of the state but 
its reconstruction. Rather, universal inclusion was conceived in moral terms, where 
universality was reconceived as the universal responsibility to engage in dialogue.  
 
 
Inclusion through Exclusion? The Nature and Function of Dialogue 
 
 It is not self-evident that Linklater’s defence of universalism can be charged 
with having a coercive disregard for difference: a common charge against late-
Frankfurt School CIRT, especially from ‘poststructuralist’ or post-colonial 
critics.49 Indeed, Linklater is not looking to undermine differences, but is actually 
in favour of greater diversification, as reflected in his claim that his thin 
cosmopolitanism is more radical than others because supporting ‘the development 
of wider communities of discourse’ makes ‘new articulations of universality and 
particularity possible.’50 He also later stresses that these wider communities of 
discourse are explicitly concerned not only with tolerating difference but with 
enlarging human diversity.51 For this reason Blaney and Inayatullah’s criticism that 
‘dialogue functions only to break down barriers and moral estrangements, never to 
reveal (perhaps irreconcilable) conflicts in values, identities, and forms of life’ is 
unfair. 52  For Linklater, particularist claims to irreconcilable differences are 
perfectly legitimate, so long as they are made through an engagement with the 
other based upon post-conventional reasoning: ‘communicating subjects [need] to 
rationalise or account for their beliefs and actions in terms which are intelligible to 
others and which they can accept or contest.’53 Herein lies the rub. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49. Martin Weber, “Engaging Globalization: Critical Theory and Global Political Change.” Weber 
cites Campbell as an example: David Campbell, “Why Fight? Humanitarianism, Principles, and 
Post-Structuralism.” On the post-colonial criticism, see the quote from Inayatullah and Blaney 
above. 
50. Andrew Linklater, The Transformation of Political Community, 48-49. 
51. Andrew Linklater, “The Changing Contours of Critical International Relations Theory,” in 
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 The value of greater dialogue should not be at issue; Lyotard is surely correct 
to argue that ‘the right to speak, and the right of the different not to be excluded 
from the speech community, are fundamental rights.’54 What is at issue is the 
nature and the function of dialogue. For instance, the concern for Brown is whether 
any particular voices are heard louder than others: ‘[c]learly voices cannot be 
excluded arbitrarily, and it would be wrong to suggest that either Habermas or his 
followers employ Eurocentric or gender-based criteria to restrict the voices that can 
be heard. The more compelling criticism is that although these and other dissenting 
voices are heard, the cost is that dissenters are obliged to speak in a particular kind 
of way, using, as it were, “received pronunciation” rather than the dialects they 
employ in everyday life.’55  
 
 In regards the latter, the issue is the commitment to the function of dialogue 
as a way of transcending moral particularity and extending moral inclusion. In 
Chapter 2 we saw that Linklater responds to anti-foundational criticisms of 
cosmopolitanism from the likes of Rorty by distinguishing between thick and thin 
versions of cosmopolitanism, associating himself with a thin cosmopolitanism that 
entails ‘no fixed and final vision of the future.’56 The validity of the latter claim 
will not concern us here: the more pertinent issue is that this thin cosmopolitanism 
does entail substantive commitments about how that future should be determined. 
To put a finer point on it, we should be taking issue with Linklater’s claim that 
discourse ethics involves ‘the willingness to engage wildly different human beings 
qua human beings,’ because this future is not to be determined by human beings 
qua human beings, but as human beings qua ethical subjects.57 	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Including the Ethical Subject 
 
 We saw in Chapter 2 that Linklater interprets anti-foundational criticisms of 
cosmopolitanism as revolving around a rejection of the possibility of an 
Archimedean viewpoint, which duly leads to his advocacy of a thin 
cosmopolitanism where ‘universality takes the form of a responsibility to engage 
others [...] in open dialogue.'58 It is this normative ideal, the ideal of unconstrained 
communication, that provides Linklater the means with which to ground an 
extension of the moral community, to thereby approximate universal moral 
inclusion and problematise practices of exclusion. The problem however is that 
Linklater's reconceived universalism is predicated on the projection of an ethical 
subject, because to be included within the moral community broader than the state, 
presumably one must adopt the position of a post-conventional discourse agent, as 
this is how the validity of competing particularist claims might be evaluated.59 That 
recognition is extended only to others in so far as they are identical with ourselves, 
that they are similarly rational agents, reveals the profound ethical deficiency of 
the discourse theory of morality that underwrites Linklater's defence of 
universalism.60 
 
 The problem is Linklater's explicit commitment to foundationalism.61 He 
does not regard this to be particularly contentious, citing the foundationalism of 
Kant and Habermas, for whom 'the evolution of a critical orientation towards 
exclusion and difference' is regarded 'as exemplifying progress towards a rational 
morality with universal significance,' and it is on this foundationalist belief that 	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Linklater builds his emancipatory cosmopolitanism.62 However, just as CT takes 
issue with positivism by arguing that knowledge does not arise from the subject's 
neutral engagement with an objective reality but reflects pre-existing social 
purposes and interests, inviting observers to reflect upon the effects of knowledge, 
the problem with foundationalism is not simply the impossibility of an 
Archimedean viewpoint, but lies with the political and social implications of 
foundational commitments, such as those to ethical subjectivity.63  
 
 In his concession to anti-foundationalism Linklater cites Hegel's 'famous 
critique of the categorical imperative' as one influential example of the rejection of 
the possibility of an Archimedean standpoint; yet, as we shall see in Part 3, Hegel's 
critique of Kant's moralism goes much further than simply rejecting the possibility 
of 'objective knowledge of permanent moral truths,' and he is far more concerned 
with the social and political implications of Kant's commitment to the ethical and 
epistemological subject.64 This is a crucial and important argument that is either 
overlooked or ignored by Linklater. In summary then, although Linklater is correct 
to argue that it is not universalism that should be at issue in debates about ethics 
and difference, his thin cosmopolitan defence of universalism is neither thin 
enough nor radical enough.65  
 
  
Rationality, Freedom, Subjectivity: The Major Fault-line of 
CIRT 
 
Subjectivity: Freedom as Autonomy 
 
 The deeper problem indicated by Linklater's foundational commitment is that 
his emancipatory cosmopolitanism is based on a limited understanding of human 
freedom, where freedom is associated with rationality and the exercise of a 	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foundational ethical subjectivity. Such a commitment to a rational autonomous 
subject is one of the hallmarks of political modernity. Reacting against the hold of 
religious authority and superstition on seventeenth and eighteenth century social 
life, thinkers such as Descartes and Kant tried to install the individual as ground of 
knowledge and action in the world, as the cogito ergo sum and the transcendental 
unity of apperception respectively. It was through the exercise of theoretical and 
practical reason that humans were able to shed their superstitions and irrational 
religious beliefs and thereby proceed to establish reliable knowledge about the 
world and thus gain increasing control over themselves, the natural environment 
and their social relations.  
 
 Of course, understandings of freedom have developed over the past three 
hundred years, but the autonomous ethical subject as envisaged by Kant still 
remains pervasive, especially in late-Frankfurt School CT.66 Just as Linklater's 
dialectical treatment of rationalism and historicism in Men and Citizens results in 
Kant's ethical subject being sublated into a philosophical-historical understanding 
of man, in Habermas the Kantian ethical subject is resuscitated in light of, and with 
the aid of, Hegel's critique. This demonstrated the necessity of developing both 
Kant's critique of pure reason and the a priori subject into a phenomenology of 
human spirit, where reason is given an historical and progressive core.67  
 
 While the subsequent paradigm shift from the production (or work) model of 
action operative in Hegel and Marx to communicative interaction in Habermas 
brought with it a change in the understanding of freedom that underwrites the 
emancipatory aims of CT, we ultimately return to a form of neo-Kantianism.68 
'[A]utonomy is no longer conceived of as self-legislation (Kant), self-actualisation 
(Hegel and Marx), or reconciliation with otherness (Adorno and Horkheimer). It is 
viewed instead as the capacity to adopt a universalist standpoint and act on this 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66. This includes second and third generation Frankfurt School critical theorists, specifically 
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67. Seyla Benhabib, Critique, Norm, and Utopia, 344. As we shall se in Chapter 6 Habermas's 
emergent dualist commitment to the foundational subject represents a significant but an ill-advised 
retreat from Hegel's own position. 
68. Ibid., 346. 
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basis.' 69  The project of Hegel's Phenomenology returns 'in the form of a 
"reconstruction" of the empirical history of the competencies of the species.'70 In 
Habermas's case this takes the form of a requirement that the universal discourse 
community be comprised of post-conventional agents cognisant of the rational 
presuppositions of discourse. Linklater both endorses Habermas's position and 
emboldens it in more recent work with the aid of Norbert Elias' historical 
sociology.71  
 
 
The Anti-Foundationalist Challenge  
 
 A common response is to remain suspicious about the universality of such 
claims to subjectivity, and hence to reject the accounts of freedom, reason, or 
community upon which emancipatory or cosmopolitan approaches to politics such 
as Linklater's are based. 72  Nietzsche is a particularly influential referent for 
challenges to the emancipatory role of reason. Responding to such scepticism 
directed toward the Enlightenment and its idea of political life governed by reason, 
Martha Nussbaum's essay Kant and Cosmopolitanism opens with a spirited attack 
on thinkers sceptical of enlightened human reason.  
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71. Andrew Linklater, “A European Civilising Process?,” in International Relations and the 
European Union, ed. Christopher Hill and Michael Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); 
Andrew Linklater, “Civilizing Processes and International Societies,” in Globalization and Global 
History, ed. Barry K. Gills and William R. Thompson (London: Routledge, 2006); Andrew 
Linklater, “Towards a Sociology of Global Morals With an ‘Emancipatory Intent’,” in Critical 
International Theory After 25 Years, ed. Nicholas Rengger and Ben Thirkell-White (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007); Andrew Linklater, “Global Civilizing Processes and the 
Ambiguities of Human Interconnectedness,” European Journal of International Relations 16, no. 2 
(2010): 155; Andrew Linklater, “Process Sociology and International Relations,” The Sociological 
Review 59 (2011): 48-64; Andrew Linklater, The Problem of Harm in World Politics, vol. 1 
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72. For instance, Hutchings identifies 'dangerous and unwarranted' temporal assumptions in CIRT 
that 'distract attention from political plurality, and thereby risk repeating ‘the hubris of Western 
political imaginaries.' Kimberley Hutchings, “Happy Anniversary! Time and Critique in 
International Relations Theory,” in Critical International Theory After 25 Years, ed. Nicholas 
Rengger and Ben Thirkell-White (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 89. 
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 Nussbaum writes that 'under the influence of Nietzsche, eminent thinkers of 
quite different sorts have felt dissatisfaction with a politics based on reason and 
principle' and have looked to base politics 'less on reason and more on communal 
solidarity, less on principle and more on affiliation, less on optimism for progress 
than a sober acknowledgement of human finitude and solidarity.'73 All of them are 
supposedly 'united in their opposition to a hopeful, active, and reason-based 
politics grounded in an idea of reverence for rational humanity wherever we find 
it.'74 The arch-foe, she notes, tends to be Kant, because 'Kant, more influentially 
than any other Enlightenment thinker' defended a 'truly universal,' 'active, reformist 
and optimistic' politics 'based upon reason.'75  
 
 Contrary to Nussbaum's portrayal, the real point of contention is not the 
objection to a hopeful, active or rational politics, neither is it a rejection of the 
reverence of humanity; as Dallmayr notes, 'what unites these diverse thinkers is 
their opposition to "foundationalism," which is another word for homogenising 
universalism.'76 The point of contention thus lies in what are regarded as the 
essentially ambivalent achievements of abstract or instrumental reason and the 
problematic associations between reason, freedom, and foundational subjectivity 
that operate in Kantian cosmopolitanism. Two examples of such objections – 
Hegel's criticisms of Kant's universalism and Adorno's identification that the 
achievement of instrumental reason has led to the rationalisation of modern 
societies and the domination of institutions over people – are taken up by 
'postmodernism,' but the latter are all dismissed by Nussbaum as 'Nietzscheans' or 
'post-Nietzscheans.'77  
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76. Ibid., 430. 
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An Inconsistent Critique? 
 
 The predictable riposte to anti-foundationalist scepticism is the familiar 
charge that the historicist/communitarian/postmodernist rejoinder is self-defeating, 
because they simultaneously criticise rational universality while relying on their 
own implicit universalist claims. 78  This is a cogent criticism. Cochran 
demonstrates that 'while they are engaged in shining a spotlight on foundationalist 
epistemologies, [postmodern anti-foundationalists] leave in the shadows the 
ontologies at work in their own methodological assumptions,' and, despite their 
protestations about modern subjectivities, 'a concept of the person and thoughts 
about being [...] fuel the ethical claims that follow.' 79  She continues: '[t]he 
poststructuralist's Foucauldian understanding of radical autonomy and Rorty's 
"liberal ironist" motivate an ethics which aims to realise human autonomy to the 
highest degree possible or imaginable.'80 Consequently, she rightly concludes that 
'an unacknowledged foundationalism remains in the ontologies at work in their 
projects' and that 'a turn away from epistemologically centred thinking places the 
burden of standards for ethical judgement onto ontology.’81  
 
 And so, while Linklater and Habermas are concerned about potentially 
conservative implications of anti-foundationalism, and thereby seek to re-establish 
a criteria of truth via Habermas' account of discourse ethics and communicative 
action, anti-foundationalists are concerned about the potentially assimilatory, 
exclusive, or violent response to difference that foundational commitments entail.82 
For their part, anti-foundationalists robustly dispute the charge of conservatism, 
and it is worth noting that the dispute here is not over the commitment to human 	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Citizens in the Theory of International Relations, 2nd ed. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1990), 
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freedom.83 Ashley and Walker, for instance, explicitly claim that their theorising is 
in a 'register of freedom,' although as Hutchings explains, this 'register of freedom 
is identified with the Foucauldian notion of an imperative to constantly transgress 
the boundaries of given limitation (in theory and practice) rather than with any 
substantive ideal of a world without oppression.'84  
 
 
Overcoming the Anti-foundationalist/Foundationalist Divide 
 
 We thus encounter what has been the major fault-line in critical theory since 
the early 1980s: drawn 'between theories that are explicitly committed to the 
legacy of the philosophy of history in the work of Kant, Hegel and Marx on the 
one hand, and theories that deny the validity of the accounts of progress and 
singularity inherent in that legacy on the other.'85 The mutual suspicion here is 
justified, yet the two perspectives might not be incommensurable. Both are 
motivated by a commitment to human freedom, but talk at cross-purposes because 
their underlying philosophical (ontological and epistemological) commitments 
remain opaque: whereas foundationalists associate freedom with the exercise of a 
foundational (usually Kantian) subjectivity, anti-foundationalists demur the 
universality of such a commitment, and hence question whether approaches to 
politics that take it as a point of departure might constitute an abrogation of human 
freedom rather than a defence of it.  
 
 By tracing the development of both ethical subjectivity and the political 
conditions within which it might be fully appropriated, Linklater's emancipatory 	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cosmopolitanism most definitely captures an important aspect of human freedom. 
Nonetheless, 'post-structuralists' are also correct to identify the transgression of any 
given limitation, including that of any established subjectivity, as another 
important aspect of human freedom, and to recognise that an autonomous 
subjectivity does not exhaust human freedom. They are also correct to recognise 
that the foundational commitment to ethical subjectivity is mistaken and poses a 
threat to other aspects of human freedom. However, bearing a striking similarity 
with Michel's demonstration that debates in international theory about whether 
epistemology or ontology comes first is based on a conflation of the ontological 
difference between entities and the being of entities, that these two normative 
perspectives commonly face each other as adversaries depends on under-theorised 
philosophical (epistemological and ontological) assumptions that serve as the 
grounds for their respective contributions.  
 
 We will recall from Chapter 1 that, while realists rightly observe that entities 
exist independently of our claims to know them, the being of those entities does 
not; idealists, on the other hand, who rightly maintain that the being of these 
entities resides in human understanding, then make the problematic assumption 
that this means that the entities themselves are also dependent upon human 
understanding.86 The foundationalist/anti-foundationalist debate similarly conflates 
the ontological difference. Foundationalists (such as Linklater and Habermas) 
rightly recognise that human beings exist independent of our claims to know them, 
but they then treat the being of those beings (as ethical subjects) as if it also had a 
mind-independent existence; anti-foundationalists rightly recognise that the 'ethical 
subject' is a mind-dependent construction, yet since a foundational commitment to 
ethical subjectivity leads to potentially exclusive and violent responses to 
difference, and due to their commitment to 'irony' or radical autonomy where 
freedom is often equated with resistance, they fail to recognise that ethical 
subjectivity is a significant historical achievement, and that 'acting as if' we were 
ethical subjects is an important aspect of human freedom. We might then draw a 
similar conclusion to Michel's concerning the realist/idealist debate: that the debate 	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between foundationalists and anti-foundationalists only arises because of 
underlying dualist commitments to a foundational split between (cognitive) subject 
and (cognitive) object, and that these seemingly primitive ontological categories 
are themselves in need of deeper reflection.87 
 
 
Freedom as the Condition of Ethical Subjectivity: Foucault and Travail 
Éthique 
 
 A further problem with Linklater's foundational commitment to subjectivity 
is that it remains blind to the fact that the process through which we become ethical 
subjects is itself grounded in freedom; following Heidegger, this is a point made by 
Foucault. That Linklater invests the time and space in both the postscript to Men 
and Citizens and in Transformation to discussing Foucault and Rorty indicates that 
he recognises the strength of the anti-foundationalist challenge, and perhaps also 
that they share more in common than not. However, his 'gesture of embrace' 
concedes too little to their critique.88 For instance, Linklater refers in his postscript 
to Foucault's empirical work on 'moral subjectification,' which he simply reads as a 
way to extend his discussion of the theme of the construction of the 'moral other' in 
international politics.89  
 
 Yet in the passages to which Linklater refers, Foucault discusses the manner 
in which persons form themselves as ethical subjects, a discussion that presents a 
powerful challenge to Kohlberg, Habermas, and Linklater's foundational 
commitments to subjectivity.90 In this passage Foucault distinguishes between a 
'moral code' and moral conduct. Code morality is morality that relies on formal 
moral rules, while moral conduct is itself differentiated into motivational guidance 
and actual conduct. He writes: 'a rule of conduct is one thing; the conduct that may 	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be governed by this rule is another. But another thing still is the manner in which 
(one thinks) one ought to conduct oneself,' where one 'forms oneself as an ethical 
subject.'91 This adoption of a position of ethical subjectivity is, for Foucault, a 
practice of self-formation, which he calls 'ethical work' (travail éthique).92 As 
Dallmayr explains in his commentary, moral conduct is not 'rigidly standardised 
but is necessarily differentiated among individuals acting in different times and 
places,' for modes of self-formation 'do not differ any less from one morality to 
another' than do systems of rules and interdictions.'93  
 
 
The Deficit of Moral Universalism 
 
 The significance of Foucault's argument for our current purposes is not only 
that he demonstrates ethical subjectivity to be a labour one performs on oneself in 
order to bring oneself into conformity with rules of conduct rather than an innate 
human capacity (Kant), or the highest expression of moral maturity (Kohlberg, 
Habermas, Linklater).94 Rather, it lies in the fact that, like Heidegger before him, 
Foucault acknowledges that freedom is not simply the possession of the subject, 
but is also the premise of moral conduct through which one transforms oneself into 
an ethical subject.95 As Foucault explained in an interview before his death, 
'freedom has to be seen as the 'ontological condition' of human-being-in-the-world 
and as the basis of ethics - where ethics denotes not so much a theory or a codified 
set of rules but rather a practice or way of life (ethos).'96  
 
 Dallmayr calls the neglect of moral self-formation and the de-emphasis of 
concrete motivation, both evident in Linklater's CIRT, the 'deficit of moral 	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universalism,' and argues that 'the issue is not simply the slighting of difference as 
particularity (which, as such, might still be subsumable under universal rules) [...] 
The issue is more serious and has to do with the privileging of moral theory over 
praxis, that is, of principles over moral conduct and self-formation grounded in 
freedom.'97 This issue of praxis brings into view the domain of politics, a domain 
that is unavoidable given the quandaries of moral rules: 'Even assuming 
widespread acceptance of universal norms, we know at least since Aristotle that 
rules do not directly translate into praxis but require careful interpretation and 
application.'98  
 
 The sidelining of politics by morality is the result of treating ethical 
subjectivity as if it were foundational. Whereas Linklater assumes that we are 
always already ethical subjects, and simply equates freedom as the exercise of this 
subjectivity, what Foucault, following Heidegger, is pointing to is that we become 
ethical subjects through moral conduct/subjectification, and that this process of 
subjectification is itself grounded in freedom. Ethical subjectivity is itself therefore 
conditional upon a more primordial (practical) freedom, and thus cannot simply be 
associated with acting morally. We will explore the implications of this 
praxeological aspect of freedom in our discussion of Heidegger's notion of 
'solicitous being-with' in Chapter 4. 
 
 
Freedom and Inter-Subjectivity  
 
 Foucault and Dallmayr's emphasis on the importance of praxis as well as 
principles of moral conduct reflect promising moves in recent critical theory that 
focus on the inter-subjective aspect of human freedom. One of the most 
encouraging lines of inquiry in this regard can be found in the recognition theory 
of Axel Honneth, a third generation Frankfurt School theorist, and in the work of 
Shannon Brincat, whose recent doctoral thesis engages Linklater's CIRT through 	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Honneth.99 The relative balance of influence between Kant, Hegel and Marx shifts 
in favour of Hegel in Honneth's work.100  
 
 
Love, Rights, and Solidarity 
 
 In contrast to Habermas and Linklater's reliance on Kant, Honneth draws 
more on early Hegel, whose theory of recognition is developed into a social-
psychological theory. In contrast to the influence of Kohlberg on Habermas and 
Linklater, empirical support is lent to Hegel's speculative insight in the 
Phenomenology into the intersubjective conditions of subjectivity with aid of 
social psychologist George Herbert Mead and child psychologist David Winnicott, 
where inter-subjective relationships of recognition are seen as crucial in the 
development of individual personality.  
 
 For Honneth, the achievement of basic self-confidence in childhood is 
supplemented in the further development of personality in later life by the 
development of self-respect and self-esteem.101 A loving relationship (such as 
parental love) is the basis of self-confidence, while self-respect involves the 
awareness of oneself as a person, as a responsible moral agent entitled to the same 
status and treatment as every other person; while self-esteem involves the sense of 
what it is that makes the self a distinctive individual and is developed through the 
person's participation in activity that is of value to the community.102 These 
different practical relations to the self are connected to three different kinds of 
recognition: love, rights, and solidarity.103 
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 It is the empirical experience of disrespect, or 'moral injustice,' when human 
'subjects' are 'denied the recognition they deserve' and which create the moral 
feelings of 'shame, anger or indignation' that provides Honneth with the 
'pretheoretical basis for social critique.'104 The fillip to social change is then seen to 
arise as a response to the injury of one of these forms of self-relation: the denial of 
rights, for instance, is an injury to self-respect, and the emotional response to this 
injury provides the affective motivation that can lead to resistance and the struggle 
to have those rights recognised. In contrast to Habermas's notion of distorted 
communication, these moral experiences are not 'aroused by a restriction of 
linguistic capabilities' but by the 'violation of identity claims acquired in 
socialisation.'105 The project of emancipation is therefore not just about securing 
the conditions of subjectivity, but is also essentially connected to relations of inter-
subjectivity. While Honneth himself does not reflect much on the cosmopolitan 
dimension of recognition theory, Brincat argues that the expansion of claims for 
'love, rights and solidarity' in global social relations demonstrates that recognition 
theory has a global dimension and that ethical life (in this case, claims for 
recognition) simultaneously operates domestically and globally.106  
 
 
The Emancipatory Credentials of Process Sociology 
 
 We will recall that Linklater's insistence on the 'tripartite structure' of any 
critical theory enjoins a sociological analysis of the prospects for the realisation of 
any normative argument, and that Linklater endorses Habermas's reconstruction of 
Marx's historical materialism, which calls for an emancipatory historical sociology 
based on the idea of social learning and the historical development of species 
capacities; what we might refer to as an historical sociological analysis of the 
actualisation of the ethical subject. Drawing on Elias, Linklater develops such an 
approach in his later work on civilising processes and the harm principle. Brincat's 	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deployment of Honneth's theory of inter-subjective recognition represents a 
promising move away from Linklater's foundational commitment to subjectivity, 
one motivated by a scepticism regarding Linklater's later reliance on Elias's 
process sociology, and one that gestures towards the recognition of what Dallmayr 
identifies as the deficit of moral universalism. However, such a move, we shall see, 
does not manage to overcome Linklater/Habermas's foundational commitment to 
ethical subjectivity. 
 
 In light of Honneth and Joas's criticism of Elias, who demonstrate that Elias's 
process sociology relies on the authoritarian and repressive structures of the state 
as the 'necessary subjugating central authority for any gains toward "civilisation,"' 
Brincat rightly questions the merits of Linklater's recent reliance on Elias's work.107 
He notes that Linklater's focus on the reduction of harm for the pacification of 
human social relations, as opposed to more positive forms of emancipation, is 
surprising, and suggests that Honneth's intersubjective concept of autonomy offers 
complimentary insights into Linklater's research agenda that can help further the 
emancipatory project of CIRT.108 The problem with Linklater's reliance on Elias's 
process sociology in relation to the harm principle is that it fails to take 'into 
account the importance of recognitive acts implicit within this process and upon 
which the normative potential of the harm principle is fundamentally reliant.'109 
For this reason, Honneth's 'refinement' of Hegel's recognition theoretic approach 
and the diagnosis of social pathologies are seen by Brincat to be 'broadly 
supportive of Linklater's ideal of emancipation through the transformation of 
political community and in ways more effective than Elias' process sociology.'110  
 
 Brincat then argues that 'it is only through recognition that the unequal moral 
significance of proximate and distant suffering - the privilege given to the suffering 
of the same “survival group” over all “others” - that has been the common concern 
of Linklater's work, can be overcome,' and that hence it is only the combination of 	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Habermasian discourse ethics, Eliasian process sociology and Honneth's 
recognition theory that can offer the complementary and holistic account necessary 
to ground the philosophical, empirical and sociological aspects of Linklater's 
project of emancipation.111 Honneth's recognition theory is therefore offered as 'an 
empirical means to ground an emancipatory politics concerned with a movement to 
a cosmopolitan community' that 'gestures towards an ideal vision of a global 
recognitive sphere that affirms all aspects of human difference and individuality 
and which has been expanded to include all human-beings.'112  
 
 
The 'Intersubjective' Turn 
 
 The emphasis placed on the intersubjective aspect of human freedom by 
Honneth and Brincat is a significant contribution to critical theory. In particular, 
through Honneth, Brincat rescues the emancipatory politics of Linklater's earlier 
work that is lost in his turn to Elias's process sociology by locating the 
emancipatory project of critical theory and CIRT 'within the experiences of the 
“dominated” themselves rather than civilising processes that take place “above 
them.”'113 In so doing, Honneth and Brincat also represent an important departure 
from the teleological side of Kantian cosmopolitanism, whose guarantee that 
perpetual peace will come about as though by a logic taking place 'behind the 
backs or over the heads' of political subjects 'leaves little or no room for politics or 
the active shaping of political life as such,' which casts a shadow over Linklater's 
approach to CIRT.114 Despite this important departure, and although it offers 
significant contributions to the emancipatory project of CIRT, the 'intersubjective' 
turn in Honneth's recognition theoretic is not simply a 'refinement' of Hegel's 
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notion of recognition, but an overhaul; one which misreads Hegel as a theorist of 
intersubjectivity and thus fails to appropriate the full force of his insights.115  
 
 
Reading Hegel Through a Kantian Kaleidoscope 
 
 The root of the misunderstanding lies in the reliance on subjectivity in the 
accounts of 'intersubjectivity.' Hegel never uses the term intersubjectivity, and 
subjectivity in Hegel has a very different meaning to the meaning it has acquired 
today, where it usually relates to an individual person, a meaning implicit in the 
term 'intersubjectivity.'116 Although dating back to Aristotle, in its modern usage it 
is Kant's definition of the subject that remains pervasive. For Kant '[a] person is a 
subject whose actions can be imputed to him [...] subject to no other laws than 
those he gives to himself, either alone or at least along with others.’117  
 
 For Hegel however, the subject and the individual are two very distinct 
categories. The subject is not an individual consciousness formed in its interactions 
with other individuals, but is a particular relation between individuals and 
universals: this is a very different proposition.118 Honneth, as well as Linklater, 
Habermas, and others, uncritically accept Kant’s identification of the individual 
and the subject, and hence read Hegel through ‘the kaleidoscope of a Kantian 
conception of the subject,’ a conception to which Hegel was profoundly 
opposed.119 While Honneth is right to emphasise the importance of love in human 
relationships and in the development of personality, as we shall see in Part 3, love 
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has a much more profound existential/ontological and emancipatory meaning in 
Hegel that is obscured by Honneth’s kaleidoscopic reading of him.  
 
 For Hegel the autonomous subject is an institution, ‘an artefact created by the 
practices of modern life: the intimate family, the market economy, and the liberal 
state. Each of these social arrangements articulate and express the value and the 
authority of the individual; they give to the individual a standing she would not 
have without them.’120 These institutions manufacture the idea of an autonomous 
individual, an ethical subject of its own actions. Honneth et al. thus read into Hegel 
a ‘methodological individualism’ that not only finds no support in his writing, but 
to which his whole project was an attempt to overcome.121  
 
 Hegel’s notion of recognition is not only incomprehensible as a relation 
between Kantian subjects, but from a Hegelian perspective, the individualism 
associated with the Kantian subject effectively alienates us from political reality.122 
As will become clear in Chapter 7, Hegel’s struggle for recognition is not a 
confrontation between two independent subjects demanding recognition from each 
other, as is implied by Honneth’s recognition theoretic, but is a process of self-
differentiation through which two independent persons (self-consciousnesses) 
emerge from a single dominant shared subjectivity. Honneth’s ‘reworking’ of 
Hegel’s recognition theory is thus based on a very creative reading of Hegel; its 
key failure ‘the doomed attempt to read Hegel through either a Kantian conception 
of the subject, or the common sense view of the individual as an autonomous 
being.’123 As Blunden correctly concludes: ‘[t]o appropriate Hegel’s great insights 	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into social philosophy, the very first task must be the renovation of the concept of 
“subject”, rejecting both naïve Cartesian or positivist conceptions and anti-
humanist conceptions like those of structuralism and poststructuralism.’124 
 
 
Relational Individuality and Singularity  
 
 Blunden’s criticism of ‘poststructuralism’ is not entirely merited, and recent 
work taking orientation from Heidegger can be read as (indirect) contributions to 
the task initiated by Hegel of challenging Kant’s association of the individual with 
subjectivity, and with foregrounding the fundamental debt owed by individuality to 
its relational construction. There are a number of interesting contributions in this 
regard, but Louiza Odysseos’s work on the ‘coexistential subject’ and Jean-Luc 
Nancy’s work on ‘singularity’ are worth singling out.125  
 
 
Coexistentiality 
 
 In contrast to other philosophers drawing on Heideggerian thought, such as 
Sartre, Levinas, Gadamer, Derrida, and Agamben, Nancy re-emphasises the role of 
‘Mitsein’ (being-with) in Heidegger’s thought, opening the implications of 
Heidegger’s thought for politics and ethics in a new way.126 Central to Nancy’s 	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argument is the Heideggerian understanding of humans as world-forming beings 
whose experiences are singular and unique, due to the essential facticity of the 
human mode of being. Crucially, for Nancy (and Heidegger) the self is not best 
thought as a subject because it is not essentially distinct from the experiences that 
constitute it, but is instead deeply implicated in its relation to them; at the deepest 
level individual human beings cannot be seen as antecedent to their relationality. 
The reason for this is that for Nancy, the proximal fact of human existence is 
coexistence, the coexistence of individuated selves that are co-originary or 
relational from the start, and who are constituted through their relations towards 
singular and multiple worlds.  
 
 
The Subject of Coexistence 
 
 Nancy’s prioritisation of relationality over subjectivity, his focus on the 
coexistential nature of human existence, leads to a way of thinking about human 
sociality that prioritises neither the individual nor the community, since to focus on 
the general or the particular detracts from the coexistential nature of sociality. This 
aspect of Heideggerian thought is taken up in IR by Louiza Odysseos. Odysseos’s 
primary engagement is with the concept of coexistence in IR. She argues that the 
dominant social ontology in IR is individualistic, and that as a result coexistence 
has traditionally been understood as the social and political co-presence of 
homologous unitary entities, such as states or individual human beings, and that 
this perpetuates an untenable commitment to the modern subject and obscures the 
co-constitutive relation between self and other.127 Odysseos turns to Heidegger in 
order to demonstrate that subjectivity is coexistential from the start, arguing that 
coexistent entities should be considered as heteronomic rather than simultaneously 
present autonomous entities, which results in the need to recognise the primacy of 
the radical embeddedness of the self in the world, and hence to forgo conceiving 
the self in ways that essentialise any perspective of the subject.  
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 Since the subject is inescapably bound up in webs of relations that constitute 
it as a concrete entity, Odysseos echoes Nancy’s insistence on prioritizing 
relationality over subjectivity, arguing that ‘theory can no longer be seen as 
consisting of establishing relations between non-relational subjects, self-sufficient 
in an ethical and political sense, but must reflect the priority of relation over 
subjectivity.’ 128  This leads her to claim that IR theory needs to develop a 
‘theoretical sensibility that is attuned to the existence of a self constituted by 
otherness [...] so as to promote an international political theory that has at its 
centre, not the modern subject, but rather an understanding of coexistence as the 
proximal fact of human life.’129 Human propriety, on this account, involves ‘the 
appropriation of one’s own being as heteronomous being-with,’ rather than the 
realisation of some foundational subjectivity.130 
 
 
Heteronomy 
 
 Odysseos’s argument that the subject must be understood as heteronomous 
rather than autonomous has significant implications for the way that we think 
about freedom. Rather than relating to the ideal of self-directing action of 
autonomous individuals, freedom for Odysseos (as for Heidegger) relates to a 
heightened sensitivity to the coexistential nature of subjectivity and to the 
possibility of the ‘freeing up’ the possibility of human existence as being-with-
others. Consequently, rather than referring to capacity of individuals to initiate 
autonomous action, on this view freedom has to do with ‘freeing up, in the sense of 
properly disclosing, the proper possibilities for the kind of Being that Dasein is, 
i.e., being-in-the-world with others.’131  
 
 Odysseos’s charge against Linklater is that due to his subjectivist ontology, 
or, as it has been presented here, his reliance on ethical subjectivity, means that he 	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confuses freedom with the conditions of possibility of a certain kind of 
subjectivity.132 Because politics is understood as the negotiation of the terms, or 
the field of possibilities, of human (co)existence, any limitation on this negotiation 
should be regarded as compromising human freedom. For Odysseos (as for 
Heidegger), freedom and coexistence are not simply about inclusivity and 
universality, but must also involve calling into question the edifice of the modern 
subject upon which accounts of liberal cosmopolitanism rest, since freeing up the 
possibility of human existence as being-with-others must involve foregoing 
conceptions of the self that essentialise any perspective of the self as subject.133 
The problem then is not that Linklater attempts to include the excluded other, but 
that he does not engage with the prior issue ‘as to how one could allow [human] 
existence [Da-sein] to show itself as other-determined, that is, as being 
heteronomous and coexistential from the start.’134  
 
 
A Politics of Singularity 
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 A similar scepticism regarding the reliance on a foundational subjectivity 
informs Nick Vaughan-Williams’s approach to cosmopolitan thought.135 Surveying 
the cosmopolitanism of Daniele Archibugi, David Held, and Linklater, Vaughan-
Williams draws out their shared commitment, with various modifications, of a 
Kantian cosmopolitical ideal, with special reference to the Stoic, Christian, and 
Kantian ideal of extending hospitality to others.136 Drawing on Derrida’s argument 
that there is an economy of violence at the heart of any ethical generality, 
Vaughan-Williams argues that there exists a structural impediment to the 
cosmopolitan ideal of the ‘mutual acknowledgement of, and respect for, the equal 
and legitimate rights of others.’137 For, according to Derrida, ‘it is only ever 
possible to extend hospitality to the other while at the same time, scandalously and 
paradoxically, sacrificing all the others to whom it is also necessary to respond.’138 
Echoing moves made by Dallmayr, Honneth, and Brincat, Derrida’s answer in his 
later works is a relocation of ethics to politics, to what Vaughan-Williams calls a 
‘politics of singularity.’139  
 
 Derrida’s ethico-political thought shares a great deal with Nancy, especially 
the latter’s commitment to relational subjectivity. Rather than understanding 
ethico-political relations as relations between human beings qua subjects, as other 
cosmopolitans such as Linklater tend to do, there is for Derrida a primordial sense 
of solidarity with others ‘caught up in conflict, famine, or other disastrous 
circumstances’ that exceeds any notion of common citizenship, as if all were 
‘citizens of the world,’ a sense of solidarity that relates to ‘the incalculable 
singularity of everyone, before any “subject” [...] beyond all citizenship, beyond 
every “state”, every “people”, indeed even beyond the current state of the 
definition of a living being as a living “human” being, and the universality of 
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rational calculation.’140 Singularity, and a politics of singularity is thus offered as 
an alternative site around which to think about relationality, and an alternative 
approach to the ‘tired and totalising’ polis/cosmopolis dichotomy that shapes much 
thinking regarding the possibilities of global order.141 Derrida’s argument for a 
‘democracy to come’ is one attempt to grapple with such a politics of singularity, 
and should be considered an important contribution to thinking about the radical 
sensibility, the democratic impulse that lies at the heart of approaches to CIRT.142 
 
 
The Challenge to Dualism 
 
 We may venture the suggestion that what unites the approaches surveyed in 
this section is the common challenge to the treatment of ‘subjectivity,’ and 
especially ethical subjectivity, as in some sense foundational. Odysseos’s analysis 
of the ‘subject of coexistence’ demonstrates that coexistent entities, such as 
ideological systems, states, civilisations, and the modern political/ethical subject, 
owe radical debts to alterity, while Vaughan-Williams’s identification of an 
economy of violence at the heart of any ethical generality highlights the fact that 
cosmopolitanism cannot simply be based on ethical universals, and has to be 
motivated more by a political concern for the singularity of human beings and 
political contexts.  
 
 Consequently, all the writers mentioned above may be read in some way as 
contributions to what it might mean to approach international relations from non-
dualist assumptions. Moreover, they demonstrate that we cannot legitimately rely 
on the idea of a foundational subject, ethical or political, to provide the ground for 	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principles of coexistence or cosmopolitan ethical ideals. In fact, there is an 
interesting argument to be made that Nancy and Odysseos’s arguments about 
relational subjectivity might be able to provide Foucault and Rorty with the 
ontological ground to base their claims to radical autonomy and liberal irony, 
which Cochran demonstrates they rely upon but do not defend.  
 
 However, these approaches are largely concerned with critique, with reacting 
against and resisting any foundational determination of the being of beings with 
the aim of freeing us up for alternative possibilities, while those that do strive to be 
more affirmative (Honneth, Brincat) remain reliant on an (intersubjective) subject. 
This is not to say that a ‘politics of singularity’ is not affirmative: it is. However, 
the relations between the emancipatory aspect of Derrida’s politics of singularity, 
the argument in Spectres of Marx and Linklater’s emancipatory approach to 
international relations, remain relatively untheorised. Our argument will attempt to 
redress this. 
 
 
Ethics as Pragmatic Critique? 
 
 This is not the first engagement with Linklater on meta-theoretical lines: we 
briefly introduced another, Molly Cochran’s Normative Theory in International 
Relations, in Chapter 1. Her focus, however, is on the epistemological status of the 
normative claims that follow from the foundational ethical commitments of various 
normative approaches to international theory, rather than on an explicit evaluation 
of the ontological aspects that underwrite them. Similarly disputing the 
‘objectivity’ of these foundations, she refers to them as ‘weak foundations’ that are 
presupposed as the conditions of subsequent normative claims, and argues that 
these can only lead to contingently held ethical claims relating to principles of 
sovereignty and universal moral inclusion.143 Cochran’s criticism of both Frost and 
Linklater, for example, is that they both mistakenly treat the claims derived from 
their weak foundations as non-contingent, and that because we cannot rely on any 	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firm foundations, any mind-independent object, international ethics should be 
conceived instead simply as a form of pragmatic critique.  
 
 Cochran’s pragmatism is an anti-foundationalist approach to normative 
theory that draws on Rorty and Dewey. However, the problem with this pragmatist 
approach to ethics is that it must ultimately remain ambivalent about the validity of 
the weak foundations that it would presumably flit between as circumstances 
change, leading to ethical claims that cannot be made with much conviction. In 
contrast, a normative argument that proceeds according to a constructivist 
epistemology, such the Hegelian one outlined in Chapter 1, might be able to 
present a renewed defence of Linklater’s critical approach to normative theory 
(i.e., one motivated by a foundational commitment to human freedom) against 
other’s, such as Frost’s.  
 
 As we have seen, the problem with Linklater’s approach is that he treats the 
cognitive object (i.e., the ethical subject) as if it had a mind-independent existence, 
which functions as the foundation of his universalism and hence also his 
emancipatory cosmopolitanism. Yet if we proceed from non-dualist premises and 
engage in a ‘philosophical ontology’ of what it means to be a free being (rather 
than simply assume that this amounts to the exercise of ethical subjectivity), if 
deemed persuasive, we might consider our ontological argument to represent a 
contribution to the construction of our understanding of the human being as a 
cognitive object (i.e., a mind-dependent interpretation of the human being as a free 
being). This is our intent as we move into Parts 2 and 3. Such an exercise might 
constitute a renewed defence of a characteristically ‘critical’ approach to 
international theory due to a more persuasive philosophical defence of its 
foundational commitments, commitments that are more universalistic than 
alternatives (such as Frost’s) and hence more appropriate for contemporary 
(global) politics and ethics.  
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The Politics of Subjectivity: the Subject/Object Split and the 
Politics of Reality. 
 
Ethical Theories as Exercises in World-Making 
 
 We will recall from Chapter 1 that one of our objections to dualist 
approaches to international theory was that they suppose a foundational split 
between subject and object occurring between mind and world; that this conflates 
the ontological difference between entities and the being of entities, and means that 
they cannot recognise the distinction between mind/world and mind-independent 
real. When an interpretation of a mind-independent entity (such as the human 
being) serves as the ‘ontological’ foundation of a universalist theory (such as 
Linklater’s emancipatory cosmopolitanism), the mind-dependent cognitive object 
is projected out onto the mind-independent real and is treated as if it had a mind-
independent ‘objective’ existence. Since they presume to ‘know’ the cognitive 
object, such a projection entails a simultaneous claim to (epistemological) 
subjectivity by the claimant. This is a position of power; one that attempts to usurp 
the essentially social and historical process through which the mind-dependent 
cognitive object, our understanding of the being of the human being, is 
constructed.  
 
 Since foundationalist ethical frameworks depend an interpretation of the 
being of beings as their ethical foundation (the post-conventional discourse agent 
by discourse ethics, for instance) universalist ethical reasoning is essentially a 
political exercise: it is an exercise in world-making, becasue these ethical theories 
produce the world they seek to transform144 For example, in Linklater’s account of 
CIRT, attempts to mediate differences involve ‘the other’ having to adopt a 
position of ethical subjectivity: that they become a post-conventional discourse 
agent. Such an approach to ethical universalism betrays a false neutrality because it 
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is predicated on presuppositions about what is essential about human beings, i.e., 
their ethical subjectivity. Linklater thereby depoliticises his politics by presenting it 
as an ethics, elevating his politics above political contestation. This depoliticises 
the ontological assumptions that he brings to the cognitive object (i.e., his 
presumption that the human being is essentially an ethical subject), which serves as 
the foundation for his subsequent normative, sociological, and praxeological 
claims. 
 
 To restate our central complaint: by treating emancipation as the historical 
actualisation of the ethical subject, where the material conditions that negate the 
full appropriation of ethical subjectivity are themselves progressively negated, and 
providing a defence of moral universalism as the universal responsibility to engage 
in dialogue, Linklater’s emancipatory cosmopolitanism rests on a conflation of the 
ontological difference between human beings and the being of human beings. 
Linklater’s approach to CIRT thus overvalues one human potentiality (ethical 
subjectivity) and is based upon relations between human beings qua ethical 
subjects. Ethical and emancipatory relations are thus reduced to relations between 
intransitive objects (i.e., ethical subjects), which is morally deficient because 
recognition is extended only to ethical subjects. Moreover, this projection of 
ethical subjectivity neglects the process of moral self-formation, the process by 
which we become an ethical subject, a process that is grounded in human freedom. 
A less sympathetic critic of Linklater might then conclude that Linklater’s 
emancipatory cosmopolitanism is neither ethical nor emancipatory.  
 
 
A Non-Dualist Account of the Human Being: the Meta-Theoretical Condition 
of an Emancipatory Cosmopolitanism  
 
 CIRT professes a high degree of reflexivity about the relation between 
subject and object, but focus lies in the role of that theorising plays in the 
recreation of social reality and in the emancipatory purposes of theory, and scant 
attention has been paid to the (ontological) implications of any underlying 
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commitments to ethical subjectivity, or of our ‘knowledge’ about mind-
independent objects, for our modes of being in the world. In his discussion of the 
subject-object split Linklater’s takes issue with the positivist claim to separate facts 
from values, arguing that critical theory collapses the subject-object distinction. 
For Linklater this collapse makes it impossible to engage in politically neutral 
analysis of an external reality, where a neutral subject faces an independent object, 
and this rightly leads to emphasis being placed on the role that knowledge plays in 
the reproduction of social reality.145  
 
 This collapse of the subject-object distinction is tied to Habermas’s 
identification of three kinds of knowledge, technical, practical, and emancipatory, 
and leads to the claim that ‘knowledge about society is incomplete if it lacks the 
emancipatory purpose.’146 This is because ‘[a]ny assumption that critical theory 
starts from normative and inevitably subjective preferences whereas problem-
solving theory avoids moral commitments in order to grapple with basic truths 
objectively is therefore untenable.’147 The upshot of Habermas's identification of 
three knowledge-constitutive interests is that the attempt to collapse the 
subject/object distinction in Critical Theory has led to an overwhelming focus on 
demonstrating the impossibility of value-free social inquiry.  
 
 While this has resulted in 'human needs and purposes' being brought to the 
fore of what counts as valuable knowledge, and it offers a cogent defence of the 
normative aims of critical theory, the consequence has been that reflexivity 
surrounding the relation between subject and object has been limited to 
epistemology; to the problem of knowledge rather than that of being. 148 For 
instance, when it comes to ethical theorising, Linklater falls back on a foundational 
commitment to the ethical subject, and fails to consider the implications of this 
commitment; implications that might even undermine the commitment to 
emancipation. For this reason, along with the others given throughout this chapter 	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and in Chapter 1, we proceed into Parts 2 and 3 with the intent of developing a 
non-dualist approach to CIRT, one not predicated on a foundational commitment 
to subjectivity or objectivity. In other words, an anti-foundational emancipatory 
cosmopolitanism.  
 
 Given our discussions so far, it should be not be surprising that we will turn 
to Heidegger and Hegel for such a task. Both depend on foundational ontological 
commitments (in the fuller sense of the term) to human freedom, and both proceed 
from non-dualist premises that can give us a deeper appreciation of seemingly 
ontological primitives such as subjectivity and objectivity. Whereas dualists 
suppose that the split between subject and object occurs between mind and world, 
as is implied by the Kantian association of subjectivity with individuality, for 
Hegel at least, the subject-object split occurs within consciousness. This introduces 
a vertical dimension to both subjectivity and objectivity that has hitherto been 
ignored.149 A non-dualist approach to understanding the human being as a free 
being would recognise that dualism is not foundational but derivative, and that 
claims to subjectivity and objectivity are essentially political exercises that must 
remain open to contestation.  
 
 This does not involve rejecting the very many contributions that Linklater 
has made to CIRT; rather it seeks to integrate his insights with those of his critics, 
surveyed above. Whereas Linklater’s foundational commitment to ethical 
subjectivity results in an essentially rationalist emancipatory cosmopolitanism, 
where the relation between self and world is ultimately mediated by moral reason, 
Heidegger and Hegel are keen to develop a non-mediated, phenomenological 
relation to reality, and their arguments in this regard will help us to develop an 
alternative praxeological emancipatory cosmopolitanism. We thus proceed into 
Parts 2 and 3 with the research question: 	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What are the implications of conceptions of human existence and freedom in 
Heidegger and Hegel for critical international theory? 
 
 
Conclusions.  
 
 Given the material conditions of contemporary (global) politics and ethics, 
we argued in the Introduction that international theory needs more universalistic 
trajectories of ontological inquiry. Following our survey of ‘ontological’ 
foundations in international theory in Chapter 1 we suggested that Linklater 
represented the most powerful advocate of a left-Hegelian tradition in IR, and 
promised an approach to IR that remained universalistic while recognising that 
certain forms of universalism can submerge or extinguish difference. After 
demonstrating that Linklater’s emancipatory cosmopolitanism is predicated on the 
existence of the ethical subject, we discussed the philosophical (ontological and 
epistemological) inadequacies of this foundational commitment in Chapter 2 
before initiating an evaluation of the ethical and emancipatory credentials of such 
an approach to world politics in Chapter 3, which will continue in Parts 2 and 3.  
 
 In light of these discussions, we conclude Part 1 by reasserting the view that 
Linklater’s approach to international theory is one of the most persuasive and 
promising available. He presents a forceful defence for the recovery of the ethical 
imperative that animated IR in the early years; one that rightly places normative 
ideas and the prospects for change at the heart of the discipline’s research agenda. 
Three of his contributions are particularly cogent: his criticism that the neo-realist 
reduction of the study of international relations to an analysis of elements of 
recurrence and repetition is profoundly mistaken, that the discipline has a deeper 
purpose that is both normative and philosophical, and his contention that IR should 
be concerned with an analysis of the potentials for the transformation of political 
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community.150 Furthermore, his characterisation of the ‘tripartite structure’ of 
critical theory – the view that any normative, philosophical position is incomplete 
as critical theory if it does not include sociological and praxeological analyses of 
the prospects for its realisation – offers a strong rebuttal to would-be criticisms that 
his emancipatory vision is hopelessly utopian.151 
 
 However, although his emancipatory cosmopolitanism, and the praxeological 
and sociological analyses that follow, represent and important contribution to the 
development of one aspect of human freedom in international relations, the 
freedom of the ethical subject, Linklater’s key mistake is to treat his commitment 
to ethical subjectivity as a foundational one since this leads to what we have called 
a ‘politics of subjectivity,’ where his politics are presented as an ethics. 
Consequently, we claimed that Linklater’s emancipatory cosmopolitanism is 
ethically deficient because, contrary to his claim to engage human beings qua 
human beings, ethical recognition is extended only to human beings qua ethical 
subjects. Such a commitment also undermines his commitment to emancipation, 
because it emphasises moral universality at the expense of emancipatory praxis and 
moral self-formation grounded in freedom. Ultimately then, Linklater’s 
emancipatory cosmopolitanism may fail by its own standards.  
 
 The deeper problem indicated by Linklater’s reliance on the foundational 
subject is both a limited philosophical ontology and a thin understanding of human 
freedom, where freedom is associated with rationality and the exercise of 
subjectivity. Indeed, as Brincat demonstrates, one of the problems with this 
exclusive focus on the freedom of the ethical subject is that, in Linklater’s later 
works for instance, we are led to a level of analysis so broad (i.e., world history) 
that we risk losing the emancipatory and ethical potential of critical theory. 
Dallmayr, Honneth, Brincat, and Odysseos all reminded us that freedom is not 
simply the possession of the subject, and that emancipation is not just about 
securing the conditions within which subjectivity can be exercised (as 	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foundationalists such as Kant, Habermas, and Linklater assume), but is also about 
inter-personal relations and emancipatory praxis. Linklater’s foundational 
commitment to ethical subjectivity undermines this inter-personal, relational 
aspect of human freedom, and thus represents an inappropriate basis for an 
emancipatory cosmopolitanism.  
 
 That said, this does not require that we reject Linklater’s emancipatory 
cosmopolitanism. Rather, we should recognise it as a potent defence of one aspect 
of human freedom: i.e., the self-realisation and autonomy of the ethical subject. 
The ideal of more inclusive dialogue in international relations, along with his 
proposals for the triple transformation of political community in Transformation, 
are basically sound. What we must realise, however, is that these arguments are 
predicated on a one-sided conception of human freedom, and that social interaction 
governed by open and rational dialogue cannot legitimately claim to be either an 
essential expression of human freedom, or its highest form. Moreover, that moral 
rationality is not an effective arbiter of difference. As a result, we must look 
elsewhere for a reliable guide for emancipatory praxis and a more universalistic 
evaluative tool for critical social theory; one that can offer a guide for an 
emancipatory cosmopolitanism not based on a commitment to subjectivity.  
 151 
Part 2.  
Worlds and World Politics 
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Introduction to Part 2 
 
 We explained in the Introduction that there was a shift in thought in the 
eighteenth century from universal and universalistic ontologies to particularist 
ontologies, a shift that was instrumental in the emergence of nationalistic, 
particularist moralities that have since contributed to the loss of ethics in 
international political thought and theory in the twentieth century.1 We also saw 
that as a consequence of the prominence of these particularist ontologies and 
epistemologies, a distinctive positivist methodology evolved during the nineteenth 
century, and that it was the combination of this shift to particularist ontology, 
epistemology and methodology that is the legacy in which the establishment of IR 
as an academic discipline, especially its neo-realist mainstream, is embedded.2 We 
then concluded with Behr that – given the material and ideational conditions of 
twenty-first century (global) politics – the challenges and requirements for a 
contemporary theory of the international ‘lie in the study of ontological and 
epistemological dynamics’ with a view to providing a groundwork with which to 
overcome ‘the cemented frameworks and aporias of particularism to establish 
renewed ontology(ies) and respective epistemologies for contemporary and future 
politics and ethics.’3 Such an approach, we prescribed, must be able to recognise 
plurality and diversity without ‘expecting “the other” to assimilate and/or not 
violating “the other” through logo- and egocentric epistemologies’4  
 
 Assessing Linklater’s self-consciously universalistic approach to 
international theory in Part 1, we argued that, despite offering perhaps the most 
persuasive and comprehensive of the ‘critical’ approaches to contemporary world 
politics, his emancipatory cosmopolitanism was hamstrung by a foundational 
commitment to the ethical subject/ethical subjectivity. This commitment, we 
argued, rested on a conflation of the ontological difference, and involved Linklater 
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submitting to a form of metaphysical dualism: comprised of a foundational 
ontological commitment to ethical subjectivity, and a foundational epistemological 
commitment to the ethical subject as a mind-independent cognitive object. As a 
result, we claimed that Linklater’s defence of universalism was predicated on the 
‘projection’ of ethical subjectivity onto ‘the other’ and other others, and that his 
conception of emancipation is essentially an account of the historical actualisation 
of the ethical subject. Such an emancipatory cosmopolitanism was ethically 
deficient because it presumed that the other adopt a position of ethical subjectivity, 
and we questioned its emancipatory credentials because too little attention was 
paid to the role of praxis or inter-personal relations as against the exercise of 
ethical subjectivity.  
 
 
The Argument of Part 2 
 
 Having outlined the insufficiencies of various alternatives in Part 1, we 
initiate our response to the problematic outlined above in Part 2. Our two principal 
concerns here are to deepen the ontological foundations (in the fuller sense of the 
term) of CIRT, and to begin our task of developing a richer account of human 
freedom upon which an emancipatory cosmopolitanism might be based. To this 
end, Chapter 4 engages with Heidegger’s Being and Time. By eschewing a 
foundational commitment to subjectivity and focussing instead on an existential 
analytic of human existence, we argue that Heidegger’s ‘fundamental ontology’ 
can lead us to a more universalistic foundation for contemporary politics and ethics 
than can Rawls, Frost, or Linklater. Whereas Rawls and Frost’s ethical foundations 
mean that their normative theories apply only to human beings qua political 
subjects of dominant institutions and practices associated with the sovereign state, 
and Linklater’s applies only to human beings qua ethical subjects, Heidegger’s 
fundamental ontology of human existence can provide us an ontological 
foundation that might apply to human beings qua human beings.  
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 In contrast to Linklater’s universalism, which arises out of an always already 
posited meaning of Being (as the historical becoming of the ethical subject) and its 
derivative structuring of a ground (the mind-independent ‘objective’ existence of 
the individual conceived as ethical subject), Heidegger’s fundamental ontology 
solicits any universalistic approach to politics and ethics to proceed from a 
recognition of the ontological difference. This would involve resisting the 
(characteristically dualist) temptation to regard our interpretation of the being of 
beings as the only interpretation and forgoing approaches to politics and ethics 
predicated on some mind-independent foundation (such as the ethical subject). The 
upshot would be that emancipation could no longer equate to the universal self-
actualisation of ethical subjectivity, as it is for Linklater, but must be premised on 
what Heidegger calls ‘resolute solicitous being-with,’ an engagement between self 
and world characterised by a de-centred receptivity to the existence of others. Such 
emphasis on practical engagement with others as others would begin to emend 
Linklater’s neglect of the praxeological aspect of human freedom in his account of 
emancipation. 
 
 After offering an account of the individual as first and foremost a ‘world-
relating creature’ rather than an ethical subject, Chapter 5 explores Heidegger’s 
account of freedom in greater depth. Here we establish that, before it is associated 
with any form of subjectivity (ethical subjectivity, or the political subjectivity 
associated with citizenship, for instance) freedom must be recognised as the 
condition of any interpretation of the being of beings, as the ‘ground’ of the 
ontological difference. This amounts to a repositioning of freedom, so that freedom 
is no longer principally seen as the property of a subject, but is recognised as the 
existential condition of world-disclosure. It is for this reason that we then claim 
that Linklater’s projection of ethical subjectivity (one interpretation of the being of 
human beings) as a general ontology of human being amounts to an abrogation of 
one aspect of human freedom.  
 
 We start exploring the ethical and political implications of our position 
towards the end of Chapter 5, where we resound calls from the likes of Jean-Luc 
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Nancy and Jacques Derrida for a ‘politics of singularity;’ this, we suggest, should 
displace the politics of subjectivity that we argued in Part 1 characterises 
Linklater’s emancipatory cosmopolitanism. The reason for this, which will become 
clearer in Chapter 5, is that the recognition of the ontological difference heralds a 
fundamental discontinuity between ethics and politics: while politics is the process 
of projecting and contesting interpretations of the being of beings as a whole, 
ethics concerns a relation to the other as ‘singularity’ (rather than subject). As a 
result, we argue that a more universalistic approach to ethics would be one based 
on the ethical relation: on a relation to the other as other, rather than as an ethical 
subject.  
 
 
Heidegger and the Critical Tradition 
 
 We are all too well aware that, given the character of the man and his 
political involvements, the suggestion that Heidegger can offer us important 
contributions to an ethical and emancipatory cosmopolitanism is to court both 
controversy and misunderstanding. As Nikolas Kompridis notes in his recent 
Critique and Disclosure, a singularly important contribution to critical theory 
based upon the thesis that reconciling Habermas and Heidegger is necessary for the 
renewal of the critical tradition: ‘the idea of integrating Heidegger’s thought into 
critical theory may be greeted with suspicious resistance if not outright revulsion 
by some critical theorists. And the idea that Heidegger’s thought can contribute to 
the renewal of critical theory is more likely to be greeted with disbelief (if not 
derision) than with curiosity.’5 He continues ‘[t]he fact is, both Heidegger’s person 
and his thought have played the role of critical theory’s “other:” he is the very 
antithesis of the critical intellectual as critical theorists imagine “him.”’6 Kompridis 
demonstrates, however, that Habermas badly misunderstands Heidegger’s insights 
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into world-disclosure, and mishandles arguments that are vitally important for a 
renewal of critical theory.7  
 
 Whereas in Habermas, the central praxis of democracy is located in the 
removal of the barriers to the implementation of practical discourses, Heidegger 
offers us a way of reformulating praxis in terms of decentred receptivity and open 
engagement with others, where receptivity is characterised, not by a ‘mindless 
submission,’ but by an ‘intensification of one’s cognitive and affective 
capabilities.’8 In contrast to the neo-Kantianism of Kohlberg, Habermas, Elias, and 
Linklater, decentring is not a learning process, and it ‘is not about overcoming our 
partial view of things in order to arrive at the single right answer to a moral 
problem. It is not about a “transcendence” of our parochial self in order to achieve 
an impartial or objective view of things; it is about an enlargement of self, opening 
it up to what was previously closed.’9  
 
 As Dallmayr has noted, this has important implications for the notion of 
inter-human recognition; implications that go beyond Honneth’s account of ‘inter-
subjective’ recognition.10 Whereas in the past recognition has been seen to operate 
purely on a cerebral level – such as in the extension of moral community only to 
post-conventional discourse agents (Habermas), or as a confrontation between two 
independent subjects claiming recognition from one another (Honneth) – 
Kompridis’s interpretation of Heidegger’s concepts of receptivity and solicitude 
reconnects cognition with affect and sensibility.11 For Kompridis, what this brings 
into view is not a ‘bland universalism or cosmopolitanism,’ but ‘an increased 
sensitivity to the presence and endangered state of plural “local worlds” – plural 
understandings not subsumable under a single notion of being.’12  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7. Ibid. Preceding Kompridis's critique, Dallmayr has also demonstrated that Habermas has a very 
poor grasp of the significance of Mitsein (being-with) in Heidegger's thought. See Fred R. 
Dallmayr, The Other Heidegger (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995), 59-60. 
8. Nikolas Kompridis, Critique and Disclosure: Critical Theory Between Past and Future, 59. 
9. Ibid., 211,213. 
10. Fred R. Dallmayr, “Nikolas Kompridis. Critique and Disclosure: Critical Theory Between Past 
and Future. (Review),” Notre Dame (2009). 
11. Ibid. 
12. Ibid.; Nikolas Kompridis, Critique and Disclosure: Critical Theory Between Past and Future, 
219. 
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 We shall not, however, be concerned with defending Heidegger’s thought 
against Habermas and the Frankfurt School. This is a task that has already been 
accomplished by both Fred Dallmayr and Nikolas Kompridis, with Dallmayr 
noting that Kompridis’s Critique and Disclosure performs the valuable function of 
nudging rank-and-file critical theorists away from certain ‘orthodox’ school 
positions that Habermas himself now seems ready to abandon.13 Neither will we be 
discussing ‘The Heidegger Affair,’ as his disastrous political involvements have 
come to be known, since this has been covered extensively elsewhere and there is 
nothing here that will add to that discussion.14 Besides, the standard disclaimers 
and explanations offered by those sympathetic to his work sound increasingly stale 
and trite, and detract from the very real contributions that Heidegger has to offer to 
the way that we think about politics; these should now be taken on their own terms.  
 
 We will be concerned then with demonstrating the fact that Heidegger 
provides very real and very powerful insights into ‘philosophical ontology’ that 
can contribute greatly to the development of more universalistic ontology for ethics 
and politics at a global level. What is more, the centrality afforded to freedom by 
Heidegger – as the ‘groundless ground’ (Abgrund) of human existence and the 
condition of politics – represents a potentially important contribution to the left-
Hegelian tradition of evaluating practices and institutions against their contribution 
to human freedom. More than this though, by redressing the dualism that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13. See Fred R. Dallmayr, Between Freiburg & Frankfurt: Towards a Critical Ontology (Amherst: 
University of Massachusetts Press, 1991). Nikolas Kompridis, Critique and Disclosure: Critical 
Theory Between Past and Future. Fred R. Dallmayr, “Nikolas Kompridis. Critique and Disclosure: 
Critical Theory Between Past and Future. (Review).” I stress that we will not defend Heidegger's 
thought against criticism since that has been done extensively elsewhere. I have no interest in 
defending Heidegger 'the man.' In this regard I concur with G.B. Smith's argument: 'We must 
confess that speculative genius need not imply nor be aligned with moral virtue or practical 
wisdom. Indeed, we seem to have it as a doctrinal statement, from no less an authority than 
Aristotle, that there is a chasm between moral and theoretical virtue ... Heidegger lends credence to 
the existence of this distinction.' Gregory Bruce Smith, Martin Heidegger: Paths Opened, Paths 
Taken (Plymouth: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007), viii. 
14. See Fred R. Dallmayr, The Other Heidegger; Victor Farias, Heidegger and Nazism 
(Philadelphia University Press: Temple University Press, 1989); Thomas G. Pavel, “The Heidegger 
Affair,” MLN 103, no. 4 (1988): 887-901; Tom Rockmore, “Heidegger After Farias,” History of 
Philosophy Quarterly (1991): 81-102; Tom Rockmore, On Heidegger’s Nazism and Philosophy 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997); Gregory Bruce Smith, Martin Heidegger: Paths 
Opened, Paths Taken; Richard Wolin, The Politics of Being: The Political Thought of Martin 
Heidegger (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990). 
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characterises Kant, Habermas, Linklater (and possibly also Marx) Heidegger’s 
‘philosophical ontology’ has an important role to play in the future of the critical 
tradition.15  
 
 Indeed, since one of the central contentions made here is that we may be 
constitutively unable to build a valid emancipatory cosmopolitanism from dualist 
premises, in order to contribute to a more universalistic philosophical ontology for 
IR – especially one committed to emancipatory and ethical relations between 
persons – we must take cues from Heidegger’s understanding of fundamental 
ontology.16 Infact, given the profundity of his ontological insights and that he is 
considered by many to be the twentieth century’s ‘greatest thinker,’ the onus of 
justification should rather be on any philosophical ontology that does not engage 
with Heidegger’s ‘fundamental ontology.’ With this in mind, we proceed in the 
recent spirit of the reconciliation of what have seemed to be divergent trends in 
critical theory: where Heidegger’s relation to the critical tradition is 
complementary, rather than antagonistic.17 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15. Whether or not Marx can be considered an ontological dualist is the subject of ongoing debate. 
On Marx's ontological dualism see Anthony King, The Structure of Social Theory (London: 
Routledge, 2004), 107-21., while for an opposing perspective, see Murray E.G. Smith, “Against 
Dualism: Marxism and the Necessity of Dialectical Monism,” Science & Society 73, no. 3 (2009): 
356-85. 
16. Heidegger's apparent shift from a monistic to a pluralist ontology in a late seminar does not 
negate this contribution. On this shift see Nikolas Kompridis, Critique and Disclosure: Critical 
Theory Between Past and Future, 219. Braver makes a convincing case that Heidegger should be 
read as an ontological pluralist see Lee Braver, A Thing of This World: A History of Continental 
Anti-Realism (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2007), 171-75. 
17. Although Dallmayr's Between Freiburg and Frankfurt was an early attempt at this 
reconciliation, for Dallmayr it is Critique and Disclosure that 'in a way signals the end of a period 
marked by divergent, even opposite tendencies: on the one hand, the "postmodern" fascination with 
"extraordinary" rupture (or rapture), and on the other, the streamlining of critical theory in the mold 
of a rule-governed, rationalist normalcy.' Fred R. Dallmayr, “Nikolas Kompridis. Critique and 
Disclosure: Critical Theory Between Past and Future. (Review).” See also Fred R. Dallmayr, 
Between Freiburg & Frankfurt: Towards a Critical Ontology. On the reconciliation between 
Derrida and Habermas see Richard Beardsworth, “The Future of Critical Philosophy and World 
Politics,” Millennium-Journal of International Studies 34, no. 1 (2005): 201-35. 
 Chapter 4.  
Beings & Being: Heidegger & Fundamental 
Ontology  
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 This chapter engages with Heidegger’s Being and Time, read in a way that 
emphasises the profound challenges that it poses to dualism; specifically, to the 
idea that we might encounter the world in a relation of (epistemological) subject to 
(mind-independent) objects. Central in this regard is Heidegger’s argument that our 
encounter with entities is never neutral: that ‘things’ never appear to us as they are 
‘in-themselves,’ but are always encountered with subjective pre-understandings, 
interpretations of the ‘object’ that we surreptitiously project onto it; entities that 
include other human beings.  
 
 In a related move – though applying to action as opposed to understanding – 
Heidegger profoundly unsettles any commitment to ‘subjectivity’ by arguing that 
man exists essentially as potentiality rather than ground (as is implied by 
‘subjectivity’), and that our mode of being in the world is fundamentally 
conditioned by existential structures that inform and condition our individual 
existences. In the process, Heidegger offers us a much deeper account of human 
existence and sociality than can be provided by accounts that depart from notions 
of ‘subjectivity’ or ‘intersubjectivity.’ Not only does this subvert 
Habermas/Linklater’s approach to critical theory, but also those of more recent 
critical theorists such as Honneth and Brincat. 
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 Although beginning with an analysis of our experiences of human existence, 
Heidegger has something altogether grander in his sights: the meaning of Being in 
general, or, what existence ‘as such’ might mean. This question of Being is 
approached through a phenomenological hermeneutical method, and leads to an 
interpretation of Being in general from an analysis of our experience of our 
particular existences.1 Thus it is through a phenomenology of the being of human 
beings (and of other entities such as rocks and hammers) that Heidegger attempts 
to gain a grasp on Being as a whole. Due to human finitude, he soon realises that 
the meaning of Being in general is out of our reach, and so ‘temporality’ is posited 
as the transcendental horizon of any interpretation of Being. This has profound 
implications for our mode of being in world; this includes a conception of freedom 
as ‘resolute solicitous being-with others,’ and Heidegger’s famous call for an 
‘overcoming’ of metaphysics. We shall see that, in essence, the latter amounts to a 
call for us to ground any universalist claim – claims to what the human being is, 
for instance – in 'fundamental ontology': in an understanding of the experience of 
existence. Put differently, it is an attempt to establish ‘perspectivality’ or ‘doxa’ as 
originary to human existence. 
 
 
The Ontological Difference & the Leading Question of 
Philosophy 
 
The Ontological Difference and the Forgetting of Being 
 
 Heidegger’s guiding aim in his most influential work, Being and Time, is to 
address the question of the meaning of Being. For Heidegger, this requires that we 
distinguish between beings (Seiende) and Being (Sein), or, between entities and 
their existence. Three kinds of entities are identified by Heidegger, each of which 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1. On hermeneutics and phenomenology see John D. Caputo, “Husserl, Heidegger, and the 
Question of a “Hermeneutic” Phenomenology,” Husserl Studies 1 (1984): 157-78. and Susann M. 
Laverty, “Hermeneutic Phenomenology and Phenomenology: A Comparison of Historical and 
Methodological Considerations,” International Journal of Qualitative Methods 2, no. 3 (2003): 21-
35. 
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having a different kind of existence. Mere things, such as rocks, the existence of 
which is characterised by being ‘present-at-hand;’ tools, the existence of which is 
characterised by their ‘readiness-to-hand;’ and human beings, whose existence is 
characterised by Da-sein (there-being). Importantly then, entities and their being 
are not coterminous, and the existential uniqueness of human beings lies not in 
their subjectivity, but in their Da-sein (there-being). What is particularly unique 
about human beings is that they have access to Being, ‘that which determines 
entities as entities, that on the basis of which entities are already understood.’2 
Being is thus related to the understanding, and so only human beings can have an 
understanding of Being: rocks and tools clearly cannot.3 Importantly, contra the 
dualist, human beings never encounter entities as knowing subject to mind-
independent object, as we always encounter the entity with a more or less 
unconscious understanding of it, and project upon it meaning and possibilities.  
 
 Heidegger’s famous example is the hammer. As a ‘substance,’ something 
‘present-at-hand,’ a hammer is simply a composite of wood and metal: these 
properties do not make the hammer a hammer. The hammer only becomes a 
hammer when a person (a Da-sein) who understands what a hammer is used for, 
encounters it. The being of the hammer, its existence as a tool, is dependent upon 
its being understood as such by a human being: the properties of a hammer are not 
intrinsic to that object, but are essentially dependent on the entity that encounters it 
as an object. Da-sein’s pre-theoretical understanding of the entities it encounters 
informs the meaning and possibilities projected upon that entity. A carpenter will 
project onto the hammer different possibilities than a physicist would, for example. 
Similarly, to use Wight and Joseph’s example, a radical Marxist will project upon 
‘the international system’ a very different understanding of its meaning and 
possibilities than will the executive of a large hedge-fund. Neither Da-sein’s 
understanding of this entity is a transparent reflection of a mind-independent 
reality, but always occurs ‘in the light of Being.’ Heidegger’s inquiry into ‘the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2. Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (Oxford: 
Wiley-Blackwell, 1962), 25-26. 
3. For a challenge to Heidegger's anthropocentrism here see Giorgio Agamben, The Open: Man and 
Animal (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004). 
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meaning of Being’ in Being and Time is thus not directed towards an analysis of 
the meaning of the entities that are encountered by Da-sein, and neither is it 
directed towards the meaning of Da-sein itself, it is directed towards the meaning 
of Being in general: the underlying current, the sine qua non of Da-sein’s 
encounter with entities.’4 
 
 Arguably, the question of Being has been the fundamental question of both 
philosophy and theology. Why is there something rather than nothing? Is there any 
support for human or cosmic existence? Is the universe primarily composed of 
matter, or spirit? Are human beings essentially rational or are they asocial beasts 
that need to be subdued? Da-sein has interpreted Being in various ways, and these 
various interpretations have influenced our political and ethical lives since they 
inform our interpretations of the being of the entities that we encounter. What 
would life be like in a ‘state of nature?’ What then justifies authority? Security 
(Hobbes)? Protection of property? (Locke) Democratic legitimacy? (Rousseau) Is 
man essentially rational? If so, then surely we should act in a way that allows him 
to flourish as a rational being (Kant). In a theological register, Christians may 
encounter other human beings as essentially all God’s children, fallen, but 
endowed with reason and essentially good, and standing towards the earth as 
stewards of God’s creation. Each understanding of Being will inform the way that 
human beings (Da-sein) interpret their own existence, and will inform the 
possibilities that they project for themselves and for others.5 These are all examples 
of different interpretations of Being that serve as the sine qua non of Da-sein’s 
encounter with entities in the world, both ‘things’ and other human beings. In each 
case the encounter with entities occurs in the light of an understanding of Being, 
‘that on the basis of which entities are already understood.’6  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4. Torsten Michel, “In Heidegger’s Shadow: A Phenomenological Critique of Critical Realism,” 
Review of International Studies 38 (2012), 221. 
5. 'As a nominalized infinitive, Dasein has no plural. It refers to any and every human being, in 
much the way that das Seiende, lit. “that which is,” refers to any and every being. When more than 
one person is in play Heidegger speaks of (the) other(s) or Dasein-wifh (Mitdasein). He revives the 
original sense, “being there,” often writing Da-sein to stress this.' Michael Inwood, A Heidegger 
Dictionary (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), 42. 
6. Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, 25-26. 
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 Heidegger thus distinguishes between ‘ontic’ inquiry and ‘ontological’ 
inquiry, where ontic inquiry explores determinations that pertain to specific entities 
– such as rocks, hammers, or human beings – and ontological inquiry, which 
explores the meaning of Being itself. This is Heidegger’s ‘ontological difference,’ 
his ‘most prized philosophical innovation.’ 7  While a hammer has an ontic 
existence independently of our knowledge of it, its being, its existence as a tool, is 
dependent upon our understanding of it. Similarly, although human beings have an 
ontic existence independently of our knowledge of them, their being as specifically 
human existences does not, and relies upon an interpretation of Being.  
 
 Heidegger’s central complaint against the Western philosophical tradition is 
that, while it has been concerned with the question ‘what are beings,’ it has 
forgotten that there is a distinction to be drawn between entities and their 
existence. Consequently, ontological questions, questions about existence, have 
been reduced to questions about ‘what is’ rather than the ‘being’ of what is. The 
forgetting of the ontological difference has thus reduced the study of ontology, of 
what it means ‘to be,’ to the study of the ontic. Since it has merely asked ‘what are 
beings,’ the central question of philosophy, the question of what it means ‘to be,’ 
has been a leading question; it has led us away from inquiring as to the nature of 
Being itself. Heidegger gives interpretations of reality as mind or spirit (Geist), as 
matter or force, as becoming, representation (Vorstellung), will, substance, subject, 
energia as example responses to this leading question. In each case entities appear 
as entities ‘in the light of Being’ (Sein), but Being itself is not thought: whenever 
metaphysics ‘represents’ entities, Being, as the ‘clearing,’ has already happened.8  
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7. Nikolas Kompridis, Critique and Disclosure: Critical Theory Between Past and Future 
(Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 2006), 219. 
8. Paul Gorner, Twentieth Century German Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 
116. Heidegger tells us from the start that Da-sein is being-in-the-world, but we are never directly 
in the world; we are always thrown into a particular context that informs the way that we relate to 
the world. Heidegger calls this situation a Lichtung (Clearing). This is an open space within which 
we can encounter objects. 'Things show up in the light of our understanding of being.' Hubert 
Dreyfus, Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on Heidegger’s Being and Time (Cambridge, MA: 
The MIT Press, 1991), 163. 
PART 2/Ch4. Beings & Being: Heidegger & Fundamental Ontology 
164 
On the Necessity and Priority of the Question of Being 
 
 In his Categories, Aristotle divided Being into a primary category of 
‘substance’ (ousia), natural ‘things’ that existed in their own right, and other 
entities as attributes of substances (quality, quantity, relation, etc.). According to 
Aristotle then, what it meant ‘to be’ was to either be a substance or to be an 
attribute of a substance. Importantly, Aristotle was a metaphysical realist: he 
regarded these categories as distinctions that inhered in the nature of things, ‘they 
are read off nature and are not schemas read into or imposed upon nature by us.’9 
This characterisation of Being as substance, or as an attribute of a substance, 
persisted throughout the Western ontological tradition. Heidegger refers to this 
traditional reliance on a substance or ground as the enduring principle of reality as 
constituting a 'metaphysics of presence,' and his innovation is to problematise the 
view that reality must be understood in terms of substance at all.10 
 
 This approach to the theorisation of reality was central to both Heidegger's 
doctoral thesis and his qualifying dissertation (his Habilitationsschrift), both of 
which challenged the ‘substance’ ontology that permeated Aristotle’s theory of the 
categories and its acceptance within the ontological tradition. For instance, 
Heidegger’s Habilitationsschrift demonstrated that in Duns Scotus’s treatment of 
the categories, ‘the conditions and means by which the subject takes hold of, or 
interprets, its objects, which Scotus had called the “conditions of subjectivity,” 
attain paramount importance.’ 11  This led Heidegger to challenge Aristotelian 
metaphysical realism by questioning the consequences of reflection and theorizing 
on reality; in short, ‘the categories of “all that is” become the categories of our 
understanding of Being: the categories become the “elements and means of the 
interpretation of the meaning of what is experienced.”’12 Crucially though, the idea 
that categories of ‘what is’ are categories of the interpreter’s understanding of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9. Dorothea Frede, “The Question of Being: Heidegger’s Project,” in The Cambridge Companion to 
Heidegger, ed. Charles Guignon (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 45. emphasis 
added 
10. Ibid. 
11. Louiza Odysseos, The Subject of Coexistence: Otherness in International Relations 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2007), 35. 
12. Ibid. 
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Being led Heidegger to conclude that reality is in fact framed by the subject’s 
understanding.13 This leads to his attempt in Being and Time to find a way to 
access a pre-theoretical attitude toward the world and reality.14  
 
 Heidegger’s engagement with Scotus led to his related argument that the 
objectifying attitude of the subject towards the object originates in the theoretical 
attitude itself.15 He thus wanted to inquire as to a method for ontology that would 
avoid the imposition of subjective categories onto reality the way that modes of 
theoretical thinking did.16 In short, for Heidegger, theoretical activity served to 
‘un-live’ human experience and objectify existence.17 Although Heidegger was not 
against theory he wanted to mitigate the inevitably subjectivist bias of the 
theoretical orientation by grounding it in an holistic conception of human existence 
as Da-sein; as being-in-the-world, with ‘care’ (Sorge) as the meaning of that 
existence, and temporality as the transcendental horizon of any interpretation of 
Being.18  
 
 
Fundamental Ontology 
 
 An exercise in what Heidegger calls ‘fundamental ontology,’ Being and Time 
is an attempt to provide such a ground. Whereas ontology has traditionally been 
concerned with the ‘ontic’ – the inquiry as to what exists focussing on properties 
of entities, their ‘whatness’ – fundamental ontology inquires as to the meaning of 
being of that entity that encounters entities as objects. Fundamental ontology 
therefore represents a step back from engaging in rational representations of reality 
– which Heidegger considers to be either metaphysics or ontology grounded in 
metaphysics – to an analysis of the fundamental structures of our experience of 
existence. Such an understanding must provide the foundation from which any 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13. Ibid. 
14. Ibid. 
15. As we shall see in Chapter 6 this is an insight shared by Hegel. 
16. Ibid., 35-36. 
17. Ibid., 36. 
18. Dorothea Frede, “The Question of Being: Heidegger’s Project,” 50-51. See also Odysseos's 
discussion: Louiza Odysseos, The Subject of Coexistence, 32-36. 
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subsequent interpretations of Being proceed, since after the loss of any 
transcendent authority, the ‘death of God,’ this pre-theoretical guide is the best that 
we now have.  
 
 Investigating the ‘truth of Being’ is thus a phenomenological task. It is only 
through the experience of existence, a phenomenology of Da-sein, that the 
meaning of Being in general can be interpreted. While ontology, the meaning of 
Being, is the object of philosophy, phenomenology is its procedure; 
‘phenomenology of Da-sein is hermeneutics [...] the work of interpretation.’19 In 
the wake of the ‘death’ of God, a phenomenology of Da-sein’s experience of 
existence is the only reliable path to interpret the meaning of Being: 
‘[p]henomenology is the science of the being of beings-ontology.’20  
 
 In the terms of the overall argument presented here then, what Heidegger is 
offering us in Being and Time is an account of the human being that goes deeper 
than the dualist reliance on a foundational subject. This account has profound 
implications for the emancipatory project of CIRT since it fundamentally alters the 
way that we understand the nature of the relations between human beings and other 
entities in world politics; this includes social objects such as states and the 
international system, but most importantly, the nature of our relations with other 
human beings. 
 
 
Being and Time 
 
 Being and Time is divided into three sections: the Introduction, Division One, 
and Division Two, each in turn divided into chapters. The Introduction establishes 
the priority and necessity of the question of Being by rehearsing the argument 
against metaphysical realism outlined above. As Heidegger puts it: ‘we always 
conduct our activities in an understanding of Being,’ where Being is ‘that which 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19. Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, 68. 
20. Ibid., 61. 
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determines entities as entities.’ 21  In social science parlance, Heidegger is 
identifying the ontological presuppositions of inquiry, which relate to the judgment 
of the prior necessity of a worldview informing any engagement with the world, 
foreshadowing what Gadamer identifies as the hermeneutic circle.22 In a different 
register, the idea of our world-relation speaks to the situatedness of knowledge, 
since even basic concepts do not give an unbiased representation of the world, but 
are themselves grounded in, and involved in the recreation of particular worlds: 
 
Basic concepts determine the way in which we get an understanding beforehand of the 
area of subject-matter underlying all the objects a science takes as its theme, and all 
positive investigation is guided by this understanding. Only after the area itself has been 
explored beforehand in a corresponding manner do these concepts become genuinely 
demonstrated and “grounded.” But since every area is itself obtained from the domain of 
entities themselves, this preliminary research, from which the basic concepts are drawn, 
signifies nothing else but an interpretation of those entities with regard to their basic state 
of Being.23  
 
 Consequently, the question of Being aims at ‘ascertaining the a priori 
conditions both of the possibility of the sciences,’ but also ‘for the possibility of 
those ontologies themselves which are prior to the ontical sciences and which 
provide their foundations.’24 Heidegger continues: [b]asically, all ontology, no 
matter how rich and firmly compacted a system of categories it has at its disposal, 
remains blind and perverted from its ownmost aim, if it has not first adequately 
clarified the meaning of Being, and conceived this clarification as its fundamental 
task.’25 This is the essence of Michel’s critique of critical realism: that critical 
realists unjustifiably assume scientific inquiry to be the highest mode of human 
activity.26  
 
 Moving onto Division One, Heidegger provides a ‘preparatory fundamental 
of Dasein,’ where he offers an existential analysis of the elements of the 
experience of human existence such as it is essentially ‘Being-in-the-world.’ Here 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21. Ibid., 25. 
22. See Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method (London: Continuum, 2004), 268-306. For 
Heidegger's discussion of the hermeneutical circle: Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, 362-63. 
23. Ibid., 30. 
24. Ibid., 31. 
25. Ibid. 
26. Torsten Michel, “In Heidegger’s Shadow.” 
PART 2/Ch4. Beings & Being: Heidegger & Fundamental Ontology 
168 
he identifies structures that inform the human experience of existence and that 
constitute the structure of Dasein; these include ‘worldliness,’ ‘being-with,’ and 
‘care.’ Division Two then offers a general interpretation of ‘the meaning of Being,’ 
which Heidegger identifies as ‘temporality:’ temporality is posited as the horizon 
of any interpretation of existence. The final part of Division Two then returns to 
the ontological structures identified in Division One in order to demonstrate their 
existential-temporal nature. We will now proceed to discuss Divisions One and 
Two in greater depth. 
 
 
Being and Time: Division One 
 
 Worldhood (BT:91-149) 
 
 In the Introduction to Being and Time Heidegger writes that ‘Dasein’s 
understanding of Being pertains with equal primordiality both to an understanding 
of something like a “world,” and to the understanding of the Being of those entities 
which become accessible within the world.’27 While there are four different uses of 
the term ‘world,’ in this sense, as Da-sein’s ‘worldhood,’ the world is understood 
as the familiar horizon within which we move confidently in our everyday 
existence and within which entities are encountered as entities.28 It is not just a 
collection of the countable or the uncountable, familiar or unfamiliar things that 
become present to us, and neither is it merely the imagined framework added by 
our representation to the sum of these things. Rather, it is the composite whole of 
our significant relationships with other entities, and within which meaning is 
conferred upon those entities. The world is something that is generated and 
projected by human Da-sein, it draws us in and shapes us, and we recreate these 
worlds in our projects and projected possibilities. Worlds, however, are not created 
by ‘subjects,’ since we cannot stand above, below, or to the side of them as 
subjects, whether as an ‘I’ or as a ‘We.’ 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27. Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, 33. 
28. On these four uses see Ibid., 93. 
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 Being-with (BT:149-169) 
 
 Turning to an analysis of who Da-sein is in its everydayness, there-being 
(Da-sein) is always already being-with (Mitsein). Being-with and Dasein-with 
(Mitsein & Mitdasein) are fundamental existential structures of Da-sein that are 
‘equiprimordial with Being-in-the-world.’29 As Heidegger writes, ‘[t]he world of 
Dasein is a with-world. Being-in is Being-with Others.’30 As we shall see, this 
structure of Da-sein does not relate to the co-presence of individual subjects, but is 
a basic state in which Da-sein gets co-determined by its relations with others.31  
 
 Care (BT:225-270) 
 
 The third existential structure of Da-sein is ‘care’ (Sorge). Care discloses the 
concrete constitution of Da-sein’s existence and is itself constituted by three 
elements: Da-sein’s facticity or thrownness, falling, and projection. These loosely 
correspond to an individual’s past, present, and future, and presage the later 
determination of time as the horizon of any interpretation of Being. Care thus 
represents the ‘structural whole’ of Da-sein, which is to say that concernful 
relations with the world represent the state of being of Da-sein: 
 
Dasein’s Being is care. It comprises in itself facticity (thrownness), existence (projection), 
and falling. As being, Dasein is something that has been thrown; it has been brought into 
its “there,” but not of its own accord. As being, it has taken the definite form of a 
potentiality-for-Being which has heard itself and has devoted itself to itself, but not as 
itself. As existent, it never comes back behind its thrownness in such a way that it might 
first release this “that-it-is-and-has-to-be” from its Being-its-Self and lead it into the 
‘there.’32 
 
 Because it is primordially constituted by care, any Da-sein is always already 
ahead of itself: ‘[a]s being, it has in every case already projected itself upon 
definite possibilities of its existence; and in such existentiell projections it has, in a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29. Ibid., 149. 
30. Ibid., 155. 
31. Ibid., 153. 
32. Ibid., 329-30. 
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pre-ontological manner, also projected something like existence and Being.’33 
Basically, thrownness is inescapable, and as selves we cannot go behind our 
thrownness in order to direct our relations with other entities from the ground up. 
 
 
Disputing the Subject 
 
 All three existential structures of Da-sein thus present a challenge to the 
supposition of a foundational subject. In Chapter III, Heidegger stresses the 
importance of gaining proper access to the phenomenon of Da-sein’s world-hood, 
and contrasts this view with that of Descartes, for whom the only genuine access to 
the world (as res extensa) lies in knowing the world, such as the knowledge we 
achieve in mathematics and physics. Heidegger’s complaint against Descartes is 
that he ignores the ontological difference by supposing that we always encounter 
entities as things ‘present-at-hand,’ as substances.34 Heidegger’s objection is that 
Descartes thereby projects an interpretation of Being as ‘substantiality’ onto 
entities: 
 
[T]he Being of the “world” is, as it were, dictated to it in terms of a definite idea of Being 
which lies veiled in the concept of substantiality, and in terms of the idea of a knowledge 
by which such entities are cognized. The kind of Being which belongs to entities within-
the-world is something which they themselves might have been permitted to present; but 
Descartes does not let them do so. Instead he prescribes for the world its real Being, as it 
were, on the basis on an idea of Being whose source has not been unveiled and which has 
not been demonstrated in its own right – an idea in which Being is equated with constant 
presence-at-hand.35  
 
 Heidegger’s contrasting view is that we do not encounter entities as if they 
were context-independent-present-at-hand-primitives, neutrally transmitted to us as 
raw sense data – such as a ‘pure’ experience of the colour blue – to which meaning 
would have to then be added, but that our encounters with entities is a kind of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33. Ibid., 363. Heidegger distinguishes between "existential" determinations and "existentiell" 
determinations. Existential determinations relate to the general structure of an entity's existence, to 
its being, while existentiell determinations relate to the particular existence of any given entity. So, 
the ability of human beings to act in different ways to shape their own being is an existential 
determination of human beings, whereas a person's decision to place more importance on being a 
good parent than a career-person is an existentiell determination. 
34. Ibid., 128-29. 
35. Ibid. 
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encounter with things that are always already ready-to-hand, and which therefore 
come laden with context-dependent significance. Perhaps his best statement of this 
distinction comes later in Being and Time:  
 
What we “first” hear is never noises or complexes of sounds, but the creaking wagon, the 
motor-cycle. We hear the column on the march, the north wind, the woodpecker tapping, 
the fire crackling [...] It requires a very artificial and complicated frame of mind to “hear” 
a “pure noise.” The fact that motor-cycles and wagons are what we proximally hear is the 
phenomenal evidence that in every case Dasein, as Being-in-the-world, already dwells 
alongside what is ready-to-hand within-the-world; it certainly does not dwell proximally 
alongside “sensations;” nor would it first have to give shape to the swirl of sensations to 
provide a springboard from which the subject leaps off and finally arrives at a “world.” 
Dasein, as essentially understanding, is proximally alongside what is understood.36  
 
 The difference then, is that rather than starting with pure present-at-hand 
‘substances’ that appear simply as they are ‘in-themselves,’ Da-sein’s worldhood 
means that it has always already conferred meaning upon the entities that it 
encounters. Trying to adopt a more objective perspective on those entities involves 
attempting to strip away the layers of meaning that we project upon them; a task 
that can perhaps never be fully achieved.37 This projection of meaning is not 
confined to things or tools, it will happen in our encounter with other persons too. 
 
 
Mitsein / Intersubjectivity  
 
 In The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity Habermas criticises Heidegger 
for remaining basically ‘caught up in the problems that subject-centred philosophy 
(in the form of Husserlian phenomenology) had bequeathed to him.’38 Habermas 
demonstrates here a profound misunderstanding of the importance of being-with 
(Mitsein) as an existential structure of Da-sein. As Dallmayr has shown, terms such 
as ‘co-being’ and ‘being-with’ in Being and Time ‘are used precisely to forestall 
the impression of a mere conjunction or juxtaposition of individual subjects (an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36. Ibid., 207. 
37. This is what happens during our constructions of cognitive objects. In the end though, cognitive 
objects are never simply reflections of the mind-independent real but are more or less adequate 
constructions of mind-independent entities. 
38. See Jürgen Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures 
(Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1990), 136-139,148-152. 
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impression still conveyed in such formulas as “intersubjectivity” or 
“intersubjectively achieved agreement”).’39 Indeed, Heidegger’s identification of 
the existential structure of Mitsein represents a deeper ontological recognition of 
the essential nature of human sociality, a sociality from which Habermas’s concept 
of inter-subjectivity abstracts and subsequently objectifies by representing it as a 
relation between subjects. Heidegger’s insistence that Da-sein (there-being) is 
always already Mitsein (being-with) means that we cannot suppose that 
subjectivity is antecedent to our relations (past, present and future) with others, and 
that inter-personal relations cannot simply consist in establishing connections 
between Ego and Alter as if these relations were a bridge between autarchic 
subjects. Rather, he demonstrates that something much deeper – our very selfhood 
– is at stake.  
 
 
The Ek-sistent Individual 
 
 Lastly, rather than presenting the human being as a subject, Heidegger has 
something altogether different in mind; namely, man as ‘ek-sistent’. The structural 
totality of ‘care’ (Sorge) as Da-sein’s essential state of being reflects the view that 
Da-sein has been ‘thrown;’ it has been brought into existence, but not of its own 
accord. Importantly, Da-sein cannot come back behind its thrownness to have 
power over its being from the ground up, so our understanding of existence is only 
possible on the basis of our thrownness, a basis that is beyond our power or 
control. Nonetheless, we understand ourselves in terms of possibilities and 
continually project ourselves into different possible futures; Da-sein is then 
nothing else but a constant becoming, right up to the point of death, when it ceases 
to exist. Da-sein is that being that is ‘between’ birth and death; existence is 
definitive for Da-sein, which exists as possibility rather than as ground.  
 
 This argument – that ‘existence’ is definitive of human existence – is 
influential in the development of Sartre’s existentialism, as reflected by his claim 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39. Fred R. Dallmayr, The Other Heidegger (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995), 60. 
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that ‘existence precedes essence.’40 We should not confuse Sartre’s claim with 
Heidegger’s, however. The difference between the two is most pronounced in 
Heidegger’s response to Sartre’s claim that ‘existentialism is a humanism’ in his 
Letter on Humanism, where Heidegger clarifies what is meant by his claim that 
existence is definitive for Da-sein. This is not a question of existential priority 
between existence and essence, since this would perpetuate the metaphysical 
tradition that Heidegger is trying to overcome. Rather, the key lies in the 
relationship between man and Being. Da-sein’s existence is thus distinguished not 
by some essence, something that precedes, but by its ‘ek-sistence,’ a neologism 
that is intended to distinguish his own view that existence is definitive of human 
being from Sartre’s, and is meant to signify that man ‘stands out’ into the ‘truth of 
Being.’  
 
 In Being and Time ‘ecstatic’ temporality (from the Greek ekstasis) signifies 
the way that human being stands out the various moments of the temporality of 
care, being ‘thrown’ out of a past and ‘projecting’ towards a future by way of the 
present.41 Ek-sistence is both the ground of the possibility of reason (ratio) but also 
the ‘essence’ of man, in that it relates to the human way ‘to be.’42 ‘As ek-sisting, 
man sustains Da-sein in that he takes the Da, the clearing of Being, into “care.” But 
Da-sein itself occurs essentially as “thrown.” It unfolds essentially in the throw of 
Being as the fateful sending.’43 Distinguishing this view of man from those within 
the metaphysical tradition, Heidegger writes: 
 
The ecstatic essence of man consists in ek-sistence, which is different from the 
metaphysically conceived essentia. Medieval philosophy conceives the latter as actualitas. 
Kant represents existentia as actuality in the sense of the objectivity of experience. Hegel 
defines existentia as the self-knowing Idea of absolute subjectivity. Nietzsche grasps 
essentia as the eternal recurrence of the same.44  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40. Jean-Paul Sartre, Existentialism is a Humanism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007). 
41. Martin Heidegger, “Letter on Humanism,” in Martin Heidegger: Basic Writings, ed. David F. 
Krell (New York: Harper Collins, 1993), 204. cf. Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, 54. 
42. Martin Heidegger, “Letter on Humanism,” 204. 
43. Ibid., 230-31. In Being and Time Heidegger writes: 'And how is Dasein this thrown basis? Only 
in that it projects itself upon possibilities into which it has been thrown. The Self, which as such has 
to lay the basis for itself, can never get that basis into its power; and yet, as existing, it must take 
over Being-a-basis.' Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, 330. 
44. Martin Heidegger, “Letter on Humanism,” 229. 
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 Proceeding to distinguish his view of the nature of man’s existence as ek-
sistence from Sartrean existentialism, he writes ‘Ek-sistence, thought in terms of 
ecstasis, does not coincide with existentia in either form or content. In terms of 
content ek-sistence means standing out into the truth of Being. Existentia 
(existence) means in contrast actualitas, actuality as opposed to mere possibility as 
Idea.’ 45  According to Heidegger then, even Sartre’s existentialist claim that 
‘existence precedes essence’ thus mistakenly affirms a metaphysical actuality, a 
substance that inheres in man. Heidegger resists a metaphysical definition of 
humanity because this fails to recognise that our ‘essence,’ or more accurately, 
what is principally unique about man, is that we relate to something that is not 
ourselves – to Being. Ek-sistence for Heidegger means that we are given over to 
Being, we interpret the world and give it meaning, meaning that we project out 
onto the entities that we encounter.  
 
 Man’s proper relationship to the world is therefore not a relationship of 
subject to object. We are not the creator and manipulator of entities, the primordial 
source of all meaning and value in the world; yet neither are we simply making 
sense of a world with which we have had no involvement in creating. Human 
beings are both interpreters and creators of worlds that we are involved in, but 
which nonetheless lie beyond us. As ek-sistent, man is neither vassal nor lord over 
entities, rather, ‘man is the shepherd of Being.’46 Our proper relationship to the 
world then is not primarily a relation of knowing subject to known object, and our 
relations to each other are not primarily relations between subjects, since ‘[a]ll 
ontical experience of entities – both circumspective calculation of the ready-to-
hand, and positive scientific cognition of the present-at-hand – is based upon 
projections of the Being of the corresponding entities.’47 
 
 A commitment to foundational subjectivity is therefore considered to be a 
‘fugitive’ way of understanding the self.48 ‘When saying “I,” Dasein surely has in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45. Ibid., 230. 
46. Ibid., 234. 
47. Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, 371. 
48. Ibid., 368. 
PART 2/Ch4. Beings & Being: Heidegger & Fundamental Ontology 
175 
view the entity which, in every case, it is itself. The everyday interpretation of the 
Self, however, has a tendency to understand itself in terms of the “world” with 
which it is concerned.’49 Understanding social relations as intersubjective relations 
presupposes then a shared interpretation of Being, and hypostatises the process by 
which Being itself is co-disclosed with others. ‘Both talking and hearing are based 
upon understanding. And understanding arises neither through talking at length nor 
through busily hearing something “all around.” Only he who already understands 
can listen.’50 According to Heidegger then, Da-sein’s proper role is not to establish 
the conditions of subjectivity but to ‘let Being be;’ to allow others to present 
themselves in their uniqueness, not simply as ethical subjects engaging in dialogue. 
Our political projects should aspire to allow the ‘here’, the ‘da’ of our Da-sein, 
what Heidegger calls ‘the clearing’ to be a place where Being can be disclosed, can 
come to presence. 
 
 
Being and Time: Division Two 
 
 While the existential analytic of the experience of human existence (Da-sein) 
in Division One established ‘care,’ concernful relations with the world, (Sorge) as 
the basic state of Da-sein’s being-in-the-world, the meaning of Being as a whole 
itself was not offered.51 Division Two sees Heidegger bring the question of Da-
sein’s being-in-the-world into an authentic relationship with time, where 
temporality is posited as the transcendental horizon of Da-sein’s concernful 
dealings with the world. In his Letter on Humanism Heidegger describes 
concernful relations with the world, ‘care,’ in the following way: 
 
Most poignantly experienced in the phenomenon of anxiety – which is not fear of anything 
at hand but awareness of my being-in-the-world as such – “care” describes the sundry 
ways I get involved in the issue of my birth, life, and death, whether by my projects, 
inclinations, insights, or illusions. “Care” is the all-inclusive name for my concern for 
other people, preoccupations with things, and awareness of my proper Being. It expresses 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49. Ibid. 
50. Ibid., 208. 
51. Ibid., 273-74. 
PART 2/Ch4. Beings & Being: Heidegger & Fundamental Ontology 
176 
the movement of my life out of a past, into a future, through the present. In section 65 the 
ontological meaning of the Being of care proves to be temporality.52  
 
 Because Da-sein exists as possibility, ‘care’ is brought into a relation with 
temporality; since existence is definitive for Dasein’s being, its essence is in part 
constituted by potentiality-for-being, for: ‘as long as Dasein exists, it must in each 
case, as such a potentiality, not yet be something.’53 An entity that is defined as 
existence, then, cannot possibly grasp the whole as an entity. This hermeneutical 
situation makes us ‘question whether “having” the whole entity is attainable at all, 
and whether a primordial ontological interpretation of Dasein will not founder on 
the kind of Being which belongs to the very entity we have taken as our theme.’54 
Consequently the meaning of Dasein as a whole, or Being in general, may thus be 
limited to an interpretation of the meaning of entities in general.  
 
 
Temporality as the Meaning of Being 
 
 Since the meaning of Being as a whole is dependent upon entities in general, 
temporality is posited as the ‘upon which’ that any interpretation of Being is 
dependent: temporality is ‘the primordial ontological basis for Dasein’s 
existentiality.’55 Identifying temporality as ‘the meaning of Being in general’ is not 
the most transparent of moves, so a brief explanation is in order.  
 
 Heidegger understands meaning as ‘that wherein the understandability of 
something maintains itself – even that of something which does not come into view 
explicitly and thematically. “Meaning” signifies the “upon-which” of a primary 
projection in terms of which something can be conceived in its possibility as that 
which it is.’56 Thus positing temporality as the ‘ontological meaning of care’ is not 
to say that temporality is expressed or signified by Being, nor is it to say that 
temporality is the end or purpose of existence. Rather, it is to identify temporality 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52. Martin Heidegger, “Letter on Humanism,” 223n. 
53. Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, 276. 
54. Ibid. 
55. Ibid., 277. 
56. Ibid., 370-71. 
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as the ‘upon which’ of any projection of Being. Temporality is the basis of our 
concern with the world; our understanding of the world is both temporal and 
temporary.  
 
 ‘Temporality’ is a translation of the German Zeitlichkeit, which Lewis 
prefers to translate as ‘temporariness’ or ‘temporaeity,’ basically signifying that 
Being as a whole is founded on a being that only has a temporary span.57 
Understanding Being as temporality or temporariness means that human existence 
is understood as founded upon the presence of human beings who are finite, and 
who thus only ever have a partial relation to the whole of Being. There are two key 
implications of this move: the first for the human mode of being in the world, the 
second for metaphysics and the project of fundamental ontology; both contribute to 
a more primordial conception of human freedom than that associated with the 
exercise of subjectivity. 
 
 
Authenticity, Resoluteness, Solicitude 
 
 Any given Da-sein’s understanding of itself is considered to be authentic 
when it is based on an understanding of its own being as being-in-the-world; when 
it proceeds from the recognition that the existential structures of worldhood, being-
with, and care, condition the nature of the self’s existence.58 The ontological basis 
for such an authenticity is Da-sein’s realisation that its being-in-the-world is a 
being-towards-death; when the issue of our own mortality is faced head on.59  
 
 Da-sein’s realisation that death is its ownmost, non-relational and 
unsurpassed – certain yet indefinite – possibility, leaves it standing in an 
anticipatory relation to the future. This brings with it the realisation that its 
existence is not just a series of perpetual ‘presents,’ and thereby compels the 
structures of care – thrownness, falling, and projection – into an authentic relation 	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58. Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, 276. 
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with time. The structures of concernful relations with the world explored in 
Division One are thus ultimately subjected to finitude (Endlichkeit). 
 
The indefiniteness of one’s own potentiality-for-Being, even when this potentiality has 
become certain in a resolution, is first made wholly manifest in Being-towards-death. 
Anticipation brings Dasein face to face with a possibility which is constantly certain but 
which at any moment remains indefinite as to when that possibility will become an 
impossibility. Anticipation makes it manifest that this entity has been thrown into the 
indefiniteness of its “limit-Situation;” when resolved upon the latter, Dasein gains its 
authentic potentiality-for-Being-a-whole. The indefiniteness of death is primordially 
disclosed in anxiety. But this primordial anxiety strives to exact resoluteness of itself. It 
moves out of the way everything which conceals the fact that Dasein is abandoned to 
itself. The “nothing” with which anxiety brings us face to face, unveils the nullity by 
which Dasein, in its very basis, is defined; and this basis itself is as thrownness into 
death.60 
 
In short, confronting our own mortality leads us to realise that ultimately we are 
responsible for our own self-actualisation, which frees us from our absorption in 
the present, our lostness in ‘the they’ (das Man).61 This freedom is ‘resoluteness’ 
(Entschlossenheit).  
 
 
Resoluteness 
 
 Kompridis is clear that he considers the translation of Entschlossenheit as 
‘resoluteness’ to be ‘deeply flawed and very misleading,’ and claims that 
resoluteness should not be misunderstood as a species of decisionism, but as 
essentially a mode of disclosure: ‘Entschlossenheit is not synonymous with 
decision, or decisiveness, or a manly readiness to take action; it is synonymous 
with Erschlossenheit, with disclosure, or disclosedness. “Unclosing” or 
“unclosedness” would serve as a much more accurate and felicitous translation.’62 
This view is reinforced by Heidegger’s later clarification that ‘[t]he resoluteness 
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intended in Being and Time is not the deliberate action of a subject but the opening 
up of human being, out of its captivity in beings, to the openness of Being.’63  
 
 Resoluteness is authentic being-in-the-world because it leads Da-sein to take 
care of things, of other beings, and of its own mode of being. Realising that our 
time on the earth is limited and will not come again frees us through an 
anticipatory resolve towards the future, a resolve to make the most of our time.   
  
[A]nticipation reveals to Dasein its lostness in the they-self, and brings it face to face with 
the possibility of being itself, primarily unsupported by concernful solicitude, but of being 
itself, rather, in an impassioned freedom towards death – a freedom which has been 
released from the Illusions of the “they,” and which is factical, certain of itself, and 
anxious.64 
 
Resoluteness is therefore key to Da-sein’s authentic being-in-the-world, and 
involves the transcendence of Da-sein’s ‘falling’ (Verfallen) into the everyday 
concerns of the present by taking over Da-sein’s own past and projecting it into the 
future. 
 
 Importantly, resoluteness is always the resoluteness of some factical Da-sein; 
it is not simply the picking out of some possibility that has been recommended, but 
amounts to ‘the disclosive projection and determination of what is factically 
possible at the time.’65 Da-sein frees itself through resoluteness, which is a mode of 
human freedom because it depends on Dasein’s potentiality-for-Being being 
indefinite: resoluteness is, therefore, both dependent upon and expressive of human 
freedom.  
 
 For Heidegger then, it is resoluteness (Entschlossenheit) that constitutes the 
authentic mode of human being in the world, as authentic potentiality-for-being. It 
is authentic because it simultaneously recognises the existential structures that 
condition the possibility of Da-sein, and is not the simple freedom of the individual 
thought as subject: 	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64. Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, 311. 
65. Ibid., 345. 
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Resoluteness, as authentic Being-one’s-Self, does not detach Dasein from its world, nor 
does it isolate it so that it becomes a free-floating “I.” And how should it, when 
resoluteness as authentic disclosedness, is authentically nothing else than Being-in-the-
world? Resoluteness brings the Self right into its current concernful Being-alongside what 
is ready-to-hand, and pushes it into solicitous Being with Others.66 
 
 In contrast to the simple ethical or practical self-determination of the 
individual thought as subject, freedom for Heidegger must relate to some 
concretely existing, factical human being. Resoluteness is therefore Heidegger’s 
way of expressing our authentic freedom for self-determination.67  
 
 
Solicitude 
 
 A common criticism of Heidegger is that he paid too little attention to the 
ethical aspects of being-in-the-world. Although he certainly paid far too little 
attention to the ethical relation between self and other, he does not ignore it, 
because it is central to his notion of solicitude (Fürsorge).68 As we saw above, 
‘resoluteness brings the Self into its current concernful Being-alongside what is 
ready-to-hand, and pushes it into solicitous Being with Others.’69 Solicitous being-
with-others is when we comport ourselves towards others in the manner of ‘caring 
for;’ the character of this relation with others is very different from the character of 
our relations with entities that are present-at-hand (things) and ready-to-hand 
(tools), since it is other people that are encountered. Concern is thus a mode of 
being-with.70  
 
 Solicitude (Fürsorge) itself is a neutral concept, and there are different types 
of solicitous relations with others, ranging from the negative (indifference) to the 
positive (‘active’). It is the mode of indifference that characterises everyday being-
with-one-another, and this mode of indifference often gets misinterpreted as the 	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68. Ibid. 
69. Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, 344. emphasis added. 
70. Ibid., 157. 
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mere co-presence of multiple individual subjects.71 Positive solicitous relations 
with others can themselves be either inauthentic – ‘taking care of’ others 
possibilities for them – or ‘authentic,’ where one actively works to free up the other 
for their own possibilities. Heidegger offers us two extreme examples:  
 
[Positive solicitude] can, as it were, take away “care” from the Other and put itself in its 
position of concern: it can leap in for him. This kind of solicitude takes over for the other 
that with which he is to concern himself. The Other is thus thrown out of his own position; 
he steps back so that afterwards, when the matter has been attended to, he can either take it 
over as something finished and at his disposal, or disburden himself of it completely. In 
such solicitude the Other can become one who is dominated and dependent, even if this 
domination is a tacit one and remains hidden from him. This kind of solicitude, which 
leaps in and takes away “care,” is to a large extent determinative for Being with one 
another, and pertains for the most part to our concern with the ready-to-hand. In contrast to 
this there is also the possibility of a kind of solicitude which does not so much leap in for 
the other as leap ahead of him (ihm vorausspringt) in his existentiell potentiality-for-
Being, not in order to take away his “care” but rather to give it back to him authentically as 
such for the first time. This kind of solicitude pertains essentially to authentic care – that 
is, to the existence of the Other, not as a “what” with which he is concerned; it helps the 
other to become transparent to himself in his care and to become free for it.72 
 
 As Kompridis has noted, Heidegger’s account of positive solicitude in this 
passage comes very close to Hegel’s understanding of freedom in the master-slave 
dialectic in the Phenomenology. Though the problem with Heidegger’s account, 
contra Hegel, is that he thinks that resoluteness must precede solicitous being-with 
others.73 And so, while Heidegger offers us both a more convincing account of the 
relation between freedom and dependence than can be offered through a reliance 
on the subject, as well an account of relations with others as solicitous being-with 
that serves as a nascent but fruitful alternative to relations of inter-subjectivity, he 
falls short when it comes to a concrete analysis of inter-personal relations. 
Essentially, Heidegger fails to demonstrate that both freedom and self-
intelligibility are ineluctably acquired in relation to others under conditions of 
cooperative interaction. Had he been a better student of Hegel’s, Heidegger might 
perhaps have avoided this mistake, since in this regard at least, Hegel’s 	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‘intersubjective’ account of freedom and subjectivity is much more convincing, 
more consistent with and more favourable to, Heidegger’s account of positive 
solicitude.74 We shall return to these claims in Part 3. 
 
 
Perspectival Presentation of the Whole: Overcoming 
Metaphysics. 
 
 The second important implication of Heidegger’s analysis of the experience 
of human existence relates not primarily to characteristically free and ethical action 
of the individual person, as do resoluteness and solicitude, but to the scope and 
nature of the ethical and political claims that persons might make. While claims to 
ethical or epistemological objectivity, such as those sought after by Habermas and 
Linklater’s (epistemological) identification of the human being as post-
conventional discourse agent, or the (ethical) attempt to transcend ethical 
particularity by reaching agreement on objective moral principles, require the 
presence of a knowing subject (epistemological or ethical) to underwrite such 
claims, Heidegger’s identification of temporality as the ‘meaning of Being’ leads 
us to regard these ethical or epistemological claims as essentially political and 
perspectival. The present section thus returns to a consideration of Heidegger’s 
discussion in Division Two of Being and Time of the nature of the possibility of 
grasping the meaning of Being as a whole.  
 
 Before we discuss what might be considered to be the broader political 
implications of Heidegger’s fundamental ontology, we must first remind ourselves 
what it is that he is responding to. We will recall that for Heidegger, since it has 
forgotten the ontological difference between entities and the being of entities, the 
history of philosophy has obscured the question of Being; and, since our 
understanding of reality is not simply read off reality but is at least partially 
imposed upon it, the question of Being is a fundamental one. In short, on the basis 	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of our prior experience, we project out interpretations of existence onto entities 
themselves; we give things meaning. The problem, as Heidegger sees it, is that we 
have misinterpreted the nature of this exercise. In part due to an overestimation of 
our rational faculties, we have come to think that our constructions of the mind-
independent real are reflections of reality as it is independent of our knowledge of 
it.  
 
 Heidegger’s complaint against the history of Western philosophy is that, by 
engaging in essentially representational forms of thinking, it has tried to 
understand the nature of human existence as a whole by identifying properties or 
traits that make beings beings ‘as such.’ Various attempts have been made to 
represent that which is essential to humans, and to thereby understand the nature of 
our existence in general. What this neglects is that such attempts to understand 
reality always involve the projection of Da-sein’s own understanding of the being 
of entities, an understanding that is grounded in Da-sein’s own concernful relations 
with the world, and a prior interpretation of Being. The problem then is that, while 
Da-sein inevitably understands entities in the light of its own interpretation of 
Being, the Western philosophical tradition has had a tendency to treat this 
understanding to be a reflection of reality rather than simply a perspective on it. In 
the form of his ‘fundamental ontology,’ Heidegger’s contribution is to force a step 
back from these perspectives on the world by providing ontological depth to these 
interpretations, interpretations that he considers to be metaphysical.  
 
 
Dualism and Metaphysics 
 
 Putting it in terms of the broader argument of the thesis, Heidegger’s famous 
call for an ‘overcoming of metaphysics’ is essentially a call for us to eschew social 
inquiry that proceeds from dualist premises, since it calls for us to realise that our 
constructions of the mind-independent real are in fact perspectives on reality that 
are influenced by our ‘world-hood,’ as opposed to being transparent reflections of 
reality as it ‘really is’. To consider them reflections of reality forgets the 
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ontological difference between entities and their being. Calling for such inquiry to 
be grounded in fundamental ontology, on non-dualist premises, would contribute 
to the recovery of the question of Being because it would involve the recognition 
that any reliance on ethical subjectivity (as in the case of moral universality) or 
claim to epistemological objectivity (to have access to a mind-independent object) 
is itself dependent upon an interpretation of Being that is essentially contestable – 
such as a philosophical history of human freedom (Linklater), or the 
overestimation of science as a human potentiality (critical realists). It has been an 
unwarranted faith in the nature of metaphysics that has led us to disregard the 
ontological difference, and to forget that these are essentially contestable 
perspectives on the world. This faith in metaphysics has been allied with a form of 
representational thinking and relies upon a mind-world dualism.  
 
 Deriving from the title of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, the term ‘metaphysics,’ 
Heidegger explains, derives from the Greek (ta) metá (ta) physiká (τὰ µετὰ τὰ 
φυσικὰ) – literally the (works) after the physical (works) – and is later interpreted 
as the inquiry into that which goes beyond beings as such, in order that beings may 
be grasped in their essence, allowing their existence as a whole to be grasped.75  
 
As traditionally understood, metaphysics means knowledge of supersensible beings, i.e. 
knowledge of those beings which lie out beyond that which is experientially accessible. 
Traditional metaphysics [...] defines these supersensible beings under the three headings 
"soul," "world," "God." Soul understood in respect of what especially concerns man, i.e. 
its simplicity, indestructibility and immortality. World as the totality of present nature, and 
God as the ground and author of all beings. Soul [...] is the object of psychology, world 
(totality of nature...) is the object of cosmology, God [...] is the object of theology.  
[...] 
Metaphysical questions concerning soul, world and God seek to define the essence of these 
and not just their empirically contingent characteristics. However, for traditional 
metaphysics, non-empirical knowledge is understood as rational knowledge, i.e. 
knowledge from pure reason alone: "Pure thought proceeds from concepts alone, 
independently of experience. Understood in this sense, the three above-mentioned 
disciplines together make up genuine metaphysics: rational psychology, rational 
cosmology, rational theology."76  
 
 Metaphysics, on this account, relates to those claims or assumptions relating 
to the nature of human beings or of the world, and of the existence or non-	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existence of a deity as the author or 'prime-mover' of that which we encounter. 
Metaphysical claims and assumptions are ones that go beyond that which is 
immediately accessible to human experience, claims that purportedly allow us to 
make claims about 'the whole' i.e., universal claims about the essence of man or of 
the universe. Since it has traditionally been the exercise of our rationality that has 
been seen to allow us to grasp the essence of something, metaphysical 'knowledge' 
has traditionally been achieved though the exercise of reason.  
 
 
Beings 'as Such' and Beings as a Whole 
 
 Metaphysics has traditionally	   involved inquiry into the essential nature of 
beings: what is the essential nature of beings as beings, and what is the essential 
nature of beings as a whole. 'What are human beings?' is an example of the first, 
while Leibniz's famous question 'Why is there something rather than nothing?' is 
an example of the second. When answering the first question, we tend to abstract 
from our own particular experiences in order to generalise and make claims about 
what we consider to be common to all beings. When proving answers to the 
second, we have often sought to ground the existence of these beings (taken as a 
whole) in the existence of a larger being, which has often been a deity such as the 
Christian God. In 'Western' societies at least, the two responses have mutually 
reinforced each other but the problem, as heralded by Nietzsche's proclamation in 
The Gay Science (1882) of the death of God – 'God is dead, God shall remain dead' 
– is that those metaphysical claims can no longer be considered to be reliable.77  
 
 The 'death of God' is a problem for our understanding of what human beings 
are because European thought had essentially relied upon God as an anchor for 
everything else. God was there to explain why the universe made sense, he was the 
answer to the endless question: but why? ‘Why do we exist?’ Because God created 
us. ‘But why should we trust our reason?’ Because God is rational and God came 
first. As Yannaras explains, the historical self-consciousness of Europe had 	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presupposed God as both 'a conceptual "first cause" of cosmology and as the 
axiomatic "principle" of categorical morality.'78  
 
Even as early as the ninth-century Carolingian "Renaissance," but especially with the 
radical distortion of Aristotelian epistemology by scholasticism, European metaphysics has 
been built upon by the presupposition of God's existence, while progressively excluding 
his presence from the world. God is either identified with the conceptual notion of an 
impersonal and abstract "first cause" of the universe (causa prima), or of an absolute 
"authority" in ethical (principium auctoritatis). In both cases the existence of God is a 
conceptual necessity, secured by demonstrative argument, but unrelated to historical 
experience and the existential condition of human beings.79  
 
 Nietzsche's proclamation is thus interpreted by Heidegger as 'the prophetic 
acknowledgement of an already accomplished event, the inevitable climax of a 
long historical process in European metaphysics.' 80  Growing scepticism and 
disbelief in the nineteenth century meant that God could no longer play the anchor 
function, and the transcendent grounds for universal truth or ultimate value had 
thus been withdrawn. 81  Although marking the end of Western metaphysics, 
Nietzsche does not move beyond it; consequently, he is for Heidegger the last 
metaphysician in whom the oblivion of Being is complete.82 As Smith explains, by 
defining Being as Will, 'Nietzsche is the final and most radical spokesperson for 
[the] one-sided elevation of human subjectivity.'83  
 
 For Heidegger, metaphysics is only overcome by thinking the truth of Being: 
by recognising that any interpretation of the being of beings will occur in the light 
of an interpretation of Being, which is itself conditioned by the transcendental 
horizon of temporality. To be clear, this is not then a rejection of metaphysics.84 	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Man will inevitably still speculate as to the essence of man, the origins of the 
universe, or the purpose of human existence; in Heidegger's words '[a]s long as 
man remains the animal rationale he is also the animal metaphysicum. As long as 
man understands himself as the rational animal, metaphysics belongs, as Kant said, 
to the nature of man.'85 We will still project meaning, and we will still engage in 
rational 'ontic' analysis of the entities that we encounter: causal analysis, for 
instance, or similar epistemological analyses that suppose a subject facing an 
object or objects; similarly, rational ethical analysis that supposes relations 
between subjects. However, with the withdrawal of any transcendent authority, the 
'death' of God, we can no longer consider these exercises to be reflections of a 
mind-independent real and must recognise that they can only ever be perspectives 
on it. Heidegger is, therefore, simply arguing that these 'reflections' of reality must 
now be grounded in a pre-theoretical experience of reality: this is the task of Being 
and Time, to ground such theoretical endeavours and thereby prepare for such an 
overcoming of metaphysics.  
 
 
The Perspectival Presentation of the Whole  
 
 It is the identification of temporality (Zeitlichkeit) as the meaning of Being in 
general in Division Two of Being and Time that aims to initiate such an 
overcoming of metaphysics. We saw that at the end of Division One Heidegger 
suggested that the hermeneutical nature of our relation to Being meant that we had 
to question whether 'having' the whole was attainable at all, and whether our 
interpretation of Being in general would founder on the kind of existence that is 
accessible to human beings.86 This was because the meaning of Being in general 
rests upon interpretations of Being by entities (human beings) that exist as 
potentiality rather than ground, and so human beings cannot possibly grasp the 
whole in its entirety.  
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 Since the whole can never be fully illuminated, human intelligibility will 
always be partial or horizonal as it depends on sites within the whole (of beings) to 
act as orienting centres. The whole then can never be fully illuminated because we 
can never escape our own situation within the whole, nor our own mortality. It is 
therefore our finitude, our mortality, that characterises our relationship to Being: 
both because our confrontation with our own mortality compels us into a state of 
anticipatory resoluteness through which we participate in the disclosure and co-
disclosure of Being with others, and because our finitude means that our 
intelligibility of Being as a whole is horizonal and temporal. This is what is meant 
by Heidegger's claim that temporality (Zeitlichkeit) is the 'upon which' that any 
interpretation of Being is based; 'temporariness' or 'temporaeity' is the 
transcendental horizon of any understanding of Being.87 
 
 As Lewis puts it, the response to one's own birth and death introduces a 'site 
of singularity into beings as a whole.'88 This singularity is not identical with Being 
as a whole but is a precondition of its disclosure. In Heidegger’s words: 
 
As surely as we can never comprehend absolutely the whole of beings in themselves we 
certainly do find ourselves stationed in the midst of beings that are revealed somehow as a 
whole. In the end an essential distinction prevails between comprehending the whole of 
beings in themselves and finding oneself in the midst of beings as a whole. The former is 
impossible in principle. The latter happens all the time in our existence.89  
 
This distinction is central. Although we will continue to project meanings on the 
whole - we will always conjecture what it is that makes human beings human 
beings, and whether there is any ultimate ground for human or cosmic existence - 
the consequence of our hermeneutic relation to Being, because our understanding 
is always inevitably conditioned, partial, and horizonal, is that we can never 
consider those projections to have captured the objective essence of human beings 
or of human or cosmic existence. This is occluded by our position within beings as 
a whole: metaphysics is structurally incapable of providing an objective ground 
(for political action, for instance).  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87. Ibid., 370-71. 
88. Michael Lewis, Heidegger and the Place of Ethics, (London: Continuum, 2005), 15. 
89. Martin Heidegger, “What is Metaphysics?,” in Martin Heidegger: Basic Writings, ed. David F. 
Krell. (New York: Harper Collins, 1993), 99. 
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 Since human beings are finite, mortal creatures, our partial, horizonal, 
interpretations of Being themselves are subject to a temporal horizon that we 
cannot transcend. Universal statements about what makes a human being a human 
being are constitutively unable to transcend our own perspectival relation to Being 
because, as Heidegger puts it, if one is to take a position one must already have a 
place to stand. 
 
Any enunciated statement requires a place from which to enunciate. Given that the 
statement [i.e., a metaphysical statement] attempts to determine beings as a whole and 
without exception, it is constitutively unable to take account of its own placement within 
this whole, its historical situatedness or "thrownness," the very givenness of the whole, 
which constitutes an exception to its determination of this whole by providing something 
which cannot be understood from within this "position." Metaphysics as a whole cannot 
understand the inherence to the whole of perspectival presentation, otherwise it would fall 
apart.90  
 
 
‘Overcoming’ Metaphysics  
 
 Although initially quite confusing, Heidegger's claim that temporality is the 
meaning of Being is therefore a hugely significant move, since it seeks nothing less 
than the 'overcoming' of the whole Western philosophical tradition by bringing the 
question of Being into a more authentic relation with time. The problem with this 
tradition, according to Heidegger, is that it has consistently eluded confronting the 
proper relationship between Being and time because it has consistently understood 
Being in terms of enduring presence. That is, this tradition has sought to identify 
some ground, subject, or essence that can serve as the foundation of reliable 
knowledge and action in the world – examples include the cogito in Descartes, the 
thinking substance that grounds reliable knowledge of the world, or the responsible 
individual person in Kant, the presence and accountability of which grounds our 
ethical relations to other humans. Identifying temporality, or 'temporariness' as the 
meaning of Being is Heidegger's attempt to exert a metaphysical paradigm shift 
from a modality of Being understood as something constantly present (spirit, 	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matter, substance) to recognise that the meaning of Being in general must be in a 
constant state of flux. 
 
 The problem with the history of Western philosophy, for Heidegger then, is 
that it has tried to understand beings as a whole by identifying properties or traits 
that make beings beings 'as such'. Various attempts have been made by writers to 
represent that which is most basic to humans thus allowing us to grasp the whole in 
its essence. What this neglects is that these attempts to grasp the whole involve 
projecting an understanding of the being of the entities that are to be grasped, an 
understanding that is inevitably grounded in Dasein's own concernful relations 
with the world, which are limited in scope and grounded in time. Such an 
identification of properties that are distinctive to entities is always done on the 
basis of some prior understanding of human existence: it is always done in the light 
of Being. 
 
 Heidegger's call for an 'overcoming of metaphysics,' amounts to the call to 
ground any claim that goes beyond that which can be experienced – such as claims 
about 'beings as such' (such as beings as ethical subjects) or beings as a whole – in 
fundamental ontology. This is essentially an attempt to establish perspectivality or 
doxa as originary to beings as a whole. Doxa, from the Greek (dokeō) 'I suppose' 
relates to common belief. For Pierre Bourdieu, a sociologist heavily influenced by 
Heidegger, doxa is a species of 'practical faith' tacitly required by any given field, a 
constructed vision of 'reality' so naturalised that it appears to be the only vision of 
reality; it is the unquestioned habitus that persons consider to be the one and only 
'truth' about the nature of existence. 'Doxa is the relationship of immediate 
adherence that is established in practice between a habitus and the field to which it 
is attuned, the pre-verbal taking-for-granted of the world that flows from practical 
sense.'91 Doxa exists as 'a quasi-perfect correspondence between the objective 
order and the subjective principles of organisation [...] (in which) the natural and 
social world appears as self-evident. Doxa is the unsaid in the field of cultural 
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possibilities, making it seem as if there are not multiple, but only a single 
possibility.'92  
 
 
Heidegger's Anti-Foundationalism 
 
 The upshot is that the perspectival presentation of the whole is incompatible 
with the search for a neutral, objective foundation for political action; this is how 
Heidegger can be situated in the foundationalist/anti-foundationalist debate. We 
saw that in Transformation Linklater took issue with Rorty's anti-foundationalism, 
and defended the Kantian and Habermasian foundationalist commitment to a 
rational morality with universal significance. 93  Part of the motivation for 
Linklater's defence of universalism is his view that 'sometimes the strongest 
defence a culture can give for recognising the rights of outsiders involves nothing 
other than an appeal to common humanity.'94 Linklater's mistake here is to conflate 
the ontological difference, in this case, between humanity and the being of human 
beings. His mistake is to interpret cross-cultural compassion and solicitous being-
with others as a justification for the universal responsibility to engage in dialogue, 
which is itself consequent of his commitment to the foundational ethical subject. In 
the same way that Heidegger criticises Descartes for projecting an interpretation of 
Being as 'substantiality' onto entities, Linklater's defence of universalism projects 
an idea of Being as ethical subjectivity onto those outside of the particular 
community. Importantly though Heidegger's argument leads to neither 
foundationalism nor anti-foundationalism.  
 
 Heidegger refers to foundations (such as Linklater's commitment to ethical 
subjectivity) as a 'ground,' a substance or subject that, as Heidegger puts it 'is that 
from which beings as such are what they are in their becoming, perishing, and 
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94. Ibid., 78. 
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persisting as something that can be known, handled, and worked upon.'95 The 
ground is that which is considered to be 'the ontic causation of the actual, the 
transcendental making possible of the objectivity of objects.' 96  It has been 
interpreted as 'the dialectical mediation of the movement of absolute spirit [Hegel] 
and of the historical process of production [Marx], and the will to power positing 
values. [Nietzsche]'97  
 
 The mistake continually made in Western philosophy is to think about the 
ground as something that can be represented and essentialised, as something 
identifiable above or behind phenomena like the human being (such as a thinking 
substance) rather than recognising that what comes to presence, what appears to us 
in its immediacy, is but one determination of Being. Heidegger's alternative 
'groundless ground' for thinking about human sociality rests on the ontological 
difference: it is on the basis of the ontological difference that entities come to 
presence in the light of prior interpretations of Being. In each case what is brought 
to presence is brought to presence in its own way and it is from this non-foundation 
that other foundations – such as a political or ethical subject – can be projected 
onto onthers and thereby come to presence. As will be shown later, the condition 
of this presencing – that which allows beings to variously come to presence – is 
freedom.  
 
 
Conclusions: From a Dualist to Non-Dualist Approach to 
Emancipatory Politics.  
 
 Our aim in Part 2 is to contribute to the task of developing a more 
universalistic ontology for global politics and ethics, one that does not expect 'the 
other' to assimilate and/or not violating 'the other' through logo- and egocentric 
epistemologies. More specifically, the aim is to contribute to the emancipatory 
project of CIRT by deepening the understanding of ontology – of existence, human 	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96. Ibid. 
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existence, and the nature of human beings – upon which it relies.98 This chapter 
has sought to initiate such a task. One of its central claims is that Heidegger's 
fundamental ontology presents a profound challenge to the metaphysical dualism 
that characterises Linklater's emancipatory cosmopolitanism: a dualism comprised 
of a foundational ontological commitment to ethical subjectivity, and a 
foundational epistemological commitment to the individual (conceived as ethical 
subject) as mind-independent cognitive object.  
 
 Heidegger's existential analytic of Da-sein provides compelling reasons why 
the human being should be regarded primarily as neither subject nor object. In 
Heidegger's words: 
 
Ontologically, Dasein is in principle different from everything that is present-at-hand or 
Real. Its "subsistence" is not based on the substantiality of a substance but on the "Self-
subsistence" of the existing Self, whose Being has been conceived as care. The 
phenomenon of the Self - a phenomenon which is included in care - needs to be defined 
existentially in a way which is primordial and authentic.99  
 
Heidegger's existential definition of the self involved the identification of three 
existential structures that condition any existing human being: worldhood, being-
with, and care. All three challenge the notion that we can usefully be thought as 
self-directing ethical subjects, or even epistemological subjects facing mind-
independent cognitive objects.  
 
 We saw that, because of Da-sein's worldhood, any encounter with other 
entities, including human beings, would not simply be an encounter with a mind-
independent object as it is in itself, but that this encounter will inevitably involve 
the projection of subjective meaning onto that entity. The way that entity appears 
to the self is, therefore, not an entirely reliable basis for us to generalise from. 
Heidegger's subsequent identification of Mitsein as a primordial existential 
structure of human existence – the recognition that ‘there-being’ (Dasein) is 
always ‘being-with’ (Mitsein) – offered us a glimpse of the ontological 	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insufficiency of thinking about sociality on the basis of inter-subjective relations, 
since this involves abstracting from and subsequently objectifying the existential 
condition of being-with: reducing it to relations between subjects, rather than co-
constitutive relations between 'Da-seins.' 
 
 Finally we saw that combination of the 'care' structure – man's thrownness, 
falling, and projection – which loosely correspond to an individual's past, present, 
and future, as well as the relationship between man and Being, lent further support 
to the view that man is not a foundational subject, since what is unique about us is 
not to be found in some 'essence;' even if, as for Sartre, that essence lies in our 
'existence.' Rather, we saw that it lies instead in man's unique relationship to Being, 
a relation that is grounded in time; a relationship for which Heidegger coins a 
neologism, identifying man as 'ek-sistent,' signifying his 'ecstatic temporality' and 
his 'standing out' in the 'truth of Being.' 
 
 Division One of Being and Time, as discussed in the first part of this chapter, 
thus poses a profound challenge to the view of the individual as subject: a view 
that underwrites the understanding of emancipation as the process whereby ethical 
subjectivity can be exercised (as implicit in Linklater's account), but also the 
moves in more recent critical theory that locate the emancipatory project in 
relations of intersubjectivity (such as in Honneth and Brincat). The question 
remains then as to what moves must the emancipatory project make from here. 
Indications of how we might proceed were given in the second half of the chapter, 
which followed Heidegger's discussion of how the existential structures of human 
existence might be brought into an authentic relationship with time in Division 
Two. Here we saw that Da-sein was 'freed' from its lostness in 'the they' (das Man) 
through the recognition of its own finitude, which forces us into an anticipatory 
resoluteness towards the future and into solicitous being-with others.  
 
 Since it related to the 'freeing up' of the future possibilities of any concretely 
existing human beings, we suggested that Heidegger's notion of resoluteness 
offered a more convincing account of the relationship between freedom and 
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dependence than did an association of freedom with the autonomy of a self-
directing subject. We shall recall that resoluteness (Entschlossenheit) is not 
synonymous with decisiveness or a manly readiness to take action, but is better 
thought as an unclosing, or unclosedness towards the future that sees us pushed 
into solicitous being-with-others. Since solicitude (Fürsorge) involves concernful 
relations with others, which in its authentic and active mode can mean working to 
free up the other for their own possibilities, we saw that the notions of resoluteness 
and solicitude contributed to an account of relations with other persons as 
solicitous being-with that served as a nascent but fruitful alternative to relations of 
intersubjectivity.  
 
 However, following Kompridis we claimed that the weaknesses of 
Heidegger's account lay in his insistence that Da-sein's resoluteness must precede 
solicitous being with others, which was indicative of a broader problem: that 
Heidegger falls short when it comes to demonstrating that both freedom and self-
intelligibility are ineluctably acquired through conditions of cooperative 
interaction; a weakness that might have been avoided had he been a better student 
of Hegel, whose interpersonal account of freedom and 'subjectivity,' we shall come 
to see, is both more consistent with and more favourable to Heidegger's account of 
positive solicitude.  
 
 Lastly, we discussed the broader implications of Heidegger's fundamental 
ontology for the nature of political and ethical universality. Early in the chapter we 
saw that, since Da-sein always encounters entities 'in the light of Being,' the 
question of Being in general must be brought to the fore. Towards the end of the 
chapter, since the meaning of Being in general is dependent on its interpretation by 
beings that are finite, we had to conclude that bringing meaning of Being as a 
whole into view is not possible. Consequently, temporality (Zeitlichkeit), or 
'temporariness' was posited as meaning of Being in general. This meant that 
metaphysical (universal) claims, claims that rely on our reason to go beyond that 
which we can experience, have to be grounded in fundamental ontology.  
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 This involves recognising that our interpretations of reality are conditioned 
by Da-sein's own existential structures, and must therefore be brought into an 
authentic relation with time – i.e., involving the realisation that they are essentially 
perspectival claims that project interpretations on the whole. We also saw that any 
universalist claims about human beings in general would be considered to be 
metaphysical if they were not grounded in fundamental ontology. This would 
include an interpretation of the 'whatness' of human beings that regarded post-
conventional reasoning as the most advanced stage of human development and the 
highest expression of human freedom, but also other epistemological claims about 
the mind-independent real. 
 
 Heidegger's argument that any claims about the nature of human existence 
that aspire to apply to human beings in general – such as the ones relied upon by 
Linklater in his defence of universality – must then be grounded in an analysis of 
the experience of human existence if they are not to be considered metaphysical (or 
grounded in metaphysics), is cogent. This is why we claim that Linklater submits 
to a form of metaphysical dualism, even though he would likely dispute it. 
Moreover, since it is based on an analysis of human existence that should be 
familiar to all human beings regardless of political or ethical differences, 
Heidegger's existential analytic of Da-sein should be considered to be a significant 
contribution to a universalistic philosophical ontology for world politics and ethics, 
since it provides us a more universalistic ontological foundation than does ethical 
subjectivity.  
 
 In essence then, we should interpret Heidegger's call for an 'overcoming' of 
metaphysics to be initiating a move away from social inquiry that proceeds from 
dualist premises. Not only does this involve eschewing the view that scientific 
claims are reflections of the world rather than perspectives on it, but it also 
involves forgoing a reliance on ethical subjectivity as an ‘objective’ way of 
mediating political differences. It does not, however, require of us that we give up 
on an emancipatory cosmopolitanism. Nonetheless, given that the individual 
cannot be thought primarily as a present entity (a subject), it does have important 
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implications for the way that we understand human freedom – and hence also for 
an ethical and emancipatory politics. Indeed, Heidegger's fundamental ontology 
harbingers a shift in thinking about what politics and ethics themselves in fact are. 
Consequently, before we proceed to develop the interpersonal aspect of 
resoluteness and solicitude with the aid of Hegel in Part 3, the next chapter will 
engage in a regional ontology of the person, freedom, ethics and politics, that 
proceeds from Heidegger's fundamental ontology. 
 Chapter 5.  
Ek-sistence, Freedom, and an Ethical and 
Emancipatory Politics 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 We saw in the last chapter that Heidegger's alternative 'groundless ground' 
for thinking about human sociality rests upon what he calls the 'ontological 
difference,' and that his fundamental ontology contributes depth to the project of 
developing an emancipatory cosmopolitanism by providing us with a more 
universalistic ontological foundation for critical international theory – applying not 
simply to human beings qua political subjects (Rawls/Frost) or qua ethical subjects 
(Linklater) but to human beings qua human beings.  
 
 For Heidegger, we learnt, what is most distinctive about 'man' is his ek-
sistence: he is the being that interprets Being. Since our own understanding of the 
nature of an entity's existence always occurs in the light of a broader interpretation 
of Being in general (an interpretation that is necessarily partial, horizonal, and 
temporal), in contrast to Linklater's approach to critical theory, a recognition of the 
ontological difference impels us to resist the (characteristically dualist) tendency to 
treat our own interpretation of the being of human beings as an 'objective' 
foundation for an ethical or emancipatory politics, and prompts us to base an 
emancipatory cosmopolitanism on engaged being-with others instead. Thus for 
Heidegger, what it means to be a free human being is to engage in resolute 
solicitous being-with others. 
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 The chapter closed with the suggestion that not only does Heidegger's 
fundamental ontology have important implications for the way that we understand 
human freedom, and hence also for any emancipatory cosmopolitanism, but that it 
also it harbingers a shift in our understanding of what politics and ethics actually 
are. We pick up on this point in this chapter by discussing four related areas that 
are affected by Heidegger's fundamental ontology, all of which entail significant 
implications for the development of an emancipatory cosmopolitanism.  
 
 We will recall from the last chapter that the existential analytic of human 
existence provided in Division One of Being and Time posed a robust challenge to 
the idea that the individual could be thought as subject. Proceeding from this 
critique, we will draw on the work of Frederick Olafson who has applied 
Heidegger's general ontology of Being (existence in general) to the philosophy of 
mind and developed a regional ontology of the human being. Offering an 
alternative to a foundational commitment to ethical subjectivity, Olafson proposes 
that we conceive human beings as essentially 'world-relating creatures,' whose 
world-relation is the proximal fact their existence,	   a constitutive perspectivality 
that individuals are unable to transcend by adopting a position of subjectivity. We 
then proceed to discuss three further central implications of Heidegger's general 
ontology of Being and Olafson's regional ontology of the person; these relate to our 
understandings of human freedom, politics, and ethics.  
 
 Through a discussion of Heidegger’s Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics 
we come to see that Kant's conception of freedom as autonomy (which undergirds 
Linklater's emancipatory cosmopolitanism) must itself be grounded in freedom as 
existential condition. A central aim of Heidegger's, we will recall, is to effect an 
'overcoming of metaphysics,' which would involve coming to see doxa or 
perspectivality as original to beings as a whole. Returning to this proposal, we 
characterise politics as the activity of projecting meaning onto the whole: as 
attempts to create a common world out of a plurality. In regards what we claim are 
the ethical implications of Heidegger's more universalistic ontology, since Being is 
always being-with (Da-sein is always already Mit-sein), we follow Nancy's 
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identification of the self as a singularity and argue that this means that ethics can 
no longer be primarily about ethical principles (since these are necessarily 
underwritten by an ethical subject) but amounts to an open and receptive relation to 
the other as singularity rather than subject.  
 
 
Humans as World-Relating Creatures.  
 
The Turn to Ontology in Political Theory. 
 
 Heidegger's general ontology of Being has had both a direct and indirect 
influence on contemporary political thought. Some of that influence has been 
surveyed by Stephen K. White in his book Sustaining Affirmation, which engages 
the work of George Kateb, Charles Taylor, Judith Butler and William Connolly, 
and illuminates the crucial role that Heidegger's thought has played in the what he 
refers to as the 'weak ontological turn' in political theory.1 'Weak ontology' is 
understood by White as a field that entwines ontological reflection with political 
affirmation, a theoretical turn that went hand in hand with a shift in the meaning of 
ontology in analytic philosophy and philosophy of science that occurred in the 
twentieth century; a shift from understanding ontology as relating to the existence 
of entities presupposed by our scientific theories and towards a 'growing propensity 
to interrogate more carefully those "entities" presupposed by our typical ways of 
seeing and doing in the modern world.'2  
 
 The prime target of this challenge has been the assumption that we may 
treat human beings as independent and autonomous, ontologically prior to their 
relations. For this reason it has tended to be political theories that, even implicitly, 
work from such assumptions that have been singled out for criticism. Most 
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prominent of these are the autonomous individual agent in liberalism and the 
ideally autonomous collective agent in Marxism. As White explains: 
 
At issue is the assertive, disengaged self who generates distance from its background 
(tradition, embodiment) and foreground (external nature, other subjects) in the name of an 
accelerating mastery of them. This Teflon subject has had a leading role on the modern 
stage. Such subjectivity has been affirmed primarily at the individual level in Western 
democracies, although within Marxism it had a career at the collective level as well. In 
both cases, the relevant entity is envisioned as empowering itself through natural and 
social obstacles; it dreams ultimately of frictionless motion. This modern ontology of the 
Teflon subject has, of course, not usually been thematized in quite such stark terms. But 
the lack of explicit thematization has been at least partially a measure of modernity's self-
confidence. It is precisely the waning of this self-confidence that engenders such a 
widespread recourse to ontological reflection. Accordingly, the current turn might now be 
seen as an attempt to think ourselves, and being in general, in ways that depart from the 
dominant - but now more problematic - ontological investments of modernity.3 
 
 White notes that Heidegger's existential analysis of the human being and the 
historical/temporal dimension of ontological reflection that he initiated is crucial to 
this turn.4 While Heidegger's influence on recent French philosophy is particularly 
noticeable, this is only one of several strands of thought that participate in the 
ontological turn: 
 
One finds similar countermodern, ontological themes in various locations across the 
contemporary intellectual landscape: in communitarianism, in political theory influenced 
by theology, in feminism, in post-Marxism, and even in some versions of liberalism itself 
[...] In each of these initiatives, ontological concerns emerge in the form of deep 
reconceptualizations of human being in relation to its world. More specifically, human 
being is presented as in some way "stickier" than in prevailing modern conceptualizations.5  
 
By 'stickier' what is meant is that these approaches exhibit a resistance to the 
'disengaged self,' to an autonomous, antecedent subjectivity: 
 
[w]eak ontologies do not proceed by categorical positing of, say, human nature or telos 
[...] Rather what they offer are figurations of human being in terms of certain existential 
realties, most notably language, mortality or finitude, natality, and the articulation of 
"sources of the self." These figurations are accounts of what it is to be a certain sort of 
creature.6  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3. Ibid. 
4. Ibid. 
5. Ibid., 5. On Heidegger's influence on French philosophy see Tom Rockmore, Heidegger and 
French Philosophy: Humanism, Antihumanism and Being (London: Routledge, 1995). 
6. Stephen K. White, Sustaining Affirmation: The Strengths of Weak Ontology in Political Theory, 
9. 
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Engaged Agents 
 
 Charles Taylor and Frederick Olafson dig deeper into the philosophical roots 
of this scepticism in political theory with reference to the philosophy of mind. In a 
short essay titled Engaged Agency and Background in Heidegger, Taylor presents 
dualist and mechanist perspectives on the mind as two different ways that a 
disengaged perspective has been 'ontologised.'7 These accounts of consciousness 
involve a view of the human being similar to that of the Teflon subject since they 
purport to discover reality out there, as it 'really is,' by freeing us from the 
perspective of embodied existence.8 Inaugurated by Descartes, dualist perspectives 
see human beings as essentially minds located in bodies, while mechanistic 
perspectives, drawing on Hobbes, understand thinking as 'an event realized in a 
body, mechanistically understood.'9  
 
 Both these perspectives are underwritten by a rationalist epistemological 
model: the belief that reason is the only reliable path to knowledge. For Taylor, 
Heidegger helps us to pry ourselves loose from modern rationalism by making us 
appreciate the role of the background in human activity. Although Linklater 
famously says that 'reason has a history,' that it has an historical, developmental 
core, neither he nor Habermas depart from the rationalist commitment to the 
individual thought as subject; a commitment that supposedly allows us to 
overcome these background conditions and transcend the particularity of context 
through the exercise of moral reason.10 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7. Charles Taylor, “Engaged Agency and Background in Heidegger,” in The Cambridge 
Companion to Heidegger, ed. Charles B. Guignon (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
8. Ibid. 
9. Ibid., 323. 
10. 'Reason has a history; it develops a determinate and progressive content from its expressions in 
various forms of social life.' Andrew Linklater, Men and Citizens in the Theory of International 
Relations, 2nd ed. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1990), 160. Arguing that Linklater's subject 
attempts to transcend embodied existence is not the same as arguing that he ignores the material 
conditions of the exercise of ethical subjectivity; due to his sympathies for Marx, the latter claim 
would clearly be wrong. 
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 Frederik Olafson's What is a Human Being: a Heideggerian View makes 
similar arguments regarding the importance of deeper ontological reflection to the 
ones surveyed by White and the non-rationalist approach to the philosophy of mind 
that is sketched by Taylor, but his argument is far more extensive.11 For Olafson, 
as for Heidegger, the question of Being is the central question of philosophy. He 
illustrates this with the claim that the three questions that defined the domain of 
philosophy for Immanuel Kant - 'What can I know?' 'What ought I to do?' and 
‘What may I hope?’ – are aspects of the more general question, ‘What is man?’12  
 
 Rather than distinguishing between weak and strong ontology, as White 
does, Olafson remains truer to Heidegger in distinguishing between 'regional' and 
general approaches to the study of Being. Inquiring as to the nature of the human 
being rather than into Being as such is an exercise in regional ontology, as opposed 
to general ontology. 'Regional' ontology is a Husserlian term that shares with 
general ontology the study of being qua being. However, regional ontology is 
concerned with addressing entities of a certain kind: understanding what is 
distinctive about a human being would thus belong to regional ontology.13 By 
contrast, general ontology is concerned not with the being of any particular entity, 
but with the concept of Being as such.14  
 
 It will be recalled that for Heidegger all general claims about what human 
beings are, must be brought into an authentic relationship with time and grounded 
in fundamental ontology if they are not to be considered metaphysical. Although 
Linklater does not explicitly identify what he takes the essence of the human being 
to be, we saw that emancipation appears in his work as the gradual negation of that 
which negates ethical subjectivity, and that his defence of universalism further 
indicates a foundational commitment to ethical subjectivity, since this mode of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11. Frederick A. Olafson, What is a Human Being? A Heideggerian View (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995). 
12. Ibid., 1. 
13. Ibid., 10-11. 
14. Ibid., 12. Heidegger's existential analytic of Da-sein is an exercise in the regional ontology of 
human experience, from which he seeks to draw conclusions regarding a general ontology of Being. 
The problem, as Heidegger sees it, is that metaphysics has been preoccupied with regional 
ontology, and has ignored general ontology. His overcoming of metaphysics is therefore intended to 
ground regional ontology in general ontology. 
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being is projected upon the other and all other others in his conception of 
university as the universal responsibility to engage in dialogue concerning shared 
principles of coexistence. Since this ethical subject is what persists in his CIRT, 
and is the foundation or the ground by which he justifies his universalism, from a 
Heideggerian perspective this is a metaphysical commitment that must therefore be 
recognised as a 'perspectival' claim regarding the essential being of human beings, 
and thus subordinate to resolute solicitous being-with others.  
 
 Although we caught glimpses of its inadequacy in our discussion of the 
existential structures of human existence explored in Division One of Being and 
Time, we did not focus on the shortcomings of understanding the human being as 
subject. Rather than proceed here with a full-scale criticism of Linklater's reliance 
on the ethical subject, we will focus instead on engaging in a philosophical 
ontology of the person that can provide a more adequate and universalistic basis 
for an emancipatory cosmopolitanism. For this task we will draw on Frederik 
Olafson's argument that we are not subjects, but essentially world-relating 
creatures; that what is common to all human beings is not their free will, nor their 
ethical subjectivity, but their world-relation: their habituation and participation in 
the creation of meaningful worlds.  
 
 
World-Relating Creatures15  
 
 Olafson avoids the problems associated with Linklater's reliance on the 
subject by taking orientation from Heidegger's general ontology of Being in order 
to inquire as to the nature of the human being. Like Taylor, Olafson presents an 
alternative understanding of the human being to those views represented by 
materialist or dualist philosophies of mind. He understands humans not as 
composites of body and mind but as unitary entities that 'have a world.' Basing his 
argument on a distinctive and Heideggerian way of conceiving 'mental' life, he 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15. It is worth noting that there is an overlapping concern here with Walzer's claim that 'we are (all 
of us) culture-producing creatures' Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and 
Equality (New York: Basic Books, 1983), 314. 
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makes the case for a radical particularist understanding of human subjectivity, 
suggesting that human beings should be understood as entities to which things are 
present; since there are many human beings, there are many entities to which 
things are present. Humans must then be understood as 'particulars,' as 'loci of 
presence:' a position that readily lends itself to pluralisation.16  
 
 As particulars, human beings are individuated by 'the varying patterns of the 
presence and absence of entities that are in the first instance a function of spatial 
location and orientation.'17 In this view, '[e]ach subject would delimit a part of the 
same world that would typically overlap with those delimited by others but would 
never coincide perfectly with them,' a thought that reflects what he calls the 
'perspectival variation' of subjects: individuated entities that have a locus in the 
space of the world, a space which 'broadly coincides with the body I call mine.'18  
 
 
Polarity and Agency  
  
 Proceeding from an understanding of human beings as entities to which 
things are present, Olafson elaborates an account of human beings as 'ek-sistents' 
whose mode of being is 'ek-sistence,' Heideggerian neologisms that reflect the 
passive and active sides of human existence. Olafson's account of ek-sistence is 
constituted by two interrelated concepts: agency and polarity; where polarity can 
be further distinguished into feeling and desire. These elements reflect 
characteristic aspects of the entity that humans are. When understanding human 
beings as entities to which other entities are present, polarity is the 'ordering of the 
field of presence of a given individual human being in terms of pairings of actual 
and possible states of affairs.'19 The passive side of polarity is 'feeling,' which 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16. Frederick A. Olafson, What is a Human Being? A Heideggerian View, 133,141. 
17. Ibid., 139. 
18. Ibid. 
19. Ibid., 166-67. 
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expresses the 'way things are with us,' in the sense that we are always 'subject to a 
situation that in some way affects our interests.'20  
 
 Nevertheless, we are also active beings, and even if it is beyond our power to 
effect a course of action, 'the situations in which we find ourselves are typically 
ones that we do not merely suffer or enjoy, but [are ones] that we want to 
terminate, modify, or maintain.'21 Desire is the human response to these life 
situations, acting as the intermediary between feeling and action. In this way desire 
orients us towards the future by disclosing possible and particular futures to each 
of us in a primordial way.22 
 
 'Polarity' then represents the field of presence of any given human being, 
broadly corresponding to their spatial location and orientation. The counterpart to 
which is agency, the human ability to intervene in the world to modify or terminate 
actual or possible states of affairs. Not only do we ek-sist in the sense that entities 
are present to us, but we also have the capacity to intervene in the world to make it 
different from what it might have otherwise been.23 Indeed, as the counterpart to 
presence, action is 'the fullest expression of ek-sistence.'24  
 
 This agency, however, is not the possession of the individual thought as 
subject. We will recall that authentic freedom, for Heidegger, is not the deliberate 
action of a subject, but is thought as the 'resoluteness' (Entschlossenheit) of some 
concretely existing human being, which involves 'the disclosive projection and 
determination of what is factically possible at the time.'25 Polarity and agency are 
thus deeply implicated in each other; exercising agency, which is itself contingent 
upon capability or power, involves intervening in the world – but this intervention 
is dependent upon polarity (feeling and desire) as the condition and the motivation 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20. Ibid., 178. 
21. Ibid. 
22. Ibid., 186. 
23. Ibid., 187. 
24. Ibid. 
25. Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (Oxford: 
Wiley-Blackwell, 1962), 345. 
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for any meaningful action.26 Meaningful action, as we will recall, does not relate 
simply to the autonomous self-direction of the subject, but is concernful Being-
alongside what is ready-to-hand: engagement in solicitous being with others.27 
 
 
World/Worlds 
 
 On Heidegger's/Olafson's account then, the human being 'is individuated in 
one way by the location in space and time of that body and in another by the way 
the world is present to it.' 28  This individuation means that each and every 
individual human being has 'a world' which influences the way they relate to 'the 
world.' This means to signify 'the web of meanings and references' through which 
any individual orients itself, and 'constitutes any fundamental understanding of the 
self and its immediate context.'29 While 'the world' is involved in the constitution 
of the worlds of individual human beings, and individuals' worlds will traverse 
each other's and have much in common, these worlds can only ever remain 
approximations of the world. Since an individual's world can never be wholly 
identical with the world, individual worlds are inescapably partial; it is this world-
relation, rather than any inherent or achieved subjectivity, that is both constitutive 
of individual human beings and represents the proximal fact of our existence.  
 
 Given that there are over seven billion human bodies in the world, and 
proceeding from the claim that humans have worlds that largely coincide with the 
location in space and time of their bodies, the way individuals make sense of the 
world will vary greatly depending upon the variation in time and space of each 
individual body. While individual worlds will overlap with others, resulting in a 
high degree of congruence between worlds in certain circumstances, thus retaining 
a commitment to the salience of particular communities and joint ventures such as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26. Frederick A. Olafson, What is a Human Being? A Heideggerian View, 166-67. 
27. Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, 344. 
28. Frederick A. Olafson, What is a Human Being? A Heideggerian View, 246. 
29. Louiza Odysseos, “Radical Phenomenology, Ontology, and International Political Theory,” 
Alternatives 27 (2002), 387. 
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states when thinking about the sources of individual agency, these worlds will 
never coincide perfectly.  
 
 When talking of 'communities' one assumes that the entities within that 
community at least on some level share a singular world, whether this is a nation 
(Wales) a state (Britain) a supra-national community (the European Union) or even 
a community of humankind (a universal dialogic community, or global recognitive 
sphere). There is a prima facie case for elevating any given community to a 
position of prominence in light of shared political objectives by encouraging the 
disparate worlds of individuated human beings to coalesce around something that 
they share in common (such as culture, language, state, or species) in order to 
facilitate cooperation in some joint venture (such as the preservation of a national 
or religious culture, to enjoy the benefits of citizenship, or to work towards 
cosmopolitan goals such as combating climate change). 
 
 
A Non-cognitivist Account of Agency 
 
 Whereas thinking of the human being as a 'composite of body and mind' 
serves to accentuate a cognitivist or rationalist approach between self and world, 
since 'mind' functions as the privileged signifier, Olafson's unitary conception of 
human being as ek-sistent recovers the importance of feeling and desire in an 
account of human agency. This non-cognitivist approach to agency also chastens 
attempts to emphasise one particular affiliation over others. While the elevation of 
one particular affiliation, such as national identity of common humanity, over 
others can certainly contribute to an emancipatory politics, there is nothing natural 
or necessary about any of these communities.30 By reducing persons to what they 
share in common, and a community to a simple aggregate of similar entities, the 
elevation of any of such subjectivity amounts to a 'levelling' of human existence; 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30. For a compelling account of the emancipatory role of the state in addressing global inequality 
see Michael Walzer, Politics and Passion: Toward a More Egalitarian Liberalism (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 2006), 131-41. 
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since what is most distinctive about man, his singular 'ek-sistence' is subordinated 
to some shared subjectivity.31 
 
 It seems, therefore, there might exist a trade-off between claims to political 
or ethical subjectivity, their potentially galvanising and emancipatory effects, and 
what makes us characteristically human: our ek-sistence. The essential tension 
between subjectivity and ek-sistence lies in the fact that freedom is not simply the 
possession of any of these entities, individual or collective, thought as subjects, but 
must be something more; the condition of the establishment of any such 
subjectivity, for instance. 
 
 
The Essence of Human Freedom: Heidegger's Ontological 
Reading of Kant 
 
 In Chapter 2 we saw that Linklater's Men and Citizens engaged in a 
dialectical treatment of Kantian rationalism and Hegelian historicism, which 
supported his philosophical history of the development of human freedom that was 
then used as a yardstick with which to judge actual historical arrangements of 
international society. We then saw that in Transformation, Linklater's 
emancipatory cosmopolitanism was reconceived along communicative lines, where 
Habermas's normative ideal of the universal communication community replaced 
the philosophical history of human freedom as the standard of social criticism. 
While Hegel's insights were seen to be his contribution to the historical 
development of human freedom, and Marx's lay in the commitment to the 
transformation of the economic and social conditions that undermine the 
conditions of human freedom, it is Kant – and in particular the Kantian ethical 
subject – that remains the central and guiding light of Linklater's understanding of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31. There is a range of different, perhaps competing, subjectivities that persons can adopt, the 
relative importance of which varies between persons. For instance, a Welsh speaker is a subject of 
the Welsh language, and a British citizen is a subject of the British state. The two are not 
incompatible, but if the policies of the British state do not do enough to help preserve the Welsh 
language, we should not be surprised if the assertion of a more particularist subjectivity becomes 
more forceful. 
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freedom; it is an historically developing ethical subject with significant debts to 
Kant's original formulation undergirds Linklater's CIRT.  
 
 While Habermas modifies Kohlberg's account of post-conventional morality 
by situating it within the dialogic framework of discourse ethics, thereby making 
ethical ratiocination a collective activity rather than an individual one, the 
commitment to the Kantian ethical subject as both the ground of universal 
principles and the loci of ethical praxis remains. More broadly, we also saw how 
Linklater's understanding of emancipation – as an historical process of the gradual 
self-realisation of the ethical subject, whereby that which negates ethical 
subjectivity is itself negated – bears striking similarities with the argumentative 
structure of Kant's Perpetual Peace: both remain fundamentally committed to the 
ideal of a universal moral community in which humanity might be united 'as co-
legislators in a universal kingdom of ends.'32  
 
 Freedom and ethical subjectivity thus go hand in hand in Linklater's approach 
to CIRT. However, we concluded Part 1 by claiming that Linklater's foundational 
commitment to the ethical subject indicated not just a limited philosophical 
ontology, but also a thin understanding of human freedom. Honneth and Brincat 
reminded us that freedom was not just the possession of the subject, but was 
located in intersubjective relations, and the emancipatory project of critical theory 
was thereby relocated 'within the experiences of the "dominated" themselves rather 
than in civilising processes taking place "above them."'33 However, we saw that 
Honneth and Brincat themselves remained reliant on the kaleidoscope of the 
Kantian subject and so we demurred on their commitment to intersubjective 
recognition as the path to emancipation.  
 
 Indications of Linklater’s shortcomings in this regard were given through 
Foucault's discussion of the process of moral self-formation whereby the person 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32. Andrew Linklater, The Transformation of Political Community: Ethical Foundations of the 
Post-Westphalian Era (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998), 84. 
33. Shannon Brincat, “Towards an Emancipatory Cosmopolitanism: Reconstructing the Concept of 
Emancipation in Critical International Relations Theory” (Ph.D Thesis, University of Queensland, 
2011), 312,314-315. 
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becomes an ethical subject, and in Foucault’s acknowledgement that freedom is not 
the possession of the ethical subject but is the premise of moral conduct through 
which one transforms oneself into an ethical subject. It is in this light that 
Odysseos's claim that Linklater confuses freedom with the conditions of possibility 
of a certain kind of subjectivity rings true.34 The following section responds to 
these discussions with the aim of contributing greater depth to an understanding of 
human freedom necessary for any emancipatory cosmopolitanism, one that moves 
away from a principal association of freedom with subjectivity or intersubjectivity.  
  
 
Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics.  
 
 Despite his discussion of resoluteness challenging the Kantian 
identification of freedom as the possession of an antecedent subjectivity, and 
briefly discussing Kantian subjectivity in Being and Time, it is not until The 
Essence of Human Freedom that Heidegger engages in a more thorough evaluation 
of Kant's conception of freedom and practical reason, explicitly defending his own 
conception of freedom in the process.35 Based on lectures given in Freiburg in the 
summer of 1930, three years after the publication of Being and Time, the central 
idea here is to reverse Kant's idea that humans are free because they have freedom, 
to argue that it is rather freedom that 'has' man; in other words, to make us come to 
regard freedom as a condition of our existence as 'world-relating' creatures as 
opposed to a property of individuals. Rather than being the possession of an 
individual thought as subject, freedom becomes the condition of being able to 
determine individuals as subjects in the first place.  
 
 Freedom is therefore understood not as a 'thing' or a property, but as an 
experience or occurrence through which the human being can appropriate his own 
being, such as in solicitous being-with others; freedom is thought as release or 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34. Louiza Odysseos, The Subject of Coexistence: Otherness in International Relations 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2007), xxx. 
35. Heidegger's discussion Kantian subjectivity can be found in Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, 
366-67. 
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deliverance to existence rather than autonomous self-control and mastery over 
things in the world. This argument is important in two respects. Firstly it does not 
involve contestable metaphysical presuppositions regarding what the human being 
is, since 'the human' is not associated with some essential substance or property. 
Secondly, it offers an understanding of freedom that respects the limitations and 
constraints of human perspectivalism as presented in an understanding humans as 
world-relating creatures.  
 
 In part a study in the ground of Kantian freedom, by conceiving freedom as 
the 'absolute self-activity' of the 'power of self-determination' of human beings qua 
human beings – as against the Christian theological tradition, in which Paul, 
Luther, and Augustine had conceived freedom as independence from God – The 
Essence of Human Freedom credits Kant with being the person who brings the 
problem of freedom 'for the first time into a radical connection with the 
fundamental problems of metaphysics.'36  
 
 Heidegger demonstrates that there are two aspects to Kantian freedom, 
'practical' freedom and 'cosmological' freedom; both of which are grounded in a 
metaphysics of presence and hence persist in following the leading question of 
philosophy ('what are beings?'). Both understandings are thus susceptible to the 
arguments made regarding the forgetting of the ontological difference and the 
elusion of an authentic relation between an understanding of Being and time.  
 
 Essentially, Heidegger's critique is that Kant's determination of freedom as 
the autonomy of the ethical subject, coupled with his failure to inquire as to the 
proper relationship between being and time, means that Kant is unable to recognise 
that his determination of freedom as the autonomy of the ethical subject is only one 
of several possible determinations of the being of human beings. Voicing a concern 
echoed fourteen years later in Horkheimer and Adorno's Dialectic of 
Enlightenment, the shared objection is to a form of levelling manifest in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36. Martin Heidegger, The Essence of Human Freedom: An Introduction to Philosophy (London: 
Continuum, 2002), 15-16. 
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Enlightenment commitment to freedom and equality that leads directly (or 
dialectically, in the case of Horkheimer and Adorno) to its opposite.37 
 
 
The Two Paths to Freedom: Spontaneity, Autonomy & Practical Freedom 
 
 Heidegger begins by explaining that the idea of freedom that normally 
comes to the fore in any discussion of freedom is freedom understood as 
autonomy. Autonomy itself is principally understood in the negative form, as a 
form of freedom-from: a denial of dependence upon something else.38 Negative 
freedom becomes fully defined by what it is that man is free from, which has been 
experienced and problematised in two essential directions: independence from 
nature, and independence from God. The former involving the claim that human 
action is not primarily caused by natural processes, while the second involving the 
view that humans have free will and that their action is not predetermined by 
God.39 
 
 Accompanying negative freedom is positive freedom, which refers to the 
'toward-which' or the being 'free for;' for Kant, practical freedom, the freedom of 
the ethical subject, is the positive freedom to be a self-determining, responsible 
person. However, this practical freedom is presented by Kant as a negative 
freedom, as a form of independence, and specifically 'the independence of the will 
of coercion by sensuous impulses.'40 Practical freedom for Kant then refers to the 
independence of the will: the human ability to be self-legislating and autonomous, 
and it is as a specific characteristic of man as a rational being that attains actuality 
in the concrete willing of the pure ought.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37. Theodor W. Adorno, and Max Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment (London: Verso, 1986). 
This common concern is likely due to the shared influence of Nietzsche on Heidegger, Horkheimer 
and Adorno. 
38. Martin Heidegger, The Essence of Human Freedom, 4. 
39. Ibid., 5. 
40. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Allen W. Wood and Paul Guyer (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998), A534,B562. 
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 In short, the essence of human freedom is for Kant 'the condition of the 
possibility of the factuality of pure practical reason.'41 Kantian freedom therefore 
establishes the individual as essentially independent from his world.  
 
 There are two paths to Kantian freedom, cosmological and practical – both 
intersecting in the individual thought as subject. Referring to a 'free act' as an 
'originary action,' freedom is determined in terms of cause and effect, and is 
thereby posed as a problem of causality in Kant's third antinomy.42 For Kant, all 
experience is subject to the law of causality, the law that 'everything that happens, 
that is, begins, to be, presupposes something upon which it follows according to a 
rule.'43 As Kant explains: 'the causality of the cause of that which happens or 
comes into being must itself have come into being, and [...] in accordance with the 
principle of understanding it must in its turn require a cause.'44 In the natural world, 
the world of phenomena, nothing is the cause of itself: every cause of a cause itself 
follows from a prior cause.  
 
 Implicit in the concept of mechanical causality, however, is the notion of a 
first cause, an uncaused causal power (i.e., transcendental freedom), since the law 
of causality would be self-contradictory if there were not another kind of causality 
that also effected phenomena in the world.45 This logical claim that natural 
causality must itself be grounded in something that is unconditional is what 
constitutes the antinomy between causality and freedom in speculative reason; an 
antinomy that Kant resolves in the first Critique by positing a sharp distinction 
between the phenomenal world of appearances and the noumenal world of 'things 
in themselves.'  
 
 In the third antinomy this takes the form of the proposition of the necessity 
of an uncaused cause (transcendental freedom), an absolute spontaneity of cause, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41. Martin Heidegger, The Essence of Human Freedom, 201. 
42. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A544,B572. 
43. Ibid., A189,B232. 
44. Ibid., A532,B560. 
45. This is the role that God plays in a mechanistic paradigm of nature: as the abstract 'first cause' 
(causa prima) of the universe. 
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which of itself originates a series of phenomena which then proceed according to 
natural laws. This distinction means that freedom and causality are no longer 
mutually exclusive, since the concept of cause presupposes two kinds of causality, 
where the causality of freedom does not contradict the laws of nature because it 
lies outside of the realm of experience. The phenomenal-noumenal distinction thus 
resolves the contradiction between freedom and mechanistic laws of nature: 
transcendental freedom is cosmological freedom.  
 
 
Metaphysical Freedom as the Ground of Practical Autonomy 
 
 The problem though is that we cannot experience this transcendental 
freedom: it is something that we can never prove or know. Cosmological freedom 
is therefore an object of intelligibility rather than sensibility, and has to be deduced 
through the exercise of reason. Kant argues in the second Critique however that we 
must still presuppose cosmological freedom – to act as if the transcendental thesis 
were true – since to conclude that human beings cannot be an uncaused cause 
would undermine our ability to consider ourselves (and therefore act as) 
responsible agents. Despite the epistemic possibility that we might well be 
deluded, for Kant there is a practical necessity of acting as if we had cosmological 
freedom, because otherwise we simply could not act.46  
 
 This variance reflects the divergent concerns of Kant's two Critiques: while 
pure reason aims at truth, practical reason tells us what we must do. This is why 
the first Critique cognises freedom in a purely negative way, as the pure possibility 
of freedom as an independence from, while the second Critique thinks about 
actually existing freedom, where freedom is regarded as the ability to will an 
action for ourselves; and for that willing to be driven by reason alone, since reason 
provides motivation for the will that transcends natural causality. It is, therefore, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46. In a metaphysics lecture Kant is quoted as saying: 'Freedom is practically necessary – man must 
therefore act according to an idea of freedom, otherwise he cannot act. That does not, however, 
prove freedom in the theoretical sense.' Henry E. Allison, Idealism and Freedom: Essays on Kant’s 
Theoretical and Practical Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 133-34. 
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ethical action driven by reason alone that allows us to consider the person to be 
engaging in an original effecting. In short, freedom is, according to Kant 'a non-
empirical (intelligible) kind of causality'; a 'causality of reason' that practical 
reason gives reality to.47  
 
 
Freedom as a Problem of Metaphysics: Cosmology, Causality & Human 
Responsibility. 
 
 We saw in the last chapter that Heidegger argues that any encounter with 
entities occurs 'in the light of Being'; Kant's account of freedom and ethical 
subjectivity is an effective illustration of this.48 Kant, a committed Newtonian, 
sought to apply Newton's insights in physics to metaphysics, a philosophical 
discipline that, in promising to give us knowledge of entities existing beyond 
experience, he regarded as a fledgling science. Newtonian physics had provided a 
mechanical explanation of nature as governed by causally determining natural 
laws; understanding freedom as non-empirical (intelligible) kind of causality 
allows Kant to find a place for human freedom in a Newtonian universe by 
reconciling the mechanical necessity of nature with the view of humans as beings 
endowed with a distinctive kind of causality.49 Kant's encounter with human beings 
thus occurs in the light of a mechanistic paradigm of nature; his positing of 
freedom as a transcendental idea is at root an attempt to make sense of the unity of 
nature given a commitment to a mechanistic understanding of the world. Hence, it 
is only within a certain conditioned interpretation of Being that freedom becomes a 
problem for Kant. 
 
 It is in the light of this understanding of Being in general (the mechanistic 
paradigm of nature) that allows Kant to postulate that ethical subjectivity resides in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47. Martin Heidegger, The Essence of Human Freedom, 177. 
48. We will recall from the previous chapter that Da-sein is always 'thrown' into a particular context 
that informs the nature of our relation to the world, and that Heidegger calls this situation a 
Lichtung (Clearing): an open space within which we can encounter objects. 'Things show up in the 
light of our understanding of being.' Hubert Dreyfus, Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on 
Heidegger’s Being and Time (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1991), 163. 
49. Martin Heidegger, The Essence of Human Freedom, 177. 
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the individual. This notion then later finds practical expression in his second 
Critique and in the Groundwork, before being expressed politically in his essays 
Perpetual Peace and Idea for a Universal History. Kant's conception of ethical 
subjectivity is thus a corollary to his understanding of freedom as transcendental 
idea (cosmological freedom); both of which are metaphysical because they cannot 
be validated by experience. Although the two are not the same – autonomy is the 
self-legislation of a rational being according to its individual will, and absolute 
spontaneity is the self-origination of a state – it is only on the basis of absolute 
spontaneity that practical autonomy is possible. Practical autonomy is a kind of 
absolute spontaneity, the latter delimiting the essence of the former:  
 
The self-determination of action as self-legislation is a self-origination of a state in the 
specific domain of the human activity of a rational being. Were there no absolute 
spontaneity, there would be no autonomy. The possibility of autonomy is grounded in 
spontaneity, and practical freedom is grounded in transcendental freedom.50  
 
 Hence what initially seems to be an unproblematic, even instinctual way of 
thinking human freedom, becomes far more complicated since it leads us to ask 
what it is that enables practical autonomy, and, what absolute spontaneity even 
means. Kant's commitment to individual autonomy thus forces us to confront a 
broader problematic, the problem of causality in general.  
 
 
Presence, Responsibility, and the Leading Question 
 
 The practical freedom associated with ethical subjectivity is not just about 
rational activity, but also involves being responsible for our actions. While the 
traditional definition of man as homo animale rationale recognises only two 
elements: man as the animal endowed with reason, since an animal can be rational 
without possessing the ability to act on behalf of itself, for Kant the humanity of 
man must consist in more than this: '[r]eason could be purely theoretical, such that 
man's actions were guided by reason, but with his impulses stemming entirely from 
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sensibility, i.e., from his animality.'51 Consequently it is not simply rationality or 
animality, but also personality that must be distinctive of man for Kant: our ability 
to rise above our animal nature and be held accountable for our actions as persons. 
In short, man is not just a rational being, but also an accountable being: '[t]he 
essence of person, the personality, consists in self-responsibility.'52 
 
 The idea that we are responsible beings that can be held accountable for our 
actions is crucial for a Kantian conception of freedom, since it is this experience of 
individual responsibility or accountability that provides substance to the idea that 
we are free. Such a view of freedom has become widely accepted, at least in 
modern, liberal, societies. If we murder someone, we expect to be held accountable 
for that crime. Similarly, when someone engages in supererogatory action we hold 
that person in esteem. Kant's understanding of freedom is therefore crucial to our 
modern self-understandings, without it we would have neither legal nor moral 
personality; both of which are central to the functioning of our modern societies. 
The problem however is that Kant treats this kind of freedom as something that 
persists historically and trans-culturally: he treats this form of ethical subjectivity 
as foundational.53  
 
 Heidegger's objection is that Kant treats this form of subjectivity as a form 
of perpetual presence, where the self is characterised not qua self but as 'the 
selfsameness and steadiness of something that is always present-at-hand. To define 
the "I" ontologically as "subject" means to regard it as something always present-
at-hand.'54 From Heidegger's perspective then, by allowing the question of the 
essence of human freedom to finish with the positing of freedom as the self-
legislation of practical reason, Kant persists in asking the leading question of 
philosophy (‘what are beings?’) since beings are the beings that are free.  
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52. Ibid. 
53. Linklater's dialectical treatment of Kant's rationalism and Hegel's historicism in Men and 
Citizens is a significant move away from this form of foundationalism, yet reconstructing ethical 
subjectivity as an historical achievement does not fully extricate himself from this commitment. 
54. Ibid., 367. 
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 Despite resonating profoundly with a modern sensibility then, by 
understanding freedom simply as the practical autonomy of a present being, of an 
individual conceived as self-directing substance, Kant's understanding of freedom 
betrays an essentially limited conception of the human being (as existent entity). 
This is because it fails to engage with the being of that entity, with the nature of the 
kind of existence that pertains to human beings; a form of existence that Heidegger 
identifies as our 'ek-sistentiality' – the fact that we are the beings that interpret 
Being. As a result, Kant's treatment of freedom and human existence is 
ontologically shallow. 
 
 We shall recall from the last chapter that Heidegger rejects metaphysical 
realism, arguing instead that our understanding of reality is not simply read off the 
mind-independent real, but is at least partially imposed upon it; that, on the basis of 
our prior experience we project out interpretations of existence onto entities 
themselves: we give things meaning. Moreover, that Heidegger's complaint against 
the Western philosophical tradition is that it has misinterpreted the nature of this 
exercise: that, in part due to an overestimation of our rational faculties, we have 
come to think that our constructions of the mind-independent real are in fact 
reflections of reality as it is independent of our knowledge of it. 
 
 Consequently, the reason why Kant's conception of human freedom and 
existence are so shallow is that he considers his metaphysics to be a fledgling 
science, and therefore that his account of human beings as rational, autonomous, 
persons, is a reflection of what human beings actually are, rather than an 
interpretation of the being of human beings that operates in the light of a 
mechanistic paradigm of nature; one that projects meaning onto human beings, and 
which can therefore be subject to evaluation according to its effects: effects 
including reification that will be explored in the next chapter. It is for this reason – 
because he ignores the priority and the necessity of the question of Being – that 
Heidegger concludes that Kant's treatment of freedom as a problem of causality 
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'lacks the metaphysical ground for the problem of freedom.'55 This leads him to 
consider if it is, in fact, the reverse that is true.  
 
 
Freedom as a Problem of Causality, or Causality as a Problem of Freedom? 
 
 While Kant presents the problem of freedom as a problem of causality, 
Heidegger questions whether it makes more sense to consider the problem of 
causality to be itself grounded in freedom. The suggestion is that we should 
consider freedom to be a condition rather than a property; that freedom might 
rather first be the condition of the possibility of interpreting the being of human 
beings as ethical subjects. Or, to put it differently, whether freedom is in fact the 
condition of our (historical and social) construction of a world in which human 
beings are deemed to be entities that possess the power of 'absolute self-activity' or 
'self-determination.' This amounts to positing freedom as the condition of any 
understanding of the being of beings, the condition of our 'world-hood,' or of what 
Heidegger calls the 'manifestness of the being of beings.' 
 
The letting-be encountered of beings, comportment to beings in each and every mode of 
manifestness, is only possible where freedom exists. Freedom is the condition of the 
possibility of the manifestness of the being of beings, of the understanding of being.56 
 
 Consequently, Heidegger leads us to a discussion of the relationship 
between the question of Being and freedom. While the question of Being has been 
the leading question of philosophy, the fundamental problem of philosophy is that 
concerning the essence of freedom. 57  Heidegger suggests that it is only by 
regarding the question of Being as rooted in the question concerning the essence of 
human freedom that we can recognise the proper ontological dimension of 
freedom. 'The essence of freedom only comes into view if we seek it as the ground 
of the possibility of Dasein, as something prior even to being and time.'58 Rather 
than seeing freedom as freedom-from and freedom-to, he suggests then that 'we 	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56. Ibid., 205. 
57. Ibid. 
58. Ibid., 93. 
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must effect a complete repositioning of freedom, so that what now emerges is that 
the problem of freedom is not built into the leading and fundamental problems of 
philosophy, but, on the contrary, the leading question of metaphysics is grounded 
in the question concerning the essence of freedom.'59 Freedom then is no longer 
conceived primarily in terms of a property of man, but it becomes 'superordinate 
and governing in relation to the whole.'60  
 
 Although it is the ground that our existence as meaningful creatures  rests 
upon, freedom cannot strictly be considered to be a foundation, as freedom must by 
definition remain indeterminate. Consequently, freedom is posited as the Abgrund, 
the abyss that the ontological difference rests upon. Freedom is the 'groundless' 
ground of the ontological difference, the condition of any interpretation of Being 
and of the perspectival presentation of the whole. We will recall that in Being and 
Time Dasein 'is in existing, the ground of its ability to be.'61 Dasein is thrown into 
existence, and since it is thrown, Dasein is not itself subject, but projects 'itself 
onto possibilities into which it has been thrown [...] It has been released from the 
ground, not by itself but to itself, so as to be the ground.'62 Freedom is the 
condition of man's ek-sistence. As Inwood explains:  
 
Dasein does not lay the ground or basis: it does not choose its entry into the world or the 
range of possibilities that initially confront it. But it assumes these possibilities as its own 
and makes them a spring-board for its subsequent trajectory. Its ability to do this depends 
on its "ecstatic temporality:" "Even if concern remains restricted to the urgency of every-
day needs, Dasein is never a pure making present; it springs from a retention that awaits, 
and exists in a world on the ground of this retention or as itself this "ground."'63 
 
 With freedom as the abyssal root of both Being and time, freedom is more 
primordial than man, and so man can only be the administrator and not the owner 
of freedom: 'he can only let-be the freedom which is accorded to him.'64 As the 
administrator of freedom, man is the site where beings in the whole become 
revealed, i.e., he is that particular being through which beings as such announce 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59. Ibid. 
60. Ibid. 
61. Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, 284. 
62. Ibid. 
63. Ibid., 356 cf. 436. Michael Inwood, A Heidegger Dictionary (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), 83. 
64. Martin Heidegger, The Essence of Human Freedom, 93. 
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themselves.'65 Hence, man is not just one being amongst other beings but he is the 
being through which the being of beings - thus beings in the whole - are revealed. 
He is that being that interprets Being. 
 
 
An Emancipatory Humanism? 
 
 Heidegger's complaint against existentialist, Marxist and Christian 
humanisms in his Letter on Humanism is that they overlook the fact that this is 
what constitutes man's uniqueness. The common humanist concern is that man 
become free for his humanity and finds his worth in it. While they differ on what 
they conceive 'freedom' and the 'nature' of man to be, along with the path to the 
realization of these conceptions, various humanisms are aligned in the sense that 
according to each, the 'humanitas of homo humanus is determined with regard to 
an already established interpretation of nature, history, world, and the ground of 
the world, that is, of beings as a whole.'66 
 
 Each of these humanisms thus projects an interpretation of beings without 
questioning the truth of Being; they engage in regional ontology without grounding 
that ontology in general ontology, which would lead to a recognition that such 
interpretations of Being are partial and temporal and thus subordinate to the 
ontological difference. It is man's ek-sistence, his world-relation, that constitutes 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65. Ibid., 94. 
66. ‘[I]f one understands humanism in general as a concern that man become free for his humanity 
and find his worth in it, then humanism differs according to one's conception of the "freedom" and 
"nature" of man. So too are there various paths toward the realization of such conceptions. The 
humanism of Marx does not need to return to antiquity any more than the humanism which Sartre 
conceives existentialism to be. In this broad sense Christianity is also a humanism, in that according 
to its teaching everything depends on man's salvation (salus aeterna); the history of man appears in 
the context of the history of redemption. However different these forms of humanism may be in 
purpose and in principle, in the mode and means of their respective realizations, and in the form of 
their teaching, they nonetheless all agree in this, that the humanitas of homo humanus is determined 
with regard to an already established interpretation of nature, history, world, and the ground of the 
world, that is, of beings as a whole. Every humanism is either grounded in metaphysics or is itself 
made to be the ground of one. Every determination of the essence of man already presupposes an 
interpretation of beings without asking about the truth of Being, whether knowingly or not, is 
metaphysical.’ Martin Heidegger, “Letter on Humanism,” in Martin Heidegger: Basic Writings, ed. 
David F. Krell (New York: Harper Collins, 1993), 225-26. 
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man's existential uniqueness for Heidegger: the way that man 'stands out' in the 
various moments of the temporality of care, being 'thrown' out of a past and 
'projecting' himself toward a future by way of the present.67  
 
Thought in terms of ek-sistence, "world" is in a certain sense precisely "the beyond" within 
existence and for it. Man is never first and foremost man on the hither side of the world, as 
a "subject," whether this is taken as "I" or "We." Neither is he ever simply a mere subject 
which always simultaneously is related to objects, so that his essence lies in the subject-
object relation. Rather, before all this, man in his essence is ek-sistent into the openness of 
Being, into the open region that clears the "between" within which a "relation" of subject 
to object can "be."'68  
 
 Therefore, despite our previous recognition that responsibility and 
accountability resonate so profoundly with our modern sensibility, freedom cannot 
principally consist in our subjectivity as it does for Kant, Habermas and Linklater. 
Rather, freedom must first be understood as engaged immersion in the world, on 
the basis of which freedom as ethical subjectivity can then be projected upon 
beings as a whole. 
 
Freedom is not merely what common sense is content to let pass under this name: the 
caprice, turning up occasionally in our choosing, of inclining in this or that direction. 
Freedom is not mere absence of constraint with respect to what we can or cannot do. Nor 
is it on the other hand mere readiness for what is required and necessary (and so somehow 
a being). Prior to all this ("negative" and "positive" freedom), freedom is engagement in 
the disclosedness of beings as such. Disclosedness itself is conserved in ek-sistent 
engagement, through which the openness of the open region, i.e., the "there," "Da," is what 
it is.'69  
 
 As the groundless ground of our existence, the Abgrund upon which the 
ontological difference rests, freedom is not simply the self-direction of 
individuated entities, and neither is it caprice or absence of restraint.70 Before it is 
any of these, freedom is the existential condition of world-disclosure, and then a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67. Ibid., 228. 
68. Ibid., 252. 
69. Martin Heidegger, “On the Essence of Truth,” in Martin Heidegger: Basic Writings, ed. David 
F. Krell. (New York: Harper Collins, 1993), 126. 
70. As Louis Blond explains: 'The "non-essence" that constitutes being and nothingness, as they are 
not "things," is described as an abyss that functions as a "non-grounding ground" which gives the 
freedom of possibilities (or rather existence) to beings. Freedom is not like an unchanging essence; 
freedom provides the space for possibilities. The abyssal ground (Ab-grund) is the boundless 
quality that is the counterpart of ground.' Louis P. Blond, Heidegger and Nietzsche: Overcoming 
Metaphysics (London: Continuum, 2010), 78. For Heidegger's own (lengthier) explanation	  of 
freedom as 'groundless ground' see Martin Heidegger, “The Anaximander Fragment,” Arion 1, no. 4 
(1973): 576-626. 
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state of being – a resolute, solicitous being-with others, where others are engaged 
as others. This involves, in Heidegger's words, 'letting beings be,' allowing others 
to appear as they are rather than on the basis of some preconceived notion of 
subjectivity that is projected onto them. It is in this solicitous engagement that 
Being is mutually co-disclosed with others, a mutual co-disclosure that is 
hampered by the projection of a substantive interpretation of what human beings 
are; such as by representing others as subjects, the strategy relied upon by 
Linklater's defence of universalism. 
 
 As a result, emancipation cannot simply be seen as the progressive self-
actualisation of an ethical subject and the establishment of the political and social 
conditions whereby individuals can exercise this subjectivity. The emancipatory 
project of CIRT cannot, from this perspective, simply involve the extension of 
community by removing barriers to universal discursive reasoning 
(Habermas/Linklater), and neither can it be about the establishment of a universal 
intersubjective recognitive sphere (Honneth/Brincat). Although an emancipatory 
politics can still lead to these conclusions, to be considered emancipatory these 
political projects must arise as a consequence of solicitous being-with others.  
 
 
An Ethical & Emancipatory Politics 
 
 So far we have engaged in a regional ontology of the person, where human 
beings are presented as essentially world-relating creatures rather than subjects, 
and have contributed to a shift in understanding freedom from being a property of 
an individual thought of as subject to the existential condition of world-disclosure. 
The current section will discuss further implications of these arguments for an 
ethical and emancipatory politics.  
 
 Politics, from the Greek politika (Πολιτικά) was considered by Aristotle to 
concern the affairs of the city, the polis (πόλις), and is commonly conceived as the 
art and science of forming, directing, and administrating political units such as the 
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state. Such a practice often involves the invocation of a shared identity as the 
common ground for social cohesion or collective action. To claim that something 
is 'un-American,' for instance, indicates this in the negative. Sometimes such social 
cohesion is established through the identification of threats to the polity, both 
internal or external, but it can also be effected through national celebrations, such 
as Australia Day, the Queen's Diamond Jubilee, or more sombre occasions such as 
Armistice Day.71 
 
 The celebration of such an imagined community, the invocation of a shared 
identity, or the remembrance of collective sacrifice, as well as efforts to influence 
the formation of public opinion, can be read as paradigmatically political activities 
since they involve attempts to establish or re-establish a political project, 
achievement, or shared vulnerability that can be regarded as common to all 
members of the community: these are processes of collective world formation. 
While an individual’s world-relation is interpretive and particular, politics should 
be regarded as the process by which a common world is created from a plurality of 
individual worlds. This involves the projection of meaning onto all members of the 
community, a process that is essentially contestable, and is contested within the 
polis. Politics may then be said to involve the perpetual contestation of meaning 
and its institutionalisation, and such an activity may be motivated by interests of 
power or influence, financial gain, or emancipation. It is the latter that we shall be 
concerned with here.  
 
 
The Political Implications of our World-relation 
 
 While we argued that understanding human beings as essentially world-
relating creatures represented a more universalistic way of thinking the human 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71. On foreign policy and collective identity formation see David Campbell, Writing Security: 
United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
1998).; Michael J. Shapiro, Violent Cartographies: Mapping Cultures of War (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1997).; Iver B. Neumann, “Self and Other in International 
Relations,” European Journal of International Relations 2, no. 2 (1996): 139-74; Iver B. Neumann, 
Uses of the Other: “the East” in European Identity Formation (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 1999). 
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being as subject, we will recall that Heidegger identifies Mitsein (being-with) as a 
fundamental existential structure of human existence, a basic state within which 
human existence is 'co-determined by its relations with others.’72 While Olafson 
develops Heidegger's idea that we are essentially ek-sistents by addressing our 
thrownness and potentiality-for-being, he does not explore the notion of being-
with.73 This is a significant limitation, especially for thinking about an ethical and 
emancipatory approach to world politics, because it means that he cannot examine 
how one ek-sistent stands to another. Olafson recognizes this shortcoming and 
suggests in his conclusion that his understanding of human being in terms of 
presence and ek-sistence 'needs to be amplified by an account of the ways in which 
the essential plurality of human being and the kind of community to which it gives 
rise would be at the centre of the discussion.'74 
 
 Beyond this limitation of being unable to think through the implications of 
his argument for the relations between ek-sistents, Olafson's account of the human 
being does not consider the role of others in the constitution of the self. If we are to 
enlist his account of humans as world-relating creatures then, we need to reinforce 
it by expanding it in the light of the proper recognition of the significance of the 
ethical and political nature of man's existence. There are two tasks here: the ethical 
and the political. The ethical task is to think of the ways in which single particulars 
ought to stand in relation to each other, while the political task, or the task for an 
ethical politics, is to consider what sort of political goals, or forms of organisation, 
we should set ourselves as targets. Since both emphasise Chapter 4 of Being and 
Time, where being is always being-with, the coexistential ontological accounts of 
Louiza Odysseos's analysis of coexistence in International Relations and Jean-Luc 
Nancy's Being Singular Plural will guide the discussion towards this end. Both 
Odysseos and Nancy lead us further away from a reliance on subjectivity and 
towards an understanding of human existence that is necessarily relational/co-
existential.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72. Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, 153. 
73. Not until three years later, at least. See Frederick A. Olafson, Heidegger and the Ground of 
Ethics: A Study of Mitsein (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). 
74. Frederick A. Olafson, What is a Human Being? A Heideggerian View, 255. 
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Coexistence 
 
 We briefly encountered Odysseos's work in Chapter 3 in our discussion of 
the move from inter-subjectivity to relational individuality in CIRT, where we saw 
that self is not best thought as subject – since it is not essentially distinct from the 
experiences that constitute it, but is deeply implicated in its relation to them. We 
saw that Odysseos's key contribution was to challenge the subjectivist ontology of 
IR by demonstrating that subjectivity is coexistential from the start. To put it 
differently, this is a move from an atomistic conception of individuality to a 
relational one. Odysseos's primary engagement, we saw, is with the concept of 
coexistence, and that she is emphatic that coexistence (between individual human 
beings or states for example) should not be understood simply as the co-presence 
of individual units, as it has traditionally been assumed to be by IR, because: 
 
[O]thers are not encountered in the world as a "plurality" of subjects that, thanks to their 
incarnation, arise as "person-things-present-at-hand" among other "things." The logic of 
composition, with its conception of others as subjects and of their coexistence as the 
coming together of self-sufficient subjects, is directly refuted by Heidegger. His 
reformulation of the "with" beyond composition "unworks" the nonrelational character 
assumed of the modern subject. The world of Dasein is a with-world [Mitwelt]. Being-in is 
Being-with Others. Their Being in-themselves within-the-world is Dasein-with 
[Mitdasein]. "With," then, shapes the very Being of Dasein as a worldly entity and cannot 
be understood as signifying copresence.75  
 
 Since the nature of a human being's existence (Da-sein) is irrevocably bound 
to the character of their 'being-with' (Mitsein), Odysseos wants to replace the 'logic 
of composition' with a 'logic of comparition' animated by a coexistential 
sensibility, where comparition is understood as appearing to and with the other. 
Her notion of a logic of comparition therefore disavows a 'politics of self-
sufficiency' and the perception that mechanist concepts, such as interest, are 
required in order to be related to the other.76 Rather, according to her coexistential 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75. Louiza Odysseos, The Subject of Coexistence, 73. 
76. Louiza Odysseos, “Radical Phenomenology, Ontology, and International Political Theory,” 
396. A concept of shared interest can be seen as important to a social contractarian approach to the 
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ontology that draws from both Heidegger and Nancy, the individuality of a state or 
a human being is radically dependent on the broader plurality within which it 
arises. Odysseos’s hope is that the recognition of this existential condition might 
'arrest a return to subject-driven politics,' serve as an 'ethical imperative 
commanding respect for others's, and secure 'the open-endedness (a-teleology) of 
political life.'77  
 
 
Being Singular Plural 
 
 We noted in the last chapter that one of the shortcomings of Heidegger's 
notion of solicitous being-with was that, despite his prior insistence that Da-sein is 
always being-with, Heidegger falls short when it comes to an analysis of the 
interpersonal conditions of selfhood. There is also a danger that our discussion of 
humans as world-relating creatures might be misinterpreted as leading to or lapsing 
into a form of solipsism. Nancy's development of Heidegger's notion of being-with 
guards against these possible misunderstandings.  
 
 In The Inoperative Community and in Being Singular Plural Nancy draws 
upon Heidegger's insight that there is no understanding of Being that is not always 
already being-with, in order to develop a coexistential ontology. While Emmanuel 
Levinas distances himself from the 'mit' of Mitsein by shifting emphasis from 
'being with' to 'being in front of,' which allows him to downgrade Heidegger's 
ontology of Being and being-with and claim that ethics is first philosophy, Nancy's 
aim is to redo first philosophy – i.e., ontology – by giving the 'singular plural' of 
Being as its foundation.78  
 
 While he focuses on the 'mit' of Mitsein, Nancy's position remains 
underwritten by a Heideggerian understanding of the human being as Da-sein, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
state, and the perception that states must share a common interest in order for them to cooperate – 
as in projects of collective security, for instance. 
77. Ibid. 
78. Jean-Luc Nancy, Being Singular Plural (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), xv. 
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where humans are understood as the beings that have access to Being. In 
Heideggerian thought it is through 'the event' that Da-sein is opened to Being: 
Being is revealed to beings through personal experience that is characteristically 
singular and unique. It is due to the facticity of human existence that human 
experience is singular as opposed to general, and it is this singularity of human 
experience that leads to the fact that our experience of Being is necessarily 
multiple and differential.79 The singularity our experience necessarily implies the 
multiplicity of Being because 'if the articulation of Being is always singular, Being 
cannot be One, and it cannot be thought simply as gathering or collecting. And if 
that to which Dasein opens is always already articulated [...] then Being must be 
thought as differential or relational.80  
 
 Despite this insistence that Being cannot be One, there remains what Nancy 
calls the 'political space,' the site of community, which is based upon the 
differential structure of human existence. This political space is the place of human 
sociality and is crucial to the nature of human existence, since it is that fact that we 
experience our political existence as a question that differentiates us from other 
animals. This 'political space' is also the place where we experience freedom; 
freedom is experienced when thought is exposed to the 'fact of Being' the fact 'that 
there are beings (and not nothing, Heidegger adds).'81  
 
 Echoing Heidegger's insistence on the necessity of an overcoming of 
metaphysics by claiming that there is no meaning of the world beyond being-in-
the-world: singularly plural and plurally singular, Nancy's coexistential ontology 
starts with an understanding of the world where 'being-with' refers to what he calls 
'the singular multiplicity of origins,' where 'the plurality of beings is at the 
foundation of Being.'82 By this is meant that, in light of Heidegger's critique of 
metaphysics, we must proceed from the assumption that we only have access to 
ourselves and to the world; that meaning is created rather than discovered, and is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79. Jean-Luc Nancy, The Inoperative Community (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
1991), xiii. 
80. Ibid. 
81. Ibid. 
82. Jean-Luc Nancy, Being Singular Plural, 12. 
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created by each and every one of us in our relations with others. Given its 
emphasis on the importance of human sociality, Nancy's coexistential ontology 
emphasises relationality over subjectivity, prioritising neither the individual nor the 
community – because to focus on either the general or the particular would detract 
from the coexistential nature of our sociality. Consequently, Nancy claims, just as 
community is 'inoperative,' the individual is 'nonviable':  
 
Some see in its invention and in the culture, if not in the cult built around the individual, 
Europe's incontrovertible merit of having shown the world the sole path to emancipation 
from tyranny, and the norm by which to measure all our collective or communitarian 
undertakings. But the individual is merely the residue of the experience of the dissolution 
of community. By its nature - as its name indicates, it is the atom, the indivisible - the 
individual reveals that it is the abstract result of a decomposition. It is another, and 
symmetrical, figure of immanence: the absolutely detached for-itself, taken as origin and 
as certainty.83  
 
 The significance of this for liberalism or Marxism is clear. Where liberalism 
understands freedom as the protection of a sphere of rights that allows individuals 
to act according to their inclinations, Marxism judges social systems according to 
the extent that they alienate man from his natural being, or to the degree to which 
they foster the autonomous action of individuals freed from the dictates of material 
scarcity or insecurity. What is common to both is a view of the subject that is not 
detached from society – indeed in Marxism man's social relations are key to his 
'natural being' – but where the individual subject can nonetheless be seen in some 
way as primordial, as antecedent to its community. 
 
 
The Singular Multiplicity of Origins 
 
 Despite his talk of beings as 'origins' indicating that his position is affiliated 
with a commitment to the aseity of the self, Nancy understands the self in a way 
that does not involve treating it as essentially distinct from the experiences that 
constitute it, but as deeply implicated in its relation to them.84 The self, according 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83. Jean-Luc Nancy, The Inoperative Community, 3. 
84. 'Aseity,' 'from-himself-ness,' deriving from the latin a (from) and se (self) is the property of a 
being that exists in and of itself. It is traditionally used in Christian theology to affirm a qualitative 
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to Nancy, 'takes place as itself and/or as the other,' it's aseity 'anterior to the 
distinction between a consciousness and its world. Before phenomenological 
intentionality and the constitution of the ego, but also before thinglike consistency 
as such,' there is for Nancy 'a co-originarity accorded to the with.'85 Nancy's 
account of being singular plural is therefore not an account of human social 
relations that anticipates the realisation of some primordial essence, but one which 
shifts concern away from both the individual and the community to singularity and 
the plural formation of singular worlds.  
 
 Nancy explains that 'singularity never has the nature or the structure of 
individuality. Singularity never takes place at the level of atoms, those identifiable 
if not identical entities; rather it takes place at the level of the clinamen, which is 
unidentifiable.'86 Any given (individual, singular) world is formed 'in exposure to 
others and thus is a relational world (or constituted in and through the relations that 
are its (co)existential building blocks).'87 Crucially then, worlds are singular and 
plural rather than general and universal as they are distinctively experienced and 
formed by individuals in their social relations; they are, therefore, divisible and 
constitutively exposed to other worlds, with which they intersect and overlap. 
Hence: 
 
The unity of a world is not one: it is made of a diversity, and even disparity and opposition 
[...] The unity of a world is nothing other than its diversity, and this, in turn, is a diversity 
of worlds. A world is a multiplicity of worlds; the world is a multiplicity of worlds, and its 
unity is the mutual sharing and exposition of all its worlds - within this world.88  
 
 For Nancy then, as for Heidegger and for Odysseos, the proximal fact of 
human existence is coexistence: the coexistence of singularities, individuated 
selves that are co-originary or relational from the start and which are constituted 
through their relations towards singular and multiple worlds. Significantly though, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
difference between God and the creatures that he made. Nancy's use of the concept is meant to 
indicate that we can rely on no transcendent source of meaning, and that we must now consider 
aseity to inhere in individual human beings themselves. 
85. Jean-Luc Nancy, Being Singular Plural, 40-41. 
86. Jean-Luc Nancy, The Inoperative Community, 6-7. 
87. Martin Coward, “Jean-Luc Nancy,” in Critical Theorists and International Relations, ed. Jenny 
Edkins and Nick Vaughan-Williams (London: Routledge, 2009), 259. 
88. Jean-Luc Nancy, Being Singular Plural, 185. 
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as with Odysseos, coexistence does not refer to the relations between preformed 
subjects – it 'holds itself just as far from juxtaposition as it does from integration.'89 
Coexistence does not supplement existence, and it cannot be subtracted out of 
existence: existence is coexistence.90 By stressing that coexistence is neither 
integration nor juxtaposition Nancy distances himself from Hobbesian realism that 
perceives the other as threatening and seeks to secure the self, just as he does from 
the Kantian and Marxian goal of uniting a community of humankind.  
 
 
Co-existentiality & the Impossibility of a Community of Subjects 
 
 In contrast to this commitment to a foundational singularity, and in a vein 
reminiscent of Heidegger's Letter on Humanism, Nancy writes that 'it is precisely 
the immanence of man to man, or it is man, taken absolutely, considered as the 
immanent being par excellence, that constitutes the stumbling block to a thinking 
of community.'91 In other words, so long as we conceive community in terms of a 
community of subjects, we will never experience authentic community, since such 
a community would founder on the identification of what constitutes the essence of 
man. 
 
 Ironically then, since he is attempting to establish a universal moral 
community, according to Nancy's way of thinking, it is precisely Linklater's 
strategy of projecting an ethical subject in his defence of universality that 
establishes the impossibility of an authentic community with the other. By 
defending a dialogic approach to ethical universality and hence universal moral 
inclusion where individuals (thought as subjects) encounter, or at least expect to 
encounter, other individuals qua ethical subjects, Linklater precludes the 
possibility of a genuine encounter with other persons. Since, as Nancy writes: 
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91. Jean-Luc Nancy, The Inoperative Community, 3. 
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What cannot appear is both the other and communication. For the other of a 
communication becomes the object of a subject - even and perhaps especially as 
"suppressed object or concept" as in the Hegelian relation between consciousnesses [...] 
This other is no longer an other, but an object of a subject's representation (or, in a more 
complicated way, the representative object of another subject for the subject's 
representation). Communication and the alterity that is its condition can, in principle, have 
only an instrumental and not an ontological role and status in a thinking that views the 
subject as the negative but specular identity of an object, that is, as an exteriority without 
alterity. The subject cannot be outside itself: this is even what ultimately defines it - that its 
outside and all its "alienations" or "extraneousness" should in the end be suppressed and 
sublated in it. It is altogether different with the being of communication. The being-
communicating (and not the subject-representing), or if one wants to risk saying it, 
communication as the predicament of being, as "transcendental," is above all being-
outside-itself.92  
 
 Discourse ethics, therefore, inescapably reduces the other to a mere 
representation, meaning that communicative consensus can lead to neither an 
authentic community, nor to mutual understanding. This problem is not confined to 
discourse ethics, but is common to a politics of subjectivity more generally, since 
persons are reduced to subjects or objects. A politics of universal principles or 
norms, for instance, means that a politics of generality is structurally unable to pay 
heed to the singularity of being, effacing it and undermining human freedom. An 
exercise in universalist ethical reasoning is therefore an exercise in world making; 
it requires an underlying commitment to a shared subjectivity, and is therefore an 
essentially political exercise. 
 
 
Relations to Singularity 
 
 What is being heralded here is a fundamental discontinuity between politics 
and ethics. The origins of which, as we shall see in Chapter 8, go back at least to 
Hegel's positing of an inequality between the logics of love and law in his Spirit of 
Christianity essay, an inequality that finds mature expression in the 
Phenomenology of Spirit and the Philosophy of Right as the division between 
Moralität and Sittlichkeit, between a rule governed morality and the immanent 
experience of ethical life. More on this later. The root cause of this divergence, 
however, lies in the rejection of the dualist commitment to a foundational subject.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92. Ibid., 24. 
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 If we remain committed to a foundational subject, ethics is simply the body 
of rules that follow from taking such a subject as a ground. If the subject is not 
regarded as foundational, the rules and principles that necessarily rely upon a given 
subject as a ground cannot be seen as anything more than contingently binding; 
contingent upon the adoption of such a common subjectivity. Our rejection of a 
foundational subject is not a rejection of rules or principles, however, but it does 
involve the view that an ethical relation is not exhausted by relations between 
subjects.  
 
 This is where Nancy's concept of singularity comes into its own, since it 
captures the ontological fullness of a person in a way that a commitment to 
subjectivity cannot. We saw above that Nancy first talks about the singularity of 
Being in The Inoperative Community, but his use of the term in relation to the 
individual is stated more clearly in Being Singular Plural. Simultaneously rejecting 
a Rorty-esque pragmatism and defending against the familiar criticism levelled 
against continental philosophy as leading to relativism or nihilism, Nancy asserts: 
 
There is a common measure, which is not some one unique standard applied to everyone 
and everything. It is the commensurability of incommensurable singularities, the equality 
of all the origins-of-the-world, which, as origins, are strictly unexchangable.93  
 
 As we saw in Chapter 3, the concept is also explored by Derrida, in Spectres 
of Marx, Nietzsche and the Machine and later in his Politics of Friendship, where 
singularity signifies the transcendent alterity of the other, 'heterogenous and 
singular, hence resistant to the very generality of the law.'94 Echoing Hegel's 
discussion of the divergent orders of love and law, Derrida sheds light on the 
relationship between subjectivity and singularity in his discussion of the 'aporetic' 
structure of democracy:  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93. Jean-Luc Nancy, Being Singular Plural, 75. emphasis added. We will recall from Chapter 3 that 
Nick Vaughan-Williams has deployed Nancy's argument in relation to various cosmopolitan 
discourses in IR. See Nick Vaughan-Williams, “Beyond a Cosmopolitan Ideal: The Politics of 
Singularity.” International Politics 44 (2007): 107-24. 
94. Jacques Derrida, “Nietzsche and the Machine: An Interview With Jacques Derrida By Richard 
Beardsworth,” Journal of Nietzsche Studies 7 (1994): 7-66; Jacques Derrida, Specters of Marx: The 
State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning, and the New International (London: Routledge, 1994); 
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With this becoming-political, and with all the schemata that we will recognize therein [...] 
the question of democracy thus opens, the question of the citizen or the subject as a 
countable singularity. And that of a "universal fraternity." There is no democracy without 
respect for irreducible singularity or alterity, but there is no democracy without the 
"community of friends" (koína ta philōn), without the calculation of majorities, without 
identifiable, stabilizable, representable subjects, all equal. These two laws are irreducible 
to one another. Tragically irreconcilable and forever wounding [...] political desire is 
forever borne by the disjunction of these two laws. It also bears the chance and the future 
of a democracy whose ruin it constantly threatens but whose life, however, it sustains.95  
 
What is common to Hegel, Nancy, Derrida, and Heidegger, is a rejection of 
foundational subjectivity that goes hand in hand with their scepticism towards the 
essentially ambivalent achievements of reflective rationality.96  
 
 
Singularity 
 
 Although Heidegger does not spend much time discussing the ethical 
implications of his existential analytic of Da-sein, representing other Da-seins as 
singularities is entirely congruent with his philosophical ontology. The term 
'singularity' originates in physics, designating the point of discontinuity in 
phenomena such as black holes: that which is, and must remain, beyond the field 
of vision. As we saw, an authentic relation between self and world involves letting 
entities appear as they are, resisting our tendency to project our regional 
interpretations of Being onto beings as a whole. The implication is that a genuinely 
ethical relation to the other would resist our tendency to project an interpretation of 
what the human subject is or should be, but would be a relation to that which must 
essentially exceed our own representations of them – a relationship that does not 
reduce the other simply to a particular case of the human species, but treats them as 
a singular, irreplaceable being: as a unique ek-sistent Da-sein.  
 
 It is for this reason that, in a move echoing Hegel's emphasis of the 
importance of ethical life over morality, Heidegger distinguishes between ethics 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95. Ibid., 22. 
96. We could also add Adorno and Horkheimer to this list. 
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and its Greek root ēthos. Whereas ethical norms and principles presuppose an 
underlying ethical subject, as demonstrated by Cochran's analysis of the 
foundational commitments implied in Frost and Linklater's approach to normative 
theory, ‘ethos’ refers to an abode or dwelling place, the 'open region in which man 
dwells.'97 Since Heidegger regards human dwelling to be authentic when it is 
responsive to the ontological difference, the ethical cannot simply be about 
theoretically constructed norms, principles, or practices, but must relate to our 
concrete way of being in the world. It is in this way that Heidegger can be said to 
be 'against ethics.'98 In the writings of those influenced by Heidegger, ethos is 
preferred to ethics since the rules and principles of the latter are generally 
incompatible with Da-sein. 99  Connolly, for instance, uses it to 'emphasize 
continually that the orientation he seeks is vivified more by a spirit or sensibility 
than by any set rules of conduct,' while Odysseos distinguishes ethos from the 
nomos of moral principles and universal ethics to understand it as 'an attitude and 
mode of relating to others.'100  
 
 
Conclusions: Towards a Politics of Singularity 
 
 Proceeding from a discussion of Heidegger's general ontology of Being in the 
preceding chapter, where we suggested that subjectivity is an ontologically 	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100. Stephen K. White, Sustaining Affirmation: The Strengths of Weak Ontology in Political 
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deficient way of thinking the human being, this chapter has explored the 
implications of this general ontology for a regional ontology of the person, and 
suggested that we understand human beings as essentially world-relating creatures 
instead of ethical subjects.  
 
 
Universality and Particularity 
 
 As a non-subjectivist way of conceiving the individual, thinking about 
humans in terms of their having 'a world' that is distinct from 'the world' offers a 
novel concatenation of the relationship between universality, particularity and 
individuality. As such, it offers an alternative understanding of the being of the 
human being to that relied upon by Linklater, for whom man's particular existence 
as a citizen of a political community is interrupted by more primordial moral 
claims upon him as an individual (thought as ethical subject): as a subject to the 
universal obligations of morality. Further, not only does this non-subjectivist 
account of the individual provide an alternative to Linklater’s foundational reliance 
on man’s ‘bifurcated subjectivity’, it also offers a way beyond the competing 
subjectivist assertions about universal and particular identities often made in the 
cosmopolitan / communitarian debate.  
 
 While communitarian thinking tends towards exclusivity and the problematic 
assumption of the shared presence of a particular community (such as the state) to 
all those subject to it, cosmopolitan thought often relies on more inclusive 
reasoning that is often divorced from people's social experiences, gives a poor 
account of motivation, and is regularly charged with being insufficiently attentive 
to difference and particularity. In contrast, the idea of humans as essentially world-
relating creatures leads to the view that it is our world-relation that is universal, 
while as entities/beings to which worlds are present, the nature of our world 
relation is necessarily plural and individuated. Conceiving human beings as 
essentially world-relating creatures also provides a more nuanced way of 
accounting for the differential salience of a variety of associations or identities, 
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along with their relative importance in the constitution of any given individual's 
personality. It thus represents a more nuanced way of understanding the 
multifaceted, often conflicting influence of human cultures, identities and human 
agency in world politics, and offers a particularist response to the cosmopolitan 
trope that increasing interconnectedness between people as a result of processes of 
globalisation undermines the exclusive nature of particularist positions, and thus 
necessitates a cosmopolitan response that often involves the problematic 
invocation of a universal human community. 
 
 
Freedom 
 
 The second part of the chapter followed Heidegger's ontological reading of 
Kant. Here we saw that the association of freedom with subjectivity that resonates 
profoundly with a modern, liberal sensibility – and which characterises Linklater's 
emancipatory cosmopolitanism and his approach to CIRT – must be considered to 
be one of many possible determinations of the being of human beings. This also 
required that we understand freedom not as a property of man, but primarily as the 
condition of any interpretation of the being of beings – the presupposition of any 
and all of our understandings of beings. In short, that we could not associate 
freedom with a foundational subject. Consequently we suggested that 
emancipation cannot first consist in the self-realisation of the ethical subject, or in 
the establishment of the conditions of subjectivity, and that the extension of 
community cannot simply be thought as the removal of barriers to discursive 
reasoning, and neither can it simply be about the establishment of the 
intersubjective recognitive sphere. Rather, we concluded that, if international 
political action is to be considered emancipatory, it must be predicated on resolute 
solicitous being-with others.  
 
 We then explored Odysseos and Nancy's contributions to the idea of 
coexistence, where, drawing on Heidegger's identification of Mitsein as a 
fundamental existential structure of human existence, subjectivity and singularity 
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are presented as being deeply constituted by a relationality that is antecedent to any 
subjectivity. The result is that a politics of generality, such as a politics based on 
ethical principles, or universal rules of conduct, must exist in an essential tension 
with the nature of man as an ek-sisting, world-relating creature. Moreover, Nancy 
demonstrated that any attempt to establish community on the realisation of some 
inherent essence or subjectivity, such as common political identity or ethical 
subjectivity, was essentially bound to fail. This, we saw, heralded a fundamental 
discontinuity between ethics and politics; the cause of which can be identified as 
the rejection of the foundational commitment to the ethical subject.  
 
 
Towards a Politics of Singularity  
 
 As a result, ethics becomes disassociated with universal principles that 
attempt to reconcile or manage human differences, and becomes primarily a 
relation to singularity. In light of cosmopolitan claims about universal principles or 
norms, what is interesting about this account is that ethics is understood as a mode 
of dwelling marked by a particular kind of relation to our own existence and to the 
existence of others rather than one wedded to a consensual approach to rules of 
conduct. Consequently, from this perspective, an ethical politics must be one that is 
predicated on openness to the other, rather than a politics based upon ethical 
principles. In contrast to subjectivist approaches to freedom (Marxist, late-
Frankfurt School, liberal) where emancipation amounts to increasing the 
possibility of the subjective freedom of individual human beings, by taking 
departures from Heidegger's thought, freedom has to be understood in terms of an 
openness and practical engagement with others as others: an openness to be 
characterised by a decentred receptivity and an 'intensification of one's cognitive 
and affective capabilities.'101 Emancipation, therefore, cannot simply consist in the 
establishment of the political conditions conducive to the exercise of subjectivity, 
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but must first involve freeing up the possibility of human existence as being-with 
others.  
 
 In short, if we eschew a foundational commitment to the ethical subject, an 
ethical or emancipatory politics can only be understood as such so long as it is 
predicated upon an understanding of politics as an interaction of singular and 
overlapping worlds, and on a recognition and defence of the singularities upon 
which it is based; a politics of subjectivity is structurally unable to do this. The 
notion of a politics of singularity, therefore, must be seen as central to the 
development of an emancipatory cosmopolitanism. Given the singularity of our 
own world, and the imperative to recognise and defend other worlds, two questions 
follow. The ethical question of how single particulars should stand in relation to 
each other, and the political question (or more accurately the task of an ethical 
politics) of how we should structure our social relations on the basis of the 
singular/plural character of Being. We will address these questions next, in Part 3. 
 
 
Conclusions to Part 2 
 
 We concluded Part 1 by claiming that the weakness of Linklater's 
emancipatory cosmopolitanism, and hence his approach to CIRT, was that it was 
predicated on a philosophically shallow understanding of human existence and a 
limited understanding of human freedom; it was these shortcomings that permit his 
(essentially problematic) foundational commitment to the subject. The aim of Part 
2 has been to contribute to the development of a more universalistic ontological 
foundation for contemporary politics and ethics with a view to developing a more 
philosophically and praxeologically adequate emancipatory cosmopolitanism; one 
that might supplant Linklater's reliance on Habermas's normative ideal of a 
universal discourse community as the philosophical and normative aspect of the 
tripartite structure of critical theory.  
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 In Chapter 1 we explored some of the problems associated with approaches 
to international theory that relied on dualistic premises, such as a commitment to 
foundational subjectivity or an intransitive object. Echoing the strategy employed 
by Hegel's phenomenological constructivism – where the split between subject and 
object does not occur between mind and world, but occurs within consciousness, 
where the cognitive object is constructed from conscious phenomena in an ongoing 
historical process – we suggested (against Cochran's pragmatist anti-
foundationalism) that, conceived as a cognitive object, through a philosophical 
ontology of the being of human beings we could construct a more universalistic 
ontological foundation for a critical approach to international theory. 
 
 By demonstrating that subjectivity is a property that we project onto human 
beings and that human beings are better thought as singularities, Part 2 has laid the 
foundations for this	  more universalistic philosophical ontology of the human being 
for a critical approach to international theory. Heidegger's ontological difference 
has helped us to see that the being of entities is not intrinsic to that object, but is 
dependent upon context specific meanings that are projected onto it by human 
beings that encounter such entities as objects. Just as Heidegger criticises 
Descartes for projecting an interpretation of Being as 'substantiality' onto entities, 
Linklater's defence of universalism projects an idea of the existence of human 
beings as ethical subjects onto those entities outside the political community. We 
also learnt that Heidegger considers the objectification of reality to result from the 
theoretical attitude itself; that theory served to 'un-live' human experience and 
objectify existence.102  This is the core of the Heideggerian objection to the 
commitment to intersubjectivity in the critical theory of Habermas or Honneth, 
because intersubjectivity involves abstracting from and then objectifying human 
sociality as relations between subjects rather than relations between always-
already-related-(co)existences.  
 
 If the being of entities, such as human beings, is not intrinsic to an entity but 
dependent upon meaning projected upon it by human beings themselves, then it 	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stands to reason that a core concern of any emancipatory cosmopolitanism must be 
to effect changes in the way that we encounter other human beings. Heidegger's 
notion of resolute solicitude provides such an orientation; the notion of resolute, 
solicitous being-with others holds great potential for the future of critical theory, as 
Kompridis has already argued. It offers us a more convincing account of the 
relation between freedom and dependence than one predicated on the subject, one 
that serves as a nascent but fruitful alternative to relations of inter-subjectivity. 
That said, we saw that Heidegger insists that resoluteness must precede solicitous 
being with others, and he thereby fails to demonstrate that both freedom and self-
hood are ineluctably acquired in relation to others under conditions of cooperative 
interaction. We also noted that had Heidegger been a better student of Hegel's, he 
might have avoided this mistake; in this regard, Hegel's 'intersubjective' account of 
freedom and subjectivity is both much more convincing, and both more consistent 
with and more favourable to, Heidegger's account of positive solicitude. For this 
reason, it is to Hegel's compelling contributions to an emancipatory 
cosmopolitanism that we now turn. 
	  243 
Part 3.  
Life, Love, and Emancipation
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Introduction to Part 3 
 
 In light of the arguments developed in Parts 1 and 2, Part 3 draws on Hegel 
with the aim of contributing to the development of a more adequate philosophical 
defence of a critical approach to world politics. With this aim in mind, Chapter 6 
engages in a discussion of the development of the subject-object relation from 
Kant to Hegel. Here we foreground the implications of what might initially be 
understood as purely epistemological arguments for our mode of being in the 
world, and since these implications concern modes of being, we often refer to them 
as 'ontological implications'. Through this discussion we substantiate the claim 
made in Chapter 2 that dualist approaches to international political action 
perpetuate a 'politics of subjectivity,' and we outline some of the implications of 
this: these implications lend further credence to the claim made tentatively in 
Chapter 2 that we might be constitutively unable to build an ethical and 
emancipatory politics from dualist premises.  
 
 Following a more detailed discussion of Hegel's constructivist approach to 
knowledge in Chapter 6, we also develop our earlier claim that we might be able to 
overcome the anti-foundational/foundational divide in normative theory by 
recognising that our claims about the human being are claims about the human 
being qua constructed cognitive object rather than about the human being qua 
mind-independent entity. Chapter 7 then initiates a shift in focus to the ethical and 
emancipatory implications of our argument, picking up on our earlier discussion of 
Heidegger's conception of authentic human freedom as leading us into resolute, 
solicitous being-with, augmenting the necessarily inter-personal aspect of this 
argument that remains under-theorised by Heidegger.  
 
 We do this through a discussion of the role of love in Hegel's thought. Pre-
empting the possibility of misunderstanding Hegel's conception of love as overly 
sentimental, romantic, or idealistic, we demonstrate in Chapter 6 that it should 
instead be conceived as a proto-phenomenological relation between self and world, 
where the limitations of theoretical activity are overcome through an attunement to 
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a practical relation to reality by a mature personality. Chapter 7 develops this 
claim, arguing that the experience of love can lead to a form of self-consciousness 
whereby we recognise that we are not actually subjects, but that our individuality – 
our sense of self and our individual autonomy – are ineluctably acquired through 
participation in society, which leaves us fundamentally dependent on others for our 
own 'subjectivity.' We then claim that properly ethical and emancipatory relations 
with others require an attunement to the social conditions of our own self-hood, 
and that we act accordingly. 
 
 Chapter 8 then sharpens our focus on the ethical and emancipatory aspects of 
our argument. We discover that Kant casts a long shadow over contemporary 
conceptions of the relationship between love and morality, since his insistence that 
love must be subordinate to a rational morality if it is not to be considered 
'pathological,' has several influential contemporaries. We explicitly reject this 
view, siding instead with Hegel's view that the converse is true: that rational 
morality not subordinate to loving relations must be considered pathological. We 
discuss Hegel's essay The Spirit of Christianity and Its Fate, which is formative in 
the development of his notion of Sittlichkeit (ethical life), wherein he heralds a 
fundamental discontinuity between the logics of love and law. These two separate 
logics inform Hegel's conceptions of ethical life (Sittlichkeit) and morality 
(Moralität) respectively, and they underlie a fundamental inequality between 
ethical life and moral laws – a discontinuity that is reflected in more recent 
'poststructuralist' approaches to the 'ethical relation,' of which Nancy's critique of 
discourse ethics (discussed in Chapter 5) is an example. 
 
 We learn that for Hegel these two logics are mutually implicated; yet, as a 
result of their dualist commitments to a foundational ethical subject, both 
Habermas and Linklater dubiously affirm the sovereignty of ethical law 
(Moralität) over ethical life (Sittlichkeit). This, we see, reflects a misunderstanding 
of the nature of ethical life and its superordinate relation to ethical law. In contrast, 
a central argument developed over the course of Part 3 is that it is our participation 
in ethical life – engaging in conscientious activity proceeding from the knowledge 
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of love – that represents the fullest appropriation of our own freedom, and can lead 
to properly ethical relations between self and other. We conclude by suggesting 
that an ethical and emancipatory cosmopolitanism must then be proximally 
concerned with the cultivation of a more cosmopolitan international ethical life, an 
argument that we outline and defend in the conclusion. 
 
 Chapter 6. 
Understanding Through Love, Not Vivisection: 
Reification, De-Reification, and Deification 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 Through a discussion of development of the subject-object relation from 
Kant to Hegel, this chapter explores the nature of Hegel's completion of the critical 
project that is initiated by Kant. We are particularly interested in Hegel's reworking 
of Kant's conception of 'subjectivity' into 'self-conscious subjectivity,' his departure 
from a foundational commitment to subjectivity, and his disassociation of 
subjectivity from individuality. In light of these moves, we argue that Hegel poses 
a robust challenge to the dualist commitment to a foundational split between 
subject and object occurring between mind and world.  
 
 The achievement of 'self-conscious subjectivity,' we learn, involves coming 
to see that the subject-object split is not foundational, but derivative, occurring 
within consciousness rather than between mind and world, and is overcome 
through a post-theoretical, phenomenological relation to reality, which Hegel 
discusses with reference to the experience of 'love.' The 'love' relationship, we 
argue, is not overly sentimental, but amounts to an openness of self to other: a 
receptive attunement to practical experience by a mature personality cognisant of 
the limitations of reflective rationality. The latter serving to un-live human 
experience and objectify the entities of experience, entities that include other 
human beings.  
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 We argue that mis-recognising the nature of 'self-conscious subjectivity' as a 
Kantian form of subjectivity leads to deleterious implications for our mode of 
being in the world – including diremption, reification, and de-reification. These are 
all consequent of a commitment to a foundational subjectivity, where the self 
(conceived as subject) stands in a transcendent and assimilatory relation to the 
objects of its experience. Our discussion here is concerned primarily with the 
philosophical (ontological and epistemological) aspect of this argument, and we 
explore the ethical and emancipatory implications of these arguments in the two 
subsequent chapters.  
  
 
On Hegel and Dualism 
 
 Before proceeding it is worth clarifying the use of our terms 'dualism' and 
'monism' in relation to Hegel. For Hegel, as for Schelling and Spinoza, there is one 
substance, the 'absolute.'1 The absolute is that which is presupposed as the 'ground' 
that underlies all the differentiated spheres of life. This is Hegel's metaphysical 
(ontological) monism. Human consciousness develops out of these underlying 
relations of life, and the mind-independent real 'appears' to consciousness: 
appearances (phenomena) that consciousness splits into subject and object. This 
split between subject and object is the condition of knowledge of the mind-
independent real, but for Hegel it occurs within consciousness rather than between 
mind and world. Consequently, since mind and world are not independent, Hegel's 
approach to epistemology is also monistic. 
 
 Nonetheless, since there remains a duality between mind/world and mind-
independent real, and between the subject and object that is split within 
consciousness, there remains a place for dualism in Hegel's thought. Indeed, for 
Hegel, dualism is the condition both of our knowledge of the world and of 
'subjective' freedom. That said, since this dualism is derivative, not foundational, 
the subject does not persist and the object is not intransitive; both depend on our 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1. It is only Schelling and Hegel that refer to this substance as the absolute, however. 
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cognitive frameworks (on the activity of mind, Geist) and develop historically 
through the interaction of human beings. For this reason dualism is seen as an 
essentially limited and one-sided way of conceiving the relationship between self 
and world. Consequently, despite their achievements, for Hegel object-oriented 
forms of consciousness, and related conceptions of the self as subject, must 
ultimately be overcome.  
 
 Hegel attempts to effect such an overcoming through the achievement of 
'self-conscious subjectivity,' which entails recognising the essential limitations of 
reflective rationality and the epistemic attitude, and orienting ourselves 
accordingly: by cultivating a post-theoretical, receptive relation to reality, for 
instance. Such a relation is essentially a relation of finite to infinite;	  it is a relation 
between that which is conditioned by our knowledge of it to that which lies beyond 
consciousness and which cannot, ultimately, be known: relations to ourselves, to 
life, to 'God,' and to other beings in their full singularity. This attempt to overcome 
dualism is crucial to understanding Hegel, yet is often suppressed by rationalist or 
'demythologised' interpretations of his thought.  
 
 
Kant & Hegel 
 
 In Part 1 we saw how both Linklater's conception of emancipation and his 
defence of universalism indicated a foundational commitment to the ethical 
subject. Linklater's dialectical reading of rationalism and historicism in Men and 
Citizens led to an historically developing ethical subject providing the grounds for 
the critique of actually existing arrangements in international society, while his 
cosmopolitanism was reconceived along discursive lines in Transformation, where 
the emancipatory project came to be seen as the removal of the constraints on 
universal dialogue about principles of coexistence in international society. 
Common to both was the underlying commitment to a Kantian ethical subject and 
the concurrent commitment to the critique of social and political conditions that 
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stand as obstacles to the realisation of a Kantian ideal of a universal moral 
community.  
 
 In Chapter 5 we then saw that Kant's conception of freedom was an effective 
illustration of Heidegger's claim that any encounter with entities occurs 'in the light 
of Being,' since Kant, a committed Newtonian, sought to provide a place for 
human freedom within a mechanistic paradigm of nature; that his positing of 
freedom as a transcendental idea is at root an attempt to make sense of the unity of 
nature given a commitment to a mechanistic understanding of the world, where the 
mechanical necessity of nature was reconciled with the view of human beings as 
beings that are endowed with a distinctive kind of causality.2 Heidegger's move to 
posit freedom as the Abgrund of the ontological difference as opposed to a 
property of the individual conceived as subject is, in short, a move that gives 
existential depth to Kant's conception of freedom; one motivated by a fuller 
consideration of the nature of human existence. A similar, but ultimately more 
persuasive move is made by Hegel, yet his thought is often misunderstood, and he 
is commonly dismissed as a metaphysician of the Absolute; not least by 
Heidegger.3 
 
 
Hegel's Completion of the Critical Project 
  
 That Hegel was Kant's most powerful critic is commonly known, and his 
reaction to Kant is roughly significant as Aristotle's critique of Plato.4 However, 
there is an unfortunate tendency to overemphasise the difference between Kant and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2. Martin Heidegger, The Essence of Human Freedom: An Introduction to Philosophy (London: 
Continuum, 2002), 177. 
3. See Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (Oxford: 
Wiley-Blackwell, 1962), 77,239,438. Martin Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. 
Gregory Fried and Richard Polt (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), 187-88. For two 
illuminating discussions on this topic see R.S. Sinnerbrink, “Sein Und Geist: Heidegger’s 
Confrontation With Hegel’s Phenomenology,” Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural and 
Social Philosophy 3, no. 2-3 (2007): 132-52. Slavoj Žižek, “Hegel Versus Heidegger,” E-Flux 32, 
no. 02 (2012). The similarity between Heidegger and Hegel's approaches to freedom – freedom as 
Abgrund and freedom of the Absolute – is largely due to the influence of Schelling on both in this 
regard. 
4. Tom Rockmore, Kant and Idealism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), 156. 
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Hegel and, despite the title of his Phenomenology of Spirit, to ignore the fact that 
Hegel is a phenomenologist.5 Hegel's critique of Kant, along with those of the 
entire post-Kantian German idealist movement, is an essentially constructive 
critique with the aim of working out and completing Kant's critical project. Despite 
criticising Kant on nearly every page of his writings, Hegel's engagement with 
Kant is not a rejection of Kantianism, but part of the development of his own 
Kantianism.6 Perhaps Hegel's central point of contention with Kant lies in the 
ontological status accorded to the individual human being and the nature of its 
relation to the entities that it encounters. Specifically, what is contested is Kant's 
view that the individual can be regarded as an ethical (moral) or epistemic 
(knowing) subject: the view that the individual can be completely autonomous, or 
stand in a transcendent and knowing relation to the entities that it encounters. The 
first view informs Linklater's emancipatory cosmopolitanism, while the second is 
reflected in the representationalist approach to knowledge that underwrites critical 
realist approaches to the study of world politics. 
 
 The sine qua non of this divergence is Hegel's rejection of the mechanistic 
paradigm of nature, which serves as the ontological background to Kant's 
philosophy, in favour of an organicist one: this amounts to a rejection of Kant's 
dualism in favour of a monistic, holistic, organicist philosophical ontology. As we 
saw in Chapter 3, although Habermas, Honneth and Linklater all develop from 
Kant in important ways, drawing on Hegel in significant respects in the process, 
their commitment to intersubjectivity shares with Kant the equation of individuality 
and subjectivity, two categories that for Hegel are very distinct. Consequently, 
while affirming Hegel's historicist view that 'reason has a history' and that the 
individual is deeply implicated in his historical circumstances, they read Hegel 
through a kaleidoscope of the Kantian subject: reading into Hegel an individualism 
that not only finds no support in his work, but which his whole project is an 
attempt to overcome.7  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5. Tom Rockmore, Kant and Phenomenology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011), 212. 
6. For a discussion see Tom Rockmore, Kant and Idealism, 156. and Tom Rockmore, Kant and 
Phenomenology, 212-13. 
7. Andy Blunden, “The Missing Mediation in Pragmatic Interpretations of Hegel,” 
http://home.mira.net/~andy/works/missing-mediation.htm (accessed 29th June 2012, 2012). We 
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 These kaleidoscopic readings of Hegel neutralise some of Hegel's most 
powerful and interesting insights, insights that can contribute to our development 
of a non-dualist, anti-foundational understanding of the human being, and a richer, 
more praxis oriented understanding of freedom than that which associates freedom 
with subjectivity or intersubjectivity; both of which will be engaged in the next two 
chapters with the aim of contributing to a more philosophically and praxeologically 
adequate emancipatory cosmopolitanism. With this aim in mind, the following 
section explores the development of the subject-object relation from Kant to Hegel 
before drawing out some of the implications for our approach to the problem of 
knowledge and for our mode of being in the world.  
 
 In Chapter 5 we saw that Heidegger engages in an ontological reading of 
Kant's epistemology in The Essence of Human Freedom.8 A similar task is engaged 
here, since we provide a reading of the development of German idealism – 
specifically the move from Kant's representationalist epistemology to Hegel's 
completion of Kant's project in his constructivist approach to knowledge – and 
draw out the 'ontological' implications of what are often simply read as 
epistemological debates. By the end we will see that Hegel's completion of Kant's 
epistemology demonstrates both the ontological error and epistemological 
insufficiency of associating freedom and subjectivity with individual human 
beings: an insufficiency that marks dualist approaches to emancipatory 
cosmopolitanism. 
 
 
The Subject-Object Relation from Kant to Hegel 
 
 Philosophy has long been concerned with the general problem of knowledge; 
all approaches to which 'share an interest in grasping, knowing, or cognising the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
will recall from Chapter 3 that Blunden accuses Honneth of reading a methodological individualism 
into Hegel, and that since methodological individualism in the social sciences denies the fact that 
there are social forces etc. that this is a misleading term to apply to post-Marxist thinkers. 
8. Martin Heidegger, The Essence of Human Freedom. 
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cognitive object or objects, sometimes also called nature, or the world, or the real.'9 
This problem was initially understood in ancient philosophy through terms such as 
reality, phenomena, and appearance, while modern philosophy is distinguished by 
its insight that cognitive claims depend on the subject.10 Applied to epistemology, 
this insight requires of knowledge 'an identity in difference between the 
epistemological subject and the epistemological object, or between epistemology 
and ontology.'11 
 
 
The 'Birth' of the Epistemological Subject 
 
 Truth and knowledge rest upon a correspondence between the 
epistemological (knowing) subject and the cognitive (known) object; starting with 
Kant there are two main approaches to the nature of the relation between knowing 
subject and known object: representationalist and constructivist. The 
representationalist approach maximally presupposes an 'identity' between a 
representation and what is represented: for instance, between an idea in the mind 
and the cognitive object that is conceived as a mind-independent thing.12 While 
constructivists affirm the same standard of truth and knowledge, they hold that the 
subject must in some sense 'construct' what it knows. These two approaches to 
knowledge lead to different claims about the cognitive object. Representationalists 
claim to uncover, discover, or reveal what is as it is, while constructivists on the 
other hand make the incompatible claim that we construct, produce, or make what 
we know.13 This constructivist claim to knowledge rests upon the activity of the 
subject in bringing about an identity between subject and object, which 
presupposes working towards an ever-closer identity between the cognitive object 
and the mind-independent entity that it seeks to know. Both representationalist and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9. Tom Rockmore, Kant and Phenomenology, 3. 
10. This shift to an idea of the epistemological subject is influenced by the Augustinian view of the 
human subject as ethically responsible, but the transition from a religious question of individual 
human responsibility that presupposes a subject to an epistemological conception of the subject 
occurs much later in Montaigne and Descartes. Ibid., 10. 
11. Ibid., 12. 
12. Ibid., 11. 
13. Ibid., 12. 
PART 3/Ch6. Understanding Through Love, Not Vivisection 	  
254 
constructivist approaches appear in Kant's critical philosophy, and Hegel 
completes the constructivist approach to knowledge that Kant initiates.  
 
 Prior to Kant, the subject was regarded as essentially passive in regards to the 
objects that it experiences, merely registering what impacts upon it. Starting with 
Kant, and common to all post-Kantian German idealists, is the converse claim that 
the subject is active in its experience of objects: that in some sense it shapes what it 
knows. Insisting on the central importance of the subject in his Critique of Pure 
Reason, Kant maintains that there can be no knowledge of objects without a 
subject, without an 'I think' to which the object appears.14 For Kant therefore, the 
subject is active in respect to the objects of experience, meaning that we never 
perceive 'things in themselves,' how things are independent of our experience of 
them. Rather, our perceptions of the object are dependent upon the way that our 
perceptual apparatus is constituted, and this inevitably influences the givens of 
experience.15 
 
 
Kant's Copernican Revolution 
 
 Kant, a committed Newtonian, sought to apply Newton's insights in physics 
to metaphysics. While Newtonian mechanics provided a mechanical explanation of 
nature as governed by causally determining natural laws, Kant was interested in 
what Newton's postulation of laws of nature standing behind observable 
phenomena tells us about the perceiving subject; specifically, about the relation 
between pure thought and intuition. The fable of Newton observing an apple 
falling from a tree, which may or not have led to him postulating gravity as the 
cause of the effect that he observed, means, for Kant, that we can infer something 
about the perceiving subject. While gravity can explain why the apple fell from the 
tree, the relation of causal dependency between that movement and its cause is a 
relation that cannot itself be observed: the relation of causality, between cause and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14. Tom Rockmore, Before and After Hegel: A Historical Introduction to Hegel’s Thought 
(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 2003), 6-7,32-33. 
15. Ibid., 6-7. 
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effect, has to be projected by the subject in order to make sense of phenomena that 
are given to sensible intuition.  
 
 Kant's argument is that, while our immediate grasp of objects is an intuitive 
one, we rely upon our understanding, on the exercise of pure reason, to make sense 
of reality as it really is; consequently, in knowing the cognitive object, the subject's 
perceptions of that object are not passively caused by that object. Rather, the 
subject is active in 'working up' the objects of its experience. This is Kant's so-
called 'Copernican Turn.' Just as Copernicus inverted the traditional understanding 
regarding the relation between the earth and the universe, Kant reverses the 
relation between subject and object. In so doing, and in distinction to Locke, who 
reduces the subject to mere physiology, and Hume, for whom the subject is 'a mere 
transitory bundle of perceptions,' Kant introduces a conception of the subject as 
enduring and transcendent in relation to the objects of its experience.16 
 
 By means of a transcendental deduction, Kant reasons that there must exist 
categories, pure a priori concepts of the understanding that give form to the 
phenomenal content of sensible intuition, which must shape our experience. These 
categories are not given in experience and are not simply transmitted by sense or 
intuition, but are the precondition of the cognitive subject's active synthesis of the 
objects of sensible intuition.17 To say that Kant's subject is transcendent is to 
identify it as the entity/being that draws the phenomena of sensible intuition 
together. The transcendental subject, which Kant barbarously calls the 
'transcendental unity of apperception' (TUA), is the entity/being that draws 
together – it is that which creates the rules of the relations between the entities that 
it perceives. On the Kantian account then, it is this transcendental subject that is 
the condition of knowledge. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16. Tom Rockmore, Kant and Phenomenology, 136. 
17. Kant's transcendental deduction (TD) postulates twelve categories of four types: categories of 
quantity, quality, relation, and modality. The most familiar of these is the category of causality: an a 
priori category of relation between cause and effect that allows us to make sense of the appearance 
of movement in the world. According to Kant these pure concepts of the understanding are 
universal, applying to objects of intuition in general. Causality, unity, plurality, and negation are all 
concepts that we presuppose before we face reality. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. 
Allen W. Wood and Paul Guyer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), §79. 
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From Representationalism to Constructivism 
 
 While Kant innovates with regard to the subject’s active role in its synthesis 
of the cognitive object, he holds two contradictory positions regarding the nature of 
this relation between the knowing subject and the cognitive object: between the 
subject passively representing the object and actively constructing it. Most 
dominant of the two is a representationalist approach, a metaphysical realist 
position where representations of the cognitive object appear to the subject, having 
their ontological cause in the mind-independent real, which leads to knowledge of 
the world as it is in itself. However, Kant does also hint at a constructivist 
approach to knowledge where the activity of the subject is not just confined to 
synthesising the object, but is more active in constructing the cognitive object.  
 
 It is worth noting that the Kantian subject, the TUA, is not a finite human 
being but is rather a subject reduced to its epistemological capacities. While this 
subject is active as regards its synthetic activity, these epistemological capacities 
are passive in the subject's relation to the world. This obscures the relation between 
the epistemological subject and the finite human being, which leads to a split 
between theoretical reason and practical reason, a split between the knowing 
subject and the acting subject.18 Kant's representational account of the subject thus 
opens a gulf that cannot be bridged between human understanding and human 
activity.  
 
 Moreover, Kant draws a crucial distinction between the mind-independent 
world, which lies beyond appearances, and the world of human experience, which 
is distinguished from reality.19 As a result, both Kant's representationalist and 
constructivist approaches to knowledge fail to give us knowledge of the cognitive 
object as it really is: of the thing in itself. There are, therefore, two dualisms that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18. Tom Rockmore, Kant and Phenomenology, 137. 
19. Ibid., 44. 
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Kant's transcendental deduction cannot reconcile: the duality between subject and 
object, and the duality between theoretical and practical reason; between the 
knowing subject and the acting subject, and the knowing subject that might not 
actually know its object. It is these essential contradictions in Kant's critical 
philosophy to which post-Kantian German idealism responds. 
 
 
Knowledge: The Identity of Identity & Non-identity 
 
 The central problem of Kant's account of knowledge is that, by failing to 
grasp the thing in itself, it is unable to reconcile the unity of subject and object. 
Subject and object need to be united in order to explain the possibility of 
knowledge, yet they must also be divided in order to explain the basic facts of 
everyday experience.20 What we see, hear, or feel, appears independent of our will 
or conscious control: there is subject-object dualism. Yet making a claim to know 
something entails the necessary identity of what is represented and what is known: 
an identity between subject and object.21 Kant maintained that the thing in itself 
could not be known, and hence subject-object identity, the standard of truth, could 
not be achieved. In Kant's wake Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel all tried to resolve 
this duality, to thereby achieve what Hegel is to call an identity of identity and 
non-identity. 
 
 
Fichte & the Infinite 'Striving' of the Ego.  
 
 Fichte resolves Kant's dualism between subject and object by postulating a 
principle of subject-object identity, which he locates in self-knowledge. In self-
knowledge the subject of knowledge (the knowing self) and the object of 
knowledge (the known self) are the same, they are united, I=I. Self-knowledge thus 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20. Subject and object need to be united, not in the sense of merging into one, but terms of having a 
relationship of some sort, if not outright correspondence. 
21. By 'identity' we do not mean that subject and object are identical, but that there must be a 
degree of self-sameness between the subject and object; some correspondence between the object 
and the subject’s representation of it. 
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provides Fichte the foundation for all knowledge. Fichte therefore abandons Kant's 
representationalist approach to knowledge and develops Kant's constructivism in 
its stead, emphasising the active role of the subject in its construction of the 
cognitive object from out of the empirical content of experience.  
 
 By rejecting Kant's representationalist approach and stressing the cognitive 
role of human activity, Fichte unifies theoretical and practical reason by grounding 
them both in the dynamic activity of self-consciousness, an exercise in practical 
reason that he calls 'striving.' According to Fichte, rather than ideas having their 
ontological cause in the mind-independent real, the subject constructs the cognitive 
object from its phenomenally given content; Fichte thus resolves Kant's dualism 
between appearances and the mind-independent real by simply doing away with 
the thing in itself.  
 
 Self-knowledge on the Fichtean account is the foundation for all knowledge 
but again, as with Kant, the subject of subject-object identity is not the finite 
human being, but is what Fichte calls the 'pure ego.' This pure ego is a self-
positing, unconditioned 'I' that divides itself into the finite 'I' and the not 'I,' where 
the finite I represents individual human particulars and the not-I is that which 
negates it. Rather than coming about through the persistence over time of the 
synthetic unity of the TUA, the Fichtean subject, the 'I,' comes about purely in the 
act of self-positing. Knowledge is no longer conceived as a representation of the 
world in theoretical understanding that corresponds to the mind-independent real, 
but comes through the inexorable march of practical reason, represented by Fichte 
as the infinite striving of the ego – where self-consciousness 'strives' in its moral 
actions (i.e., practical reason) to conform to its own moral law: to make the 'is' 
what it ‘ought’ to be.  
 
 
The Fichtean Trope 
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 Essential to Fichte's account of knowledge then is a dynamic relation 
between the Self (das Ich) and the Non-Self (das-Nicht-Ich), where the self at once 
confronts and projects the not-self.22 Consequently, on the Fichtean account, nature 
becomes an essential self-limitation on the universal 'I;' Northrope Frye provides a 
beautiful image that illustrates Fichte’s representation of the dynamic between self 
and other in his suggestion that the fundamental gesture of Western thought is the 
transformation of the natural world into the farm.23 Such a dynamic is thus 
characterised by a process of de-reification, a process of taking something that is 
thing-like, independent, and de-reifying it by withdrawing its independence so as 
to bring it into accordance with the norms of reason, desire, and humanity.24 This 
thought, that consciousness strives to take objective recalcitrance out of the world 
and bring it into conformity with human desire, is hugely important to Marxist 
thought, and there is a whole aspect of continental thought that attempts to 
overcome the independence of the object by bringing it into conformity with the 
norms of reason.25  
 
 However, despite offering an account of the ‘striving’ subject, the 
epistemological problem of the thing in itself remains. By using self-knowledge as 
an epistemological foundation Fichte is able to account for subject-object identity 
in self-knowledge, but he cannot do likewise for subject-object non-identity. By 
doing away with the thing in itself, the mind-independent real, Fichte reduces the 
world to its construction by the subject, where objects of experience are treated as 
negations of the subject and thus exist simply in order to be overcome: to be 
assimilated by the subject. Reality on the Fichtean account is thus purely reducible 
to its construction by the subject. By relying on a foundational subject, Fichte 
inevitably overemphasises the constructive role of the subject, and cannot provide 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22. Roger Cardinal, “Romantic Travel,” in Rewriting the Self: Histories From the Renaissance to 
the Present, ed. Roy Porter (London: Routledge, 1997). 
23. Northrop Frye, The Double Vision: Language and Meaning in Religion (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1991), 22-39. J.M. Bernstein, “Phenomenology of Spirit. Lordship and Bondage,” 
Lectures on Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit The New School. New York City. 8th November 
(2006): http://bernsteintapes.com/lectures/Hegel/19MasterSlaveA.mp3. 
24. Ibid. 
25. See Tom Rockmore, Fichte, Marx, and the German Philosophical Tradition (Carbondale: 
Southern Illinois University Press, 1980). J.M. Bernstein, “Phenomenology of Spirit. Lordship and 
Bondage. (a).” 
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an adequate account of the object. The problem is that we want our subject-object 
dualism, we want our experience of the world to be different from our experience 
of ourselves, but Fichte’s account cannot provide this as he denies the object any 
mind-independent reality.26 There thus remains a dualism between the knowing 
subject and mind-independent real that neither Kant nor Fichte can reconcile. 
Proceeding from a foundational subject, both rationalist accounts fail to give an 
account of how we can know things in themselves.  
 
 It is for this reason that, in his (1799) open Letter to Fichte Jacobi charges 
the transcendental idealism of both Kant and Fichte with leading us to the spectre 
of sceptical nihilism. Nihilism is the inevitable conclusion of a reliance on the 
foundational subject because if we can only know what we create or produce 
according to the laws of our own activity, we cannot know anything beyond our 
own consciousness. According to Kant we can only know appearances, not things 
in themselves, and because we do not know things in themselves, Jacobi suggests 
that that these representations might be representations of nothing at all.27 This 
would make Kantianism a philosophy of nothingness, what we nowadays call 
nihilism, since nihilism is the thought that we know nothing by knowing 
appearances.28 
 
 
From Dualism to Monism: Situating the Subject 
 
 The problem with both Kant and Fichte's accounts of human experience is 
that they take the conscious subject as their point of departure. Responding to both, 
Schelling's transcendental idealism moves away from the question of the 'I' as point 
of departure, regarding consciousness not as a condition of our experience of the 
world, but as a result. For Schelling, consciousness has its origins in nature, which 
it transcends: this is why Schelling's idealism is referred to as a transcendental 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26. Ibid. 
27. 'Without the presupposition [of the 'thing in itself,'] I was unable to enter into [Kant's] system, 
but with it I was unable to stay within it.' Friedrich Jacobi, David Hume Über Den Glauben, Oder 
Idealismus Und Realismus. Ein Gespräch (Breslau: Gottlieb Löwe, 1787). 
28. J.M. Bernstein, “Phenomenology of Spirit. Lordship and Bondage. (a).” 
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idealism as opposed to Fichte's subjective idealism. Whereas for Fichte nature was 
seen as an essential limitation on the striving of practical reason, Schelling 
recognises that nature has a reality in and of itself, and out of this reality, ideality, 
consciousness, springs: nature begins unconsciously and results in conscious, 
philosophical activity and knowledge. Subjective consciousness is grounded in, 
and thus becomes the result of, the organic development of nature. Schelling 
therefore also represents a broader shift away from the mechanistic paradigm of 
nature, the sine qua non of Kant's account of ethical and epistemological 
subjectivity, towards the Naturphilosophie central to understanding Hegel's 
thought.  
 
 Of equivalent import is Schelling's introduction of the notion of the absolute, 
which is posited as the ultimate ground of nature and of reality in general, later 
becoming central not only to Hegel's 'absolute idealism' but also to Heidegger's 
positing of freedom as the Abgrund of the ontological difference.29 It is in the 
absolute, rather than in the epistemological subject, that Schelling locates the 
unconditional identity of subject and object; subject and object only then become 
divided within consciousness, as the condition of the knowledge of the real: the 
absolute is the starting point, and subjective consciousness is the result. As an 
exercise in subjective consciousness, philosophy cannot represent this absolute 
because conscious thinking 'operates from the position where the "absolute 
identity" of the subjective and the objective has always already been lost in the 
emergence of consciousness.' 30  Schelling thus conceives the epistemological 
subject to be driven by conceptually inaccessible forces and essentially limited in 
what it can know: a conception of the subject that is later to influence Nietzsche 
and Freud but, most importantly, Hegel. 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29. See Parvis Emad, “Heidegger on Schelling’s Concept of Freedom,” Man and World 8, no. 2 
(1975): 157-74. and Martin Heidegger, Schelling’s Treatise: On the Essence of Human Freedom 
(Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1985). 
30. Andrew Bowie, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Von Schelling, The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (Winter 2010 Edition) (2010). 
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Self-Conscious Individuality: Hegel's Completion of Kant's Critical 
Epistemology 
 
 Both Kant and Fichte take the subject as their point of departure; for Kant 
this means that the mind-independent real cannot itself be known and that we can 
only know 'appearances' or 'phenomena,' while Fichte resolves the dualism 
between mind and world by simply doing away with the thing in itself. Hegel 
wants to be able account for subject-object dualism, and his resolution is to argue 
that the subject-object split does not occur between mind and world, but occurs 
within consciousness. This entails a mind-world monism, but retains a duality 
between subject/object and mind independent real; the mind-independent real is 
that which lies beyond consciousness, and 'appears' at the level of consciousness. 
Through a process of cognitive activity, the understanding splits what appears to 
consciousness into subject and object, an ongoing historical process through which 
the cognitive object is constructed from phenomena given to consciousness, 
leading to the construction of increasingly adequate accounts of the mind-
independent real.  
 
 Hegel takes Jacobi's charge against Kantianism seriously, and his answer to 
the spectre of sceptical nihilism is to shift from consciousness to self-
consciousness. Rather than arising from the persistence of the TUA over time, or 
of the activity of the striving of the pure ego, Hegel's thought is that self-
knowledge is only possible through mutual recognition, and not through the 
Cartesian view, of which Kantianism is a type, of the self-knowledge of a rational 
subject. In short, without the recognition of the other, the self cannot have 
knowledge of itself as a rational being. Because self-consciousness depends on 
intersubjective recognition, reason is no longer confined to the activity of 
individual subjective consciousness, but is exercised through intersubjective 
activity, bringing both the individual and practical reason into a close relationship 
with a historical community. 
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The Passage to Self-Consciousness.  
 
 One of the central moves of the Phenomenology of Spirit, a book that traces 
the development of Geist, the self-conscious subject, is to provide an account of 
the achievement of self-consciousness. The treatise is split into three main parts: 
A) 'Consciousness'; B) 'Self-consciousness;' iii) and a final, unnamed part 
comprising chapters on 'Reason,' 'Spirit,' 'Religion,' and culminating in 'Absolute 
Knowing.' Part A) discusses three forms of object-oriented consciousness, sense-
certainty, perception, and the understanding. The construction of the cognitive 
object, however, requires some sense of self, as subject, that is independent of the 
object. As we have seen, Kant regards this sense of self as the consequence of the 
persistence over time of the TUA, while Fichte thought it as something that came 
over the course of subjective activity. Hegel's intervention is to insist that this self 
is not foundational, and what is required for this sense of self, which is a 
prerequisite of an encounter with objects, is a move from subjective consciousness 
to self-consciousness.  
 
 Self-consciousness, for Hegel contra Kant and Fichte, only arises when 
cognitive activity is turned in on itself. A sense of self, as an independent agent, is 
not fully complete until one realises that one's self is also an object for other 
subjects. Children and animals may well possess consciousness of things that are 
external to them without having an awareness of themselves as an independent 
consciousness aware of those things as objects. The achievement of a sense of self 
is the key move played out in the passage from consciousness to self-
consciousness, a move that is explored in Hegel's famous account of the master 
and slave. Self-consciousness, understanding ourselves as independent beings, 
develops from consciousness's encounter with objects, but only comes about when 
an object-oriented consciousness encounters another consciousness, i.e., through 
human sociality. Crucially though, because the self-conscious 'subject' is 
fundamentally dependent on others for its self-consciousness, the individual is no 
longer regarded as a subject of the Kantian/Fichtean type, and subjectivity is 
sublated into 'absolute' knowledge: an insight, or at least the implications of this 
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insight for our mode of being in the world, that is overlooked by kaleidoscopic 
readings of Hegel as a theorist of intersubjectivity. 
 
 
Absolute Knowledge 
 
 While philosophy, and modern philosophy especially, has aimed at absolute 
knowledge, certainty beyond any doubt, as symbolised by the Cartesian idea of 
epistemological apodicticitym; this is not what Hegel has in mind. 
 
Absolute knowledge in [Hegel's] theory is not merely a later version of the Cartesian claim 
to certainty; nor is it related to the Kantian idea that philosophical knowledge is absolutely 
permanent and not subject to revision of any kind. On the contrary, the upshot of Hegel's 
detailed and lengthy review of the different angles of vision on knowledge, or conceptual 
perspectives that have historically emerged in the human search for knowledge, is that we 
absolutely cannot escape from the perspectival approach to some angle of vision beyond 
all perspective. For whenever we scrutinize experience, we necessarily do so from the 
attitude due to our time and place. Absolute knowledge, if this reading of Hegel's theory is 
correct, is, then, the consequence of thinking through the epistemological problem to the 
end where we finally become aware that we cannot avoid an ever changing perspective 
with respect to our experience. There is no absolute knowledge if that is interpreted to 
mean knowledge beyond time and place. Rather, since claims to know are never beyond 
time and place, they are, then, always and necessarily subject to revision as our experience 
changes.31  
 
 The achievement of self-conscious individuality, which is a moment on the 
path to knowledge, ultimately leads to an awareness of ourselves as non-knowers: 
to realise that we are not essentially Kantian/Fichtean subjects. This is the 
conclusion of the Phenomenology: to come to realise that we are essentially not-
subjects, that we are historical beings living in complex social worlds according to 
communal norms. 32  Although Heidegger is apparently uninterested in 
epistemology, there are striking similarities here with the Heideggerian view of the 
perspectival presentation of the whole, as discussed in Chapter 4. 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31. Tom Rockmore, Before and After Hegel: A Historical Introduction to Hegel’s Thought, 102. 
32. J.M. Bernstein, “Phenomenology of Spirit. Introduction,” Lectures on Hegel’s Phenomenology 
of Spirit The New School. New York City. 10th October (2006): 
http://bernsteintapes.com/lectures/Hegel/09PhenomenologyIntroC.mp3. 
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Hegel's Constructivism 
 
 Kant and Fichte's mistake is to take the foundational subject as their point of 
departure. On both accounts this leads to a transcendental conception of the subject 
where the subject exists in a hierarchical relation to the objects of its experience. 
The transcendent subject is left essentially unconditioned by these experiences, and 
objects are encountered in a way that presupposes their assimilation into subject-
object identity: these objects are never out of the subject's reach. Hegel takes from 
Kant the essential role of the epistemological subject and he follows Fichte's 
emphasis on the active and constructive role of the subject. However, he avoids 
falling foul of Fichte's mistake of over-stressing the role of subjective activity by 
following Schelling's argument that the subject-object split occurs within 
consciousness rather than between mind and world; that the subject-object 
distinction is not something prior to consciousness, but arises through conscious 
activity. As a result, Hegel argues that subjectivity is derivative rather than 
foundational: that the subject is immanent to the phenomenal realm, existing in a 
mutually conditioning, dependent relationship with the object. Contra Kant and 
Fichte, subject and object emerge through the interaction between self and world, 
and neither subject or object is transcendent or unconditioned. This is what Hegel 
means by the notion of subject-object unity, not that they are identical, but that 
they are not independent. 
 
 While Kant analyses the preconditions of consciousness, Hegel lays no claim 
to know what lies beyond consciousness.33 For this reason his argument cannot be 
considered metaphysical, in the Heideggerian sense at least. For Hegel the mind-
independent real 'appears' to consciousness, which it constructs rather than 
represents: a process that is generative of both subject and object. Rather than 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33. Tom Rockmore, Kant and Phenomenology, 97. There is an attractive, immanent quality to 
Hegel's thought. He does not engage in the kind of metaphysical projection (projection outside of 
experience) that Kant, Nietzsche, and Freud make; projections that make their thought questionable. 
'Kant saw metaphysics as speculation about transcendent entities, as a priori reasoning about 
objects lying beyond the sphere of experience. In this sense Hegel cannot be a metaphysician at all, 
and for a very simple and compelling reason: he denied the existence of the transcendent, the purely 
noumenal or supernatural. If metaphysics consists in speculation about such a realm, then Hegel 
would be the first to condemn it as a pseudo-science.' Frederick C. Beiser, Hegel (London: 
Routledge, 2005), 55. 
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reflecting a split between mind and world, it is consciousness that splits 
appearances of the mind-independent real into subject and object, and the cognitive 
object is constructed in light of our conscious experience of the mind-independent 
real. Although we can never fully know this realm, we can develop increasingly 
adequate accounts of it. Knowledge is thus a non-objective construction of the 
world that is derived from a practical relation to reality. 
 
 In contrast to the Kantian or Fichtean subject, which is treated as 
foundational, Hegel's subject is derivative, emerging from its interaction with the 
objects of its experience, and self-conscious subjectivity is mediated by processes 
of recognition: by the intersubjective creation and validation of ourselves as certain 
kinds of subjects. The important epistemological and ontological implication of 
this is that we do not primarily relate to the world as knowers. Because our 
knowledge of objects presupposes our knowledge of ourselves as subjects, our 
encounter with the objects of our experience is fundamentally mediated by our 
relations with others. We will return to this in the next chapter. 
 
 For this reason self-conscious subjectivity is itself sublated into absolute 
knowledge. What this means is that, while human beings are essential components 
of epistemological or ethical subjectivity, they are not its direct correlate. Subject-
object identity is located in the absolute, to which individual human beings stand 
as parts to whole: we exist within epistemological and ethical communities; 
individuality and subjectivity are not coextensive. This is a radical insight of 
Hegel's, with important implications for our understanding of the human being and 
freedom, an insight that is neutralised by kaleidoscopic readings of him as a 
theorist of intersubjectivity; readings that, by establishing the individual conceived 
as subject as the point of departure, threaten to perpetuate a politics of subjectivity 
associated with the Kantian/Fichtean approach to the subject. We will return to this 
claim shortly. 
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Hegelian Subjectivity  
 
 Rather than presuming an a priori subjectivity that precedes and underwrites 
the finite human being's interactions with the world, the central insight of Hegel's 
account of the master and slave is that self-consciousness arises relationally; that I 
can only gain self-consciousness of my existence as a free being by being 
recognised as such by the other. While the self initially manifests itself to the other 
as an external object, as simply an immediate concrete existence, the ensuing 
struggle for dominance between these two consciousnesses results in mutual 
recognition between free beings. The struggle for recognition that is the foundation 
of self-consciousness thus binds us together in relations of dependence with others, 
on whose recognition we are dependent for our own 'subjectivity.' Our 
'subjectivity' is interrupted by the other, and this interruption of subjectivity is the 
condition of subjectivity.34 Consequently, although often read as a discourse on the 
nature and possibility of freedom, before it is this, the struggle for recognition is a 
struggle between our absolute dependence and our absolute independence: it is a 
struggle between love and death.35  
 
 The passage to self-consciousness is not essentially a confrontation between 
independent subjects, but is a process of mutual self-disclosure in which the 
operation of object-oriented consciousness is disrupted by its interaction with 
another consciousness. Treating each other 'as if we were' subjects is a compromise 
solution, a way of mediating our absolute dependence on one another – but it is 
misleading to represent this compromise as an essentially intersubjective relation 
because the individuals are co-dependent, fundamentally reliant on one another for 
their (relative) independence. The disarmingly simple point demonstrated by Hegel 
in the passage to self-consciousness then, is that individuals are neither subjects 
nor objects. This is disarmingly simple because it is all too easy to fall back into 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34. Levinas, for whom the 'not me' is simply opposed to 'me,' disputes this. For Hegel however, we 
need more than difference, we need interruption. J.M. Bernstein, “Phenomenology of Spirit. 
Lordship and Bondage. (a).” 
35. On a reading of the struggle for recognition as a discourse on the nature and possibility of 
freedom see Robert B. Pippin, “What is the Question for Which Hegel’s Theory of Recognition is 
the Answer?,” European Journal of Philosophy 8, no. 2 (2000): 55-172. Love is the image of our 
absolute dependence, whilst death demonstrates our absolute independence. 
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the logic of subject-object thinking by treating the other independent self-
consciousness simply as a subject, as a self-enclosed and independent ground of 
action, thereby eschewing the mutually codependent constitution of any given 
'subjectivity'. 
 
 In addition to the dependence on other consciousnesses, self-conscious 
'subjectivity' is also essentially conditioned by the other objects (entities) that it 
encounters: subject and object are mutually conditioned. Hegel's 'subject' thus does 
not persist – that is, stand in being – but is transformed in action. To put it bluntly, 
Hegel's 'subject' is not a subject. Resonating with Heidegger's existential analytic 
of Da-sein, in her classic work on the Phenomenology and its reception in France 
Judith Butler explains that: 
 
The emergent subject of Hegel's Phenomenology is an ek-static one, a subject who 
constantly finds itself outside itself, and whose periodic expropriations do not lead to a 
return to a former self. Indeed, the self who comes outside of itself, for whom ek-stasis is a 
condition of existence, is one for whom no return to self is possible, for whom there is no 
final recovery from self-loss.36  
 
 While we are often constituted as subjects – legal persons or citizens, for 
instance – there is therefore a definitional difficulty in associating 'subjectivity' and 
'intersubjectivity' with individual human beings in Hegel's thought, since 
subjectivity properly resides in the absolute, to which individuals stand as parts to 
whole. Associating 'subjectivity' with individual human beings evades the deeply 
relational nature of individuality and the temporal (ek-sistential) nature of human 
existence; the latter relating to the view that human individuals are not preformed 
monadic entities (subjects), but are beings that exist in a perpetual state of 
becoming.  
 
 It is Jean-Luc Nancy who comes the closest to capturing this ek-sistential 
aspect of the Hegelian 'subject' in his Hegel: The Restlessness of the Negative.37 
For Nancy the Hegelian subject 'is not recoiled into itself, but is defined 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36. Judith Butler, Subjects of Desire: Hegelian Reflections in Twentieth-Century France (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1999), xv. emphasis added. 
37. Jean-Luc Nancy, Hegel: The Restlessness of the Negative (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2002). 
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fundamentally as an act by which the self overcomes itself in its passage toward 
and into the world. The subject disperses itself into its world, and this self-
surpassing is precisely the operation of its negativity [...] the 'disquiet' of the self is 
precisely its mode of becoming its final non-substantiality in time, and its specific 
expression of freedom.38  
 
 For this reason, conceiving the individual human being as a subject is both 
epistemological error and ontological insufficiency: it misunderstands what the 
human being is and it misrepresents our mode of being in the world. Permitting 
ourselves the indulgence, it would be more appropriate to write the Hegelian 
subject sous rature – as subject – since 'subject' is necessary, but insufficient.39 
From a Hegelian perspective, the problem with conceiving the human being as a 
subject, and relations between beings as intersubjective relations, is that it makes it 
harder for us to extirpate ourselves from the mechanistic paradigm of nature 
against which Hegel was reacting. 
 
 
The Problem of Life: Hegel's Monistic Philosophical 
Ontology 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38. Judith Butler, Subjects of Desire: Hegelian Reflections in Twentieth-Century France, xii. 'The 
subject is - or makes up - the experience of its being-affected as the ordeal of what dissolves its 
subsistence. But again: it is not "some thing" (pain, death, the other, or joy) that undoes this 
subsistence from the exterior. It is not another subsistence that divides the subject; it is substance 
that divides itself - that enters into relation, or that opens itself to it, or that manifests itself. The 
subject is the experience of the power of division, of ex-position or abandonment of self.' Ibid.  
Nancy continues: '"Self" "is" only this: negating itself as in-itself. Self in itself is nothing, is 
immediately its own nothingness. Self is only fissure and fold, return upon self, departure from self, 
and coming to self. That is why the Hegelian "self" has its concept only in the multiple and infinite 
syntax of these expressions: in itself, for itself, right at itself, or near itself, unto itself, outside of 
itself.' Jean-Luc Nancy, Hegel: The Restlessness of the Negative, 42-43. 
39. Writing the 'subject' as subject, is meant to signify that it is necessary, but insufficient. The 
technique was first used by Heidegger in his letter to Ernst Junger The Question of Being, and was 
later used extensively by Derrida as a way of denouncing the metaphysics or 'presence' behind the 
word used. As Spivak explains in her preface to Derrida's Of Grammatology 'Since the word is 
inaccurate, it is crossed out. Since the word is necessary, it remains legible.' Jacques Derrida, Of 
Grammatology, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1998), xiv. 
PART 3/Ch6. Understanding Through Love, Not Vivisection 	  
270 
 Whereas Kant and Fichte take the epistemological subject as their points of 
departure, an ontological commitment informed by Kant's approbation of 
Newtonian physics, Hegel follows Schelling by taking 'life' as the starting point of 
his philosophy: his thought proceeding from an organic vision of the world, a view 
of the universe as a single living organism.40 The main challenge to such a 
monistic holism came from the old mechanistic paradigm of nature associated with 
Newton, Hobbes, and Descartes, which was elevated into the very paradigm of 
rationality by Kant and Jacobi. According to the mechanistic paradigm, the natural 
world can be best explained mechanically in terms of cause and effect, as it is 
governed by certain fundamental laws of nature.  
 
 Hegel thought this mechanistic paradigm insufficient for understanding life 
for two main reasons: firstly because living beings, and life in general, are self-
generating and self-organising, while mechanistic explanations of events can only 
explain the action of one entity upon another. Secondly, whereas organicism 
regards living entities as a unity, a totum where whole and parts form an indivisible 
unity, a mechanism can only be understood analytically, as a compositum where 
the parts precede the whole.41 Hegel's reaction against dualism, his concern to 
show, against Kant and Descartes, that the world is not primordially divided into 
subject and object, mind and body, self and other – as well as all his central and 
characteristic concepts, such as unity-in-difference and the dialectic – all grow out 
of this organic conception of nature: a monistic, holist philosophical ontology that 
underwrites his approaches to epistemology, subjectivity, freedom, ethics, and 
politics.  
 
 Those encountering Hegel for the first time will likely find his use of 
apparently contradictory terms such as 'infinitely finite,' 'unrestricted 
restrictedness,' and later 'unity-in-difference,' perplexing to say the least. Indeed 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40. Although this sounds implausible, besides Winnicott's example of the mother and child to be 
discussed shortly, such an organicist approach is not too far-fetched (at least on planet Earth). See, 
for instance, research into the Last Universal Common Ancestor (LUCA), a single cell existing 
3/4billion years ago, from which all life has since evolved. Gary Hamilton, “Looking for Luca - the 
Mother of All Life,” New Scientist 2515 (2005). 
41. Frederick C. Beiser, Hegel, 81-82. 
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Hegel has often been dismissed as nonsensical.42 However, Hegel's concepts and 
dialectical logic are less incomprehensible when placed in the context of his 
organicism, since they emerge as attempts to provide a non-reductive or non-
atomistic method of understanding living beings as self-generating and self-
organising concrete wholes.43 They represent a reaction against atomistic accounts 
of our understanding of life, where focus begins with the particular, from which 
universals are generalised. 
 
 
Hegel's Philosophy of Life 
 
 Hegel's holistic philosophical ontology represents an immensely important 
move away from the metaphysical and methodological individualism associated 
with the social contract theorists, but most significantly, from Kant. His holistic 
philosophical ontology sees human beings, not primarily as subjects, but as 
elements of a broader multiplicity of life. The term 'multiplicity' is used in contrast 
to a plurality, as the latter implies a collection of subjects. Human 'multiplicity' 
reflects the view that human beings are not independent units, isolated essences 
that exist as one of many in a plurality of substantiality, but exist as different 
elements of the multiplex nature of life; individuals are thus regarded as 
modifications of the same life rather than being wholly separate essences.  
 
 While Habermas, Honneth, and Linklater all read Hegel through a Kantian 
kaleidoscope, Hegel's philosophy of life had earlier found favour, influencing the 
development of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche's Lebensphilosophie ('life-
philosophy'), hermeneutics, and Heideggerian phenomenology - the latter two at 
least through the work of Wilhelm Dilthey. In contrast to other biographer's focus 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42. Schopenhauer's many denunciations of Hegel along these lines reaches almost comic vigour. 
An example: 'But the height of audacity in serving up pure nonsense, in stringing together senseless 
and extravagant mazes of words, such as had previously been known only in madhouses, was 
finally reached in Hegel, and became the instrument of the most barefaced general mystification 
that has ever taken place, with a result which will appear fabulous to posterity, and will remain as a 
monument to German stupidity.' Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Idea, vol. 2 
(Edinburgh: The Edinburgh Press, 1906), 22. 
43. Frederick C. Beiser, Hegel, 81-82. 
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on Hegel's 'mature' system, Dilthey's (1905) study The Young Hegel's History 
considers Hegel's later thought as an inexorable expression of his earlier 
metaphysical and theological concerns, which are most apparent in his essays 
Fragment on Love (1797/1798), The Spirit of Christianity and its Fate (1799), and 
his Fragment of a System (1800) – now published as his Early Theological 
Writings.44 What emerged from Dilthey's (1905) study of Hegel was a principal 
concern with the concept of 'life,' which is the holistic, temporal context of 
meaning. Dilthey writes '[l]ife is the basic element or fact which must form the 
starting point for philosophy. It is known from within. It is that behind which we 
cannot go. Life cannot be brought before the bar of reason.'45 Palmer explains that 
the significance lies in the implication that '[o]ur access to an understanding of 'life' 
lies deeper than reason, for life is rendered understandable through its 
objectifications.'46  
 
 Dilthey's (Hegelian) view that 'life' is the holistic, temporal context of 
meaning was to become a central theme in the writings of both Rosenzweig and 
Heidegger, and in turn influenced the 'ontological turn' in hermeneutics, as initiated 
by Heidegger and developed by Gadamer.47 Dilthey's influence on early Heidegger 
is well documented, for whom philosophy occurs within a hermeneutic sphere of 
temporal existence: in Being and Time this is Dasein, but in Heidegger's early 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44. This rescuing of Hegel's metaphysics is common to writers of the (first) 'Hegel Renaissance,' 
which emerged at the end of the 19th century. G.W.F. Hegel, Early Theological Writings, trans. 
T.M. Knox (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971). Alice Ormiston, Laura Werner, 
and the author of this thesis also share this view. See Alice Ormiston, “”The Spirit of Christianity 
and Its Fate:” Towards a Reconsideration of the Role of Love in Hegel,” Canadian Journal of 
Political Science 35, no. 3 (2002): 499-525; Alice Ormiston, Love and Politics: Re-Interpreting 
Hegel (New York: SUNY Press, 2004). Laura Werner, “The Restless Love of Thinking: The 
Concept of Liebe in Hegel’s Philosophy” (Ph.D Thesis, University of Helsinki, 2007). 
45. Quoted in Richard E. Palmer, Hermeneutics: Interpretation Theory in Schleiermacher, Dilthey, 
Heidegger, and Gadamer (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1969), 120. 
46. Ibid. 
47. On Dilthey's influence on Rosenzweig and Heidegger see Peter Eli Gordon, Rosenzweig and 
Heidegger: Between Judaism and German Philosophy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
2003), 86. On his influence on hermeneutics see Richard E. Palmer, Hermeneutics: Interpretation 
Theory in Schleiermacher, Dilthey, Heidegger, and Gadamer. Schopenhauer and Nietzsche's 
Lebensphilosophie ('life-philosophy') proceeds in a similar vein, criticising the theoretical and 
positivist focus of post-Kantian philosophy. 
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work, such as his 1920-1921 lectures on the philosophy of religion, he designates 
this sphere as 'life.'48  
 
 It is worth noting that Hegel's idea of an underlying unity of life is not as 
mystical or metaphysical as it might first appear, especially in contrast to Kant's 
assignation of subjectivity to the individual. Illuminating in this regard is the work 
of the child psychologist Donald Winnicott, who develops an essentially Hegelian 
approach to understanding the relation between a mother and child.49 Successful 
child development requires that the infant build the self-confidence to separate 
from the mother and to have an independent existence. In this process Winnicott 
treats the mother-infant as a single subjectivity that subsequently develops into 
separate, autonomous individuals. This development is not a process of 
confrontation between two independent subjects, but is a process of differentiation 
of a single subjectivity into independent agencies.50  
 
 Blunden uses this illustration to criticise Honneth's reading of Hegel's 
recognition theory, as this is a process of becoming a self-conscious independent 
person through a process of differentiation rather than 'a demand for recognition 
from an already self-conscious subject upon another independent subject.'51 Since 
this not a process of confrontation between two independent subjectivities, the 
criticism applies to kaleidoscopic readings of Hegel as a 'theorist of 
intersubjectivity' more broadly. Considered in this light then, rather than being 
mystical or metaphysical, Hegel's monistic philosophical ontology can be seen as 
contributing to a deeper ontological account of individuality. 
 
 
From Particular/Universal to Part/Whole 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48. In his History of the Concept of Time Heidegger writes that 'Dilthey was the first to understand 
the "aims of phenomenology."' Quoted by Peter Eli Gordon, Rosenzweig and Heidegger: Between 
Judaism and German Philosophy, 87n12. See also Martin Heidegger, The Phenomenology of 
Religious Life (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004). Especially pp7-10 
49. See Donald Woods Winnicott, Playing and Reality (London: Routledge, 1971). 
50. Andy Blunden, “The Missing Mediation in Pragmatic Interpretations of Hegel.” 
51. Ibid. 
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 Hegel's holism thus marks an important shift from thinking relations of 
particular to universal to relations of parts to whole; a shift that plays out across his 
work, with consequences for fields such as ethics, freedom, epistemology, 
aesthetics and theology. His Science of Logic presents a 'logic of life,' an attempt to 
understand the organic development of life in conceptual form, the Phenomenology 
of Spirit is a philosophical study of the organic and phenomenological 
development of different forms of consciousness, while his Philosophy of History 
traces the historical development of different forms of human freedom, and his 
Philosophy of Right is a study of the organic development of Recht (law/right). 
 
 It is this latter example, where relations between individual and community 
are presented as organic relations between parts and whole that is likely to be most 
familiar with the reader. Hegel's argument in the Philosophy of Right poses a 
forceful challenge to the social contract approach to the relation between individual 
and state, and is later a source of inspiration for Mervyn Frost's 'constitutive theory' 
of individuality.52 Whereas the social contract tradition projects an interpretation of 
the nature of human individuals that might be said to exist in a hypothetical state of 
nature, from which universal interests – such as provision of security, the 
protection of property, or the enforcement of the general will – can serve to justify 
state authority, Hegel's holism presents the interests of citizens and community not 
as relations of particular to universal, but as part to whole. This does not 
subordinate the individual to the community, but regards both as implicated in 
mutually sustaining living relations between parts and whole. Hegel provides a 
poetic illustration of this idea in his essay The Spirit of Christianity and Its Fate: 
 
Even in the expression "A son of the stem of Koresh," for example, which the Arabs use to 
denote the individual, a single member of the clan, there is the implication that this 
individual is not simply a part of the whole; the whole does not lie outside him; he himself 
is just the whole which the entire clan is. As with any genuinely free people, so among the 
Arabs, the individual is a part and at the same time the whole. It is true only of objects, of 
things lifeless, that the whole is other than the parts; in the living thing, on the other hand, 
the part of the whole is one and the same as the whole. If particular objects, as substances, 
are linked together while each of them yet retains its character as an individual (as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52. Mervyn Frost, Ethics in International Relations: A Constitutive Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996). 
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numerically one), then their common characteristic, their unity, is only a concept, not an 
essence, not something being.53 
 
It is for this reason that Nancy is correct to claim that Hegel's world is a 'world in 
which no generality subsists, only infinite singularities.'54  
 
Neither generality nor particularity subsists, for the "particular" is still only the finite in an 
extrinsic relation with the general, itself still exterior and therefore in its turn posited as 
particular - the finite, therefore, in the relation of particular interests with a general 
interest. The singular, on the contrary, is the finite in itself and for itself infinite, for which 
there is no separate universality. If I say, "Socrates is a man," I take Socrates for a 
particular case of the human species. But Socrates-the-singular is not a case: it is he and 
nothing other. If one prefers, he is an absolute case, and the absolute in general is made up 
solely of absolute cases and of all their absolute relations.55 
 
 
‘Ontological’ Implications of the Foundational Subject 
 
 In the opening pages of the Phenomenology Hegel criticises any philosophy 
that is only an epistemology, and, since it involves claims and assumptions about 
the relationship between individuality and subjectivity and the relationship 
between self and world, our discussion of the development of the relationship 
between subject and object is not exclusively an epistemological one but is also an 
ontological one. In light of the previous discussions of Hegel's completion of 
Kant's constructivist approach to knowledge, along with his rejection of the 
emergent (Kantian/Fichtean) subject of transcendental idealism, and his monistic 
philosophical ontology, we are now in a position to discuss the implications of 
these (primarily epistemological) arguments for our mode of being in the world. 
 
 We will recall that Hegel's completion of Kant's critical epistemology 
involves reformulating Kant's a priori constructivism a posteriori, where 
knowledge is constructed retrospectively on the basis of our experience. This also 
involves a shift in the conception of the knowing subject. Whereas Kant's subject is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53. G.W.F. Hegel, “The Spirit of Christianity and Its Fate,” in Early Theological Writings 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971), 260. 
54. Jean-Luc Nancy, Hegel: The Restlessness of the Negative, 22. 
55. Ibid. 
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a foundational subject that faces the world, remaining unconditioned by the objects 
of its experience, Hegel's self-conscious subject is one that is dependent on others 
for its subjectivity and is transformed in its interaction with the objects of its 
experience. In contrast to Kant's dualist account of the relation between self and 
world, where the individual (as subject) faces a world of objects, Hegel's monistic 
perspective sees 'subject' and 'object' as categories that arise through the activity of 
consciousness, subordinate to the relationship between self and world, where 
consciousness splits experiences into 'subject' and 'object.' This leads to a very 
different conception of the nature of the role of reason in the relations between self 
and world, centring on the faculty of the understanding. 
 
 
The Activity of the Understanding 
 
 Hegel discusses the faculty of the understanding in Part (A) of the 
Phenomenology, where it is introduced as a more complex form of object-oriented 
consciousness than the other two forms that he discusses, perception and sense-
certainty.56 For both Kant and Hegel the understanding attempts to grasp the object 
intellectually. Whereas for Kant the understanding is a relationship of subject 
towards an object, where the subject 'works up' the objects of its experience, for 
Hegel it is the understanding that splits experience into subject and object. The 
faculty of the understanding is an activity, a mode of being in the world.  
 
 Whereas in Kant and Fichte theoretical and practical reason mediate the 
encounter between mind (subject) and world (object), for Hegel practical reason is 
necessarily retrospective, it occurs on the basis of prior experience, experiences 
that it splits into subject and object. While for both Kant and Hegel the 
understanding seeks to grasp the objects of experience intellectually, since for 
Hegel the split between subject and object occurs within consciousness, rather than 
corresponding to a primordial split between mind and world, the understanding is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56. G.W.F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A.V. Miller (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), 
§§132-65. 
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regarded as a source of difference and otherness. The mind-independent real 
appears to consciousness, which the faculty of the understanding then splits into 
relations of subject and object (other persons can be objects too), and relations are 
understood negatively, through a form of dissolution and relation.57 So, whereas 
for Kant and Fichte the subject-object split occurs between mind and world, for 
Hegel it is the understanding that is the source of this split, and is therefore a 
source of difference and otherness. 
 
 
Reification 
 
 So conceived, the understanding effects a 'diremption' (Entzweiung) of life: 
literally, a splitting in two. This diremption is the condition of conceptual 
knowledge of the world, but treating this split between subject and object as 
foundational and as coextensive with the relation between self and world is seen by 
Hegel to lead towards the pathologies of modernity: the establishment of 
bifurcations between mind/body, man/nature, individual/society, faith/reason. The 
central objection being made here is against metaphysical dualism, against 
approaches that rely on a foundational subject-object split. This objection is made 
because – by treating this split as foundational, and thus conceiving the individual 
as subject – a false independence is established between self and world, where the 
two seemingly escape the logic of mutual dependence through which 'subjectivity' 
(and objectivity) is established. To put it differently, a foundational subject-object 
split effectively treats the finite individual human being as something that is 
essentially pre-formed and unconditioned by its interaction with the world; the 
individual is thereby reified into an object. This is the paradoxical logic of treating 
the human beings as subjects: they become things.58  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57. See Ibid., §§113-15. 
58. This is the truth of Adorno's remark that, the more autonomously the subject ascends above the 
ontic realm, the more it surreptitiously turns into an object, in ironic cancellation of its constitutive 
role. Theodor Adorno, Negative Dialectics (London: Routledge, 1990), 176-77. It is also the idea 
expressed by Nancy in his criticism of discourse ethics, quoted in Chapter 5: 'What cannot appear is 
both the other and communication. For the other of a communication becomes the object of a 
subject - even and perhaps especially as "suppressed object or concept" as in the Hegelian relation 
between consciousnesses [...] This other is no longer an other, but an object of a subject's 
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 This concept of ‘reification’ (literally, 'making into a thing') later becomes 
prominent in Western Marxist thought, and is employed by Marx, Lukács, Adorno, 
and Honneth.59 For Lukács, reification follows from contemplative activity in a 
capitalist mode of production, within which social relations become objectified.60 
Building on Lukács's work, Honneth identifies three kinds of reification: in 
relations to the objective world, in towards other persons, and in relations towards 
ourselves.61 For Honneth, each of these types of reification indicate an underlying 
social pathology, a pathology where one's own relation towards praxis - one's 
mode of being in the world - is misunderstood. Reification thus leads to 'an 
atrophied or distorted form of a more primordial and genuine form of praxis, in 
which humans take up an empathetic and engaged relationship toward themselves 
and their surroundings.'62  
 
 The similarities here with Heidegger's notion of resolute solicitous being-
with-others, discussed in Chapter 4, are clear. Indeed, the similarities between 
Heidegger and Hegel go further. We will remember from Chapter 4 that 
Heidegger's engagement with Duns Scotus led him to regard the objectifying 
attitude of the subject towards the object to originate in the theoretical attitude 
itself, and that he considered theoretical thinking to 'un-live' human experience and 
to objectify existence.63 Hegel held a similar view. Since Geist is the passage 
between mutually conditioned subject and object, self and other – which, as Nancy 
has shown, is perpetually restless – the understanding is essentially a mode of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
representation (or, in a more complicated way, the representative object of another subject for the 
subject's representation). Jean-Luc Nancy, The Inoperative Community (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1991), 24. 
59. See Marx's discussion of 'commodity fetishism' in Chapter One of Capital. Karl Marx, Captial: 
Critique of Political Economy, vol. 1 (London: Penguin, 1976).; Georg Lukács, Reification and the 
Consciousness of the Proletariat, History and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics 
(Pontypool: The Merlin Press, 1971). Axel Honneth, “Reification: A Recognition-Theoretic View” 
(Paper presented at the Tanner Lectures on Human Values, University of California, Berkeley, 
2005); Axel Honneth, Reification: A New Look At an Old Idea (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2008). 
60. Georg Lukács, Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat. 
61. Axel Honneth, Reification: A New Look At an Old Idea. 
62. Axel Honneth, “Reification: A Recognition-Theoretic View,” 101-02. 
63. Louiza Odysseos, The Subject of Coexistence: Otherness in International Relations 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2007), 36. 
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death, as it fixes subject and object in their determinations: it is a hypostatisation of 
beings that exist essentially in their becoming. As T.M. Knox explains in a note to 
Hegel's Fragment of a System, for Hegel '[p]hilosophical reflection always 'kills' 
life by distinguishing oppositions, and it cannot give up those distinctions without 
killing itself.'64  
 
 For Hegel then, the understanding necessarily leads to the diremption and 
reification of life, and it fosters several divisions that characterise the historical 
conditions of modernity: such as those between individual and community, mind 
and nature, reason and emotion. This diremption, these divisions, contribute to the 
development of human life from an immature unity (being-in-itself) in the 
absolute, but the mistake is to remain caught in the dualist frame that is wrought by 
the understanding. Hegel wants us to transcend this framing by recognising a 
higher unity between thought and being, a unity he thinks can be achieved by 
overcoming the contemplative attitude, achieving self-conscious subjectivity, and 
identifying with the broader wholes within which the self is situated: such as 
epistemic or ethical communities. 
 
 
Dereification 
 
 A related problem that arises as a result of taking subjectivity as foundational 
and treating it as coextensive with individuality (i.e., the view that every individual 
person is necessarily to be regarded as a subject with reason) is that identified with 
as Fichtean trope. As we saw above, Fichte, who is credited by Jacobi as the true 
disciple of Kant for taking the premises of his transcendental idealism to their 
logical conclusions, attempts to overcome Kant's dualisms between theoretical and 
practical reason, and subject-object non-identity, by grounding them in the 
dynamic activity of self-consciousness – where self-consciousness strives in its 
moral actions to make the 'is' what it ought to be. This, we saw, is de-reification: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64. G.W.F. Hegel, “Fragment of a System,” in Early Theological Writings (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971), 312-313n6. translator's note. 
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the activity of taking something that is thing-like, independent of us, and 
withdrawing its independence by bringing it into accord with the norms of reason, 
desire, and humanity.  
 
 The problem with the Kantian/Fichtean foundational subject is that it leads to 
a conception of the self where the self stands in a transcendent, knowing and 
assimilatory relation to the objects of its experience. Other persons can also be 
objects of our experience, as the struggle for recognition attests. However, while 
Hegel's account of the master and slave disrupts the subject's object-oriented 
consciousness, the Kantian/Fichtean foundational subject is not similarly 
interrupted – and persons are therefore encountered in a way that presupposes their 
assimilation into the order of the same. We claimed earlier that this thought – that 
consciousness strives to take objective recalcitrance out of the world and bring it 
into accordance with human desire – is important to a whole aspect of continental 
thought, including Marx; it is most certainly evident in Habermas's moral 
cognitivism, and Linklater's account of emancipation as the progressive self-
realisation of the ethical subject, along with his defence of universalism through 
the projection of an ethical subject, seems to lend credence to the contention that it 
underwrites his emancipatory cosmopolitanism too. 
 
 
Deification 
 
 Hegel's objection is that the commitment to a foundational subject is both 
ontological error and epistemological insufficiency as it misunderstands what the 
human being is, and misrepresents our mode of being in the world. It leads to an 
overemphasis on the role of reason in the self's relation to the world, and an 
ignorance regarding the pernicious implications of a foundational commitment to 
subjectivity, which involves the distortion of the relationship between self and 
world where the self encounters the objects of its experience in an assimilatory and 
dominating way.  
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 Indeed, it is perhaps the overemphasis on the nature and role of reason that is 
Hegel's central objection to the emergent subject of transcendental idealism. It is 
reflective rationality, for Hegel, that splits subject from object, establishing 
distance between the self and the objects of its experience, and alienating self from 
world. He recognises that this diremption contributes to the development of life – 
and importantly, the self-consciousness of life – but he insists that this dualism 
between self and world is simply a moment on the path to truth, which requires the 
subsequent reconciliation of consciousness and being.65 This, in short, is his way of 
maintaining a commitment to subject-object non-identity: the fact that our 
experience of the world is different from our experience of ourselves, a duality that 
neither Kant nor Fichte can account for.  
 
 In short, Hegel is soliciting us to step back from our reliance on reflective 
rationality, on our commitments to subjectivity or objectivity, and instead attune 
ourselves to our practical relation to the world. For Kant, theoretical reason allows 
the self-conscious subject to make intelligible the appearances given to sensible 
intuition, and practical reason is exercised when the subject acts in the world, while 
for Fichte practical reason brings about subject-object identity in the objective 
world. For Hegel, on the other hand, practical reason is essentially retrospective: 
we can only know what has appeared to consciousness, and this knowledge is 
achieved by alienating self from world. Crucially then, Hegel rejects the 
Kantian/Fichtean view that reason should mediate the relation between self and 
world. If we are to maintain a commitment to subject-object non-identity and not 
fall into the problems associated with the Kantian/Fichtean overemphasis on the 
role of subjectivity, we have to remain open to the mind-independent real 
'appearing' to consciousness.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65. While Hegel follows Schelling in his adherence to Naturphilosophie and his positing subject-
object identity residing in the absolute as the ground of existence, there are two important 
differences between Hegel and Schelling that must be noted. Firstly, Hegel was unable to accept 
Schelling's notion that the absolute in which subject-object identity resided be regarded solely as 
the ground of existence, as this would reduce human beings to non-being, since as the finite 
particulars the implications is that humans non-essential as they contribute nothing to the substance 
of the absolute. Hegel contrarily wants subjective activity to be recognised as an integral part of the 
development of Geist, of human spirit, and so the absolute becomes both the ground and the result 
in his absolute idealism: the absolute starts as being 'in itself' and ends as being 'for itself' in self-
conscious subjectivity. In short, whereas Schelling provides an account of the development of 
consciousness from life, Hegel goes one step further to account for the self-consciousness of life. 
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Overcoming the Limitations of Reflective Rationality 
 
 As we saw, Hegel's response to the emergent subject of transcendental 
idealism is to insist that our mode of being in the world is not essentially as 
knowers, but as agents. For Hegelian self-conscious subjectivity is not a 
subjectivity of the Kantian/Fichtean type, but involves recognising the essential 
limitations of our own subjectivity. This recognition entails being open to an 
overcoming of the limitations of reflective rationality, being open to the 
reconciliation of thought and being, to the achievement of a living union between 
self and world. For Hegel it is the experience of love, an experience where thought 
and being are reconciled, that represents such an overcoming.  
 
 From an underlying unity of life the activity of the understanding erects 
oppositions between subject, object, and between objects (and subjects). As an 
experienced identity of subject and object, love is a step beyond the reifying effects 
of contemplative activity and thus constitutes a higher form of knowing. It 
transcends the divisions that the understanding establishes, reconciling subject and 
object in a broader unity-in-difference.66  
 
 While the philosophical or theoretical standpoint assumes the subject and 
object to be distinct from one another, and the moral or the practical standpoint 
demands that the subject dominate the object, in love subject-object unity is 
achieved: in love, we are at one with the object, which at the same time is not us. 
As an experienced identity of subject and object, love transcends these prior 
standpoints, annulling or overcoming the differences that are established by the 
understanding: '[love] is this feeling of unity of life, a feeling in which all 
oppositions, as pure enmities, and also rights, as unifications of still subsisting 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66. We will return to an extensive discussion of Hegel's notion of a 'unity-in-difference' and its 
relation to love in the next chapter. 
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oppositions, are annulled.'67 Love is thus a living, non-conceptual bond that reacts 
against the objectification of life through the adoption of philosophical or moral 
standpoints, which it transcends in order to achieve a mature unity of subject and 
object. As Frye puts it in Double Vision: 'the conscious subject is not really 
perceiving until it recognises itself as part of what it perceives. The whole world is 
humanised when such a perception takes place.'68  
 
 This is because in the love relationship, that which is encountered is not a 
subject or an object, but something unique and irreplaceable. While the self can 
stand towards the world in an open, loving way – Heidegger's discussion of the 
Rhine is an example – the love relation is perhaps easiest to comprehend as a 
relation to another person, to a singular and irreplaceable being.69 In both examples 
– in our relation to other persons and our relations to nature – these entities are 
reified and (figuratively) 'killed' by contemplative reflection because such a 
relation is constituted by a relation of 'subject' to 'object'. 
 
Since something dead here forms one term of the love relationship, love is girt by matter 
alone, and this matter is quite indifferent to it. Love's essence at this level, then, is that the 
individual in his innermost nature is something opposed [to objectivity]; he is an 
independent unit for whom everything else is a world external to him. That world is as 
eternal as he is, and, while the objects by which he is confronted change, they are never 
absent; they are there, and his God is there, as surely as he is here; this is the ground of his 
tranquility in face of loss and his sure confidence that his loss will be compensated, 
because compensation here is possible. [trans. note: i.e., what is lost at this level of thought 
is a material object and therefore something replaceable by something else.]70 
 
Sharing a concern to challenge views of the relation between self and world as 
relations of subjects to objects, what Hegel terms the 'love' relation bears striking 
affinities with the relation between self and world that Heidegger seeks to foster 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67. G.W.F. Hegel, “The Spirit of Christianity and Its Fate,” 278. 
68. Northrop Frye, The Double Vision: Language and Meaning in Religion, 23. 
69. In The Question Concerning Technology Heidegger contrasts technology's ‘challenging forth’ 
and poetry's ‘revealing.’ Technology's instrumental orientation to the world, where the world is 
turned into a ‘standing-reserve,’ and the human relation to the world becomes one of ‘enframing,’ is 
contrasted with poetic ‘revelation.’ Using the example of the Rhine, when a hydroelectric dam is 
built on the river, the meaning of the Rhine changes; it becomes an energy reserve. This is 
contrasted to the appearance of the Rhine in Höderlin's work, where it serves as a source of 
philosophical inspiration and cultural pride. Martin Heidegger, The Question Concerning 
Technology and Other Essays, trans. William Lovitt (New York: Harper & Row, 1977), 16. 
70. G.W.F. Hegel, “Fragment on Love,” in Early Theological Writings (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1971), 303. 
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with his notion of solicitous being-with. We saw in Chapter 4 that the latter is 
Dasein's authentic mode of being in the world, and leads to a genuine appropriation 
of human freedom. Similarly, the 'love' relation involves overcoming a theoretical 
attitude through engaged praxis – the intention of both is the same: to overcome 
the limitations and pernicious effects that each author regards as going hand in 
hand with a dualistic 'philosophical ontology'. Heidegger's primary target is 
Descartes, whereas Hegel's is Kant. 
 
 
Hegelian 'Phenomenology' 
 
 It would be easy to misunderstand Hegel's view that love leads to a 
reconciliation of self and world as something overly sentimental, romantic, or 
idealistic. We should not make this mistake. Hegel's conception of love is better 
understood as a proto-phenomenological approach to the relationship between self 
and world that recognises that the theoretical attitude serves to un-live human 
existence and to objectify the objects of its experience, including other persons. 
We have seen that for Hegel the mind-independent real 'appears' to consciousness, 
and that these appearances are understood retrospectively. We have also seen that, 
if we are to avoid the pernicious implications of the Kantian/Fichtean subject, we 
must be cognisant of the limitations of both our own subjectivity and of the 
limitations of reflective rationality – which means that we must leave ourselves 
open to experiencing the mind-independent real. It is this openness that Hegel is 
advocating when he is talking about the love relationship. The love relationship is 
a relationship of openness of self to self and self to other, a post-theoretical 
attunement to practical experience; a position that we now call phenomenology.71  
 
 
Phenomenology 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71. This is a key difference between Hegel's 'phenomenology' and Heidegger's phenomenology. 
Heidegger's phenomenology, his fundamental ontology, seeks a pre-theoretical approach to reality. 
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 Phenomenology is not simply a method, but is best understood as an attitude 
towards philosophical problems.72 For Scheler this attitude equates to a 'spiritual 
seeing,' while for Heidegger it involves being open to 'the event' through which 
Being is disclosed.73 Common to both is an attunement to original experience, an 
engagement with phenomena as phenomena, and an openness to experience that 
resists the assimilation of experience into a set of categories – resisting the 
presupposition of essences given a priori. 
 
 While widely attributed to Husserl, who believed and sometimes even 
claimed to have invented phenomenology, there are significant pre-Husserlian 
phenomenologists, including Kant, Fichte and Hegel.74 Phenomenology is broader 
than the epistemological domain because phenomenologists often regard 
knowledge claims to be a subset of a broader phenomenological domain – such as 
ontology or metaphysics – and as such 'phenomenology' may be traced back as far 
as Parmenides and Plato, who drew the distinction between appearance and reality. 
However, as an approach to knowledge, phenomenology goes back at least to 
Kant's epistemological concern with the construction of phenomena as 
distinguished from mere appearances; this then entails all the reformulations and 
rejections of Kant's approach as contributions to phenomenology, which includes 
Fichte, Hegel, Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty.75  
 
 Phenomenology takes on different meanings across these different angles but 
it retains its concern throughout with a distinctly practical relation to reality. In part 
due to his emphasis on practical reason (as embodied in Geist), over two hundred 
years later, Hegel's thought remains a good guide. Deriving from the Greek 
phenomenon (‘what appears’) ‘phenomenology’ is literally the study of phenomena 
present to our mind at the level of consciousness. As such, Hegel completes what 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72. On the misguided conception of phenomenology as a method see Tom Rockmore, Kant and 
Phenomenology, 189-90. 
73. Max Scheler, Selected Philosophical Essays (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 
1973), 137. 
74. The term appears for the first time in a book published by Kant's friend Lambert in 1764. Tom 
Rockmore, Before and After Hegel: A Historical Introduction to Hegel’s Thought, 87. 
75. For more on this see Tom Rockmore, Kant and Phenomenology. especially pp1-3 
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Kant's epistemology starts and, as a phenomenologist, is perhaps even more 
Kantian than Kant:  
 
Since Kant maintains that without doubt all our knowledge comes from experience, he 
opens the door wide to the possibility of knowledge that is not founded on experience [...] 
[although he later closes this door]. Hegel immediately closes the door on this possibility, 
or rather, he does not open it. According to Hegel, the only source of knowledge is 
experience, namely what appears on the level of consciousness. The difference, however, 
is clear. For where Kant speaks of experience, Hegel speaks of the experience of 
consciousness. He goes, hence, further than Kant, since he elucidates what his illustrious 
predecessor presupposes. According to Hegel, our experience of the external world is not 
something that remains external to us. For experience presupposes that its object is, so to 
speak, in consciousness.76  
 
 For Scheler, who describes philosophical thinking as 'a love-determined 
movement of the inmost personal self of a finite being toward participation in the 
essential reality of all possibles,' a properly phenomenological relation to the world 
is a loving one, an appropriate attitude that allows the proper disclosure of 
phenomenological facts.77 
 
 
Understanding Through Love, Not Vivisection 
 
 We can illustrate the phenomenological impulse and illuminate what Hegel is 
talking about with the love relationship with reference to Stanislaw Lem's science-
fiction novel, Solaris.78 The novel highlights anthropological limitations through 
an interaction between human beings and a higher sentience, 'Solaris,' where the 
protagonist, Kris Kelvin, a psychologist, is sent to a space station hovering above 
Solaris – a planet covered by an ocean that we soon discover is a single-planet 
encompassing sentient organism. The space station is host to scientists that have 
studied Solaris for decades, research that has yielded little more than the formal 
classification of phenomena occurring on the ocean surface. Shortly prior to 
Kelvin's arrival, the scientists embark on a more aggressive form of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76. Tom Rockmore, Before and After Hegel: A Historical Introduction to Hegel’s Thought, 88. 
77. Max Scheler, On the Eternal in Man, trans. Bernard Noble (New York: Harper & Brothers, 
1960), 74. 
78. Stanislaw Lem, Solaris (New York: Berkeley Books, 1982). The novel has inspired cinematic 
adaptations by both Andrei Tarkovsky (1972) and Stephen Soderbergh (2002). 
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experimentation by bombarding the planet with X-rays, which elicits a response 
from Solaris. 
 
 Solaris's sentience is beyond the reach of human understanding, but it 
attempts to communicate with the humans aboard the research station by reading 
their minds and constructing physical human simulacra from their memories. 
However, this attempt to communicate between two vastly different 
consciousnesses fails, exposing deeper, hidden aspects of the researcher's 
personalities in the process. One of the scientists is sent dwarves and strange 
creatures, and his response is to dissect them and experiment on them, which he 
justifies as essential to understanding the phenomena. Kelvin, however, is visited 
by a simulacra of his late wife, Rheya, who had killed herself after Kelvin had told 
her that he would leave her. Although aware that he is in fact communicating with 
Solaris and not with his wife, Kelvin falls in love with Rheya.  
 
 The novel serves to reveal the stark contrast between divergent responses to 
attempted communication from an unfamiliar consciousness. The scientist's 
dissection of the phenomena reflects the objectifying attitude of scientific inquiry, 
an attitude that kills the object of inquiry and perverts the subject (the scientist) 
into a monster, a lesser Dr Mengele. Kelvin, however, resists objectifying the 
phenomena that he experiences, a response that reflects the phenomenological 
attitude: what Hegel represents as the love relationship, and what Heidegger 
discusses as positive solicitude. In short, phenomenology seeks to understand 
through love, not vivisection.79 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79. My characterisation of phenomenology is an adaptation of a blog post on Solaris. See Phil Hall, 
“Solaris: Higher Sentience Communicates Through Love, Not Vivisection,” 
http://xuitlacoche.blogspot.com/2008/07/solaris-higher-sentience-communicates.html (accessed 
14/06/2012).  
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 In light of our previous discussion, we can now return to the broader 
argument that is being developed over the course of the thesis: that we are 
constitutively unable to build an emancipatory cosmopolitanism from dualist 
premises. The problem, to be precise, is foundational subject-object thinking, a 
dualism that characterises Linklater's emancipatory cosmopolitanism. Such 
thinking is both epistemological error and ontological insufficiency: it 
misunderstands the nature of the cognitive object as something that exists in the 
mind-independent real rather than something that we construct on the basis of our 
experiences, and it misrepresents our mode of being in the world by representing 
ourselves as subjects, rather than as self-conscious subjects cognisant of the 
limitations of the contemplative attitude, and open to the transcendence of 
reflective rationality through an attunement to practical experience: what Hegel 
understands as the love relationship, and Heidegger as engaged solicitous being-
with. 
 
 The problem is that treating individuality as coextensive with subjectivity 
establishes the individual a false independence and reifies the person into an 
object. Through an overemphasis on the constructive role of the subject, and 
failing to recognise the objectifying nature of reflective rationality, approaches to 
social inquiry proceeding from foundational commitments to subjectivity are 
unable account for subject-object non identity – that is, the independence of the 
thing in itself – and leads to a conception of the self that stands in a transcendent 
and assimilatory relation to the objects of its experience. By failing to account for 
the independence of the mind-independent real, the Kantian/Fichtean subject de-
reifies the objects of its experience, leading to a conception of the human being 
where the self strives to bring the phenomena it encounters into conformity with its 
own moral law through the exercise of practical reason. This, we contend, is a 
central aspect of what we have called a politics of subjectivity: a politics that 
follows from a foundational commitment to the individual conceived as subject. 
Such a foundational commitment to subjectivity thus unwittingly leads dualist 
approaches to social inquiry into the terrain of hegemony and domination. 
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 The trick then must be to situate subject-object thinking; this is the task of 
philosophy. Hegel's challenge to dualism, for instance, solicits us to different 
understandings of the cognitive object, the self, the relation between self and 
world, and the nature and limitations of reflective rationality. For Hegel, we saw, 
the cognitive object is not represented by the epistemological subject, but is 
constructed on the basis of the mind-independent real appearing to consciousness. 
From these phenomena that appear to consciousness we construct the cognitive 
object; although corresponding entities exist in the mind-independent real, the 
cognitive object itself does not, but is instead constructed through 'the interaction 
between human beings situated within the historical process in which we come to 
know the world and ourselves.'80 Consequently, rather than being established 
through a simple correspondence between mind and mind-independent real, 'truth,' 
'objectivity,' subject-object unity, or what Hegel calls 'absolute knowledge,' is 
never fully achieved, but is perpetually deferred in an ongoing process within 
consciousness whereby increasingly adequate accounts of reality emerge; a process 
that transforms both subject and object.  
 
 Following a comprehensive survey of phenomenological thought, which, 
despite his claim, does not begin with Husserl, Rockmore concludes that Hegel's 
'constructivist strategy, which is routinely overlooked in phenomenological circles, 
is arguably the best such approach we currently possess.'81 He explains that Hegel's 
view of knowledge is constructivist in three senses: 
 
[F]irst, knowledge arises in an ongoing historical process in which we construct 
conceptual frameworks based on prior experience that we test against later experience. 
Second, we routinely alter these frameworks when they fail to fit experience; and to alter 
the framework alters the conceptual object. Third, since cognitive objects depend on the 
conceptual framework, a change in the framework results in a change in the object.82 
 
Proceeding from the view that 'knowledge does not concern the world in itself but 
the world for us,' Hegel's approach situates knowledge within the historical process 
and subordinates knowledge construction to the interaction between human 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80. Tom Rockmore, Kant and Phenomenology, 215. 
81. Ibid., 213. 
82. Ibid. 
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beings.83 Reality, what we consider to be 'real,' emerges out of these relations, and 
there are thus irrevocably plural and historical dimensions to 'subjectivity.'  
 
 In contrast to kaleidoscopic readings of Hegel, such as those of Habermas 
and Linklater, who read into Hegel an individualism in order to recover a 
commitment to moral cognitivism, Hegel's phenomenological approach to the 
construction of knowledge means that we simply cannot hold fast to an 
understanding of the individual as subject. Rather, as a knowing and acting being, 
the individual can instead be understood as potentially a self-conscious subject 
who is cognisant of the limitations of contemplative activity and who remains open 
and attuned to practical experience. In relations between persons, so as not to slip 
back into a form of object-oriented consciousness, a form of consciousness that the 
account of the master and slave serves to disrupt, we suggested that other persons 
are best thought as singularities. 
 
 Understanding the human being as a self-conscious subject or singularity 
involves treating ourselves as cognitive objects, as something that can be known. 
This represents a move beyond the foundational/anti-foundational divide in 
normative theory, providing a response to Cochran's claim that we must resign 
ourselves to pragmatic critique; a response that follows in the spirit of Nancy's 
claim that there is a common measure, which is not a common standard applied to 
everyone and everything, but 'the commensurability of incommensurable 
singularities.'84  
 
 We saw that Linklater's commitment to foundational subjectivity involves 
treating the human being as a mind-independent object, which serves as the ground 
for his emancipatory cosmopolitanism, and that Cochran's anti-foundationalism 
denies the validity of this strategy. Later in Chapter 3 we then suggested that both 
foundationalist and anti-foundationalist strategies involved obscuring the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83. Ibid., 215. 
84. Jean-Luc Nancy, Being Singular Plural (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), 75. See 
also Nick Vaughan-Williams, “Beyond a Cosmopolitan Ideal: The Politics of Singularity,” 
International Politics 44 (2007), 122. 
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ontological difference between entities and the being of entities; that is, while 
human beings clearly exist independent of our knowledge of them, the being of 
those beings does not. Our determination of the being of human beings as ethical 
subjects, for instance, is dependent on a particular interpretation of the nature of 
human beings that is projected onto them. We saw in Chapter 4 that Heidegger's 
concern is to ensure that the being of beings remain open to contestation, that we 
do not treat our regional ontologies of the person as general ontologies. Hegel's 
constructivist epistemology can help us develop this further.  
 
 Ontological claims about the nature of a being's existence are simultaneously 
epistemological claims because they entail the supposition to know that this claim 
is true. The problem with foundationalist approaches to normative theory is that 
they usually presuppose the truth of their understanding of the being of beings: that 
they (the subject) are representing the nature of human beings (the object) 'as it 
really is'. With the aid of Heidegger we have argued that this is simply not the case, 
and that we project interpretations of the being of beings onto human beings in 
general on the basis of our own particular (subjective) experiences. An example 
would be to interpret ethical subjectivity as the essential being of human beings. 
 
 The mistake made by many foundationalists, including Linklater, is to fail to 
recognise that such an interpretation of the being of human beings is in fact a 
construction of the human being as a cognitive object – one that remains dependent 
on historically and socially conditioned (i.e., particularist) conceptual frameworks 
(such as a mechanist paradigm of nature and a Kantian/Fichtean conception of the 
self as subject) – rather than an unbiased representation of the human being as a 
mind-independent 'thing'. It is this mistake that anti-foundationalists rightly call 
our attention to. 
 
 Nonetheless, their skepticism often leads anti-foundationalists to resign 
themselves to pragmatic critique or liberal postmodern irony, for instance. The 
oversight here is to fail to recognise that there can be better or worse accounts of 
the nature of human existence. By conceiving the human being as both mind-
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independent entity and mind-dependent cognitive object, with the being of human 
beings an aspect of our understandings of human beings as cognitive object, 
Hegel's constructivist approach to knowledge can lead us out of this impasse. 
 
 From the Hegelian perspective developed here, accounts of the being of 
human beings would not be evaluated according to their correspondence with the 
mind-independent real (whether they represent the thing in itself), but with the 
degree to which they accord with our experience, and/or according to their political 
and ethical consequences – such as their contribution to human freedom, for 
example. For instance, by proceeding from a foundational commitment to the 
ethical subject, Linklater's critical approach to international theory (including his 
criticism of neo-realism and his agenda for the triple transformation of political 
community) can be judged favourably since it can contribute to the development of 
states of affairs that are more conducive to human freedom. Nonetheless, it can 
also be criticised as an insufficiently universalistic foundation, and for potentially 
undermining his commitment to emancipation for the reasons given earlier.  
 
 We can then attempt to further the debate by engaging in a philosophical 
ontology of the human being, provided that we recognise that these interpretations 
of the being of human beings are essentially perspectival and must be left open to 
contestation rather than providing the foundation for a form of universalism. 
Consequently, rather than simply rejecting the foundationalist claim that human 
beings are ethical subjects, by specifying that our interpretations of the being of 
human beings can be regarded as contributions to an understanding of the human 
being as a constructed cognitive object, Hegel's constructivist epistemology can 
lead us out of this impasse. 
 
 Our philosophical ontology of the human being as singularity or subject is a 
contribution to such a task, responding to both the foundational/anti-foundational 
divide and Behr's call for more universalistic ontology(ies) for global ethics and 
politics. The respective epistemology is a phenomenological constructivism, which 
is considered to be a more fruitful phenomenological approach to knowledge than 
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Michel's renewed focus on language, and which stresses the essential limitations of 
the contemplative attitude; emphasising instead the importance of a practical 
relation to reality. One of the central contentions of this philosophical ontology is 
the concern to avoid over-relying on subjectivity and reflective rationality as an 
arbiter of difference, since these commitments are constitutively unable to 
reconcile the divisions that they foster.  
 
 We saw that Hegel's insistence on a practical relation to reality, what he 
considers to be a loving relation between self and world, bears similarities with 
Heidegger's conclusion that an authentic (read ethical) relation to the other is not 
one in which subjective preconceptions are foisted upon them, but involves 
engaging in solicitous being with others. We saw, however, that Heidegger's 
weakness lay in the fact that he fails to provide for an account of the interpersonal 
conditions of self-hood and freedom. We caught a glimpse of how Hegel achieves 
this in our discussion of the interpersonal conditions of self-conscious subjectivity, 
but it is to a discussion of this point that we now turn.  
 
 Chapter 7.  
Exposure, Transcendence, and the Community of 
Fate 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 One of the central aims of the thesis is to contribute to the development of 
more universalistic ontological foundation for contemporary (global) politics and 
ethics, a task motivated by a left-Hegelian commitment to evaluate practices and 
institutions on the basis of a commitment to human freedom. This has seen us 
engage with the tradition of left-Hegelian thought in International Relations, most 
notably that of Andrew Linklater. We saw in Part 1 that Linklater's emancipatory 
cosmopolitanism relies on a commitment to a foundational ethical subject, where 
freedom is equated to the unhindered exercise of ethical subjectivity, a 
commitment reflected in his treatment of emancipation as the process by which 
that which negates the autonomy of the ethical subject is itself negated.  
 
 Chapter 3 discussed challenges to Linklater's association of freedom with 
subjectivity in more recent critical theory, where Brincat (following Honneth) 
shifts focus to the inter-subjective conditions of human freedom. Here, 
emancipation is no longer simply about the establishment of the political 
conditions for the non-contradiction of ethical subjectivity as it is in Kant, 
Habermas, and Linklater, but develops along a more Hegelian line, where 
emancipation is located in relations of intersubjectivity. However, we argued that, 
although a valuable contribution to the revival of the praxeological aspect of 
emancipation that remains largely recessive in Linklater's CIRT, Honneth and 
Brincat rely on a kaleidoscopic reading of Hegel as a theorist of intersubjectivity, 
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where recognition is mistakenly conceived as the confrontation between two 
independent subjects. We will demonstrate in this chapter that this reading of 
Hegel jettisons some of his most interesting and powerful ontological insights – 
insights into the nature of human existence and human freedom. 
 
 Later in Chapter 3 we discussed recent challenges to such a commitment to 
subjectivity in the work of Nancy and Odysseos, both of whom demonstrate the 
deeply co-existential and relational nature of individuality and subjectivity. Part 2 
deepened this insight through an exploration of Heidegger's general ontology of 
Being, whose existential analytic of human existence demonstrated that a 
commitment to a foundational subjectivity is misguided, and that approaches to 
sociality reliant on the notion of intersubjectivity involved abstracting from and 
subsequently objectifying sociality. We then learnt that Heidegger's engagement 
with Kant's understanding of freedom meant that an understandingof freedom as 
individual autonomy must itself be grounded in freedom understood as existential 
condition, where properly free and ethical relations with others cannot be relations 
predicated upon the projection of a substantive interpretation of the being of 
beings, but must be predicated on an engagement with others as others, which 
involves orienting ourselves in a way that encourages authentic mutual co-
disclosure between self and other.  
 
 Although such an aim is shared by Linklater, most clearly in his defence of 
universalism against Rorty's anti-foundationalism in Transformation, we saw that 
his argument for the universal responsibility to engage others in dialogue is 
predicated on the projection of an ethical subject, a morally deficient strategy as 
recognition was extended on the condition that the other appeared as an ethical 
subject. Further compounding this weakness, we saw in Chapter 5 that for Nancy it 
is precisely this commitment to a foundational subjectivity that constitutes the 
stumbling block to a thinking of community, and that hence, ironically, it is 
precisely this foundational commitment that establishes the impossibility of an 
authentic community, since the dialogic approach to ethical universality and moral 
inclusion precludes a genuine encounter with the other. 
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 In light of these prior discussions, the last chapter engaged with a reading of 
the development of the subject-object relation from Kant to Hegel with three main 
aims. Firstly, to destabilise readings of Hegel as a theorist of intersubjectivity, such 
as those of Habermas, Linklater, and Honneth; all of whom read Hegel through a 
kaleidoscope of the Kantian subject. Secondly, to outline the ontological and 
epistemological groundwork for the alternative emancipatory cosmopolitanism that 
will be developed in this chapter and the next; and finally, to provide a defence of 
Hegel as a theorist of self-conscious subjectivity.  
 
 This chapter develops the latter point, turning what has largely been an 
ontological and epistemological argument in an essentially ethical and 
emancipatory direction. In so doing, we substantiate the claims made in Chapter 1 
that Hegel's philosophy leads to a better way of conceiving human relationality 
(relations to other persons, to our worlds, and to ourselves) than can Linklater's 
reliance on Habermas's discursive account of moral reason. We also pick up and 
develop the claim made in Chapter 4 that, while the notion of resolute solicitous 
being with others has important implications for an account of inter-human 
recognition that does not purely operate at a cerebral level, that Heidegger's 
position lacks an account of the inter-personal conditions of freedom and 
individuality – a deficiency that he might have avoided had he been a better 
student of Hegel.  
 
 This chapter will continue the discussion of the inter-personal aspect of 
freedom as sociality initiated in Chapter 3: the aspect of freedom that is not simply 
associated with the autonomy of the individual, but is understood as practical 
engagement with others. However, with the aim of effecting a shift from 
conceiving the individual as an autonomous ethical subject to a recognition of the 
concrete interdependence of selves, our focus is on the inter-personal rather than 
inter-subjective aspects of freedom and individuality. It was suggested in the last 
chapter that Hegel's account of the master and slave in the Phenomenology 
essentially serves to disrupt object-oriented forms of consciousness, and leads to 
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the achievement of self-conscious subjectivity where the self becomes cognisant of 
the essential limitations of reflective rationality and attunes themselves to practical 
experience: to the appearance of the mind-independent real, where other 
consciousnesses (i.e., persons) are related to as singularities rather than subjects. 
This chapter engages with Hegel's account of the master and slave in greater depth, 
demonstrating the profoundly ethical and emancipatory aspects of this argument 
that are, by and large, obscured by kaleidoscopic readings of Hegel. 
 
 We saw that for Hegel it is love that represents an overcoming of the 
limitations of reflective rationality, representing a higher form of cognition where 
the duality between self and world is overcome. In this chapter we will see how the 
experience of love models the ethical logic of traversal between self and other, 
leading to the transcendence of subjectivity. We argue that this is not confined to 
the experience between two lovers, but that it provides us with both the personal 
experience of the co-existential nature of individuality, and an experience that can 
provide us with a model of more genuinely ethical and emancipatory relations with 
others than can the notion of intersubjectivity.  
 
 However, in order to distinguish it from Kant's model of freedom, where 
transcendence is the transcendence of the self conceived as ethical subject from its 
phenomenal experience, the suggestion is made that the model of self-other 
relations provided by the experience of love is better understood as a process of 
transgression rather than transcendence – where emancipation is thought as a 
process through which any prior determination of the self (subjectivity) is 
transcended, or better, overcome, through the concrete interaction between self and 
world. Understanding emancipation as a process of beings in their becoming, 
freedom is then thought as freedom-with rather than freedom-from, and the model 
of our radical dependency is love.  
 
 
The Argument of Chapter 7 
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 The central argument of this chapter is that properly ethical and 
emancipatory action is action that proceeds from the knowledge of love. By this 
what is meant is that the experience of love is an experience that can lead to a 
greater awareness of the nature of our existence as self-conscious beings, as 
individual selves who are dependent on others for the very constitution of our own 
subjectivity. This awareness solicits us to cultivate our practical relation to reality, 
and leads us to engage with others as others rather than as ethical subjects.  
 
 We first discuss the philosophy of love, coming to see love as an experience 
that can lead to an overcoming of object-oriented forms of consciousness to attain 
self-conscious subjectivity, where the self becomes fully cognisant of a living 
union between self and world, and leads to a more faithful attunement to reality 
and to the world of others. When we talk of the 'knowledge of love,' it is the 
knowledge of this experience to which we are referring, not knowledge of what 
love is, since we argue that love is not a substantial thing that we can know.  
 
 We see that Hegel's conception of love is best understood in this experiential 
way – as an open receptivity to otherness – and we learn that it plays a central role 
in the development of his thought; a role that, until recently, twentieth-century 
interpretations of his thought have obscured. This claim is substantiated through a 
discussion of Hegel's account of the master and slave. Although commonly 
interpreted as a treatise on the nature and possibility of freedom, this passage is 
principally about the re-cognitive structure of self-consciousness, serving to 
identify a radical mutual dependency of self on others for the constitution of self-
conscious subjectivity. This account of the nature of self-consciousness is 
modelled on the experience of love, by which is meant that the moves through 
which self-conscious subjectivity is established reflect the movement between self 
and other in loving relations, and the experience of both leads to a higher form of 
self-awareness: an awareness of myself as subject.  
 
 Whereas Linklater ultimately equates acting freely with acting morally, 
where individuals are most free when they act according to maxims that have been 
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subjected to the test of universalisability, our conception of self-conscious 
subjectivity leads both to a different conception of self-other relations, and an 
understanding of freedom as the transcendence of any prior determination of my 
subjective being through concrete interaction with others. Finally, we argue that 
self-conscious subjectivity involves cultivating an attunement to the existence of 
others where the existence of others becomes part of a deeper fabric of our own 
self-understandings, subsequently informing the way that we relate to ourselves, to 
others, and to our worlds. We represent this orientation through the notion of our 
participation with others in a community of fate, and argue that this self-conscious 
awareness of the relational constitution of our own individuality augments 
Heidegger's account of freedom as solicitous being-with others by demonstrating 
the profoundly inter-personal and cooperative basis for own freedom and self-
hood.  
 
 To pre-empt an obvious criticism: this is not an overly idealistic argument. 
We are not arguing that the establishment of a universal human community where 
all human beings relate to each other in this way is likely, or even necessary. In 
this sense we echo Linklater's recognition that the normative ideal of a universal 
discourse community is, at the limit, unattainable. Although recognising that there 
are significant obstacles to the realisation of these characteristically ethical and 
emancipatory relations, and that there are limits to what can be achieved by an 
emancipatory politics, our argument is that it is these relations that constitute both 
the fullest appropriation of our freedom and to properly ethical relations between 
self and other, and that this is what an emancipatory politics should be seeking to 
achieve.  
 
 
The Philosophy of Love 
 
The Metaphysics of Love 
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 Love has been a mainstay in philosophy at least since the early Greeks, and 
its discussion transcends many sub-disciplines, including metaphysics, 
epistemology, theology, politics and ethics. There are a variety of approaches to 
love ranging from the materialistic reduction to a physical phenomenon – an 
animalistic or genetic urge – to idealist conceptions of love as the construction of 
the mind that is the consequence of the body's release of endorphins, but also 
spiritualist conceptions that associate it with the touch of divinity. Most of these 
use Platonic and Aristotelian conceptions as a touchstone.1  
 
 Characterising it in the Symposium as a series of elevations, for Plato love 
starts with animalistic desire or base lust that is superseded by an intellectual 
conception of love, before this too is superseded by an almost theological love that 
transcends sensual attraction and mutuality.2 In contrast, Aristotle's Nicomachean 
Ethics offers a secular theory, where love is reflected in what he poetically 
described as 'two bodies and one soul.'3 In English the word 'love,' deriving from 
the Germanic form of the Sanskrit lubh (desire) is broadly defined and hence 
imprecise, which generates problems of definition and meaning. For this reason 
explorations often start with a discussion of the different shades, or 'natures' of 
love; shades that are discussed through the Greek terms eros, philia, and agape.4 
 
 Accompanied by its two companions, pathos (longing) and himeros (desire), 
eros refers to that aspect of love experienced as a passionate and intense desire for 
something, where the subject is driven toward the object; this is often conceived in 
sexual terms, leading to the modern notion of the erotic. Eros is conceived by Plato 
as desire that transcends the particular object. It is a desire for transcendental 
beauty rather than the beauty of a singular entity since 'the particular beauty of an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1. For a concise overview of behaviouralist, physical determinist, and expressivist approaches to 
love, see Alexander Moseley, “’Philosophy of Love’ Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy,” 
http://www.iep.utm.edu/love/. 
2. Plato, Plato’s Symposium, trans. Seth Benardete (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001). 
See also Allan Bloom, “The Ladder of Love,” in Plato’s Symposium (Chicago: Chicago University 
Press, 2001). 
3. Alexander Moseley, “Philosophy of Love.” 
4. As we shall see, the contention that love has a ‘nature’ would likely be disputed by Hegel, since 
it presupposes that love can be described in rational propositions; a form of cognition that love 
transcends. 
PART 3/Ch7. Exposure, Transcendence, and the Community of Fate 	  
301 
individual reminds us of true beauty that exists in the world of Forms or Ideas.'5 On 
this account, to love is to love the element of the ideal (true beauty) that the 
particular element (a person, or piece of art) possesses. The implication is that the 
object of love becomes interchangeable across people and things.  
 
 Contrasting with the yearning associated with eros, philia entails a fondness 
and appreciation of the object, and is a derivative of eros that Aristotle 
characterises as 'a sort of excess of feeling.'6 Philia is roughly captured by the 
English concept of 'friendship,' although for the Greeks it also incorporated loyalty 
to the family, to the polis, or to a job. Further distinguishing it from eros, philia 
entails reciprocity between the subject and object of philic love. For Aristotle, 
those with whom we share a philic love are only those who are worthy of it, and he 
suggests that there is therefore an objective basis for philia. For instance, we would 
share with them dispositions, and they would admire us appropriately as we admire 
them, etc. Although it is not necessarily equal, and parental love can involve a one-
sided fondness, reciprocity is the condition of Aristotelian love and friendship.7 
Aristotelian philia is a love of virtue. True lovers are those whom act out of virtue 
or the other's interest; all other relationships are ones of pleasure or utility.8  
 
 Drawing on elements of both eros and philia, for the Greeks at least, agape is 
the highest kind of love; a perfect kind of love that entails both the fondness of 
philic love and the passion and transcendence of the particular object of love in 
eros, as well as its non-requirement of reciprocity. Unlike philia, agape is not 
directed towards particular persons but to all of humanity, and it is later 
appropriated by Christian theology where it refers to the 'paternal love of God for 
man and man for God,' and to a brotherly love for all humanity. For this reason 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5. Ibid. 
6. Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, trans. David Ross (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 
VIII,6. 
7. Aristotle writes: 'In all friendships implying inequality the love also should be proportional, i.e. 
the better should be more loved than he loves.' Ibid., VIII, 7. 
8. C.F. Cheung, “Between Myself and Others: Towards a Phenomenology of the Experience of 
Love” (Paper presented at the Identity and Alterity: Phenomenology and Cultural Traditions, Hong 
Kong, 24th May 2005). 
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agape is most commonly associated with the Christian sense of love as giving.9 
The Biblical command to 'love thy neighbour as thyself' is a universalist command 
that, if necessary, may be unilateral since the onus is on the extension of love to 
others.10 That said, C.S. Lewis is misguided in his The Four Loves to claim agape 
as a specifically Christian virtue since all the world's great religions assume and 
teach the priority of love in religious practice.11  
 
 
The Experience of Love. 
 
'... the ultimate essence of love and hatred cannot be defined but only exhibited'  
Max Scheler 
 
 The problem with the Platonic, Aristotelian, and Christian understandings of 
love is that they focus on the object and finality of love rather than love as a 
phenomenon.12 The eros-philia-agape schema is not a description of what love 
actually is, but represents different attempts to prescribe meanings of what love 
ought to be and against which all love should be measured. The schema thus 
defines what I should love and how I should love it.13 These metaphysical accounts 
of love are misguided: there is no object of love, there is not a 'thing' that love is. 
Love is no-thing other than a movement, a lived experience. As Cheung notes, the 
question of what love is, is then a metaphysically misplaced question, because love 
is not a substance. 
 
Between myself and the beloved object, there is love. But, the being of love is in loving 
experience, i.e., my love for my mother is only meaningful if "loving my mother" is a 
lived experience (Erlebnis) for me. This love cannot be abstracted from the "I" who is 
loving my mother [...] I do not have something called love but I am loving something. This 
loving as an irreducible unique in-between lived experience is the phenomenon of love. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9. Alexander Moseley, “Philosophy of Love.” 
10. Matthew, 19:19; 22:39; Mark 12:31; Luke 10:27; Romans 13:9; Galatians 5:14; James 2:8 Ibid. 
11. C.S. Lewis, The Four Loves (Boston: Mariner Books, 1960). See John Templeton, Agape Love: 
A Tradition Found in Eight World Religions (Radnor: Templeton Foundation Press, 1999). The 
Buddhist example of Mettā ("loving-kindness," active interest in others) is a case in point. 
12. C.F. Cheung, “Between Myself and Others: Towards a Phenomenology of the Experience of 
Love,” 5. 
13. Ibid., 4. 
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The how of love as experienced by myself is phenomenologically more primordial than 
the reason or cause of love.14  
 
 Consequently, we should change our focus from the eidos to the ethos of 
love. Since even if love has a nature, the question remains as to whether we are 
able to understand it, whether love can be an object of our knowledge. We can 
perhaps catch glimpses of its essence as phenomena of our experience, meaning 
that it can be hinted at even if not ever fully understood in and of itself. Although 
fundamentally limited, this is the benefit of the eros-philia-agape schema, since it 
reflects several shades of love that are exhibited in different kinds of relationships: 
romantic love, love for friends, or love of photography, etc. Rather than imposing 
these prescriptive meaning onto experiences, however, we must suspend the 
definitional schema of agape-eros-agape in order to render the lived-experience of 
love more transparent. 
 
 
Love and Phenomenology 
 
 Towards the end of the last chapter we saw that Hegel considers 'love' to 
represent an overcoming of the standpoint of reflective rationality, an experience 
that represents a higher form of cognition through which the self becomes more 
attuned to practical experience and where that which is encountered is no longer 
simply a subject or an object. This is why we suggested that what Hegel calls 
'love,' the achieved reconciliation between self and world, is best understood not as 
something overly sentimental or romantic, but as a proto-phenomenological 
relationship between self and world. We also learnt that phenomenology is not 
simply a method, but is better understood as an attitude towards philosophical 
problems, an attunement to practical experience and an openness to experiencing 
prior to the assumption of a set of criteria or assimilation within a set of categories 
or conceptual scheme. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14. Ibid., 5. 
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 Since Plato, grasping the meaning or essence of an object has involved 
disengaging from the object, suspending that object's present and immediate 
existence in order that it may be grasped as it is 'in itself.' In contrast, 
phenomenology cultivates a shift in seeing so that the world is no longer taken for 
granted, as is the assumption in treating something as a given object, but is 
regarded critically and engaged with practically. Importantly, the 
phenomenological attitude does not simply reject the objectification of the world, 
where entities are treated as objects, but holds this objectified world in abeyance 
out of a love of the world.15  
 
 Following both Augustine and Hegel, love is taken by Scheler as the 
foundation of knowledge, and hence an affective and emotional life to be the 
foundation of a rational one: '[b]efore the world is known, it is first given. The 
loving human being is this openness to the world, to that which is other.'16 Love is 
often derided as a way of acting in the world, and a more rational, objective way of 
looking at the world is seen to be more appropriate since it helps us see how the 
world 'really is.' However, perhaps we are blinded to the full mystery, depth and 
singularity of other people by the standpoint of dispassionate objectivity; perhaps it 
is our overemphasis on rationality that is the mistake, and perhaps love is the 
expression of a more faithful attunement to a world of others, one that makes a 
more honest and faithful encounter with the world possible. As Wirzba and Benson 
write: 
 
Love makes it possible for us to receive the world as it is rather than as we want or wish it 
to be. Love enables us to resist the (often violent) integration of others into the sameness 
and comfort of the thinker's world. It acknowledges in a way that no other disposition or 
activity can the integrity and the mystery of existence.17 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15. Zachary Davis and Anthony Steinbock, Max Scheler, Winter 2011 ed., The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2011/entries/scheler/, 2011). 
16. Ibid. Referring to Max Scheler, Gesammelte Werke (Bonn: Bouvier Verlag, 1986), V,83. 
17. Norman Wirzba and Bruce Ellis Benson, Transforming Philosophy and Religion: Love’s 
Wisdom (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008), 18. 
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Hegel and Love. 
 
 It is in light of these latter dimensions of love that Hegel's conception of love 
is best understood. Love, for Hegel, is not an object but an experience of 
essentially connected yet differentiated forms of life, which is best represented as 
an experience through which the self overcomes the limitations of object-oriented 
forms of consciousness to achieve the recognition of a living union between self 
and world. We have seen that for Hegel reflective rationality reifies life into 
subjects and objects, and can therefore only capture external relations between 
things. Consequently, reason is an essentially limited way of understanding 
relations towards and between living entities, as it is constitutively unable to grasp 
the mutually conditioned nature of the relation between subject and object: reason 
simply cannot capture the unity-in-difference that is, for Hegel at least, the 
structure of life.  
 
 Proceeding from an underlying unity of life, the understanding splits this 
unity into subject and object so that we may rationally represent the objects of our 
experience and gain knowledge of them. The exercise of rationality therefore 
alienates ourselves from the worlds in which we are immersed. This raises us 
above our immediate existences, a process that is essential for the development of 
knowledge and our self-conscious freedom. This relative independence of self and 
world, however, is easily misconstrued – and the self might come to think of itself 
as independent from nature and other persons, such as in the case of the 
Kantian/Fichtean subject, for instance.  
 
 This misunderstanding, however, is self-defeating and cannot be sustained 
because it involves a self-defeating logic that we see play out in the account of the 
interaction of object-oriented forms of consciousness in the account of the master 
and slave. For this reason, an object-oriented form of consciousness must itself be 
transcended. This transcendence is not achieved by further abstraction, but through 
a reconnection between self and world. This higher form of cognition requires that 
the self takes a step beyond the reifying nature of contemplative activity to achieve 
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self-conscious subjectivity, whereby a living relation between self and world is re-
experienced, and the self recognises both its fundamental difference, and its 
essential connection, to the rest of life: both physical processes of life, and the life 
of Geist.  
 
 Love's recognition of a 'unity-in-difference' thus aims to capture the nature 
of living relations between parts and whole: a dynamic that cannot be captured 
wholly conceptually because these relations have no static structure or form, but 
consist in fluid relations to that to which is not-me, but to which I am nonetheless 
essentially bound.18 This recognition most certainly does not require a cancellation 
or levelling of difference, nor a simple transcendence of difference through 
abstraction. Rather, 'unity-in-difference' aims to reflect that the independence and 
autonomy of parts, such as individual human beings, cannot be thought in 
separation from their respective wholes, and that at the same time, these wholes are 
nothing without their parts. Although fundamentally connected to these wholes, 
there is an essential non-identity between part and whole: a non-identity that is the 
essential condition of that whole. For instance, the self is essentially located within 
communities, but these communities are nothing without the selves that comprise 
them. The 'structure' of unity-in-difference is therefore an immense contradiction: a 
contradiction that the understanding simply cannot resolve, because it wants 
relations to be either external relations between subjects and objects, or for the 
parts to be fully immersed within (and thus subordinate to) a broader unity, but as 
self-conscious living beings, we are both.19 
 
 
The Role of Love in Hegel's Thought. 
 
 First appearing early in his career during his Frankfurt years, in his Fragment 
on Love (1797/1798) and in The Spirit of Christianity and its Fate (1799), love 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18. Just as Heidegger's 'being-in-the-world,' is hyphenated, 'identity-in-difference' or 'unity-in-
difference,' is hyphenated to denote that this recognition is a unitary phenomenon. 
19. J.M. Bernstein, “Phenomenology of Spirit. Lordship and Bondage,” Lectures on Hegel’s 
Phenomenology of Spirit The New School. New York City. 8th November (2006): 
http://bernsteintapes.com/lectures/Hegel/19MasterSlaveA.mp3. 
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plays a formative role in the development of Hegel's thought; three of Hegel's most 
important ideas first emerge in these essays: his organicist conception of freedom, 
his dialectical logic (the mutually conditioned nature of the relation between 
subject and object), and his notion of ethical life (Sittlichkeit). Responding to 
Kant's duality between freedom and nature, where freedom is thought of as the 
freedom of the subject and the object as a limitation on the subject's freedom, 
Hegel reworks the Kantian model of self and world. Here, the freedom of the self 
is worked into a true freedom of the infinite, where the opposition between subject 
and object is reworked into a living, mutually conditioned union of subject and 
object in Geist, and the interaction between subject and object is governed by a 
dialectical rather than a transcendental logic. Kant's transcendental morality, 
governed by the categorical imperative, is thus situated within and subordinated to 
the immanent structure of ethical life, and this leads to Hegel's well-known 
distinction between Moralität and Sittlichkeit. All three of these responses to Kant 
are based on the experience of love. Both love and freedom are defined by Hegel 
as 'being with oneself in the other,' his dialectical logic is based upon the 'logic' of 
love, and the experience of love is the experience of ethical life in its most basic 
form. All three of these concepts developed in his Early Theological Writings are 
central to the development of his subsequent thought.  
 
 
The Reception of Hegel  
 
 Marxist appropriations of Hegel justifiably endorse the view of him as the 
'pre-eminent philosopher of reconciliation.' However, they primarily read him as a 
'philosopher of the concept', where the 'immature' metaphysics of his early 
theological writings are superseded by a 'mature' analysis of the dialectical logic of 
reason. Frankfurt School theorists such as Habermas, for instance, affirm Hegel's 
commitment to the essential role that reason plays in the attainment of moral 
autonomy and progress. Habermas follows Hegel in understanding reason as 
having a historical and progressive core, thus supporting the emancipatory 
possibility that human individuals thought as subjects may involve themselves in 
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the creation of their own world from a critical and rationalist perspective. In so 
doing, Habermas reads the movement of Hegel's thought as a development from 
the standpoint of love to the standpoint of reason. It is this reading of Hegel that 
characterises Linklater's appropriation of his thought.  
 
 There are understandable historical reasons why this rationalist aspect of 
Hegel's thought has been emphasised. The Hegel renaissance of the mid to late 19th 
century took great interest in Hegel's early metaphysics of life, a metaphysics that 
played a role in the development of the Lebensphilosophie (life-philosophy) of 
Schopenhauer and Nietzsche.20 Yet the emphasis that Lebensphilosophie placed on 
vitalism and renewal is believed to have been complicit in the promise of a 
reinvigoration of the German spirit prior to the Great War, and this subsequently 
led to Rosenzweig's infamous disavowal of Hegel in the introduction of his 
doctoral thesis Hegel and the State prior its submission in 1920/21.  
 
 In the English-speaking world Hegel's thought was primarily represented by 
the British Idealists, against whom the analytic tradition emerged as a revolt.21 
Subsequently the opinions of writers such as Russell and Popper, whose 
accusations that Hegel was an enemy of freedom and a totalitarian were as off the 
mark as they were influential, prejudiced a whole generation of analytic 
philosophy against Hegel. This prejudice went largely without challenge for over 
half a century, as a generation of post-War German philosophers were keen to 
resuscitate those elements of their beleaguered tradition that were not tarnished 
with any association to a proto-fascistic irrationalism, and that were at least 
compatible with key strands of analytic philosophy.22  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20. See, for example, Dilthey's biography of the young Hegel Wilhelm Dilthey, Die 
Jugendgeschichte Hegels Und Andere Abhandlungen Zur Geschichte Des Deutschen Idealismus 
(Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1990). 
21. See David Boucher, ed. The British Idealists (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); 
David Boucher and Andrew Vincent, British Idealism and Political Theory (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 2000). 
22. Axel Honneth, Disrespect: The Normative Foundations of Critical Theory (London: Polity, 
2007), 164. 
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 The consequence is that, during the last century at least, people writing about 
Hegel have consistently emphasised the developmental understanding of reason in 
his writings, suppressing the role of love. However, Hegel's 'absolute' – absolute 
knowledge and absolute spirit – is achieved through a recognition that is not given 
wholly conceptually but is based instead upon a reconciliation of concept and 
being, where the latter operates as the privileged signifier. Because of this, 
'secularised,' 'demythologised,' or 'pragmatic' interpretations of Hegel ultimately 
elevate reason to a position from which Hegel consistently and insistently displaces 
it, effectively severing or 'killing' the living relationship between subject and 
object, self and world, that is absolutely central to Hegel's thought. Consequently, 
this dominant interpretation of Hegel is at best debatable, and, as is the opinion of 
this author, may even be fundamental distortion of Hegel's thought.23  
 
 What is at stake here is nothing less than a recognition of the proper nature of 
the relationship between self and world, the role of praxis, and the questionable 
authority of reason (along with its essential limitations). Fortunately though, there 
are several recent attempts to redress this interpretation of Hegel, Jay Bernstein 
(1994;2003) and Alice Ormiston (2002;2004) are the most significant of these, but 
Richard Beardsworth (2006) and Laura Werner (2007) are also worthy of note.24 
These all see in Hegel's early writing a potentially radical way of conceptualising 
self-other relations that is not effectively reflected in the 'demythologised,' 
'secular,' and 'mature' readings of Hegel.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23. An argument might even be made that the emphasis on the sovereignty of reason in rationalist 
interpretations of Hegel actually contributes to the totalitarian charges made against him by Popper. 
On this rationalist view, universality is something that might be achieved: hence the part can 
ultimately be subordinated to the whole, as opposed to recognising that our ‘universals’ are always 
conditioned and incomplete; our concepts constituted by a Derridean 'trace,' a constitutive exclusion 
or blind-spot. Such a realisation enjoins us to recognise the essentially limited nature of our 
understandings. 
24. J.M. Bernstein, “Conscience and Transgression: The Persistence of Misrecognition,” Bulletin of 
the Hegel Society of Great Britain 29 (1994): 55-70; J.M. Bernstein, “Love and Law: Hegel’s 
Critique of Morality,” Social Research: An International Quarterly 70, no. 2 (2003): 393-431. 
Alice Ormiston, “”The Spirit of Christianity and Its Fate:” Towards a Reconsideration of the Role 
of Love in Hegel,” Canadian Journal of Political Science 35, no. 3 (2002): 499-525; Alice 
Ormiston, Love and Politics: Re-Interpreting Hegel (New York: SUNY Press, 2004). Laura 
Werner, “The Restless Love of Thinking: The Concept of Liebe in Hegel’s Philosophy” (Ph.D 
Thesis, University of Helsinki, 2007). Richard Beardsworth, “A Note to a Political Understanding 
of Love in Our Global Age,” Contretemps (2006). 
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The Struggle For Recognition  
 
 We saw in the previous chapter that, in contrast to the Kantian/Fichtean 
foundational subject that remains unconditioned by the objects of its experience, 
the Hegelian subject is one that is transformed in its interactions with the objects of 
its experience: it is a subject that does not persist, but is one that is transformed 
through action. In Butler's words, Hegel's subject is an 'ek-static' subject.25 Further 
deepening this account of Hegelian subjectivity – in contrast to self-conscious 
subjectivity simply arising purely from the persistence over time of the TUA 
(Kant), or from the practical activity of the 'pure ego' (Fichte) – for Hegel self-
conscious subjectivity is an achievement. This achievement is modelled in the 
account of the master and slave, an encounter initiated when an object-oriented 
form of consciousness encounters another object-oriented form of consciousness: 
when two Kantian/Fichtean 'subjects' collide.26 To be clear, this is not an account 
of the interaction of two independent self-conscious subjects demanding 
recognition from each other (Honneth), but is about the achievement of 
differentiated self-conscious subjectivities by the respective protagonists.  
 
 Although the outcome of this struggle is mutual recognition between self-
conscious subjects, this is only the non-vital end of the struggle.27 It is non-vital 
because mutual recognition between free beings is simply a compromise solution.28 
To be treated as autonomous, free, beings is what both the master and the slave 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25. Judith Butler, Subjects of Desire: Hegelian Reflections in Twentieth-Century France (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1999), xv. 
26. Hegel's account of the master and slave is found in the section of the Phenomenology of Spirit 
on 'Lordship and Bondage,' commonly referred to as the master-slave dialectic or the struggle for 
recognition. G.W.F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A.V. Miller (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1977), §§178-96. 
27. J.M. Bernstein, “Phenomenology of Spirit. Lordship and Bondage,” Lectures on Hegel’s 
Phenomenology of Spirit The New School. New York City. 8th November (2006): 
http://bernsteintapes.com/lectures/Hegel/20MasterSlaveB.mp3. 
28. The struggle for recognition is commonly read as a discourse on the nature and possibility of 
human freedom, but the establishment of subjective freedom is only the non-vital end of this 
struggle. For a reading of this passage as a treatise on the nature and possibility of freedom see  
Robert B. Pippin, “What is the Question for Which Hegel’s Theory of Recognition is the Answer?,” 
European Journal of Philosophy 8, no. 2 (2000): 55-172. 
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want: it is their desire for absolute independence, subjectivity, that draws them into 
the struggle in the first place.29 Treating each other as if they were subjects is a way 
of resolving the ensuing struggle between life and death. The 'subjects' that face 
each other make claims of freedom on one another, and ultimately resolve to 
recognise each other as subjects; this is freedom as sociality. Freedom as 
independence is problematic because it is part of a fantasy of freedom, the fantasy 
that freedom is absolute independence from all conditionality.30 Hegel's move is to 
reroute freedom and argue that it is only within dependent relations with others that 
we can establish any independence.31 Importantly though, mutual recognition is a 
way of mediating the fact that we are absolutely dependent on the other, and 
consequently, our independence can only ever be a relative independence, relative 
to the others on whom we depend.  
 
 Freedom is the non-vital end of the struggle for recognition because the 
outcome of the account of the master and slave is not simply about the 
'intersubjective' conditions of 'subjectivity' (purposefully written without the 
strikethrough), but is the achievement of self-conscious subjectivity; achieving 
awareness of the fact that the self is not a subject. The self-conscious subject 
establishes itself as an independent entity, but at the same time recognises that its 
subjectivity is dependent on others. Recognition is, therefore, a union of 
separateness and connectedness: it leads to the recognition that we are both 
absolutely dependent on the other for their recognition, and at the same time, 
absolutely independent of them. In short, the self-conscious subject achieves a 
recognition of their unity-in-difference. Self-consciousness – becoming aware of 
the nature of our own existence, what we actually are, and our mode of being in the 
world – involves recognising this unity-in-difference, recognising our simultaneous 
dependence and independence on others. 
  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29. J.M. Bernstein, “Phenomenology of Spirit. Lordship and Bondage. (B).” 
30. Ibid. 
31. Ibid. 
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Love and Recognition: The Three Moments of the Re-cognitive Structure of 
Self-Consciousness32 
 
 In short, what is being explored in the account of the master and slave is the 
re-cognitive structure of self-consciousness. Becoming self-conscious, gaining a 
higher level of self-awareness about the nature of our own individual existences as 
human beings, as selves, involves overcoming object-oriented forms of 
consciousness by realising that I am not a Kantian/Fichtean subject, and that I am 
fundamentally and irrevocably reliant on others for the constitution of my own 
subjectivity. In other words, that my own freedom and my self-understandings are 
not purely own to me, but depend on the others with whom I interact.  
 
 There are three moments to this achievement, which are modelled on the 
experience of love. Although stating that 'there are no parts, moments, types or 
stages of love [...] only an infinity of shatters,' Nancy's discussion of the movement 
of love mirrors the three moments of the re-cognitive structure of self-
consciousness discussed in Hegel's account of the master and slave, and dividing 
Nancy's account of the movement of love into these moments can help us to better 
grasp what Hegel is getting at in this part of the Phenomenology.33  
 
 Love is, for Nancy, 'the extreme movement, beyond the self, of a being 
reaching completion,' which he later restates in Hegelian terms as 'having in an 
other the moment of one's subsistence.'34 The first moment of love is that I do not 
wish to exist as an independent person in my own right, since as this independent 
existent I feel deficient and incomplete; in the second moment I then find myself 
through the recognition of another person, and they find theirs in me. The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32. The discussion in this section follows Nancy's discussion in: Jean-Luc Nancy, “Shattered 
Love,” in A Finite Thinking (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003). And Bernstein's discussion 
in J.M. Bernstein, “Early Theological Writings,” Lectures on Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit The 
New School. New York City. 20th September (2006): 
http://bernsteintapes.com/lectures/Hegel/06EarlyTheologicalWritingD.mp3; J.M. Bernstein, 
“Phenomenology of Spirit. Lordship and Bondage. (a).”; J.M. Bernstein, “Phenomenology of Spirit. 
Lordship and Bondage. (B).” 
33. Jean-Luc Nancy, “Shattered Love,” in A Finite Thinking (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
2003). 
34. Ibid., 249. 
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combination of these two moments leads to the third moment, which is the 
achievement of the recognition of unity-in-difference. This will now be unpacked.  
 
 Because love is essentially other-regarding, the first moment of love can be 
referred to as the moral moment of love.35 Our experience of finding our own 
meaning or truth in the love-object means that loving something is accompanied by 
a feeling of being dispossessed of exclusive self-regard. The lack of reciprocity 
here between the subject and the object of love shows that this is not a form of self-
love, which is why this constitutes love's moral moment. The second moment is 
the logical aspect of love. Should the other return my love, I then find my 
fulfilment in them and they find theirs in me; by finding fulfilment in the other, the 
self lacks nothing, life has run the circle of development to a completely mature 
unit of self and other. It is this moment that Nancy refers to in his definition of love 
as the movement, beyond the self, of a being reaching completion. Since in this 
moment, love neither restricts nor is restricted: it is not finite, between self and 
other there is no exteriority, no external restriction.36 
 
 The third moment of love is a combination of these two prior moments, in 
which I recognise a unity-in-difference with that which is not-me. This recognition 
entails the renunciation of my absolute autonomy and the recognition of my 
connection to the other, but simultaneously recognising that the other remains 
absolutely independent, and will die proving this independence.37 This aspect of 
love equates to the experience of being 'broken,' and of being constituted by this 
exposure. This 'break' should not be confused with being damaged or faulty, 
because being 'broken,' being exposed to the existence of others, is what makes us 
human. It is only the narcissist who clings to their absolute independence.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35. Ibid., 258. 
36. This is what Hegel means by 'infinite,' for example, when he says that, in love, finite life is 
raised to infinite life: 'The partial character of the living being is transcended in religion; finite life 
raises to infinite life.' G.W.F. Hegel, “Fragment of a System,” in Early Theological Writings 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971), 313. 
37. J.M. Bernstein, “Phenomenology of Spirit. Lordship and Bondage. (a).” 
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 This unity-in-difference does not require a spontaneous one-ness of will: the 
self is still a self, an independent agent, but it does realise that this independence is 
only relative, and that absolute independence, subjectivity, is illusory. The other 
remains other because I cannot make it will things. Although I can will its will and 
desire its desire, I cannot force either: I cannot get ahold of the other's freedom. If I 
am lucky the other can will what I will and desire what I desire, and in this case I 
am united with the other, and them with me. However, the other can stop loving 
me at any time, and so remains and must remain other: it cannot be dominated by 
either force or reason. This is why love is an immense contradiction that the 
understanding simply cannot resolve: the understanding demands either internal 
relations or external relations, it wants me to be either in myself (separate) or 
immersed in this unity (from which I cannot separate myself from), but I am both, 
and there is no whole either holistically or atomistically.38 
 
 
Unity-in-Difference: Emerson's Experience 
 
 We can readily admit that this discussion is not a straightforward one, and 
the notion of recognising a unity-in-difference with something that is not-me does 
seem foreign. But we can illuminate our discussion of love as the image of our 
radical dependency, and its distinction from a model of self-other relations based 
upon the subject, through a brief discussion of Ralph Waldo Emerson's essay, 
Experience.  
 
 Emerson published two collections of essays, the first series in 1841 and the 
second in 1844. Preceding the first was the death of his first wife Ellen in 1831. 
The nature of Emerson's response to Ellen's death is reflected in the themes of his 
first collection. These themes, best illustrated in the 1841 essay Circles, included 
nature's forgetfulness, an overcoming of the past through casting off, and the 
transcendence of pain and suffering by severing his relations to her. Essentially, 
Circles sees Emerson responding to Ellen's death through acts of Stoic resignation 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38. Ibid. 
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where he sheds his past and establishes himself as autonomous from it; an 
individualism that is carried over to a fourth theme of the collection, the possibility 
of self-perfection, where solace is sought by carrying the self to its highest possible 
achievement.39  
 
 Preceding Emerson's second series of essays published in 1844 was the death 
of his five-year-old son Waldo in 1842. Emerson is unable to react to his son's 
death as he did to Ellen's, and this bind is reflected in his second collection in 
which he adopts a radically different attitude to the autonomous individuality that 
characterises the first: an attitude of embracing rather than forgetting; of relations 
rather than individuality; and of mature acceptance rather than adolescent 
rebellion.40  
 
 This shift in attitude is due to the fact that Emerson's stoicism simply does 
not work with the passing of his son. He can neither forget Waldo, nor transcend 
the experience of his death. Because he cannot achieve a visceral understanding of 
Waldo's death, Emerson simply cannot comprehend the death of his son, and is 
thus unable to pass through the experience to the other side. Waldo's ghost haunts 
him.41 There is 'no scar' from Waldo's death, there was no ripping apart; no 
separation. Emerson writes '[s]ome thing which I fancied was a part of me, which 
could not be torn away without tearing me, nor enlarged without enriching me, 
falls off from me, and leaves no scar. It was caducous.'42 Emerson is saying to 
himself that, if love was what he thought it was, which is what every lover, every 
parent thinks love is, then he could not have survived this death; because they were 
one. Yet he survived. And that is his terror: that he is absolutely separate.43 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39. Ralph Waldo Emerson, Selections From Ralph Waldo Emerson (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 
Company, 1960). Stephen Barnes, “Emerson: Death and Growth” (Paper presented at the Society 
for the Advancement of American Philosophy, Las Vegas, 2001). 
40. Ibid. 
41. Ralph Waldo Emerson, Selections From Ralph Waldo Emerson. Stephen Barnes, “Emerson: 
Death and Growth.” 
42. Ralph Waldo Emerson, Selections From Ralph Waldo Emerson. 
43. J.M. Bernstein, “Phenomenology of Spirit. Introduction,” Lectures on Hegel’s Phenomenology 
of Spirit The New School. New York City. 27th September (2006): 
http://bernsteintapes.com/lectures/Hegel/07PhenomenologyIntroA.mp3. 
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The Interruptive Condition of Subjectivity 
 
 Clearly the death of a son is an extreme case, but it demonstrates what is for 
Hegel a deeper truth about the nature of human existence; that is, the interruptive 
condition of subjectivity. For Hegel, I can only gain awareness of myself as an 
independent and free personality through the recognition of an other. 'Self-
consciousness exists only in and for itself when, and by the fact that, it so exists for 
another; that is, it exists only in being acknowledged.'44 Since I cannot be assured 
of being a self-conscious rational being without being recognised as such by the 
other, Hegel's claim is that the other mediates my self-relation constitutively.45 For 
this reason I remain bound to others on whom I come to depend on for my sense of 
self.  
 
 Although Emerson is not so affected by Ellen's death, and clearly would be 
even less so for the passing of a stranger, the love that he feels for his son brings 
stark relief to the human connectedness that Hegel considers to be part of the very 
fabric of self-conscious life. Waldo's death reveals Emerson's exposure, attesting 
that he is in fact a finite human being who is exposed by his love, and that 
consequently, his subjectivity is not wholly up to him. Indeed, Emerson's assertion 
of a radical selfhood in response to Ellen's death paradoxically only serves to 
affirm this connection. It is her death that spurs him to respond in this way; so, 
despite attempting to establish himself as autonomous to his past, his connection to 
Ellen remains in the person that he becomes: his Stoic acts of resignation only 
distances him from Ellen, the relation simply cannot be severed.  
 
 Reading an individualism into Hegel's thought leads to representing inter-
personal relations as external relations between subjects, as 'intersubjective' 
relations. Yet if our relations with others were simply external relations, then these 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44. G.W.F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, §178. 
45. An opposing view is given by Levinas, for whom the 'not me' is simply opposed to 'me,' but for 
Hegel subjectivity requires more than difference: it requires interruption. J.M. Bernstein, 
“Phenomenology of Spirit. Lordship and Bondage. (a).” 
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relations would not constitute our own subjectivity. The experience of love thus 
discredits the idea that we can consider ourselves to be subjects because we are 
fundamentally exposed to the existence to others, an exposure that constitutes the 
condition of our own subjectivity. 
 
 Importantly, as Emerson attests, we cannot simply transcend these 
attachments as if we were essentially undetermined by them. Our individual 
freedom thus cannot consist in tearing ourselves away from these commitments, 
because these commitments are deeply implicated in who we are; indeed, it is 
precisely because I cannot transcend my attachments that I am a person at all. Just 
as Emerson's assertion of an independent selfhood can only ever distance himself 
from Ellen, thinking of ourselves as subjects is simply a fugitive way of 
understanding the self. It is recognising the opposite, that transcendence is an 
impossibility, and then acting accordingly, that constitutes the achievement of a 
mature personality for Hegel.  
 
 Although he formulates it as the recognition of a 'unity-in-difference,' it is 
this third moment of love – the recognition that the individual is 'broken' – which 
the struggle for recognition leads to.46 This amounts to the achievement of a 
mature personality, by renunciating my complete autonomy and recognising my 
exposure, whereby self-consciousness has been established through several 
moments which, in Hegel's words: 'must on the one hand be held strictly apart, and 
on the other hand must in this differentiation at the same time also be taken and 
known as not distinct.'47 It is recognising that I am 'broken,' exposed to others in 
my subjective being and that my independence is only ever a relative 
independence, that constitutes the highest form of self-awareness of the nature of 
our own existences as selves.  
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46. Indeed, Nancy suggests that the Phenomenology can essentially be read as a tome that 
ultimately leads to this exposure of the individual (i.e., the individual's exposure to absolute 
knowledge). Jean-Luc Nancy, “Shattered Love.” 
47. G.W.F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, §178. 
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Transcendence: The Crossing of Love 
 
 Accompanying this conception of the person is a shift in an understanding of 
freedom. Whereas Kantian/Fichtean freedom is predicated on the self transcending 
(in the sense of standing above) the objects of its experience and negating that 
which negates the exercise of autonomous subjectivity, Hegel's conception of 
freedom is an entirely immanent form of transcendence that arises through the 
interaction of exposed subjects.  
 
 This exposure binds self to other, and transforms both in their interaction; 
something of the 'I' is lost in the act of loving: I come back to myself, I come out of 
the experience broken.  
 
The "return" does not annul the break; it neither repairs it nor sublates it, for the return in 
fact takes place only across the break itself, keeping it open. Love re-presents I to itself 
broken (and this is not a representation). It presents this to it: he, this subject, was touched, 
broken into, in his subjectivity, and he is from then on, for the time of love, opened by this 
slice, broken or fractured, even if only slightly [...] the break is a break in his self-
possession as subject; it is, essentially, an interruption of the process of relating oneself to 
oneself outside of oneself. From then on I is constituted broken. As soon as there is love, 
the slightest act of love, the slightest spark, there is this ontological fissure that cuts across 
and that disconnects the elements of the subject proper [...] The love break simply means 
this: that I can no longer, whatever presence to myself I may maintain or that sustains me, 
pro-pose myself to myself (nor im-pose myself on another) without remains, without 
something of me remaining outside of me.48  
 
 It is the interaction between self and other that leads to the transcendence of 
the self; it is through the movement of love that I transcend the immanence of my 
'subjectivity' and overcome any prior determination of my being. The interruption 
of subjectivity is the transcendence of this subjectivity, and the transcendence of 
subjectivity is the operation of human freedom. This transcendence is not the 
transcendence of the Kantian (knowing or ethical) subject that stands above the 
objects of its experience, but is the transcendence of a being that becomes 
something else as a result of its interaction with others.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48. Jean-Luc Nancy, “Shattered Love,” 260-61. Butler expresses the same idea differently: 'The 
price of self-knowledge will be self-loss, and the Other poses the possibility of both securing and 
undermining self-knowledge. What becomes clear, though, is that the self never returns to itself free 
of the Other, that its "relationality" becomes constitutive of who the self is.' Judith Butler, “Longing 
for Recognition: Commentary on the Work of Jessica Benjamin,” Studies in Gender and Sexuality 
1, no. 3 (2000), 286. 
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 In order to distinguish this entirely immanent form of transcendence from the 
Kantian form of transcendence, it is better termed 'the crossing of love.' This form 
of transcendence is termed a 'crossing' because the individual does not 'unite' or 
'commune' with the other, as if they stood in an external relation; neither does the 
other 'penetrate' the self, transforming one but not the other. Love cuts across self 
and other, exposing both.49 As the self-conscious individual is not separated, and is 
neither subject nor object, this serves to reinforce our earlier designation of human 
beings as finite singular beings: as singularities rather than subjects.  
 
 
Bound Together: The Community of Fate 
 
 Hegel's account of the achievement of self-conscious subjectivity not only 
leads us to a very different understanding of the self than that which emerges from 
kaleidoscopic readings of him, but also to a very different model of self-other 
relations.	   Moreover, and as a consequence, it leads to a radically different 
conception of the nature of community from that presented by Linklater. We will 
now explore the nature of these self-other relations, criticising the divergent 
strategy employed by 'intersubjective' approaches to emancipatory 
cosmopolitanism, before arguing that the character of this community can be 
represented by the notion of a 'community of fate'. 
 
 
I-Thou / I-It 
 
 We can illuminate the nature of the relationship between genuinely self-
conscious subjects that have emerged from the struggle for recognition with 
reference to Martin Buber's relational schema. Buber, a philosopher, theologian, 
and Levinas's friend and mentor is, like Hegel, concerned with the nature of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49. Jean-Luc Nancy, “Shattered Love,” 262. 
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relationship between self and world.50 Referring to the nature of this relation as a 
'between,' which we co-constitute before we know it, the nature of our relation to 
the 'between' prefigures all subsequent relations that we have. In a similar vein to 
Hegel's development of different forms of consciousness from an underlying unity 
of life, Buber begins from a relational situation of all beings, akin to a prenatal 
existence, out of which the establishment of a separate 'I' requires a fundamental 
split. The establishment of this separate 'I' can then lead to the separateness of an I-
it relation, built on the schism of subject and object. This I-it relation is the typical 
subject-object relationship 'in which one knows and uses other persons or things 
without allowing them to exist for oneself in their uniqueness.'51  
 
 However, the I-it relation is not the only possible mode of interaction 
between self and other, and Buber contrasts it to the I-Thou relation: a concrete 
encounter between two persons that is characterised by openness, mutuality, and 
presence.52 Whereas in the I-it relation I experience a detached thing (an object), in 
the I-Thou relation self and other participate in a dynamic process in which we 
exist as as polarities of relation, the centre of which is the ‘between’. Importantly, 
the 'I' of man differs in these alternative modes of existence. The 'I' can be taken as 
the sum of its attributes or acts, an abstracted essence that permits it to be 
represented as a subject, or it can be taken as a singular, irreducible, finite being. 
Only in the I-Thou relation is the other truly other, rather than existing as a 
representative object for a subject, and only in this concrete encounter can the 'I' 
develop as a whole being. Although Buber challenges Hegel in important respects 
in his lecture What is Man, Buber's categorisation here can illuminate our response 
to Linklater through Hegel, and help us to shed any latent religiosity, mysticism or 
romanticism when discussing Hegel's notion of love – by foregrounding the ethical 
logic that is reflected in the experience of love.  
 
 Since the establishment of a separate 'I' requires a split from a prior unity, 
just as for Hegel, and in contrast to Kant, for Buber subjectivity is not 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50. Martin Buber, Between Man and Man (London: Routledge, 2002). 
51. Ibid., xii. 
52. Martin Buber, I and Thou (London: Continuum, 2004). 
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foundational, but derivative. Moreover, this 'I' has different modes of interaction 
with the world, Buber's I-it relation thus resonating with Hegel's analysis of object-
oriented forms of consciousness, both of which are inappropriate as relations to 
persons. In this respect, as a relation between persons, Buber's I-Thou relation 
echoes what Hegel seeks to achieve through the struggle for recognition: namely, 
the transcendence of an object-oriented form of consciousness in the concrete 
encounter with another human being. In Hegel's version, both 'subjects' actively 
react against their reduction to objects, demonstrating right up to the pain of death 
that they are underdetermined by their constitution as subjects in order to achieve 
mutual recognition between mature personalities (i.e., self-conscious 
subjectivities).  
 
 For both Buber and Hegel our mode of interaction with the world is 
constitutive of the self. While for Buber the 'I' of man differs according to our 
mode of interaction with the world, for Hegel subject and object are mutually 
conditioning, and both are transformed in the interaction between self and world. It 
is only in the I-Thou relation that both relata can develop as whole beings – just as 
the interaction between mutually recognising self-consciousnesses is the condition 
of a complete personality for Hegel. Although Buber's I and Thou is criticised for 
denigrating I-it relations, he does not deny their usefulness and necessity. His point 
is that one is only fully human to the extent that one can participate in the I-thou 
relation. Similarly, Hegel would identify the I-it relation as a form of diremption of 
life, epitomised by Kantian dualism between subject and object, a duality that is 
transcended when the self achieves recognition of its own exposure. 
 
 
Intersubjectivity: Walls and Bridges 
 
 Essentially what both Hegel and Buber recognise is that there is a different 
kind of relation here, between I and Thou, and that it is this relation that constitutes 
properly ethical relations between self and other. Since reflective thought 
represents ethical relations as relations between ethical subjects, it constitutes a 
PART 3/Ch7. Exposure, Transcendence, and the Community of Fate 	  
322 
retreat from the concrete relation between singular finite beings that are not 
reducible to their ethical subjectivity. The problem is that in affirming the 
sovereignty of reason in ethical subjectivity, we reinforce the split between self and 
other and distort the nature of the 'between,' which adversely affects both self and 
other. Moreover, as we have seen, by reducing persons to ethical subjects we 
preclude the possibility of a genuine encounter with the other.  
 
 This is the problem of reading a methodological individualism into Hegel: it 
reduces concrete interactions between self-conscious beings to relations between 
things. If we were to draw out the implications of this insight regarding ethical and 
emancipatory relations between persons even further, we might go so far as to 
suggest that this indicates a more fundamental problem: that, perhaps, we are 
constitutively unable to build an ethical and emancipatory cosmopolitanism 
theoretically. One of the central problems with developing an ethical and 
emancipatory cosmopolitanism from individualist, subjectivist premises is that this 
essentially involves a strategy of building walls around the self, before attempting 
to surmount those walls and bridge relations between selves through the exercise of 
reason.  
 
 As we saw in Chapter 2, Linklater is far from unfamiliar with Hegel's 
thought, especially with Hegel's insight into the social and historical constitution of 
subjectivity and development of self-conscious freedom. Further, Linklater's later 
works are not anti-Hegelian in their themes in as much as they engage in an 
historical-sociological analysis of the evolution of the moral capacities of the 
human being, and he does attempt to do justice to this notion of a unity-in-
difference, most evident in his desire to balance universality and particularity in 
Transformation. However, Linklater's emphasis on discourse ethics simply serves 
to reaffirm a separation between individuals by treating them as ethical subjects. 
Here, concrete differences between individuals are supposedly reconciled through 
discursive reason and ethical constructivism, but he is constitutively unable to 
achieve this reconciliation because he remains reliant on thinking the individual as 
a Kantian ethical subject (where the individual is represented as an autonomous 
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ground of action) before subsequently 'bridging' the relation between subject and 
subject through the exercise of reason. In so doing Linklater effectively imposes a 
vision of the ethical subject onto the human being. Not only can this imposition be 
considered neither ethical nor emancipatory, but it serves to alienate self from 
other. 
 
 While for Linklater individuals are by no means unconditioned, and they 
exist in a social-historical context, this contradictory position that he gets himself 
into is a direct consequence of failing to adequately apply Hegel's insight about 
what self-conscious subjectivity entails and, in the last instance, treating human 
beings as ethical subjects. This is precisely what Hegel insists against, and it is 
why the struggle for recognition is essentially a struggle between love and death 
rather than simply about the path to the constitution of free subjectivity. What 
Hegel is demonstrating to us, not only in the struggle for recognition in §§178-196 
of the Phenomenology on 'Lordship and Bondage,' but also in his Spirit of 
Christianity and Fragment on Love essays, as well as in the Philosophy of Right 
(specifically in the distinction drawn between Moralität and Sittlichkeit) is that as 
individuals, our subjectivity is not absolute or foundational – and that hence 
ultimately, we cannot adequately be referred to, or be treated as subjects. Through 
the re-cognitive structure of self-consciousness Hegel is demonstrating to us that 
we are connected to each other in ways that go beyond what can adequately be 
represented by reflective thought, and that consequently reason is of limited value 
for representing the relations between self and other. The struggle for recognition 
is about a mutual dependence between self and other that reason is unable to 
adequately grasp, where what is ultimately demonstrated is that the notion of the 
subject is an inappropriate way of thinking about the relations between self and 
other. This is why the free subject is the non-vital end of the struggle, and why the 
relations between self and other that are modelled here are better understood as a 
struggle between love and death.  
 
 Consequently, Linklater's dualist approach to emancipatory cosmopolitanism 
establishes walls around the autonomous subject while it simultaneously attempts 
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to surmount that subjectivity through the exercise of discursive reason. By building 
these walls around the subject freedom does not consist in the concrete interaction 
between persons, but in the adoption of a universal perspective and acting 
according to the rules given thereby. In addition to the problems associated with 
the foundational ethical subject explored in the previous chapter, this involves an 
alienation from our radical dependency, from the interruptive condition of our own 
subjectivity, which leads to a limited account of human freedom and threatens to 
alienate ourselves from the depth phenomena of human existence: from a genuine 
experience of our own individual existences as selves, from a full appropriation 
and experience of our freedom, and an from an authentic experience of 
community. In short, the very experiences that make us human.53  
 
 
The Community of Fate 
 
 We have seen that it is precisely the notion of an ethical subject that 
constitutes the stumbling block to a thinking of community; a commitment that, 
ironically, leads to the impossibility of a genuine encounter with the other. 
Moreover, we argued that the theoretical construction of a more universal human 
community is probably destined to fail. Questions remain however about post-
Westphalian forms of community: about how we ought to effect emancipatory 
political change, and how we can overcome our solipsistic particularisms if not by 
the establishment of some common measure such as 'impartial' ethical principles. 
This section will argue that developing the notion of a 'community of fate' can help 
us respond to these questions. 
 
 In Chapter 4 we saw that for Heidegger resolute solicitous being-with others 
is the authentic appropriation of Da-sein's freedom, and that this form of activity is 
both dependent on and expressive of human freedom. We learnt that this involves 
acting in ways of 'caring' for others, and that this was a nascent but fruitful 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53. Heidegger has a similar concern about the Western technological civilisation see Gregory Bruce 
Smith, Martin Heidegger: Paths Opened, Paths Taken (Plymouth: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007), 3. 
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alternative to conceptualising interpersonal relations as intersubjective relations. 
Nonetheless, we concluded that the weakness of Heidegger's account was that it 
falls short when it comes to a demonstrating that both freedom and self-
intelligibility are ineluctably acquired in relations to others under conditions of 
cooperative interaction, and that Hegel's intersubjective account of freedom and 
self-hood is more convincing. We are now in a position to substantiate that claim, 
and to suggest that an important aspect of any emancipatory cosmopolitanism 
involves not just establishing the conditions for the exercise of subjectivity, but 
engaging in resolute solicitous being-with others and cultivating the awareness of 
our shared participation within a 'community of fate.' 
 
 We have seen that while both Kant and Fichte identify the self with reason 
rather than the authority of someone else, Hegel thinks that this view of self-other 
relations, where a sharp distinction is drawn between the rational self and 
everything else, is a mode of escape or self-withdrawal from our condition of 
radical dependency. Hegel follows Fichte in understanding the self as its own self-
positing activity, but the self is regarded as the outcome of this activity rather than 
its condition. Selfhood is not achieved through an aloofness of subject to object, 
but through engaged participation in the world of objects and other 
consciousnesses. Self-conscious selfhood (subjectivity) is achieved when I 
recognise that I exist in a condition of unity-in-difference with others on whom I 
am dependent for the constitution of my own subjectivity.  
 
 The idea that is modelled in Hegel's account of the master and slave – the 
interruptive condition of subjectivity, that were we are left fundamentally exposed 
to the other as part of the very fabric of our being – leads to self and other being 
bound together in a community of fate. This is not a community based upon an 
abstraction, such as one in which we participate simply by virtue of being 'human' 
rather than 'non-human' – where specific attributes or capacities, such as 
compassion for others, or universal ethical reasoning, have to be used or developed 
in order for us to become 'fully human' – but is an existential community that is 
PART 3/Ch7. Exposure, Transcendence, and the Community of Fate 	  
326 
created and recreated through our own activity, constituting the social matrix 
within which humans become the kinds of beings that we are. 
 
 This experience of being broken, of being exposed, reveals my bind to others 
– and, regardless of whether I recognise this exposure, I can either distance myself 
from others through my actions, or I can identify with them. But I cannot sever this 
bind. For Hegel at least, recognising this exposure amounts to the achievement of a 
higher form of self-consciousness. Subsequently identifying with it, and taking 
other's interests as not entirely distinct from my own – whereby the other is 
regarded not as an external limitation on my own freedom but as co-constitutive of 
it – is essential to the progressive development of human freedom.  
 
 The central idea here is that, ultimately, our self is not up to us: that we are 
reliant on others not just for the things that we have and the things that we do, but 
also for the very way that we are. This is not a psychological claim, but an 
ontological one. Clearly we develop psychologically in relations to others. A child 
is fundamentally dependent on their parents and other caregivers, and we all 
develop at least initially in relation to others. As an ontological claim though, the 
idea is not just that the self develops in relation to others, but that in some sense 
that this relation precedes the self.  
 
 
Co-dependent Arising 
 
 At least from the point of view of a Western cultural tradition, this is clearly 
a paradoxical thought, which is why at least one commentator has suggested that 
here Hegel perhaps reaches the end or limit of traditional Western thought and 
approaches the East. 54  There are striking similarities here with a Buddhist 
metaphysics of 'no thing' and dependent arising, for example. The latter (Sanskrit: 
Pratītyasamutpāda) is a cardinal Buddhist doctrine that all phenomena arise 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54. See the comments section on J.M. Bernstein, “An Interview With J.M. Bernstein,” The New 
York Times Opinionator 21st November (2011). 
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together in a mutually dependent web of cause and effect. In the Madhyamaka 
philosophy, founded by Nāgārjuna, this is synonymous with saying that all things 
and persons are lacking in inherent existence and are without any enduring 
essential nature; that there is no independently existing self and that all phenomena 
depend on other things for their existence.55  
 
 Clearly this is a very different model of community from that which we are 
accustomed to, but at its most basic it is simply a model of radical human 
dependency at the level of self-consciousness. Hegel's idea is that the subject 
(Geist, mind) is not in the head, but is in the social world, embodied in relations of 
intersubjectivity, meaning that we are radically dependent on others for who we 
are. The minimal unit for there to be self-conscious subjectivity is two, we cannot 
have an immediate relationship to ourselves, our being is always mediated by the 
other. But two is never enough; we always need the third: for an 'I think' we need a 
'we think,' and this 'we think' is embodied in Geist.56  
 
 A key contention here is that rather than being something that bubbles up 
from the ego or the id, the self is something that exists between you and me; i.e., 
that my subjectivity is essentially related to the way that people respond to me.57 
Who I am is how I connect, how I get responded to, how I get recognised or fail to 
get recognised by others. Others can harm, degrade, and devalue me, and it this is 
in these relations of intersubjectivity that human life is lived. We are taught 
independence since we need to separate from our parents, from our school, and 
from our peer group. It is important to us that our lives are not pre-scripted, and 
that we make our own way. Consequently, we seek to establish or secure our own 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55. See Nāgārjuna, The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way: Nāgārjuna’s 
Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, trans. Jay L. Garfield (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 
24:18,24:19. also Dalai Lama, How to Practice: The Way to a Meaningful Life, trans. Jeffrey 
Hopkins (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002), 137,149,156-159. Candrakīrti, Introduction to the 
Middle Way: Chandrakirti’s Madhyamakavatara (Boston: Shambhala Publications, 2002). 
Elizabeth Napper, Dependent-Arising and Emptiness: A Tibetan Buddhist Interpretation of 
Mādhyamika Philosophy Emphasizing the Compatibility of Emptiness and Conventional 
Phenomena (Somerville, MA: Wisdom Publications, 2003). 
56. J.M. Bernstein, “Introduction,” Lectures on Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit The New School. 
New York City. 9th September (2006): http://bernsteintapes.com/lectures/Hegel/01IntroA.mp3. 
57. J.M. Bernstein, “An Interview With J.M. Bernstein.” 
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independence, and as a result freedom is often understood in terms of an individual 
thought as subject participating with other subjects on mutually agreeable terms.58  
 
 The problem with this conception of freedom from a Hegelian perspective, 
however, is that it denies our mutual dependence and thus misrecognises 
'subjective' freedom as an absolute freedom. It thereby contributes to the crises of 
modernity, where dualisms between self and other, individual and community, man 
and nature are taken to be absolute or foundational. To put it differently, our 
mutual dependence and independence as finite singular beings does necessarily 
equate to the subjective freedom associated with the sense of a self-directing 'I:' 
our subjective freedom as individuals is not an absolute independence. Instead, our 
subjective freedom only warrants us a partial independence, and so imagining 
ourselves as subjects ultimately misrecognises the nature of our own existence and 
leads to forms of alienation of self from other. Curiously we feel an indebtedness 
to another is a limitation on our freedom rather than its proper condition, so we 
tend to block out our dependency since it is almost always a sign of failure – just as 
when we are old, ill, or incapacitated – rather than acknowledging it and 
celebrating positive images of this dependency, playing in an orchestra, for 
instance.59 From this perspective freedom is not the establishment of a separate 'I,' 
nor does it equate to the ethical self-determination of the individual, although these 
are both moments of freedom: true freedom is found through engagement, and self-
conscious, emancipatory engagement proceeds from the knowledge of love.  
 
 
Action that Follows from the Knowledge of Love: The Condition of Ethical 
Relations and the Full Appropriation of Human Freedom.  
 
 Since it proceeds from the recognition of the nature of the self's dependency 
on others, action that follows from the knowledge of love is ultimately the 
condition of a truly ethical and emancipatory politics. Such an approach to an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58. These Hegelian insights are Jay Bernstein's. See J.M. Bernstein, “Introduction (a).” J.M. 
Bernstein, “An Interview With J.M. Bernstein.” 
59. Ibid. 
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ethical and emancipatory politics might lead to a form of cosmopolitanism based 
upon the recognition that emancipatory political action is not simply about 
defending other people's rights to engage in dialogue with us, but involves being 
aware that my fate is bound with yours (at least when it comes to self-conscious 
individuality). Such an approach to an emancipatory politics would not require that 
we 'bridge' relations between subjects through the exercise of reason, but would 
demand instead that we foster an attunement to the social conditions of our own 
'subjectivity'. On this basis it would then require that the relationship between self 
and world be characterised by relations of openness, mutuality and co-presence; 
relations that would contribute to the liberation of both self and other. 
 
 The rationale for this is as follows. By recognising my exposure and 
subsequently identifying with the other within a common structure of unity-in-
difference, I transcend my previously alienated condition of a subject facing other 
subjects in external relations between subject and object. This attunement to the 
conditions of my own subjectivity leads to the possibility of a fuller appropriation 
of my own freedom: a freedom that does not consist in an isolation from my 
relations with others but in engagement with them. Because this engagement is 
based upon the recognition of the other as other, rather than as subject or object, it 
is also the proper condition of ethical relations between self and world. This 
engagement, in order to be ethical, involves eschewing attempt to manage, 
dominate, or control others (or at least recognising the essential limitations of these 
engagements) and relating to the other as a singularity.60 Here ethical relations are 
grounded not in universal ethical reason, but in the cultivation of loving relations 
between self and other where I am motivated less by a desire to act according to 
duty – the course of action that I should take if I wish to act like an ethical subject 
– but from the recognition that the other's interests are not wholly distinct from my 
own.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60. Recognising the essential limitations of these forms of engagements does not deny that there 
will be a great many situations in world politics where the management or control of political 
differences will represent an ethically significant improvement on a previous state of affairs, 
particularly in cases where the protagonists are in a violent confrontation with one another. The 
point being made here is that pacification or control is more a politically expedient or pragmatic 
resolution rather than a truly ethical one. 
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Conclusions 
 
 We began the chapter by arguing that love is not an object of knowledge, but 
is a lived experience, and that we should therefore change our focus from the eidos 
of love to the ethos of love. Understanding love as an ethos is to regard it as an 
experience through which we transcend object-oriented forms of consciousness 
thereby achieving a higher level of self-awareness of the living union between self 
and world. Understood in this way,	  we claimed that such an ethos of love can be 
considered as a proto-phenomenological attitude that suspends the objectified 
world in abeyance in order to attune the self to practical experience, thereby 
making a more genuine encounter with the world possible.  
 
 We then saw that the experience of love is formative in the development of 
Hegel's central and characteristic concepts, such as his dialectic logic, his 
organicist conception of freedom, and his notion of ethical life (Sittlichkeit). 
Nonetheless, we learnt that twentieth-century interpretations of Hegel's thought 
have elevated the role of reason to a position from which Hegel consistently and 
insistently displaces it, effectively severing or 'killing' the living relationship 
between self and world, subject and object, that is absolutely central to Hegel's 
thought. What is at stake here, we claimed, is nothing less than a recognition of a 
genuine, authentic relationship between self and world, of the (limited) authority of 
reason, and of the emancipatory role of praxis.  
 
 We later discussed Hegel's account of the master and slave, which is not an 
account of the interaction of two independent self-conscious subjects demanding 
recognition from each other, but is an account whereby the respective protagonists 
overcome object-oriented forms of consciousness and thereby achieve self-
conscious subjectivity as a result of their concrete interaction. For this reason, we 
argued, the account of the master and slave is about our radical dependency on 
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others for our own sense of self, and that the mutual recognition between free 
beings ('subjects') is only the non-vital end of this struggle.  
 
 Consequently, the achievement of what we have termed 'self-conscious 
subjectivity, gaining a proper awareness of the nature of our own existence as 
individual selves, involves recognising our unity-in-difference: that our 
'subjectivity' is ultimately illusory and that others mediate our self-relation 
constitutively. It is for this reason that the achievement of self-conscious 
subjectivity is modelled on the experience of love. This then leads to a different 
form of freedom, where freedom is thought as 'the crossing of love.' In contrast to 
Linklater/Habermas's Kantianism, this is an entirely immanent form of 
transcendence that occurs through the concrete interaction of self-conscious 
subjects.  
 
 The problem with Linklater's emancipatory cosmopolitanism from this point 
of view is that it employs a strategy whereby walls are built around individuals 
(conceived as ethical subjects) while it simultaneously attempts to surmount these 
walls by establishing relations between subjects whose independence has already 
been asserted. In summary, we claim that Linklater's reliance on the existence of an 
ethical subject ultimately (and paradoxically) reifies individuals, distorts the nature 
of our interactions, and alienates ourselves from the depth phenomena of our 
existence: from a genuine experience of our own individual existences as selves, 
from a full appropriation and experience of our freedom, and an from an authentic 
experience of community; the very experiences that make us human.  
 
 Since it is precisely the notion of an ethical subject that constitutes the 
stumbling block to a thinking of community, a foundational commitment that 
ironically leads to the impossibility of a genuine encounter with the other, an 
ethical and emancipatory politics begins to take a different shape. For instance, we 
argued that a politics that aims to overcome our solipsistic particularisms and 
develop more inclusive post-Westphalian communities ought not primarily be 
concerned with the establishment of some common measure, such as 'impartial' 
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moral principles, but should involve cultivation an attunement to a practical 
relation to reality and to the existence of others.  
 
 We represented this with the notion of our shared participation within a 
community of fate, where an attunement to the existence of others becomes part of 
a deeper fabric of our own self-understanding and informs the way that I relate to 
myself, to others, and to the social and political institutions in which I am 
enmeshed. In this account of an ethical and emancipatory politics, our freedom is 
no longer about the ability of the ethical subject to abstract from its particularity 
and act according to maxims that have been subjected to the test of 
universalisability (even across state boundaries) but involves an attunement to, and 
sense of responsibility towards, the social conditions of our own individuality.  
 
 This is not a community of ethical subjects, nor one based on the possibility 
of mutual understanding, but is a community of mutually conditioning finite 
singular beings co-existing in their becoming. In Chapter 4 we argued that an 
authentic mode of being in the world involves solicitous being-with others, where 
engaging with others as others, and in a way that 'frees up' their potentiality for 
being. Hegel's contribution to this mode of being in the world involves self-
conscious subjects recognising that such an activity contributes to their own 
liberation too, by overcoming forms of alienation between self and other that 
seems to follow from object-oriented forms of consciousness. 
 
 In contrast to the establishment of the conditions of subjectivity then, which 
can only achieve a partial and limited ethical and emancipatory politics, it is action 
that follows from the knowledge of love that is the condition of a properly ethical 
and emancipatory politics. The experience of love, which leads to a greater 
awareness of the social conditions of my own subjectivity, allows us to be more 
attentive to our co-dependent arising, and helps us move beyond a politics 
predicated on the subject, and lead to a fuller engagement with the depth 
phenomena of our existence, and a fuller appropriation of our freedom. The next 
chapter will develop this claim by arguing for the development of a cosmopolitan 
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ethos from these premises, fleshing out the essentially ethical logic of the 
experience of love, and exploring the nature of this logic as a guide for 
emancipatory praxis.  
 Chapter 8.  
The Lived Character of Ethics 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 We have seen that when it comes to the interactions between self and world, 
both Heidegger and Hegel consider the theoretical attitude to lead to an 
objectification of human experience and an alienation of self from world. This 
leads them both to develop pre- and post-theoretical relations to reality. 
Heidegger's pre-theoretical relation to reality entails human beings being enjoined 
into resolute solicitous being-with others, while Hegel's pre- and post-theoretical 
relation involves an overcoming of object-oriented forms of consciousness through 
the achievement of self-conscious subjectivity – where the self recognises the 
social conditions of its own individuality and acts accordingly. In the last chapter 
we argued that the experience of love provides a demonstration of our exposure to 
the existence of others, with phenomenological enquiry demonstrating that this is 
so, and that fully ethical and emancipatory relations with others were relations that 
proceeded from this knowledge rather than on the basis of some notion of 
‘intersubjectivity’.  
 
 We return here to a point made in Chapter 6, where we claimed that the 
experience of love plays a formative role in the development of three of Hegel's 
most important ideas.	  We focus here on one of these: that 'love' is the feeling of 
ethical life (Sittlichkeit) in its natural form. Just as rationalist interpretations of 
Hegel obscure his insights about the achievement of self-conscious subjectivity, 
they also obscure his insights into the nature of ethical life.	  Both Habermas and 
Linklater, for instance, mistakenly regard ethical life as essentially atavistic, and 
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thus subordinate it to ethical rationality. This reverses Hegel's own conception of 
the relation between moral law (Moralität) and ethical life (Sittlichkeit), so that it 
falls into line with their commitments to understanding the individual as subject 
rather than as a potentially self-conscious subject. We argue that this denies them a 
powerful tool for critical social theory, a claim that we defend in our conclusion. 
 
 
Love in Practical Philosophy 
 
 The subject of love has played a minor role in postwar philosophy, with 
practical philosophy paying little attention to its concept and essence. There are 
several reasons for this, but, as Honneth suggests, they ultimately 'derive from the 
predominance of a concept of morality geared so strongly towards principles of 
impartiality that personal relationships hardly seemed worthy of inquiry.'1 He 
further explains that in the postwar Anglo-Saxon world, practical philosophy did 
not engage in any serious exploration of the experience of love largely as a 
consequence of a 'narrow interpretation of Wittgenstein,' where focus lay on meta-
ethics and the logical status of moral statements; as the dominance of this approach 
receded, 'the resurgent currents of utilitarianism and Kantianism then saw to it that 
the subject remained in the margins of philosophical interest.'2 In the German-
speaking world, if we were to take the phenomenological tradition further beyond 
Heidegger to Max Scheler, we would rediscover 'a work enormous current 
importance in philosophy's treatment of the subject.'3 Yet Scheler's influence was 
quickly overshadowed by that of Heidegger.  
 
 Nonetheless, in the 1970s a full-scale turn towards topics of love and 
friendship was initiated by Michael Stocker's seminal essay The Schizophrenia of 
Modern Ethical Theories.4 Stocker's central claim was that modern ethical theories 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1. Axel Honneth, Disrespect: The Normative Foundations of Critical Theory (London: Polity, 
2007), 163. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid., 163-64. 
4. Michael Stocker, “The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories,” The Journal of Philosophy 
73, no. 14 (1976): 453-66. 
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had failed to examine motives and the motivational structures of ethical life, and 
thus dealt 'only with reasons, with values, with what justifies.'5 Stocker argued that 
this exclusive concern with moral rationalism led to ethical theories ignoring the 
fact that love, friendship, affection, fellow feeling and community are important 
sources of moral action, and that by ignoring them modern ethical theories force 
moral agents to live a bifurcated, schizophrenic life in order to achieve what is 
good.6 
 
 
The Long Shadow of Immanuel Kant 
 
 With the possible exception of Andreas Wildt, who drew on Hegel's early 
work to point out 'forms of moral awareness that could not be defined in legal or 
contractual terms, thus setting them in opposition to the posture of impartial justice 
favoured by Kant,' the vast majority of the subsequent treatment of love in 
practical philosophy has remained trapped within a Kantian moral paradigm.7 
Honneth's discussion of love in his essay Love and Morality is a case in point.8 We 
have already seen how Honneth reads Hegel through a kaleidoscope of the Kantian 
subject, reading into Hegel an individualism that obscures the ontological and 
ethical significance of his account of love; this is reflected in his conclusion of his 
survey of contemporary approaches to love and practical philosophy, where he 
states that love 'does not lead us to abandon the idea of moral duty, but rather to 
diversify it.'9 
 
 Rather than being an experience through which object-oriented 
consciousness is overcome and an attunement to a practical relation to reality is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5. Ibid. 
6. Stocker uses the example of a friend visiting you in hospital. You are pleased to see them until 
you find out that they are visiting you, not out of any particular concern for you, but out of a sense 
of moral duty. The point is that there is something wholly deficient about action motivated purely 
by duty; we want to be visited by someone who cares about us directly, not about his duty. Ibid. 
7. Axel Honneth, Disrespect: The Normative Foundations of Critical Theory, 164. Andreas Wildt, 
Autonomie Und Annerkennung: Hegel’s Moralitatskritik Im Lichte Seiner Fichte-Rezeption 
(Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1982). 
8. Axel Honneth, Disrespect: The Normative Foundations of Critical Theory, 163-81. 
9. Ibid., 178. 
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achieved, for Honneth love is simply an affective bind that we have to people close 
to us, such as to our family – a relationship that must be appropriately balanced 
with the respect that we owe to all.10 Pointing out that Honneth's ethic is 'very 
"communitarian" in the bad sense of that word,' Blunden's critique of Honneth's 
ethic of recognition illuminates the differences between Honneth's treatment of 
love and the one developed here.11  
 
 Blunden reduces Honneth’s ethical claim to the claim that 'individuals are 
entitled to expect appropriate love, respect and esteem from other people with 
whom they interact.'12 A claim that is 'supplemented by the psychological claim 
that people suffer injury to their moral development if they fail to receive the 
affirmation that they expect from others by way of love, respect and esteem.'13 The 
problem however is that, if 'solidarity' is given on the basis of the person's 
contribution to the community, and 'rights' are what are owed to everyone as a 
human being, then: 
 
there is no place in Honneth's system for solidarity in the sense of hospitality, or 
unconditional support extended to a stranger. But solidarity in this sense is the very 
foundation of modern, urban, multicultural society, and Honneth's failure to incorporate it 
in his ethics is problematic. On the basis of what mode of "recognition" would a stranger 
give up their seat on a bus to a pregnant woman, or assist a lost child? According to 
Honneth one owes loving care only to those with whom one has a close personal bond, one 
owes solidarity only to those who have earned your esteem, and what one owes to a 
stranger is only their rights. There is no room for the supererogatory. What right does the 
child have for the care of a stranger? [...] What right, under Honneth's schema, does a child 
have at all, for a child is not yet a subject.14 
 
 Honneth's treatment of love as a diversification of moral duty – as 'a form of 
intersubjective relationship in which the persons involved are entitled to a degree 
of reciprocal benevolence greater than that which can be expressed in the 
observance of the Kantian requirement of respect' – is indicative of a general trend 
in the way that love has been treated in practical philosophy. That is, to focus on 
attempting to reconcile the special obligations that we undoubtedly owe to some 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10. Ibid., 164. 
11. Andy Blunden, “The Missing Mediation in Pragmatic Interpretations of Hegel,” 
http://home.mira.net/~andy/works/missing-mediation.htm (accessed 29th June 2012, 2012). 
12. Ibid. 
13. Ibid. 
14. Ibid. 
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(such as family members) with the opposing moral demand that we treat everyone 
as equals.15  
 
 Kant casts a long shadow over these discussions. Recognising that the 
partiality of loving relations exist in tension with practical reason's principle of 
universalisability, Kant distinguishes between two aspects of love in his 
Groundwork and in the Metaphysics of Morals: 'practical' love and 'pathological' 
love.16 Insisting that morality must override loving relations, practical love is love 
that is grounded in and subordinate to reason; love recalcitrant to such 
subordination is considered 'pathological.'17 Kant thus treats love essentially as 
problem for morality, and in a way that asserts the sovereignty of reason over 
desire, the priority of concept over being: both serving to affirm a foundational 
commitment to the individual thought as ethical subject.  
 
 
Hegel: Love as the Condition of Morality 
 
 Hegel's famous critique of Kant's ethical theory proceeds from close readings 
of both Kant's ethics of duty and the major alternative in moral theory at the time, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15. Axel Honneth, Disrespect: The Normative Foundations of Critical Theory, 178. See, for 
example Michael A. Slote, Goods and Virtues (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983). J.D. Velleman, 
“Love as a Moral Emotion,” Ethics 109, no. 2 (1999): 338-74. Susan Wolf, “Morality and 
Partiality,” Philosophical Perspectives 6 (1992): 243-59. 
16. It is worth noting that not all accounts of love see its universality and partiality as necessarily 
contradictory. As Moseley explains: ‘The universalism of agape runs counter to the partialism of 
Aristotle and poses a variety of ethical implications. Aquinas admits a partialism in love towards 
those we are related while maintaining that we should be charitable to all, whereas others such as 
Kierkegaard insist on impartiality. Recently, Hugh LaFallotte (1991) has noted that to love those 
one is partial towards is not necessarily a negation of the impartiality principle, for impartialism 
could admit loving those closer to one as an impartial principle, and, employing Aristotle's 
conception of self-love, iterates that loving others requires an intimacy that can only be gained from 
being partially intimate. Others would claim that the concept of universal love, of loving all equally, 
is not only impracticable, but logically empty - Aristotle, for example, argues: "One cannot be a 
friend to many people in the sense of having friendship of the perfect type with them, just as one 
cannot be in love with many people at once (for love is a sort of excess of feeling, and it is the 
nature of such only to be felt towards one person)"' Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, trans. David 
Ross (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), VIII.6. Alexander Moseley, “’Philosophy of Love’ 
Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy,” http://www.iep.utm.edu/love/. 
17. Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals: A German-English Edition, trans. 
Mary Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge, 2011), 27,399,31. Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of 
Morals (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 203,401. 
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the Scottish theory of moral sentiments. Hegel read Hume, Rousseau, Kant and 
Smith carefully, and is concerned throughout his philosophy (not just in his early 
works) to overcome the tension between love and reason. Eschewing the 
foundational commitment to an ethical subject, Hegel sees a broader ontological 
significance to the experience to love, and he reverses Kant's formulation of the 
relation between love and morality. Explicitly responding to Kant's notion of a 
pathological love in his Spirit essay, he writes: 
 
[O]f course "love cannot be commanded;" of course it is "pathological, an inclination;" but 
it detracts nothing from its greatness, it does not degrade it, that its essence is not a 
domination of something alien to it. But this does not mean that it is something 
subordinate to duty and right; on the contrary, it is rather love's triumph over these that it 
lords over nothing, it is without any hostile power over another.  
[...] 
Only through love is the might of objectivity broken, for love upsets its whole sphere  
[...] 
Love alone has no limits. What it has not united with itself is not objective to it; love has 
overlooked it or not yet developed it; it is not confronted by it.18 
 
 While Kantian approaches to love forcibly reassert the sovereignty of the 
ethical subject by shoehorning the experience of love into a deontological moral 
schema, reconciling love's partiality with the overwhelming authority and 
universality of practical reason, on the Hegelian view the experience of love tells 
us something deeper about our own existential condition: that we are not actually 
ethical subjects relating to objects (such as other ethical subjects). 
 
 On this view, love is not simply a special relationship between subjects who 
love each other, but is an experience associated with a higher form of awareness of 
the relation between self and world. Here, the self's independence is recognised as 
only a relative independence; ultimately leading to the possibility of the sublation 
of egoistic and object-oriented forms of consciousness into a form of other-
directedness, akin to what Gilligan identifies as 'care.' While for the Kantian love 
must be grounded in the will if it not to be 'pathological,' for Hegel the converse is 
true: the rational will must be grounded in love. And, as we shall see in our later 
discussion of the Spirit essay, if not subordinate to this other-directedness, it is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18. G.W.F. Hegel, “The Spirit of Christianity and Its Fate,” in Early Theological Writings 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971), 247. 
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reason that becomes pathological. From a Hegelian perspective then, love is the 
condition of morality.  
 
 It is Harry Frankfurt who is the closest contemporary exponent of this view. 
His central claim is that:  
 
The origins of normativity do not lie [...] either in the transient incitements of personal 
feeling and desire [as some Humeans would have it], or in the severely anonymous 
requirements of eternal reason [as some Kantians would have it]. They lie in the 
contingent necessities of love. These move us, as feelings and desires do; but the 
motivations that love engenders are not merely adventitious or (to use Kant's term) 
heteronomous. Rather, like the universal laws of pure reason, they express something that 
belongs to our most intimate and most fundamental nature. Unlike the necessities of 
reason, however, those of love are not impersonal. They are constituted by and embedded 
in structures of the will through which the specific identity of the individual is most 
particularly defined.19 
  
Frankfurt thus associates volitional qualities with love, defining it as an 
involuntary form of caring that involves an investment in and identification with 
that which is loved, and is not dependent on reciprocity or symmetry. He sees in 
the experience of love an originary quality as a form of motivation – from love 
springs other drives: esteem, value, and reasons for action. By regarding love as a 
source and limit on the will, Frankfurt defends an essentially Hegelian position that 
regards love as the ultimate ground of practical rationality: that rationality is 
dependent upon moral experience, that the authority of practical reason is lesser 
than that of love, and that the authority of reason is itself grounded in the authority 
of love.20 
 
 
Deflecting the Ethical 
 
 According primacy to love over an essentially limited moral rationality 
further pits this reading of Hegel against that of Habermas and Linklater. Although 
neither denies that other-directedness is an important component of morality, both 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19. Harry G. Frankfurt, The Reasons of Love (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 48. 
20. Ibid., 170. Harry G. Frankfurt, Taking Ourselves Seriously and Getting it Right (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2006). 
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fail to recognise the full ethical and ontological significance of Gilligan's 
identification of the dual context of moral maturity. While Gilligan's criticism of 
Kohlberg resembles that of Hegel's critique of Kant, Habermas and Linklater's 
rationalist interpretations of Hegel essentially obscure the nature of Hegel's 
position; similarly, their ontological commitment to a foundational ethical subject 
means that they are unable to grasp the full implications of Gilligan's position. This 
significance, we will argue, is that it reflects a fundamental discontinuity between 
the logics of love and law: between ethics and politics.  
 
 We saw that Habermas's discourse ethics proceeds from a moral cognitivist 
belief that ethical subjects can approximate knowledge of universal, 'objective' 
moral principles. In his response to Gilligan's critique of Kohlberg, Habermas 
reasserts the sovereignty of ethical subjectivity by insisting that an ethics of care 
supplements a universalistic form of moral reasoning. 
 
The unique disposition of a particular case that calls for regulation, and the concrete 
characteristics of the people involved, come into view only after problem of justification 
have been resolved. It is only when it has to be established which of the prima facie valid 
norms is the most appropriate to the given situation and the associated conflict that a 
maximally complete description of all the relevant features of the particular context must 
be given.21 
 
Linklater responds twice to Gilligan in Transformation, both times reflecting 
Habermas's reassertion of ethical subjectivity. His first discussion recognises the 
feminist claim that women frequently speak in a different voice to men, but 
concludes that the ethic of care simply cannot deal with social relations separated 
by considerable distances.22 Although only reflecting the title of Gilligan's book, 
this gendered frame of reference deflects the deeper ontological and ethical 
significance of Gilligan's position.23 Linklater's second discussion of Gilligan 
returns to Habermas's insistence that the ethic of care complements the ethic of 
justice, and Linklater recognises that the criticism that Habermas's account of 
moral reasoning always privileges universality over difference is understandable; 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21. Jürgen Habermas, Justification and Application: Remarks on Discourse Ethics (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 1993), 153-54. 
22. Andrew Linklater, The Transformation of Political Community: Ethical Foundations of the 
Post-Westphalian Era (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998), 68-69. 
23. Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993). 
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yet, deploying his familiar strategy, Linklater simply surmises that we must be 
more sensitive to difference.24  
 
 Although Linklater's work commands a truly impressive breadth of 
reference, and despite being admirably responsive to criticism, challenges to his 
position tend to be met with this logic of supplementarity – where alternative 
perspectives to his own are only ever seen to augment rather than fundamentally 
challenge his central argument. His non-negotiable commitment to moral 
universalism is supplemented by an ever increasing sensitivity to difference; yet he 
never seems to recognise that his concern to balance universality and particularity 
rests upon the fulcrum of a shared foundational commitment to ethical subjectivity.  
 
 Another example is his treatment of 'cosmopolitan emotions' in his most 
recent book, The Problem of Harm in World Politics.25 Here he engages in a 
historical sociological and social psychological discussion of emotions – including 
love, shame, and guilt. He follows Elias's view that emotions represent an essential 
component of the civilising process, with shame and guilt playing the role of 
regulating conduct in modern societies, which he views as potentially supportive of 
cosmopolitan harm conventions.26 He also discusses the relationship between 
emotional responses to suffering and proximity, and the possibility of 
emancipating human sympathy from its ties to existing groups in order that 
emotional attachment might be extended to distant strangers.27 He concludes, 
however, that moral emotions 'might be more useful in shaping ethical ideas than 
in trying to understand how radical change may occur at a global level.'28 We 
challenge this conclusion in the next chapter. 
 
 In the same work Linklater briefly discusses Schopenhauer's critique of Kant, 
making the point that compassion is important for moral conduct. Nonetheless, the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24. Andrew Linklater, The Transformation of Political Community, 94-95. 
25. Andrew Linklater, The Problem of Harm in World Politics, vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2011). 
26. Ibid., 211-212,221. 
27. Ibid., 222-31. 
28. Ibid., 231. 
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discussion of the relation between compassion (i.e., 'love') and reason is largely 
confined to footnotes, and he quickly returns to the importance of the rationality 
and universality of moral principles for just relations between strangers.29 The 
latter point is correct, but still misses the significance of Gilligan's argument about 
the dual context of moral maturity. We hinted at this in Chapter 5 when discussing 
Nancy's criticism of discourse ethics. This, we claimed, heralded a fundamental 
discontinuity between ethics and politics, where ethics is understood as a relation 
to the other, while politics is the domain of competing universal principles. This 
discontinuity is also reflected in the work of Derrida, Nancy, and Levinas. While 
the latter reformulates Heidegger's fundamental ontology, both Derrida and 
Nancy's positions draw heavily on Hegel.30 We return to Hegel's discussion of this 
discontinuity, his identification of an essential inequality between ethics and 
politics, which will lead to our distinction between a cosmopolitan justice and a 
cosmopolitan ethos in the next chapter.  
 
 
Love and Law: the Vertical Moral Geometry of Moral Law 
and the Ethical Logic of Love 
 
 We will recall that the claim was made in Chapter 7 that Hegel's central and 
characteristic concepts first arise in his early works, in which the experience of 
love plays a formative role, setting the trajectory of the future development of his 
thought.31 This section sees us return to a discussion of Hegel's essay The Spirit of 
Christianity and its Fate (1799) to illustrate the nature and significance of Hegel's 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29. Ibid., 94-96. 
30. Levinas reformulates Heidegger's Mitsein from being-with to being-in-front-of in order to 
establish ethics as first philosophy. Derrida's ethical position develops most obviously in relation to 
Kierkegaard's Fear and Trembling in his Gift of Death, but before this he deals with Hegel's 
identification of this discontinuity in The Spirit of Christianity and its Fate in his Glas, while we 
saw that Nancy refers to Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit in our quote from The Inoperative 
Community. Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority (Pittsburgh: 
Duquesne University Press, 1999). Jacques Derrida, The Gift of Death (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1996). Jacques Derrida, Glas (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1990). Jean-
Luc Nancy, The Inoperative Community (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991), 24. 
31. For two strident defences of this reading of Hegel see Alice Ormiston, Love and Politics: Re-
Interpreting Hegel (New York: SUNY Press, 2004). Laura Werner, “The Restless Love of 
Thinking: The Concept of Liebe in Hegel’s Philosophy” (Ph.D Thesis, University of Helsinki, 
2007). 
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understanding of love and its relation to Kantian moral rationalism, before we draw 
out what we consider to be the implications for an ethical and emancipatory 
approach to world politics.  
 
 We will remember from Chapter 6 that Hegel considers the understanding to 
be a mode of being in the world, an activity that is essentially retrospective, 
dissolutive, and objectifying; a view later shared by Heidegger, who considered the 
objectification of the object by the subject to originate in the theoretical attitude 
itself. As a result both seek a pre- or post-theoretical relation to reality that 
overcomes this objectifying attitude. For Heidegger this involves Da-sein's resolute 
solicitous being-with, while for Hegel this is achieved through action that proceeds 
from the knowledge of love. While Heidegger's challenge to Kant is more indirect 
than direct, Hegel's response is far more explicit. 
 
 
A Genealogy of Transcendental Reason 
 
 Although once prizing the Kantian ideal of autonomy in The Life of Jesus 
(1795), by the time he wrote The Spirit of Christianity (1799) Hegel had distanced 
himself from Kant's commitment to the notion that individual self-legislation under 
the aegis of reason leads to freedom because he considered it to establish in the 
subject a division between law and inclination, concluding that submitting to the 
laws of one's own reason merely makes a man 'his own slave.'32  
 
 In his Sprit essay Hegel engages in a genealogy of moral reason with the aim 
of establishing the theological origins of the rationalism that characterises Kant’s 
approach to ethics. Hegel locates the emergence of Western rationality as a 
response to the flood whereby humans might master a nature that they discovered 
to be indifferent to themselves. 33  Through a discussion of Noah, Nimrod, 
Deucalion and Pyrrah, and Abraham, Hegel sees in Judaism a vertical moral 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32. 'For Kant, man remains a duality; reason tries to thwart desire, but the two are never 
synthesised.' G.W.F. Hegel, “The Spirit of Christianity and Its Fate,” 211n34. 
33. Ibid., 182-87. 
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geometry in which the individual subject mediates his relation to the world through 
a relation to a fictional transcendent object: God.  
 
 This leads Hegel to regard Judaism as a religion of positive legislation, where 
believers subject themselves to an external authority and are subsequently only 
able to appeal to categories of generality, where universal rules are applied to 
particular instances. Taking an ultra-rationalist view of Kantian morality, Hegel 
regards the transcendental idealism of Kant and Fichte to be a philosophical 
replication of the same vertical moral geometry – where God's authority is replaced 
with that of reason; Kant substituting the fear of a dominant lord outside of him for 
a reverence of the moral law within man's conscience. Both Judaism and 
Kantianism are seen as systems of positive legislation, where action is 
subordinated to an overarching law.  
 
 The implication of this mediated relation between self and world is illustrated 
by the story of Abraham and Isaac, where Abraham's willingness to act on God's 
command by sacrificing his son demonstrates a refusal of love in order to be free. 
By being cold and indifferent to his son, Abraham's freedom consists in tearing 
himself free from his family – from the most affective of loving relations. For 
Hegel, this parable heralds a form of diremption between life and law that is 
pervasive in Western thought, a diremption that is the source of discontinuity 
between two different forms of social organisation: between family and state, 
Sittlichkeit and Moralität.34  
 
 Hegel regards Kant's equation of acting freely with acting morally to be a 
replication of Abraham's assertion of a strict independence of self from world, 
where loving relations – affective ties, relations that Kant regards as 'pathological' 
unless subordinate to duty – are regarded as essential limitations of individual 
freedom. Hegel's basic criticism is that the categorical imperative is a replication of 
the instrumental rationality through which we master nature: a logic of causal 
manipulation and the subjection to an external authority are common to both. Both 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34. Cf. Kierkegaard and Derrida's discussions of Abraham and Isaac. Søren Kierkegaard, Fear and 
Trembling (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). Jacques Derrida, The Gift of Death. 
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ways of relating to the object internalise a conception of the other – nature without 
and nature within – as antagonist, making the assumption that the only possible 
relationship between self and world is one of mastery, domination, and control.  
 
 
Presumptive Dualism  
 
 Hegel's central objection is to Kant's establishment of a presumptive dualism 
between self and world, which he considers to be a fundamental error that deforms 
the relationship between the two. Hegel's basic point is that, by treating this 
dualism as fundamental, as something that precedes our relation to the world, the 
self is forced to mediate its relation to the world through reason – and this casts us 
into a series of ethical and epistemological binds from which there is no escape.  
 
 We can illustrate the nature of the epistemological bind into which we are 
cast with reference to the introduction to the Phenomenology, where Hegel is 
trying to make us anxious about the idea of epistemology as first philosophy. Here, 
in reference to theoretical reason, i.e., to the faculty of the understanding, the 
problem is that from the moment that we become sceptics, as soon as we doubt the 
validity of our knowledge of the external world, we find ourselves in trouble. 
Hegel writes:  
 
If cognition is the instrument for getting hold of absolute being, it is obvious that the use of 
an instrument on a thing certainly does not let it be what it is for itself, but rather sets out 
to reshape and alter it. If, on the other hand, cognition is not an instrument of our activity 
but a more or less passive medium through which the light of truth reaches us, then again 
we do not receive the truth as it is in itself, but only as it exists through and in this 
medium. Either way we employ a means which immediately brings about the opposite of 
its own end; or rather, what is really absurd is that we should make use of a means at all.35  
 
 Hegel is trying to unsettle Kant's epistemology by demonstrating that 
treating knowledge (theoretical reason) as a medium through which we navigate 
the world presupposes a foundational dualism between the subject and object: a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35. G.W.F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A.V. Miller (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), 
§73. 
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dualism that casts us into a series of paradoxes. The first is that the idea of 
knowledge as an instrument generates the very opposite of what it intends: if 
knowledge is an instrument then it must alter the object, and by altering the object 
it creates a categorial synthesis, thus leaves the object behind. The second is that if 
we treat knowledge as a passive medium through which the world reaches us, then 
we do not know the world as it is in itself, but only as it exists in and through this 
medium; this generates a gap between the knower and what they hope to know.36  
 
 The issue is the language of instrumentality, and the mistake is to think of 
knowledge as a medium. The root of the problem is that epistemology is borne out 
of fear: out of a fear of error we step back from the knowledge that we already 
have and institute the subject-object split; but it is the fear of error that is the error. 
This fear generates a series of responses that deepen the separation between self 
and world, with no way back.37 
 
 This is the logic applied to ethical reason in the Spirit essay. Here, in the 
terms of practical reason, the problem is that from the instant that we perceive the 
world to be hostile to us, that our relations to the world must be mediated by 
reason, we establish ourselves a false independence that adversely affects our 
relations to ourselves, to others, and to the natural world. From our position of 
false independence we project outside of our shared lived experience with others 
and submit ourselves to an ideal, which deforms internal relations of life because 
moral law, the idea of the good, or God, does not exist.  
 
  
The Separate Logics of Love and Law 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36. This epistemological bind is pithily captured in the following rhyme: 
'But for these and the rest, the greatest distress 
trapped in a philosophers hell 
For even the best, there's infinite regress 
Which means you never can tell' 
37. J.M. Bernstein, “Phenomenology of Spirit. Introduction,” Lectures on Hegel’s Phenomenology 
of Spirit The New School. New York City. 27th September (2006): 
http://bernsteintapes.com/lectures/Hegel/08PhenomenologyIntroB.mp3. 
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 Against the mediated relation between self and world implied by a 
commitment to understanding human beings as subjects, Hegel contrasts living 
relations with others. And these relations are modelled on the experience of love. 
This discussion is crucial in the development of his notion of Sittlichkeit (ethical 
life), which is understood in contrast to the formal, rule-governed approach of 
Kantian Moralität (moral law); where properly ethical relations are ones 
proceeding from the knowledge of love rather than from the authority of reason. 
Essentially Hegel is heralding a fundamental discontinuity between ethics and 
justice, the idea that there is an inequality between the logics of love and law: that 
the two are separate orders.38  
 
 Hegel regards Kantian ethics, Moralität, to operate according to a logic of 
law, which is at issue when a higher court is called upon to adjudicate between 
competing claims from opposing parties. This adjudication requires a common 
authority, such as that of Reason or the state, where parties concerned either 
identify themselves as subject to this authority, or are forced to subject to it. The 
logic of law is a logic of mediation, where subjects of the law mediate their 
relations to themselves and one another with reference to a common authority. 
Hegel regards this logic to be a form of external command, where the law is 
grounded in a double movement beyond the concrete particular, whereby the 
particular is subsumed and controlled by an authority that stands above it: an 
authority such as transcendent reason, or 'God.'  
 
 It is in this light that Hegel reads the teachings of Jesus. The central idea of 
the Spirit essay is to demonstrate that there is a logic of ethical experience in early 
Christianity that can be read as a guide to ethical conduct immanent to human 
experience rather than transcendent to it. Against the objective models of positive 
legislation of Judaism and Kantianism, where the self mediates its relation to the 
world through an 'objective' law, by demonstrating that human need trumps 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38. Derrida makes a similar argument in his Force of Law essay. Jacques Derrida, “Force of Law: 
The Mystical Foundation of Authority,” in Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice, ed. 
Rosenfeld and Carlson Cornell (London: Routledge, 1992). 
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religious command, Hegel claims that Jesus introduces something totally foreign: 
the subjective. 
 
Over against commands which required a bare service of the Lord, a direct slavery, an 
obedience without joy, without pleasure or love, i.e., the commands in connection with the 
service of God, Jesus set their precise opposite, a human urge and so a human need.39  
 
This is because Jesus focussed not on becoming a good subject of a transcendent 
Other (Reason or God), but on responding to the human need of the finite singular 
being. He replaced law with love. 
 
 In contrast, Kant insists that 'love is not to be understood as a feeling' but 
'must rather be thought as the maxim of benevolence (practical love), which results 
in beneficence.'40 Kant thus asserts the sovereignty of both the law and the subject 
over that of love, a move later shadowed in the work of both Habermas and 
Linklater. Although Hegel does not deny the necessity of law, he holds that 'the 
law is later than life and is outranked by it:' a key move through which he reverses 
Kant's conception of the relationship between love and morality, as discussed 
above.41 
 
 Subverting Kant's account of the relation, for Hegel love is the feeling of 
ethical life (Sittlichkeit) in its natural form. Whereas (moral) law is a kind of 
practical reasoning that abstracts from context-specific particularity, involving the 
deployment of reasons and arguments, in loving relations the law loses its form. In 
other words, love is a living relation to reality that makes the (moral) law 
superfluous. Hegel illustrates this difference with regard to the religious command 
'Thou shalt not kill:' 
 
The command "Thou shalt not kill" [Matthew v.21-22] is a maxim which is recognized as 
valid for the will of every rational being and which can be valid as a principle of a 
universal legislation. Against such a command Jesus sets the higher genius of 
reconcilability (a modification of love) which not only does not act counter to this law but 
makes it wholly superfluous; it has in itself a so much richer, more living, fullness that so 
poor a thing as a law is nothing for it at all. In reconcilability the law loses its form, the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39. G.W.F. Hegel, “The Spirit of Christianity and Its Fate,” 206,209. 
40. Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, 243-244,449. 
41. G.W.F. Hegel, “The Spirit of Christianity and Its Fate,” 230. 
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concept is displaced by life; but what reconcilability thereby loses in respect of the 
universality which grips all particulars together in the concept is only a seeming loss and a 
genuine infinite gain on account of the wealth of living relations with the individuals 
(perhaps few) with whom it comes into connection. It excludes not a reality but only 
thoughts and possibilities.42  
 
 For Hegel the essence of Christianity lies in this 'reconciliation,' where the 
law 'loses its' form and 'the concept is displaced by life.' Reconciliation is not 
achieved conceptually here, such as through the affirmation of a common 
humanity, but is achieved through love, through action that makes the law 
superfluous. The loving relation is congruous with both the law and the inclination: 
it is their synthesis; one that express an attunement to our ethical immediacy, 
dissolving the need for law.  
 
 
An Immanent Ethical Logic 
 
 To reiterate, Hegel is not denying the necessity of law, but is arguing that 
love and law are mutually implicated, although they operate according to different 
logics. However, in contrast to Kant, and also Habermas and Linklater, it is 
ultimately love that is more binding than law, and it is the person’s participation in 
the dynamic of ethical life that constitutes an ethical and emancipatory relationship 
between self and world.43 By demonstrating that ethical life is lived independently 
of moral laws, and that acting freely and ethically does not involve assuming the 
perspective of an ethical subject but simply an attunement to practical experience, 
Hegel 's critique of Kantian rationalism is supplemented by an immanent doctrine 
of ethics. 
 
 For Hegel, what Jesus demonstrates practically is that our first question when 
we see someone who is hungry should not be 'do they deserve food,' but to 
recognise that they are hungry means to recognise that they need food, full stop: 
the logic of ought has no role in ethical life. The notion of 'ought' is related to the 
idea of moral law, and belongs to a mediated relation between self and world; to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42. Ibid., 215-16. 
43. Ibid., 230. 
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act ethically what we need is not to obey the law, but to love thy neighbour. Ought 
only enters into consideration in relations of authority: you ought to obey because 
it is your duty, or because you will be punished if you do not.  
 
 Here relations between self and other are not external relations between 
subjects bridged mechanically by notions of common interest or moral law, but 
operate according to the logic of unity-in-difference, a logic that we discussed in 
the previous chapter in relation to the idea of mutual exposure and co-dependent 
arising, where the central idea is that my selfhood and freedom is essentially 
related to the character of my relations with others.  
 
 Hegel's basic thought here is that we cannot harm others without ethically 
harming ourselves; to act against some other person is not to break some 
transcendent law, but to act against our own life. This sees him drawing a 
distinction between punishment and what he calls 'fate,' which appears whenever 
life is injured. The working of fate commences 'when the trespasser feels the 
disruption of his own life [... and] The deficiency is recognised as a part of 
himself.'44 While punishment is 'the effect of a transgressed law' that is enforced by 
something alien, an external power that is opposed to the self, fate is experienced 
as something internal to the person, taking the form of guilt or shame. Whereas 
punishment presupposes a figure that inflicts the pain of punishment (and the fear 
of punishment is fear of Him) in fate, the fear is not the fear of an alien being but 
the fear of 'the power of life made hostile.'45 The appearance of 'fate' thus discloses 
the fact that we are fundamentally connected to each other: a phenomenological 
demonstration of the re-cognitive structure of self-consciousness.46 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44. Ibid. 
45. Ibid., 231. 
46. Harris's commentary on 'fate,' community & forgiveness is worth reproducing here: 'Fate is the 
understandable shape in which absolute Spirit finally emerges. Hegel speaks of "God appearing" 
only when the community understands its own function of forgiveness. Until then, "God" (as a 
subject-name) identifies only a necessary "transcendental illusion." Fate we must always reverence; 
but rational beings do not worship the Big Bang. But when we arrive at the consciousness that "God 
is Love," we are recognizing a divinity whose very being is constituted by our recognition. Nature 
forgives nothing. There is no "spirit of forgiveness" anywhere except in human self-consciousness. 
That is what God's necessary "Incarnation" conceptually signifies; and "nothing in fate is changed 
by it" - any more than Fate could be changed by Zeus. H.S. Harris, Hegel’s Ladder, vol. 2: The 
Odyssey of Spirit (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997), 540. 
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 Deeper insight into the dynamic of ethical life, our connectedness and the 
operation of fate, can be gained by applying the notion of love and fate to murder. 
In this context, the significance of murder is not so much that it is a negation of 
life; killing one life is not killing all life, and it does not sever my connection to 
that other, at least not fully. Instead, this transgression effects the diremption of life 
through a violent act of two-ing. In other words, by transforming life into an 
enemy, the destruction of life in this transgression undermines the conditions of my 
own life. In characteristically eloquent prose Hegel writes: 
 
Only through a departure from that united life which is neither regulated by law nor at 
variance with law, only through the killing of life, is something alien produced. 
Destruction of life is not the nullification of life but its diremption, and the destruction 
consists in its transformation into an enemy [i.e., the murderer thinks he has killed his 
victim. But he has only turned life into an enemy, only produced a ghost to terrify him]. It 
is immortal, and, if slain, it appears as it is terrifying ghost which vindicates every branch 
of life and lets loose its Eumenides. The illusion of trespass, its belief that it destroys the 
other's life and thinks itself enlarged thereby, is dissipated by the fact that the disembodied 
spirit of the injured life comes on the scene against the trespass, just as Banquo who came 
as a friend to Macbeth was not blotted out when he was murdered but immediately 
thereafter took his seat, not as a guest at the feast but as an evil spirit. The trespasser 
intended to have do with another's life, but he has only destroyed his own, for life is not 
different from life, since life dwells in the single Godhead. In his arrogance he has 
destroyed indeed, but only the friendliness of life; he has perverted life into an enemy. It is 
the deed itself which has created a law whose domination now comes on the scene; this 
law is the unification, in the concept, of the equality between the injured, apparently alien, 
life and the trespasser's own forfeited life. It is now for the first time that the injured life 
appears as a hostile power against the trespasser and maltreats him as he has maltreated the 
other. Hence punishment as fate is the equal reaction of the trespasser's own deed, of a 
power which he himself has armed, of an enemy made an enemy by himself.47 
 
 The disruption of my own life through the appearance of fate means that I 
must recognise the prior transgression as my own, and acknowledge my own 
answerability for it. By recognising my fate through guilt or shame, I face up to my 
own responsibility for my transgression, and can then attempt to atone for my 
transgression and reconcile with the other by seeking their forgiveness. There is no 
external authority here: my transgression reveals that I am already situated within 
an ethical community where I am bound together with others with whom I co-
participate within a community of fate: the trespass reveals the whole.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47. G.W.F. Hegel, “The Spirit of Christianity and Its Fate,” 229-30. 
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 While the subjective, formal, freedom that I have by virtue of being an 
individual ensures that I am able to deny this 'originary debt' to the other and cling 
on to my own independence as a subject, or perhaps to suppose that the other 
deserved whatever fortune became of him and to thereby eschew my responsibility 
for his situation, this only establishes for myself a false independence. Causing 
injury to another, and subsequently disavowing or ignoring my answerability to 
them, considering my actions just or permissible, leaves me bound to my prior 
subjectivity and constitutes an alienation from my own existence as a self-
actualising being. Similarly, hate is not a rejection of love but its inversion. Hating 
someone, a person or even a group, does not deny my connection with them; 
neither does it dissolve that community, it only perverts them. Hate is a tearing 
apart, a terrible distortion of 'the between' that both perverts the hater and is 
destructive of the self.  
 
 More serious than hate is indifference. Indifference to others, feeling no guilt 
for wrong-doing, or no compulsion to help those in need, amounts to a rejection of 
love, not hate. It is therefore narcissism that is the ultimate failure of love. 
Narcissism is an individual and social pathology that is worse than hate. My 
subjective freedom as an individual to deny my originary debt, to transgress the 
law, to act out of caprice or to hate – in short, to avoid participation in my 
community of fate – is, for Hegel, not a full appropriation of my freedom as a self-
actualising being. However, reconciling with the other by acknowledging my 
answerability for my transgression, facing up to my responsibility, seeking 
forgiveness and subsequently being let back into the fold represents the fullest 
appropriation of my freedom. Love is the model of this reconciliation: 'in love fate 
is reconciled,' and it is this conception of freedom that serves as Hegel's normative 
standard.48 Through my reconciliation, in love, I transcend my prior subjectivity 
and am no longer bound to my prior fate: reconciliation in love is a liberation. 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48. Ibid., 231. 
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Moralität and Sittlichkeit 
 
 Ethical life, experienced as love, both underwrites and transcends the law; it 
may even be set against it. Such is the case with Antigone. Against the conscious 
written law of the state, i.e., Creon's decree that, as a traitor of the state, Polynices' 
body be left out in the open for the vultures, Hegel regards Antigone as the 
personification of the unwritten ethical law that is society's unwritten foundation.49 
In direct contrast to Habermas's moral cognitivism Hegel writes: 
 
True ethical law is the unwritten, inerrant, unalterable divine law spoken of in the 
Antigone. It is not anything that an individual can hope either to criticize or to justify, and 
certainly not in terms of mere self-consistency.50 
 
Antigone's conscientious disobedience of Creon's decree is seen as righting the 
one-sidedness of the 'thought of' human law. Creon's edict is driven by the need to 
punish Polynices and to deter any future sedition; yet this is incompatible with 
Antigone's love for her brother and her conviction that, despite his transgression, 
he deserves the respect of a proper burial.  
 
 
The Mutual Implication of Moralität and Sittlichkeit 
 
 In his commentary of the Phenomenology Harris argues that Antigone's 
personification of the unwritten law is not just referring to the particularity of 
familial relations, but to the broader ethical identity of the members of 'the whole 
Greek world over which Zeus holds sway,' an identity extending beyond the 
confines of the specific polis.51 Creon then represents the 'thought of' human law 
that is realised by self-consciousness and built on top of this unwritten law, a law 
that generates its own commitments and obligations.52 The tragedy consists in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49. This ethical law corresponds with ethical life (Sittlichkeit) rather than moral law (Moralität). 
50. G.W.F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, 550n437. 
51. H.S. Harris, Hegel’s Ladder, 168. 
52. For an illuminating extended commentary on Hegel's Antigone see Kimberley Hutchings, 
Hegel and Feminist Philosophy (Cambridge: Blackwell, 2003), 96. Also Kimberley Hutchings and 
Tuija Pulkkinen, eds. Hegel’s Philosophy and Feminist Philosophy: Beyond Antigone? 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010). 
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fact that Antigone and Creon can only act out their one-sided conviction in their 
own right rather than recognise the rightness and mutual implication of the 
opposing perspectives and achieve a reconciliation therefrom; the written law of 
the state and Antigone's personification of the unwritten law of moral conviction 
are thus tragically entwined because each can only act out one side of the synthetic 
unity that would constitute truly ethical behaviour.  
 
 Demonstrating that love is not simply mere emotion, Hegel's point is that 
ethical society needs the recognition of the mutual dependency of both 
perspectives. He is not following the Humean or Smithean view that ethics are 
based simply on the intuition, on feelings: his position is that it is the unity of 
intuition and reason that is the ground of ethics. Ethical relations are not simply 
individual preferences grounded in the intuition, they also have a conceptual 
element: the 'thought of' human law. This 'thought of' law must be grounded in an 
underlying ethical life, the extension of which is not correlative with the extension 
of human law, a reconciliation or unification under the concept, because without 
this underlying ethical life, the 'thought of' human law is simply an imposition on 
those subject to it. This position, we shall see, has profound implications for an 
ethical and emancipatory approach to world politics. 
 
 Although this ethical position does contain a relative aspect, it does not 
subjectivise value. Ethics are not relative in the sense that anything goes, but 
relative in the sense that ethical concepts are not universal, but are historically 
grounded in the mores and practices that constitute ethical life. In the Philosophy 
of Right (1820), Hegel's 'mature' work that builds on his earlier work by applying 
his philosophical system to the actualisation of freedom in the world – to the 
objective structures of right that represent the social conditions of human freedom, 
institutions such as the family, civil society and the ethical state – Hegel formulates 
the divergent logics of love and law through his distinction between Moralität and 
Sittlichkeit. 
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Moralität and Sittlichkeit in Linklater's CIRT 
 
 Linklater discusses Hegel's distinction in his The Transformation of Political 
Community, where he writes: 
 
Moralität is the approach to ethics which assumes that the solitary individual can use 
autonomous reason to discover the normative foundations of a cosmopolitan society. It 
abstracts individuals from concrete settings and credits them with innate powers for 
apprehending universal moral truths. Sittlichkeit refers to the social institutions and norms 
which precede the individual and lend shape to the subject's moral life.53  
 
Linklater's treatment of this distinction centres around his attempt to reconcile 
universality and particularity by balancing the ethical claims of universality with 
the claims of the (nation-state) community to difference, self-determination, and 
exclusion.54 He understands Sittlichkeit to be 'central to Hegel's attempt to defend 
state sovereignty from a cosmopolitan critique,' and affirms Hegel's notion of 
Sittlichkeit to be both a 'bold formulation of the nature of social morality' and 'a 
rich explanation of the diverse forms of political community.'55 Nonetheless, 
unsurprisingly given his foundational commitment to the ethical subject, Linklater 
repeats the dialectical strategy employed in Men and Citizens where rationalism 
and historicism are sublated into a synthesis that simply reasserts the sovereignty 
of ethical reason: an affirmation that betrays both a limited understanding of the 
nature of ethical life and of Hegel's account of the relation between ethical life and 
moral law.56 
 
 According to Linklater, the importance of the distinction between Moralität 
and Sittlichkeit revolves around the centrality of either rational deliberation or the 
reliance on custom and convention at the heart of social and political life.57 He 
makes two key mistakes here: firstly, reducing ethical life to customs and 
conventions, and secondly, supposing that either rational deliberation or ethical 
life are central to social and political life, rather than recognising that the two are 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53. Andrew Linklater, The Transformation of Political Community, 52. 
54. Ibid., 55. 
55. Ibid., 52. 
56. Ibid. 
57. Ibid. 
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mutually and inexorably implicated. As we have just seen, against the privilege 
that Linklater ascribes to ethical reason, it is the mutual implication of ethical life 
and ethical reason that constitutes Antigone's tragedy. While Creon's refusal to 
bury Polynices is in accord with the 'thought of' human law (forbidding traitors a 
proper burial), and overrides the Thebian custom (of burying the dead under 
normal circumstances), the significance of this action is not just that it constitutes a 
simple contravention of a local, particularist morality, but because it contravenes 
an unwritten ethical law: it goes against what is right; what Douzinas refers to as 
the law as dike (justice) as opposed to the law as reason and nomos.58  
 
 As Hegel writes: 'Ethical disposition consists in sticking steadfastly to what 
is right, and abstaining from all attempts to move or shake it, or derive it.'59 He 
goes on to explain in a footnote that: 
 
Ethical law is implicit in communal living. It is not grounded on arbitrary individual 
decrees, which can be simply disregarded. It is what all men in the community accept as 
their standard, and that without question, and what they do not in anyway see as foreign or 
alien.60 
 
This ethical law, the 'unwritten, inerrant' law that is felt as love, and which 
underwrites ethical life, is not the same as the 'thought of' moral law. Nor does it 
simply consist of 'customs and conventions,' to be transcended by a rational 
morality. Ethical society is dependent on the dialectical interaction of both.61  
 
 
The Dominion of Moral Law 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58. Costas Douzinas, “Law’s Birth and Antigone’s Death: On Ontological and Psychoanalytical 
Ethics,” Cardozo Law Review 16, no. 3-4 (1995): 1325–62. 
59. G.W.F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, §437. 
60. Ibid., 549-550n436. 
61. While Antigone and Creon have different points of view on the matter of Polynices's burial, the 
matter is not reducible to their contrasting perspectives: the facts that Antigone is Polynices's sister, 
and Creon is the head of state are largely inconsequential. Rather, it revolves around the justice of 
the Creon's decree. As Hegel explains 'Alteration of the point of view is not contradiction; for what 
we are concerned with is not the point of view, but the object and the content, which ought not to be 
self-contradictory.' Ibid., §437. 
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 We saw in Part 1 that the basic theme uniting Men and Citizens, 
Transformation and Linklater's later work on the harm principle is the normative 
ideal of universal moral inclusion, where universality was conceived as the 
universal responsibility to engage in dialogue. The problem, we claimed, was that 
this defence of universalism against anti-foundationalism involved the projection 
of an ethical subject, a strategy that conflates the ontological difference between 
human beings and the being of human beings (conceived as ethical subjectivity). 
Hence it should cause little surprise to learn that, while he affirms the social nature 
of morality, he effectively treats ethical life as an anachronism that is subordinate 
to the sovereignty of moral reason.  
 
 Linklater's position here mirrors that of Habermas, who considers himself a 
'communicative Kantian;' the communicative aspect reflecting his dialogical or 
communicative turn away from Kant's monological conception of practical (moral) 
reason. Although claiming that 'for all its affinities with Kant's moral theory, 
discourse ethics is rather different,' Habermas nonetheless explains that discourse 
theory 'takes its orientation for an intersubjective interpretation of the categorical 
imperative from Hegel's theory of recognition but without incurring the cost of 
dissolution of morality in ethical life:' the implication is that rational morality, 
moral law, is superordinate to the lived character of ethics.62 
 
 Linklater is correct to recognise that Moralität brings a reflective orientation 
to Sittlichkeit, and that it plays a central role in 'promoting the decisive transition 
from unreflective to reflective social moralities,' but he is wrong to treat this as a 
linear progression from a customary morality to a reflective one rather than one 
aspect of a dialectical interaction.63 It is his foundational commitment to the notion 
of an ethical subject that is the cause of this error. This commitment allows him to 
read the transcendence of Sittlichkeit by Moralität as a Kantian form of 
transcendence rather than a Hegelian one. While this distinction was discussed in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62. Jürgen Habermas, “Morality and Ethical Life: Does Hegel’s Critique of Kant Apply to 
Discourse Ethics,” in Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action (Cambridge, Mass.: The 
MIT Press, 1992), 203. Jürgen Habermas, Justification and Application: Remarks on Discourse 
Ethics, 1n24. 
63. Andrew Linklater, The Transformation of Political Community, 52. 
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the previous chapter, the difference is that the Kantian form of transcendence 
involves moral law rising above ethical life, while the Hegelian form involves the 
mutual implication of ethical life and moral law, where moral law is immanent 
within ethical life and manifests itself through the dialectical transformation of 
ethical life, but cannot simply rise above it.64 
 
 In contrast to Habermas and Linklater's reading, Hegel's version of ethical 
society requires not the exclusion or transcendence of ethical life but recognition of 
the mutual dependence and dialectical interaction of ethical life and moral law 
where, due to the essentially limited nature of reflective rationality, precedence is 
ultimately given to ethical immediacy: to the operation of conscientious activity 
that proceeds from the knowledge of love. As Moyar has recently noted 'the free 
conscience is the pivotal concept in [Hegel's] view of modern ethics and politics.'65 
It is the activity of the conscience that is the moving and justifying principle for the 
continuing development of human freedom; Hegel's focus thus falling sharply on 
the activity of liberation.66  
 
 Hegel's emphasis on the relation between freedom and conscientious activity 
develops Schiller's objection to Kant.67 The famous controversy between Kant and 
Schiller is over the role of duty and inclination.68 For Schiller, our attitude to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64. For more on the notion of Sittlichkeit see sections §§142-64, §§182-8, §§194-5, §§201-2, 
§§205-8 and §§255-8 of the Philosophy of Right, which discusses ethical life and its articulation in 
the moments of family, civil society, and the state. See also Allen W. Wood, Hegel’s Ethical 
Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 195-203. and Frederick C. Beiser, Hegel 
(London: Routledge, 2005), 233-39; Terry Pinkard, “Virtues, Morality and Sittlichkeit: From 
Maxims to Practices,” European Journal of Philosophy 7, no. 2 (1999): 217-39. 
65. Dean Moyar, Hegel’s Conscience (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 23. 
66. Hegel is taking cues from the development of free religious conscience in the Protestant 
Reformation, and he thought that the authority of individual self-consciousness could only come 
into its own with the displacement of traditional religious authority. In his Lectures on the 
Philosophy of History he claims that the Reformation was the decisive moment in European history 
for setting into motion the development of modern freedom. The Reformation introduced into the 
world what Hegel calls 'free spirit,' 'the idea of an inner disposition to will the ethical without an 
internalised fear of religious authority.' Ibid., 23-24. 
67. On the relation between Kant, Schiller and Hegel see Dieter Henrich, “Ethics of Autonomy,” in 
The Unity of Reason: Essays on Kant’s Philosophy, ed. Richard Velkey (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard 
University Press, 1994). 
68. The disagreement is neatly surmised in Schiller's infamous epigram, much discussed in the neo-
Kantian literature: 
'Gladly I serve my friends, but alas I do it with pleasure 
Hence I am plagued with doubt that I am not virtuous.  
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morals had to be different to that presented by Kant, and he emphasised the role of 
the sensuous, emotive side of human nature, and the cultivation of ethical 
inclinations, in contrast to Kant's insistence that moral actions are ones that follow 
from a dutiful respect for the moral law. What Schiller was attempting to show is 
that, in a free human being, duty has to descend and become inclination, while 
inclination has to ascend so that a natural inclination is developed for the content 
of duty; in order that, acting out of inclination rather than rational respect for the 
moral law, the free human being does what is right for the whole of mankind.  
 
 Although defending Kant against Schiller, Gerold Prauss argues that the 
dispute highlights the fact that Kant overlooks a third source of motivation besides 
inclination and duty; that is, love.69 As Rudolf Steiner puts it: '[i]f we look for the 
roots of moral Intuitions in human nature, if we look for the actual impulse, the 
ethical motivation in those moral Intuitions, we find love;' this love, he continues 
'absorbs into itself the moral Intuitions, and we are moral human beings in so far as 
we love our duty, in so far as duty has become something that arises out of the 
human individuality itself as an immediate force.'70  
 
 In Hegel this all relates to the idea of conscientious activity. First arising in 
his discussion of the activity of the conscience in the Phenomenology (§§632-671), 
the conscience is understood as the finding of an appropriate response in a given 
situation: 'it is in and through the activity of conscience that the knowledge of love 
is actualised in the world,' the activity of the conscience represents 'the resurfacing 
of the knowledge of love.'71  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
For that there is no other advice: you must try to despise them, 
And then do with aversion what duty commands you.' 
Cosmopolitans might read 'friends' here as pertaining to circle of moral concern beyond our 
compatriots. Friedrich Schiller, Werke. Nationalausgabe, vol. 1-42 (Weimar: Böhlau, 1943), 357. 
Quoted by Frederick C. Beiser, A Lament, Friedrich Schiller: Playwright, Poet, Philosopher, 
Historian (Bern: Peter Lang, 2007), 237.; For a discussion see Herbert James Paton, The 
Categorical Imperative: A Study in Kant’s Moral Philosophy (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1948), 47.; Henry E. Allison, Kant’s Theory of Freedom (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1990), 180-184,275n3. Frederick C. Beiser, A Lament. 
69. Henry E. Allison, Kant’s Theory of Freedom, 275n3.; Gerold Prauss, Kant Über Freiheit Als 
Autonomie (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1983), 240-77. 
70. Rudolf Steiner, Fruits of Anthroposophy (London: Ruldolf Steiner Press, 1986), 59. 
71. Alice Ormiston, Love and Politics: Re-Interpreting Hegel, 55-56. 
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 It is this activity of the conscience, the actualisation of the knowledge of love 
in the world, that Alice Ormiston demonstrates is the basis of Hegel's politics. The 
very logic of the Philosophy of Right, she shows, is meant to affirm the knowledge 
of love, upon which it is based.72 The logical development of the will – from the 
immediate ethical unity of the family to civil society and to the ethical state – as 
well as the logical arguments that Hegel presents to convince reflective rationality 
of the truth of the political principles articulated in the Philosophy of Right are 
predicated upon 'the inner certainty that is acquired through the experience of 
love.'73 Hegel's arguments concerning welfare, for instance, depend on more than 
just abstract right, they require the actual recognition by individuals of their own 
and other's finitude, of their shared vulnerability: it is love that makes this 
recognition possible. It is love that allows us, at the level of intuition, 'to feel our 
commonality with others and to see the injustices of a system that creates such 
inequality.'74 It is only on the basis of this recognition that Hegel’s concept of 
'morality' subsequently helps to rationally justify the prior response of love.75  
 
 By affirming the sovereignty of ethical reason over ethical life, Linklater not 
only distorts Hegel's characteristic form of transcendence, where freedom is 
associated with the activity of the conscience and the overcoming of any given 
subjectivity, but in supposedly standing above the perspective of ethical 
immediacy Linklater also denies himself a powerful evaluative tool with which to 
engage in critical social theory. Per contra Linklater, rather than representing a 
conservative or atavistic approach to ethics, Hegel's approach to ethical life, as 
modelled on the experience of love, represents both a more primordial aspect of 
our ethical experience, an aspect that Linklater's approach overlooks, and a 
powerful tool for CIRT.76 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72. Ibid., 71. 
73. Ibid., 73. 
74. Ibid., 78. 
75. Ibid. 
76. In a similar vein, Neuhouser argues that the concept of 'life' in Hegel's early philosophy can be 
deployed as an evaluative tool to identify forms of social pathology. Frederik Neuhouser, “Hegel on 
Life, Freedom, and Social Pathology” (Paper presented at the Philosophies of Right: Philosophical 
Conceptions of Right from German Idealism to Critical Theory, New York, 2011). 
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The Lived Character of Ethics 
 
 In short, there is much more to the idea of ethical life than is reflected in 
Linklater's treatment of Sittlichkeit; specifically the model of social relations 
provided by the experience of love.77 While Linklater concurs with Hegel that the 
standpoint of morality represents a higher form of freedom because it raises us 
above the simple acceptance of norms and customs, and leads to the principle of 
individuality that characterises modernity, Hegel quite rightly insists that this 
perspective is itself inexorably entwined with ethical life, and that it is the 
operation of ethical life that drives 'the moral point of view' forwards. While more 
rationally based moral understandings and principles represent a higher form of 
self-conscious freedom than do simple customs and norms, these moral principles 
are themselves only developed and overcome through the operation of ethical life. 
This does not entail rejecting moral rationalism, but recognising its pernicious 
effects and limitations, and ultimately supplementing it.78  
 
 As we have seen from our discussions in Chapters 6 and 7, this 
supplementation amounts to a view of the individual, thought as self-conscious 
subject, overcoming the limitations of object-oriented consciousness and becoming 
attuned to a practical relation to reality and the recognition of our shared 
participation in a community of fate. This involves an attunement to the experience 
of others becoming a deeper part of the fabric of our self-understandings and 
informing the way that we relate to ourselves, to others, and the natural world. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77. Indeed, it seems that our discussion of Linklater's treatment of the relation between Moralität 
and Sittlichkeit affirms Walker's (brief) criticism of Transformation where he claims: 'in each and 
every case Linklater's strategy is to take what he thinks is useful and then discard the rest. And what 
is useful is always some sort of argument for a greater universalization, and what can be discarded 
is the tattered residue of particularity.' R.B.J. Walker, “The Hierarchicalization of Political 
Community,” Review of International Studies 25, no. 1 (1999), 152. 
78. 'Although Hegel has quite often been taken to be rejecting Kantian, "individualistic" morality in 
favour of something else – "social ethics," accepting one's community's norms, or some such view – 
more recent work has argued that in fact he is best seen as extending Kant's "rationalist" morality 
by critiquing it and supplementing it, but not rejecting it. This interpretation seems to me entirely 
correct.' Terry Pinkard, “Virtues, Morality and Sittlichkeit: From Maxims to Practices,” 222. 
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Borrowing an argument of Heidegger's, it involves engaging in resolute solicitous 
being-with, a form of conscientious activity that not only appropriates our freedom 
as existential condition, but frees ourselves up for being-with others, and leads to 
an entirely immanent form of transcendence: freedom as the crossing of love.  
 
 It is this prioritisation of our ethical immediacy that is the central point of the 
distinction between Moralität and Sittlichkeit. Derrida makes similar point in 
Glas.79 There he notes that the transition from Moralität to Sittlichkeit, from Part 
Two to Part Three of the Philosophy of Right, is intended to reflect the transition 
from Judaism to Christianity in the Spirit essay: from a religion based on command 
and duty to a religion based on love and freedom.80 The idea of Sittlichkeit is thus 
better understood – not as parochial ethical particularism, an anachronistic morality 
of custom and conventions to be transcended by ethical reason – but as an attempt 
to reflect an existential condition of ethical immediacy, a condition modelled on 
the experience of love. The supplementary role given to moral reason over a 
practical relation to reality is demonstrated in Hegel's discussion of the conscience 
in the Phenomenology. Although superseded by chapters on religion and absolute 
knowing, the activity of the conscience transcends the standpoint of reflective 
rationality and represents the completion of the Phenomenology at the level of 
personal experience, i.e., conscientious activity is the highest form of the activity 
of individual human consciousness.  
 
 
The Activity of the Conscience  
 
 As we saw previously, the activity of the conscience is understood as the 
finding of an ethical response in a given situation. It bears testament to the 
antecedent experience of love since it is in the conscience that reason and being are 
united; conscientious activity is not the dutiful activity of morality, but neither is it 
pure intuition. It is in the conscience that law no longer exists in an abstract form, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79. Jacques Derrida, Glas. 
80. Ibid., 33a-93a. See also Simon Critchley, Ethics, Politics, Subjectivity: Essays on Derrida, 
Levinas and Contemporary French Thought (London: Verso, 1999), 6. 
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standing over sensuous being as something alien that commands it. Rather, through 
conscientious activity, law and being are united and expressed through the 
individual person. Here ethical action is not action that follows a rational 
calculation (or even discussion) of our duties, but is conscientious action in a 
contingent context that expresses something universal. If we see someone 
drowning, we jump in and save them: we just act. This action is not mediated by 
moral reason, reasons do not exist. This is ethical immediacy: moral reasons and 
validations of that action come later. For instance, if asked why we jumped in to 
save the person we might retrospectively justify our action in the form of a maxim 
by saying that, if it were us drowning then we would want someone to save us; yet 
we must recognise that this is a retroactive justification of an experience that tells 
us something more fundamental about the structure of our life with others.  
 
 It is of course possible for us to feel indifferent towards another in need, or 
perhaps to consider their suffering to be deserved – but neither position will 
absolve us of our personal responsibility if we fail to act. This is an important 
point: it is not simply the case that acts of conscience should be considered 
supererogatory and be lauded, as is the tendency with perspectives that affirm the 
sovereignty of the ethical subject, but it is to hold that there is a fundamental 
responsibility, an originary debt to the other, and that our existence as separate 
entities, as ethical subjects for instance, is based upon an abstraction that denies 
such a debt. We tend not to recognise this.  
 
 The problem is that as soon as we start to think in terms of rights and duties 
associated with ethical subjectivity, as soon as we start to rely on our moral reason, 
we are already in trouble. This frame of mind leads to an essential limitation on 
what we think we owe to others, and we tend to mediate these relations with 
reference to some overarching norm or rule, which we might dutifully observe. 
However, arguments regarding duty have only a limited purchase: they only serve 
to bolster or modify prior commitments.81 Philosophy is simply not that powerful, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81. To borrow Bernstein's metaphor, there is no use saying to the parent of a suicide bomber 'your 
son ought not to blow up other people,' because once that primitive notion of empathy is gone, there 
is little point arguing with them philosophically. J.M. Bernstein, “Early Theological Writings,” 
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pointing out logical mistakes or inconsistencies in the beliefs that people hold is 
not going to make them change their position dramatically; philosophy only gives 
non-sceptics and non-fanatics internal reasons to think that they are rationally 
justified in holding the beliefs that they do: it is the scepticism or fanaticism that is 
the barrier and, in ethical discourse, affirming the sovereignty of reason over love 
is more likely to encourage that scepticism rather than eliminate it.  
 
 Shakespeare illustrates as much in Othello. As a soldier Othello simply 
cannot stand the feeling of vulnerability that his all-encompassing love for 
Desdemona brings; he simply cannot bear his exposure to her, and his dependence 
makes life intolerable for him. This leads him into a desperate quest for 'ocular 
proof' of her love for him; yet what would such proof look like? Iago plants a 
terrible thought into Othello's head: that while it cannot be proved, Desdemona's 
love can surely be falsified; infidelity would provide Othello with solid proof that 
she does not love him. Othello's anxiety – feelings that accompany his unstable 
subjectivity – drives him to seek evidence of Desdemona's infidelity, and the 
tragedy begins its course to its murderous conclusion. Othello is a tragic 
demonstration that overemphasising the role of reason over love can turn even 
intimate lovers into distant strangers.82 
 
 That we expect people to be other-regarding and compassionate can be 
demonstrated by the recent censoring of Chinese society after a two-year old girl 
was hit by two different vehicles and ignored by passers-by. After being run over 
by a van, more than a dozen people walked or cycled past her before she was hit by 
a second truck. In the ensuing public uproar, Chinese society was reproached for a 
'moral numbness' due to the incredible display of public apathy towards a seriously 
injured child in extreme danger.83 The episode holds a perverse mirror up to the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Lectures on Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit The New School. New York City. 13th September 
(2006): http://bernsteintapes.com/lectures/Hegel/04EarlyTheologicalWritingB.mp3. 
82. This illustration is Giles Fraser's: Giles Fraser, “You’ve Got to Respect Sceptics,” The 
Guardian Friday 29th June. (2012). For a discussion see Stanley Cavell, The Claim of Reason: 
Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 451-96. 
83. See Ben Blanchard, “Chinese Girl Dies in Hit-and-Run That Sparked Outrage,” Reuters, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/21/us-china-girl-idUSTRE79K0HM20111021 (accessed 
12/03/2012.  
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parable of the Good Samaritan in which Jesus illustrates the injunction to love thy 
neighbour. 84  Although the parable focusses on commending the Samaritan's 
compassion, it can also be read as an indictment of both the priest and the Levite 
who both cross the road in order to pass by the 'half dead man.' Read in this way, 
both the parable and the Chinese episode function as a negative illustration of 
Hegel's use of love as an image of human connectedness. In both cases, there was a 
fundamental ethical responsibility to the other on the parts of the priest, the Levite, 
and the Chinese public, and in both cases all failed in their responsibility.  
 
 There are of course mediating factors. The priest, who is supposed to be 
ritually clean, could not tell if the man were a 'neighbour;' if he were a non-Jew, 
the priest risked defilement, while if he were dead he could not come within four 
cubits of the man without incurring the humiliating and lengthy process of 
restoring ritual purity. Similarly, people in China are hesitant to help those in 
distress out of fear of being blamed themselves. However, we are right to 
reprehend those responsible for allowing these concerns to mediate the immediate 
ethical responsibility of the priest to the half-dead man, and the Chinese public to 
the little girl; allowing these concerns to mediate their relation to reality represents 
a distortion of an underlying ethical life. The error in both cases is that these 
factors were allowed to mediate the lived character of ethics. While there is no 
external authority to punish the Chinese public, the Levite, or the priest, all have to 
face up to their fate, experienced here as shame. A shame that is the proper 
response to the lack of love, from the denial of their mutual implication and an 
abrogation of their ethical responsibility for the other. 
 
Conclusions 
 
 Through our discussion of the relationship between love and morality we 
have seen that Kant casts a long shadow over contemporary ethical thought. There 
are good reasons for this. Clearly Kant's moral rationalism is an important 
contribution to our understanding of ethics. Nonetheless, we will recall that the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84. (Luke 10: 25-37) 
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claim was made in Chapter 6 that, despite being the most strident of Kant's critics, 
Hegel's engagement with Kant is an essentially constructive critique with the aim 
of developing his own Kantianism; accordingly our aim here has not been to reject 
Kantian ethics, rather to demonstrate how Hegel completes it. Although Hegel's 
criticism of Kantian ethics is certainly not new, Hegel's insights into the nature of 
ethical life are often overlooked, and the tendency of twentieth century left-
Hegelian thought has been to read him as a philosopher of the concept, a reading 
which obscures his most powerful insights.85 We have demonstrated this to be true 
in the cases of both Habermas and Linklater with reference to their prioritisation of 
Kantian Moralität.  
 
 The problem in both cases is that this simply asserts the sovereignty of the 
ethical subject, leading to a dualism between self and world that we have sought to 
demonstrate is profoundly misguided. In contrast, the position taken here is that, in 
order to live up to the ethical and emancipatory ideals of CIRT, we need to eschew 
this duality and follow the moves made in post-Kantian German idealism away 
from the foundational commitment to the individual thought as ethical subject to a 
conception of the human being as the being that has the potential for self-conscious 
subjectivity.86 This not only entails a shift in our understanding of freedom, as 
discussed in the previous chapter, but also in our understanding of the nature of 
ethical relations.  
 
 Ethical relations, as they have been presented here, are not simply relations 
of ethical subjects that proceed according to maxims that have been subjected to 
the test of universalisability, whether that ratiocination is seen to be an individual 
exercise (Kant) or a collective, communicative one (Habermas, Linklater). Rather, 
they consist in the concrete interaction of conscientious self-conscious subjects 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85. There are of course notable exceptions to this. Dean Moyar's recent Hegel's Conscience is a 
good example. Dean Moyar, Hegel’s Conscience. 
86. There are clearly similarities here with Linklater's account of emancipation as the historical 
actualisation of the ethical subject. However, recalling our discussions from the previous chapter, 
self-conscious subjectivity differs significantly from Linklater's treatment of this as a Kantian form 
of subjectivity. Moreover, the problem is with Linklater's treatment of ethical subjectivity as a 
foundational commitment. We will return to a discussion of our relation to Linklater in the 
Conclusion. 
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proceeding from the knowledge of love. This is not to deny the need for ethical 
reason or the postulation of moral laws. It does however insist that we recognise 
that properly ethical relations must operate according to a different logic: a logic of 
love, and that it is ultimately action that follows from the knowledge of love that 
leads to a genuine reconciliation with the other, not the exercise of discursive 
reason – as implied in Linklater's defence of universalism.  
 
 There is a further problem with deploying an argument based on the 
affirmation of Moralität at the cosmopolitical level. We have seen that the exercise 
of moral reason operates according to the logic of law, where a higher court is 
called upon to adjudicate between competing claims between opposing parties. 
This requires either an identification with a common authority or enforced 
compliance; no such authority currently exists in world politics. The underlying 
assumption behind Linklater's defence of universalism is that moral reason can 
provide such an authority, yet we have been questioning the ethical and 
emancipatory credentials of such a position. While most international political 
actors recognise the binding authority of norms such as state sovereignty, or 
peremptory norms against gross human rights violations such as genocide, the 
authority of these norms have followed from humanity's experience of their 
violation: from our prior transgressions. Our collective responses to such violations 
reveal that we are already situated in a universal human community, albeit one 
limited to the collective rejection of such transgressions rather than a stronger 
sense of community that may be required to tackle the problems that humanity 
faces as a species (such as thos discussed in the Introduction). 
 
 These examples might then lend further credence to Hegel's insistence on the 
mutual dependency of moral law and ethical life. Without reiterated demands for 
the recognition of human rights from those who have theirs violated, it would be 
easier to decry universal human rights as Western impositions on non-Western 
cultures. But these universal norms seem to be grounded in a nascent but 
developing international ethical life; they are not impositions. We might then 
venture to contend that rather than overextending our abstractive capabilities by 
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projecting ethical subjectivity on others in order that we may reach a consensus 
regarding shared principles of coexistence, that Hegel's argument for the mutual 
dependency of ethical life and ethical law can lend support to the argument that we 
must also be concerned with cultivating a more cosmopolitan form of international 
ethical life; indeed that this might need to come first. We shall defend such an 
argument in the Conclusion.  
 Conclusions.  
Love, Ethics, and Emancipation 
 
 
 
 
Political and Theoretical Contexts 
 
 We saw in the Introduction that several writers have suggested that, given 
increasing global interdependence, we sit at the twilight of the Westphalian system, 
confronting a material actuality that is drawing us into a struggle to define the 
character of globalisation: a struggle between the development of a more 
democratic cosmopolis that could be characterised by greater collective human 
responsibility, where sovereignty might be subordinated to global interdependence, 
or one where we remain increasingly ensnared in the naked pursuit of power and 
wealth.1 We learnt, however, that the principle of state sovereignty has had an 
enormous and lasting effect, not only on the objective structuring of human 
political and social relations, but also on our political imagination; both of which 
have conspired to produce a vision of politics that would be contained within the 
state.2  
 
 In light of these material transformations, we affirmed Behr's call for more 
universalistic trajectories of ontological inquiry for contemporary (global) politics 
and ethics. Ontology, we explained, is a form of philosophical inquiry into 
existence: into what exists, and into the nature of existence. Yet, beyond the 
disciplining effect that the principle of state sovereignty has had on political 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1. Fred R. Dallmayr, Small Wonder: Global Power and Its Discontents (Oxford: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 2005), 55. Barry K. Gills, “Introduction,” in The Global Politics of Globalization: 
“Empire” Vs “Cosmopolis”, ed. Barry K. Gills (London: Routledge, 2007). 
2. R.B.J. Walker, Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1993), 63. 
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thought and practice, standing as further obstacles to the initiation of more 
universalistic forms of ontological inquiry in world politics is the fact that attempts 
to bring ontological reflection into international theory have largely been facile, 
concerned only with 'things that exist' in international relations (as opposed to the 
being of that entity which encounters such entities as 'objects'); furthermore, the 
overwhelming trajectory of thought since the eighteenth century has been geared 
towards recognising the particularity of philosophical (ontological and 
epistemological) interests.  
 
 These claims were illustrated in Chapter 1: the first with reference to recent 
meta-theoretical debates in international theory, and the second with relation to 
two influential 'normative' approaches to international theory, those of Rawls and 
Frost. Both Rawls and Frost assert the particularity of their claims, and attempt to 
evade controversial philosophical questions by taking dominant practices and 
institutions associated with the sovereign state as their ethical foundations. Their 
attempts at evasion, however, were ultimately unsuccessful, since we are led to ask 
whether we can consider such ethical foundations to have an 'objective' existence, 
what it means to take such foundations as objective, and what it tells us about the 
being of that entity that encounters such entities as 'objects.' 
 
 
Left-Hegelian Thought 
 
 It was in this context that we introduced Hegel, for whom freedom serves as 
the normative standard by which institutions and practices such as the sovereign 
state are to be judged. According to this view, the 'objectivity' of institutions and 
practices remains conditional upon the relation between these practices and the 
being that encounters them as 'objects.' Put differently, the 'objectivity' of 
institutions such as the state is conditional upon the extent to which they contribute 
to the self-actualisation of the human being as a free being. Our contention was 
that this foundational Hegelian commitment to human freedom, an ontological 
commitment to the human being as a free being, might represent a more 
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universalistic ontological foundation for contemporary (global) ethics and politics, 
applying to human beings qua human beings rather than to human beings qua 
political subjects of dominant institutions such as the state.  
 
 It is worth reminding ourselves that this was a meta-theoretical engagement 
with Rawls and Frost. We were not necessarily rejecting their normative claims, 
but arguing that for their approaches to be considered 'good theories,' their ethical 
foundations are in need of further evaluation.3 In other words, that we should only 
accept their normative claims as binding on the condition that their respective 
foundations serve to contribute to human freedom, that the basic structures of a 
modern constitutional democracy (Rawls), or the practices of global civil society 
and the system of sovereign states (Frost) contribute to the historical actualisation 
of the human being as a free being.  
 
 It was for this reason that we identified with the left-Hegelian tradition of 
thought. Motivated by an ontological commitment to the human being as a free 
being, left-Hegelians, from Marx all the way down to contemporary critical 
theorists and critical international theorists, have engaged in social inquiry with the 
aim of foregrounding the possibilities for emancipatory change of the status quo. 
After a discussion of the relation between critical theories and critical international 
theories, where we outlined the two main paths of enquiry (historical/sociological 
and normative/philosophical) into CIRT since the early 1980s, we defended the 
view that the relevance of critical international theory is likely to grow and the 
claim that Andrew Linklater's thought represents the most powerful, persuasive, 
and promising version of CIRT.  
 
 
Linklater's Dualist Rationalist Emancipatory 
Cosmopolitanism. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3. As Neufeld explains 'International meta-theory [...] seeks an answer to the question: "what 
constitutes good theory with regard to world politics?"' Mark A. Neufeld, The Restructuring of 
International Relations Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 2. 
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 By not treating dominant institutions as 'objective' ethical foundations, but 
adopting a broad, philosophically, historically, and sociologically informed 
vantage on these institutions instead, Linklater represents a marked improvement 
on both Rawls and Frost. Nonetheless, we suggested that he might fall foul of the 
same mistake made by Rawls, Frost, and the critical realists: that is, to rely on a 
shallow ontology of 'things' as his ontological foundation, as opposed to a fuller 
ontology of the human being as a free being. 
 
 With a view to substantiating such a claim, Chapter 2 initiated a 
philosophical analysis of the philosophical/normative defence of Linklater's critical 
international theory, which we often referred to simply as his 'emancipatory 
cosmopolitanism.' Our central claim was that this is underwritten by a foundational 
commitment to the human being conceived as ethical subject. To establish this, we 
engaged in a meta-theoretical analysis of some of Linklater's key works: we 
analysed his conception of emancipation, which is presented as the historical 
actualisation of the ethical subject, the process by which the material conditions 
that negate the full appropriation of ethical subjectivity are themselves 
progressively negated, and his defence of moral universalism, where universality is 
conceived as the universal responsibility to engage in dialogue. Both of these, we 
argued, are underwritten by a foundational commitment to ethical subjectivity.  
 
 Our contention was that this foundational commitment represents a 
conflation of what Heidegger identifies as the ontological difference between 
entities and the being of entities (conceived as ethical subjectivity), which reveals 
Linklater's submission to a form of metaphysical dualism: an ontological dualism 
where ethical subjectivity amounts to the essential being of human beings 
(although it manifests itself historically), and an epistemological dualism where the 
individual conceived as ethical subject (i.e., the post-conventional discourse agent) 
is treated as if it had a mind-independent existence, independent of the subject's 
(Linklater's) claim to know it. Such an argument is metaphysical because it 
presumes to apply to human beings qua human beings (human beings 'as such') 
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and to human beings as a whole, and is dualist because it rests on a foundational 
split between subject and object. 
 
 As a result, Linklater's universalism, his emancipatory cosmopolitanism, 
arises out of an always already posited meaning of being (as the historical 
actualisation of ethical subjectivity) and its derivative structuring of a ground (what 
the human being is: an ethical subject/post-conventional discourse agent) upon 
which basis any claims to universality proceed. Our complaint was that this 
overvalues one human potentiality (ethical subjectivity), and leads to an 
emancipatory cosmopolitanism that is based upon relations between human beings 
qua ethical subjects. Here, ethical and emancipatory relations are essentially 
reduced to relations between 'intransitive objects' (i.e., ethical subjects), which is 
morally deficient because moral recognition is extended only to ethical subjects.4 
Moreover, we argued in Chapter 3 that Linklater's commitment to moral 
universalism neglects the role of emancipatory praxis: the significance of practical 
engagement with others, and the processes through which we become ethical 
subjects, both of which are grounded in human freedom. Our conclusion was that 
this is a contradictory and inappropriate basis for an ethical and emancipatory 
cosmopolitanism, and that Linklater's emancipatory cosmopolitanism might then 
fail by its own standards.  
 
 
A Non-Dualist Praxeological Emancipatory Cosmopolitanism 
 
 Part 1 thus made the case that more universalistic forms of ontological 
inquiry were required for contemporary (global) politics and ethics, and established 
that the central weakness of Linklater's critical approach to international theory lay 
in his foundational (ontological and epistemological) commitments to subjectivity 
and objectivity. These commitments, we suggested, indicated both a limited 
philosophical ontology of the human being, and a shallow conception of human 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4. It is worth noting that moral recognition is not the same as moral concern. Whereas moral 
recognition is extended to those who can, and/or are willing, to engage in dialogue, there is no basis 
whatsoever to question the universality of moral concern in Linklater's account. 
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freedom. This led us to the conclusion that, although CIRT professes a high degree 
of reflexivity regarding the relation between subject and object, its focus lies on the 
role that theorising plays in the recreation of social reality and the emancipatory 
purposes of theory, rather than with the implications of any underlying 
commitments to ethical subjectivity, or claims to know any mind-independent 
objects, for our modes of being in the world.  
 
 Having identified Heidegger and Hegel as two powerful challenges to 
foundational commitments to subjectivity and objectivity, and with the aim of 
improving on Linklater's essentially rationalist cosmopolitanism, we suggested 
that both Heidegger and Hegel could help us develop an alternative praxeological 
cosmopolitanism; one that might overcome the deficit of moral universalism. We 
thus proceeded into Parts 2 and 3 with the research question: 
 
What are the implications of conceptions of human existence and freedom in 
Heidegger and Hegel for critical international theory? 
 
 
Part 2 
 
 The central aims of Part 2 were to deepen the ontological foundations (in the 
fuller sense of the term) of CIRT, and to begin our task of developing a richer 
account of human freedom upon which an alternative emancipatory 
cosmopolitanism might be based. Our claim was that, by eschewing a foundational 
commitment to subjectivity and focussing instead on an existential analytic of 
human existence, Heidegger's fundamental ontology could help us develop a more 
universalistic ontological foundation for contemporary (global) politics and ethics. 
In contrast to Rawls, Frost and Linklater, whose foundational ethical commitments 
to 'objects' such as the state or the ethical subject led to normative claims that 
applied only to human beings qua subjects of dominant political institutions, or 
qua ethical subjects, Heidegger's existential analytic of human existence provides 
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us with a more universalistic ontological foundation, applying to human beings 
qua human beings.  
 
 After establishing that Heidegger offers a much deeper account of human 
existence and sociality than those departing from notions of 'subjectivity' or even 
'intersubjectivity,' we argued in Chapter 4 that a more universalistic approach to 
contemporary (global) politics and ethics must involve resisting the 
(characteristically dualist) temptation to regard our own interpretation of the being 
of beings as the only interpretation, and therefore to forgo an approach to politics 
and ethics that is predicated on some universal foundation (such as an ethical 
subject). Instead, the condition of an ethical and emancipatory politics, we argued, 
is that it is predicated on what Heidegger calls 'resolute solicitous being-with,' 
which is to be characterised by an 'intensification of one's cognitive and affective 
capabilities' and a de-centred receptivity to the existence of others as others.5 
 
 Having surveyed Heidegger's existential analytic of human existence and his 
general ontology of Being in Chapter 4, Chapter 5 explored some of the 
implications for a regional ontology of the human being. Endorsing Olafson's 
proposal that we conceive human beings as essentially 'world-relating creatures' 
rather than ethical subjects, we then argued what this might mean for our 
understandings of freedom, politics and ethics. Through Heidegger's engagement 
with Kant's conception of freedom, we established that, before it is associated with 
any form of subjectivity (ethical subjectivity, or the political subjectivity associated 
with citizenship, for instance) freedom must be recognised, not as the property of 
an individual, but as the existential condition of world disclosure: as the Abgrund 
of the ontological difference.  
 
 Towards the end of Chapter 5 we saw that Heidegger's demonstration that 
existence is coexistence, that relationality is antecedent to individuality, effectively 
heralds a fundamental discontinuity between ethics and politics; while politics is 
the process of projecting and contesting interpretations of the being of beings as a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5. Nikolas Kompridis, Critique and Disclosure: Critical Theory Between Past and Future 
(Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 2006), 59. 
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whole, ethics concerns an open, receptive relation to the other as other. 
Consequently, the problem with foundationalist approaches such as Linklater's is 
that, by treating ethical subjectivity as a foundational ethical commitment, a 
(subjective) interpretation of the being of human beings that is projected as a 
general ontology of human being, they effectively present their politics as an 
ethics, raising it above political contestation. For this reason we resounded calls 
from the likes of Nancy and Derrida for a 'politics of singularity' to displace the 
'politics of subjectivity' that we argued characterised Linklater's emancipatory 
cosmopolitanism.  
 
 
Part 3 
 
 Since one of the central weaknesses of Heidegger's account of resolute 
solicitous being-with lies in his failure to give an account of the interpersonal 
conditions of freedom and individuality, one of our reasons for turning to Hegel 
was to refine our argument with the aid of his account of inter-human recognition. 
With a view to demonstrating the nature of Hegel's completion of Kant's critical 
project, this task was initiated in Chapter 6 through a discussion of the subject-
object relation from Kant and Hegel. We were particularly interested in Hegel's 
reworking of Kant's treatment of (ethical and epistemological) subjectivity into 
self-conscious subjectivity, Hegel's departure from Kant's foundational 
commitment to subjectivity, and the nature of his disassociation of subjectivity 
from individuality.  
 
 We determined that the achievement of self-conscious subjectivity involves 
recognising that the subject-object split is not foundational, but derivative, 
occurring within consciousness, and is overcome through an open, receptive 
(phenomenological) relation to the mind-independent real, a relation discussed by 
Hegel with reference to the experience of love. Insisting that this not be 
misinterpreted as overly sentimental, we ascertained that 'love' is best understood 
as an openness of self to other, and an attunement to the practical experience of the 
CONCLUSIONS: Love, Ethics, and Emancipation 	  
378 
mind-independent real by a mature personality cognisant of the limitations of 
reflective rationality. Misrecognising the nature of self-conscious subjectivity as a 
Kantian form of subjectivity, we argued, leads to deleterious implications for our 
mode of being in the world, contributing to diremption, reification and de-
reification. These implications are consequent of a conception of the self as 
foundational subject that stands in a transcendent and assimilatory relation to the 
entities of its experience, entities that include other human beings. 
 
 Shifting focus from the philosophical (ontological and epistemological) 
aspect of self-conscious subjectivity in Chapter 6, Chapter 7 attended to the 
emancipatory aspect through a discussion of Hegel's account of the master and 
slave. We established that this passage of the Phenomenology provides a model of 
the re-cognitive structure of self-consciousness and the interruptive condition of 
subjectivity. Or, put differently, it provides a demonstration that, as self-conscious 
beings, we are fundamentally exposed to the existence of others for the character 
of our freedom and our individuality - an exposure that is disclosed 
phenomenologically through the experience of love. In light of this re-cognitive 
structure of self-consciousness, we introduced another aspect of human freedom: 
freedom as the transcendence of any given subjectivity through the interaction of 
self and world. 
 
 In contrast to the Kantian conception of freedom as autonomous self-
direction, this form of freedom is best understood as an entirely immanent form of 
transcendence, a process of transgressing any prior determination of a self. 
Emancipation is then understood as a process of beings in their becoming, which, 
following Nancy, we referred as the 'crossing of love.' We then argued that the 
achievement of self-conscious subjectivity involves cultivating an attunement to 
the existence of others, a receptivity that becomes part of a deeper fabric of our 
self-understandings and ultimately informing the way that we relate to ourselves 
and to others. We represented this with the notion of a shared participation in a 
community of fate - an affective, cognitive attunement to the inter-personal and 
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cooperative conditions of our own (subjective) freedom and self-hood that 
augments Heidegger's account of resolute solicitous being-with. 
 
 Having outlined the philosophical and emancipatory aspects of Hegel's 
argument in Chapters 6 and 7, Chapter 8 focussed on the ethical aspect. Our central 
aim here was to resuscitate and foreground the importance of ethical life 
(Sittlichkeit) in an ethical and emancipatory politics, especially relative to the 
importance of universalistic moral reason. For Hegel love is the feeling of ethical 
life (Sittlichkeit) in its natural form, and following Hegel and Frankfurt, we argued 
that love is a source and limit on the will and should be considered to be the 
ultimate ground of practical rationality. Demonstrating that Habermas and 
Linklater mistreat the notion of ethical life (Sittlichkeit) by ultimately treating it as 
subordinate to moral law (Moralität), we established that ethical society requires 
the recognition of the mutual implication of moral rationality and ethical life. 
 
 Since the exercise of moral reason operates according to the logic of law, 
requiring the subjection to a common authority that is absent in world politics, our 
contention was that there is a fundamental problem with the deployment of 
Moralität at the cosmopolitical level. While the underlying assumption of 
Linklater's emancipatory cosmopolitanism is that a shared commitment to ethical 
subjectivity can provide such an authority, we have questioned the ethical and 
emancipatory credentials of such a position. Having contended that ethical life 
both underwrites and transcends the law, and that the ethical logic of love operates 
in the absence of authority, we concluded by arguing that an ethical and 
emancipatory approach to contemporary (global) politics and ethics must be based 
upon the cultivation and extension of ethical life at a cosmopolitical level: the 
development of a cosmopolitan ethos of love.  
 
 
Vivifying Sittlichkeit: a Cosmopolitan Ethos of Love 
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 While this is to concur with the conclusion to Men and Citizens that 
progressive change in world politics involves the development of a nascent 
international ethical life and a more rational form of international political life, it 
does take issue with Linklater's more recent claim in The Problem of Harm, in 
which he states that what he calls 'moral emotions' 'might be more useful in 
shaping ethical ideas rather than in trying to understand how radical change may 
occur at a global level.'6 Our complaint here is that Linklater underestimates the 
full ethical and emancipatory significance of ethical praxis: circumscribed by his 
foundational commitment to ethical subjectivity, he is unable to incorporate the 
other two aspects of human freedom we have been discussing into his 
emancipatory cosmopolitanism. With a view to clarifying the nature of our own 
contribution, and shedding light on the nature of the shortcomings of Linklater's, 
we can draw a distinction between cosmopolitan justice and a cosmopolitan ethos.  
  
 
Cosmopolitan Justice / Cosmopolitan Ethos 
 
 We will recall from Chapter 5 that Heidegger distinguishes between ethics 
and ethos, where the latter denotes an abode or dwelling place. Ethics, from the 
Greek (hē) ēthikē (tekhnē)'(the science of) morals,' rely on the existence an ethical 
subject, whereas 'ethos,' deriving from the Greek ēthos, 'nature' or 
'disposition' relates to a habit of character, a spirit that is manifested in the actions 
that such an ethos inspires. This distinction between ethics and ethos is also 
reflected in Hegel's distinction between Moralität and Sittlichkeit, and our 
advocacy of a cosmopolitan ethos of love clearly relates to the latter.  
 
 Largely characterised by the emphasis placed on moral universalism and 
the development of universal norms of coexistence that might command the 
consent of all those who stand to be affected by them, Linklater's emancipatory 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6. Andrew Linklater, Men and Citizens in the Theory of International Relations, 2nd ed. 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1990), 195. Andrew Linklater, The Problem of Harm in World 
Politics, vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 231. 
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cosmopolitanism is one primarily motivated by the ideal of justice.7 While this 
remains an important aspect of an emancipatory cosmopolitanism, Linklater's 
foundational commitment to ethical subjectivity undermines the significance of an 
emancipatory cosmopolitan ethos.8 This leads to a neglect of the importance of 
praxis (the deficit of moral universalism), an overemphasis on the significance of 
moral rationality, and a reductive emancipatory cosmopolitanism.  
 
 Our distinction between a cosmopolitan justice and a cosmopolitan ethos 
builds on Paul Ricoeur's distinction between justice and love.9 Despite containing 
no explicit reference to Hegel, Ricoeur's suggestion that justice and love are 
dialectically entwined is both illuminating and Hegelian in its theme. Insisting that 
justice and love are not dichotomous, and neither should they be confused, with 
one being reduced to the other, Ricoeur argues that the two exist in a creative 
tension: between the poetics of love and the prose of justice, between a logic of 
superabundance and a logic of equivalence.10 Ricoeur's insight is that the logics of 
justice and love exist together in a way that makes a more responsible human life 
possible.11 For Ricoeur, love is a medium of exchange between two people that 
goes beyond the level of command (law). Although the law, the universal above 
and beyond the two (the domain of justice), is a restraint against that which 
destroys the possibility of this relation, love is a gift that both goes beyond and 
sustains the law. Ultimately then, love comes before justice and makes justice 
possible.12  
 
 Although both love and law are required for ethical society, we argued in 
Chapter 8 that a logic of love is more appropriate in the absence of a common 
authority. While we can try to foist a common authority onto others, ultimately this 
can only lead to the establishment of the conditions of cooperation, preventing 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7. Andrew Linklater, The Transformation of Political Community: Ethical Foundations of the Post-
Westphalian Era (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998), 96. 
8. We will clarify our relation to Linklater's emancipatory cosmopolitanism shortly. 
9. Paul Ricoeur, “Love and Justice,” in Paul Ricoeur: The Hermeneutics of Action (Thousand Oaks: 
Sage, 1996). 
10. Ibid., 23-37. 
11. Ibid., 31. 
12. Norman Wirzba and Bruce Ellis Benson, Transforming Philosophy and Religion: Love’s 
Wisdom (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008), 5. 
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communities from disintegrating, rather than developing them. Although an 
emancipatory cosmopolitanism needs both, given that a key aim of 
cosmopolitanism is to overcome the duality of 'the domestic' and 'the global,' to 
create more inclusive forms of communities and foster more universalistic forms of 
common identification, love, compassion, and emancipatory praxis must come 
first.  
 
 While more just relations can contribute to the development of such a 
cosmopolitanism, the active transcendence of a condition of mutual disinterest, of 
mutual antipathy, the achievement of a renewed and richer recognition of our 
mutual dependence, and the development of heightened forms of mutuality and 
solidarity, are things which cannot simply be based upon principles derived 
through practical reason: it requires the development of more loving relations, 
relations through which a more genuine human 'we' might emerge.  
 
 
Our Praxeological Emancipatory Cosmopolitanism 
 
 Before we outline what we consider to be our original contribution to critical 
international theory, and offer some examples of how our emancipatory 
cosmopolitanism might be deployed, we will first outline some of the limitations of 
our argument and clarify our relation to Linklater.  
 
 
Limitations of Our Argument 
 
 The objections that we have raised to Linklater's CIRT, especially our claim 
that it rests on a foundational commitment to ethical subjectivity, are important to 
our argument and our own emancipatory cosmopolitanism has been developed in 
response to these perceived shortcomings. However, our claims have been made 
through a meta-theoretical analysis of his work and there are limitations to this 
form of argument.  
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 For instance, Linklater does not explicitly defend a commitment to ethical 
subjectivity, and so our claims are necessarily inferential and are, therefore, 
fallible. Beyond the inferential analysis of his conceptions of emancipation and 
moral universality, our claim that Linklater's emancipatory cosmopolitanism is 
predicated on a foundational commitment to the ethical subject was bolstered by an 
analysis of Habermas in Chapter 3; but Linklater is not Habermas, and there are 
differences between the two.13 It is not patently clear, for instance, whether 
Linklater wholly subscribes to Habermas's moral cognitivism and he is much more 
sensitive to the concerns of 'postmodernism' and the challenges made to ethical 
universalism than is Habermas.14 For these reasons, our argument may be errant.  
 
 Nonetheless, we maintain that there is ample evidence to conclude otherwise. 
Much of this was provided in our close reading of Men and Citizens and 
Transformation in Chapter 2, but also in our discussion of his essay The 
Achievements of Critical Theory in Chapter 3. While affirming the challenges to 
positivism and the immutability thesis, we questioned the ethical and emancipatory 
credentials of Habermas's reconstruction of historical materialism and development 
of a discourse theory of morality, both of which are crucial to Linklater's 
philosophical, praxeological, and sociological analyses – and both are underwritten 
by a foundational commitment to ethical subjectivity and the ethical subject.  
 
 Another shortcoming is that we have necessarily curtailed our engagement 
with Linklater's work. Although we have broached his praxeological and 
sociological arguments, our focus lay on the philosophical/normative aspect of his 
CIRT. Besides the fact that Linklater has been impressively prolific, and his output 
covers a broad ambit that we cannot hope to do justice to given our constraints, our 
justification for this focus is that Linklater's emancipatory cosmopolitanism serves 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13. For an explanation of differences between the two, and the weaknesses of Linklater's 
deployment of Habermas see Martin Weber, “Engaging Globalization: Critical Theory and Global 
Political Change,” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 27, no. 3 (2002): 301-25. 
14. See the section on 'Dialogue and Discourse' in Transformation, especially his discussion of the 
feminist critique of discourse ethics, and his search for common ground between Lyotard and 
Habermas. Andrew Linklater, The Transformation of Political Community, 87-100,93-95,96-98. 
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as the philosophical defence of his subsequent praxeological and sociological 
analyses; any weaknesses in the philosophical/normative defence of his CIRT will 
therefore be carried over. Nonetheless, given Linklater's insistence on the 'tripartite 
structure' of any critical theory, save for the praxeological/sociological aspects of 
our argument that are outlined below, our attempt to develop an emancipatory 
cosmopolitanism on more convincing meta-theoretical foundations remains 
incomplete according to Linklater's standards. This is an area for further work. 
 
 
Our Relation to Linklater's CIRT 
 
 Our engagement with Linklater has obviously been a critical one; our 
concern to outline the central weaknesses and shortcomings of his emancipatory 
cosmopolitanism and develop our own has involved using his work as a critical 
foil. While we stick by our criticisms, and insist that our own departs from his in 
significant ways, our method of argumentation might ultimately be misleading, and 
perhaps even at times, a little unfair; we can afford to be more conciliatory in 
concluding our argument. 
 
 Linklater's emancipatory cosmopolitanism is a very real contribution to 
international theory; we stand by the view that it represents the most persuasive 
and powerful approach to international theory available. Moreover, we self-
consciously identify with the aspirations of CIRT and consider our argument to be 
a contribution to the project of which Linklater has played a central part. Without 
drastically overestimating our own abilities (or Linklater's for that matter), there is 
a parallel running between our relation to Linklater's critical project and Hegel's to 
Kant's.  
  
 As we explained in Chapter 6, there is an unfortunate tendency to 
overemphasise the differences between Kant and Hegel, since 'Hegel's critique of 
Kant, along with those of the entire post-Kantian German idealist movement, is 
essentially a constructive critique that aims to work out and complete Kant's 
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critical project. ‘Despite criticising Kant on nearly every page of his writings, 
Hegel's engagement with Kant is not a rejection of Kantianism, but part of the 
development of his own Kantianism.'15  
 
 Similarly here, despite our criticisms of Linklater's work on nearly every 
page, we are not rejecting Linklater's CIRT, but developing it; our ardent criticisms 
does not deny our deference. Linklater must be commended for reminding the 
discipline of the deeper philosophical and normative purpose of international 
theory and for placing normative ideas and prospects for emancipatory change at 
the heart of the research agenda in IR. His defence of a left-Hegelian approach to 
international theory against alternatives is sound, as are his criticisms of neo-
realism, positivism, and the immutability thesis (as discussed in Chapter 3). 
Moreover, his insistence on the 'tripartite structure' of any critical theory provides a 
strong rebuttal against criticisms that emancipatory change is hopelessly idealistic 
or naïve, and his later historical/sociological analyses of emancipatory political 
change, as well as his praxeological arguments in Transformation that connect up 
with the international society approach to international theory, all demonstrate that 
an ethical and emancipatory approach to world politics can be realistic and 
realisable. These are all important contributions that should be built upon, not 
rejected.  
 
 
Beyond the Foundationalist / Anti-foundationalist Divide? 
 
 However, running parallel to Rawls's and Frost's normative approaches to 
international theory, the force of Linklater's argument rests on our acceptance of a 
commitment to ethical subjectivity as an 'objective' ethical foundation. Such an 
assumption is unwarranted.  
 
 We demonstrated the epistemological insufficiency of treating the individual 
human being as ethical subject in Chapters 1 and 6, where we discussed Hegel's 	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non-dualist approach to knowledge, according to which our interpretation of the 
being of human beings is a mind-dependent construction. From this point of view, 
the problem with foundationalist approaches to ethics and politics is that their 
universalism rests upon a conflation of what Heidegger identifies as the ontological 
difference between the mind-independent existence of entities and our mind-
dependent interpretations of their being (as ethical subjects, for instance). By 
treating a commitment to ethical subjectivity as a foundational commitment, 
foundationalist approaches to politics and ethics misrepresent their (subjective) 
interpretation of the being of human beings as objective, treating the ethical subject 
(or anther interpretation of the being of human beings) as if it had a mind-
independent existence.  
 
 Our philosophical evaluation of such a foundational commitment to ethical 
subjectivity was initiated in our discussion of recent departures in critical theory in 
Chapter 3. Our discussion there aimed to highlight the general tendency to move 
increasingly further away from a foundational commitment to the ethical subject. 
One of the central arguments developed was that the foundational commitment to 
the ethical subject led to the privileging of moral theory over emancipatory praxis: 
the side-lining of politics by morality (the deficit of moral universalism). This 
argument was made primarily with reference to Foucault's notion of travail 
éthique.16 Following Heidegger, Foucault aimed to draw attention to the fact that a 
foundational commitment to ethical subjectivity, acting as if we were always 
already ethical subjects, neglects the process of moral self-formation - the process 
through which we become an ethical subject, a process that is grounded in human 
freedom.  
 
 In light of this we endorsed Brincat's deployment of Honneth's theory of 
recognition, which focussed on the interpersonal aspect of human freedom. Such a 
move is promising because the project of emancipation is no longer only connected 
to the establishment of the conditions for the exercise of ethical subjectivity, but 
locates it within relations of inter-subjectivity: 'within the experiences of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16. Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, trans. Robert Hurley, vol. 2: The Use of Pleasure 
(New York: Vintage, 1985), 27. 
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'dominated' themselves rather than civilising processes that take place 'above 
them.'17 Nonetheless, following Odysseos's and Nancy's Heideggerian arguments, 
we departed from Brincat's and Honneth's reliance on relations of 'intersubjectivity' 
because this is unable to provide an adequate account of the relational nature of 
individuality: the fact that relationality is antecedent to subjectivity, or, that 
existence is coexistence.  
 
 
The Achievements of Ethical Subjectivity 
 
 Anti-foundationalists rightly challenge foundationalist ethical or political 
commitments (to ethical subjectivity for instance), arguing that these commitments 
can potentially lead to violent and exclusive responses to difference. However, due 
to their commitments to 'irony' or to radical autonomy, they often fail to recognise 
that ethical subjectivity, and the political conditions within which it might be 
exercised, are very real historical achievements.  
 
 We clearly need commitments to ethical subjectivity. We want to feel that 
our decisions are our own. Acting 'as if we were' ethical subjects and being treated 
'as if we were' ethical subjects empowers us to aspire to this level of responsibility 
and autonomy: notional commitments to ethical subjectivity encourage individuals 
to become free and responsible. Moral reason encourages us to adopt a level of 
critical distance from our immediate existences and it helps shed light on the 
essential limitations of our particularist communities. It enjoins us to challenge the 
irrationalism and parochialism of nationalist ideologies and the exclusivity of self-
regarding forms of communitarianism, and offers us a forceful way of challenging 
questionable institutions and practices – such as the self-defeating nature of drives 
for power and influence in international affairs (of which Linklater's analysis of 
Waltz's structural realism is a cogent example). Acting 'as if we were' ethical 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17. Shannon Brincat, “Towards an Emancipatory Cosmopolitanism: Reconstructing the Concept of 
Emancipation in Critical International Relations Theory” (Ph.D Thesis, University of Queensland, 
2011), 312,314-315. 
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subjects most certainly does lead to the achievement of higher levels of self-
determination; ethical subjectivity helps bring the free being into being. 
 
 Indeed, we underlined the importance of our ability to 'act as if' we were 
ethical subjects in Chapters 5 and 7 in relation to Kant's conception of freedom, 
and Hegel's account of the master and slave. In regards the former, we saw that 
Kant's resolution to the third antinomy between freedom and causality was to posit 
the necessity of an uncaused cause (transcendental freedom). Although we cannot 
experience this transcendental freedom, Kant argues in the second Critique that we 
must act as if this transcendental thesis were true; to act otherwise would deny us 
the ability to consider ourselves (and therefore act as) responsible agents. Despite 
the epistemic possibility that we might well be deluded, for Kant there is a 
practical necessity of acting as if we had cosmological freedom, otherwise we 
simply could not act.18  
 
 Similarly with Hegel, in Chapter 7 we saw that both master and slave enter 
the struggle for recognition with the desire for absolute independence; it is their 
desire for freedom from all conditionality, their desire for subjectivity, that draws 
them into the struggle in the first place. The individuals that face each other make 
claims of freedom on one another, and resolve to treat each other 'as if they were' 
ethical subjects to avoid the ensuing struggle between life and death. Importantly 
though, this mutual recognition between 'subjects' is simply a way of mediating the 
fact that they are fundamentally dependent on each other for their freedom, and 
hence their subjective freedom is only ever a relative independence.  
 
 This is the central strength of Linklater's rationalist emancipatory 
cosmopolitanism: he provides us with a potent defence of one aspect of human 
freedom. Just like our meta-theoretical engagement with Rawls and Frost did not 
lead to a rejection of their normative claims, but to an insistence that their 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18. In a metaphysics lecture Kant is quoted as saying: 'Freedom is practically necessary – man must 
therefore act according to an idea of freedom, otherwise he cannot act. That does not, however, 
prove freedom in the theoretical sense.' Henry E. Allison, Idealism and Freedom: Essays on Kant’s 
Theoretical and Practical Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 133-34. 
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foundational ethical commitments be subjected to further evaluation before we 
accept their normative claims as binding, we are arguing that Linklater's normative 
claims must be conditional upon the extent to which ethical subjectivity contributes 
to human freedom; to be judged according to a more comprehensive account of 
this normative ideal, such as ours.  
 
 
'Overcoming' Linklater's Rationalist Emancipatory Cosmopolitanism 
 
 It is because we recognise with Linklater that ethical subjectivity is an 
historical achievement, and that a logic of mutual equivalence is an important 
aspect of an emancipatory cosmopolitanism, that we are not rejecting his 
emancipatory cosmopolitanism. Reflecting Heidegger's famous call for an 
'overcoming' of metaphysics (discussed in Chapter 4), we are arguing that 
cosmopolitanism must be predicated on a more persuasive, more universalistic, 
meta-theoretical foundation: that is to say, on a fuller ontological account of the 
human being as a free being, to be accompanied by an epistemology that does not 
conflate the 'ontological difference' or overlook the distinction between 
mind/world and mind-independent real.  
 
 The problem with working from dualist premises is that ontological 
commitments are concealed or treated as if they were neutral or universal. 
Rhetorically, this method of argumentation is powerful but philosophically it might 
be disingenuous and, in any case, it does not stand up to much scrutiny. Hence 
despite recognising the achievements of ethical subjectivity (in this sense we are 
more Hegelian than Heideggerian), we hope to have demonstrated that treating it 
as a foundational commitment, or as if it were the apex of human maturity 
(Kohlberg, Habermas, Linklater), is profoundly mistaken.  
 
 This way of thinking does not correspond to our experience (Emerson); it 
misrepresents the essentially connected nature of our personalities (Hegel, 
Emerson); it distorts our understandings of the world by objectifying the entities of 
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our experience (Heidegger, Hegel, Scheler, Lem); by establishing the self as 
transcendent, knowing, and assimilatory in its relations to the entities that it 
experiences, it adversely affects the nature of the relation between self and world 
(the problem with Kant and Fichte; Frye, Buber); it precludes the possibility of a 
genuine encounter with the other (Nancy); and it alienates us from the depth 
phenomena of our existence - our experiences of ourselves as self-actualising 
beings, of our positive freedom gained through the transcendence of any given 
subjectivity (the crossing of love), and from our experiences of authentic 
community - communities in which we are not subjects relating to other subjects. 
For all these reasons a foundational commitment to the ethical subject is 
profoundly misguided, epistemologically, ontologically, and ethically.  
 
 Furthermore, and more pertinent to an emancipatory politics, this way of 
thinking undermines the two other aspects of human freedom that we have sought 
to shed light on: freedom as existential condition of world-disclosure and freedom 
as the transcendence of subjectivity, where any given subjectivity is transcended in 
ethical and emancipatory praxis. For this reason, as it stands, being reliant on a 
foundational commitment to ethical subjectivity, there is an essential tension 
between Linklater's commitment to the development of more ethical and 
emancipatory human relations and his philosophical defence of this position. This 
is why we have argued that we are constitutively unable to build an emancipatory 
cosmopolitanism from dualist premises, and why we need to overcome Linklater's 
rationalist emancipatory cosmopolitanism with a praxeological emancipatory 
cosmopolitanism. Herein lies our original contribution to critical international 
theory.  
 
 
Conclusions: Our Contribution to Critical International 
Theory 
 
 Responding to Behr's call for the development of more universalistic 
trajectories of ontological inquiry for contemporary politics and ethics, and having 
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identified with the left-Hegelian tradition of thought, our original contribution to 
critical international theory has been to argue that it must be predicated, not on any 
foundational commitments to subjectivity or objectivity, but on a fuller ontological 
foundation: on an ontology of being, and of human being in particular. After 
highlighting the essential weaknesses and contradictions latent within the most 
compelling advocate of this approach to international theory, our move has been to 
establish a 'critical' approach to international theory on a more persuasive and 
universalistic meta-theoretical foundation. Our hope is that this represents a 
contribution to a more adequate ethical and emancipatory approach to 
contemporary (global) politics and ethics.  
 
 We offered an epistemological defence of this praxeological universalism 
through Hegel's phenomenological constructivist approach to knowledge. In 
contrast to the dualist approach, where the subject-object split occurs between 
mind and world, and the object is treated as if it had a mind-independent 'objective' 
existence, Hegel's approach to knowledge regards the subject-object split as 
derivative, rather than foundational, and occurring within consciousness. This 
called for a further distinction to be drawn between mind/world and mind-
independent real, where entities have a mind-independent existence, but their 
being, which is dependent upon human understanding, and therefore on the activity 
of 'mind' (Geist), does not.  
 
 Our contention was that this epistemological aspect of our argument can help 
us move beyond the foundationalist/anti-foundationalist schism in normative 
theory. In contrast to the foundationalist approach, we recognise that our 
interpretation of the being of beings is a mind-dependent interpretation of a reality 
that we wish to construct, and thus does not have a mind-independent existence; 
consequently, that an ethical and emancipatory politics cannot be predicated on an 
interpretation of the being of human beings that is projected as a universal 
ontology of human being. In contrast to the anti-foundationalist approach however, 
we realise that we can give better or worse accounts of the being of human beings, 
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accounts that are to be evaluated according to the normative ideal of more ethical 
and emancipatory relations between human beings.  
 
 This brings us to the ontological aspect of our meta-theoretical argument, 
which has aimed to develop a fuller, more universalistic understanding of the 
nature of the human being as a free being. This has been an essentially 
philosophical exercise that amounts to an attempt to contribute to the development 
of a more adequate account of the human being as mind-dependent cognitive 
object.  
 
 Since every human being that we encounter is first and foremost an entity 
that has a mind-independent existence that we must presume exceeds our 
understanding or interpretation of them, we have argued that relations to others are 
best conceived as relations to singularities, relations that do not reduce the other to 
simply a particular case of the human species, but relations that aspire to treat them 
as singular irreplaceable beings. Building on this premise, we have also sought to 
contribute other non-subjectivist accounts of the being of human beings. These 
accounts are not mutually exclusive: they all capture aspects of the being of human 
beings. Moreover, while they do not deny our ability to 'act as if' we were subjects, 
they do amount to a recognition that such an activity is essentially a fugitive way 
of understanding the self.  
 
 Firstly, following Heidegger, in Chapter 4 we defended a view of human 
beings as ek-sistents: as beings that interpret Being, and which exist essentially as 
potentiality rather than ground (as implied by 'subjectivity'). Following Olafson, 
we built on this in Chapter 5, where we defended the view of the human being as a 
world-relating creature, whose world relation represents the proximal fact of their 
existence, and which they cannot simply transcend when they adopt a position of 
subjectivity. Finally, in Part 3 we defended the view of the human being as the 
being with potential for self-conscious subjectivity, the achievement by a mature 
personality of a form of cognition that overcomes the limitations of object-oriented 
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forms of consciousness, which is characterised by an open, receptive attunement to 
the existence of others, and to the disclosure of the mind-independent real.  
 
 Our argument that our interpretations of the being of human beings are mind-
dependent constructions means that an ethical and emancipatory politics cannot be 
based upon some universal ground, a shared subjectivity, but must be premised 
instead on a universal relation: an affective and receptive relation to the mind-
independent real where 'the other' can appear to us in their full singularity. Having 
argued that freedom is not a property that drives our actions, but is appropriated in 
praxis with others, and that what it means to be a free human being is to engage in 
resolute solicitous being-with others, we concluded that an ethical and 
emancipatory politics does not simply amount to the establishment of the political 
conditions for the exercise of subjectivity, but must go beyond this.  
 
 Indeed, our fuller account of human freedom and the being of human beings 
allow us to go beyond Linklater's praxeological arguments, which are seemingly 
confined to the obligations of states to engage in different modes international 
society to promote higher levels of universality and difference, or to project the 
achievements of national citizenship out onto the sphere of international 
relations. 19  While not opposing Linklater's suggestions, our emancipatory 
cosmopolitanism calls for a deeper and more demanding approach to an ethical and 
emancipatory approach to contemporary (global) politics and ethics. Given the 
material transformations of world politics outlined in the Introduction, it is 
important that we make this move. 
 
 Our praxeological arguments are not just aimed at states and their agents, but 
should also be received as a galvanising call to human beings qua human beings to 
fully appropriate our own freedom by acting in ethical and emancipatory ways 
towards others that we encounter. We might then return to our discussion of Bob 
Francis and the Commonwealth minister's constituents from the Introduction and 
ask again: what does it tell us about the being of those beings that encounter 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19. Andrew Linklater, The Transformation of Political Community, 181,211-212. 
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refugees as others to be excluded? Does their prerogative as political subjects (as 
citizens of the Australian state) to exclude others amount to an exercise of their 
freedom as human beings? Does an ethical relation simply consist in their state's 
non-contravention of cosmopolitan norms? In light of our previous discussions, the 
answer to both is clearly a resounding 'no.'  
 
 
Applying Our Argument 
 
 One of the problems highlighted with Wight's ontological argument about the 
relation between structure and agency is that, although he shows that ontology 
matters, it is not clear how social practice is affected by this realisation, both 
analytically and normatively.20 We should avoid such a mistake. Moreover, our 
fuller account of human freedom allows us to look beyond Habermas's and 
Linklater's deployment of the normative ideal of universal communication as an 
evaluative tool for critical social theory and a guide for ethical and emancipatory 
praxis.  
 
 Based upon our argument for the vivification of an international ethical life, 
we will now discuss three key implications of our argument. These allow us to 
adopt critical stances on cosmopolitan norms, institutions, and identities, and they 
relate to love as a guide for praxis, love as an evaluative tool for critical social 
theory, and love as a way of cultivating a common human identity.  
 
 It is worth noting at the outset that we are not arguing against Linklater in 
what follows; Linklater's rationalist emancipatory cosmopolitanism and ours are 
not mutually exclusive. Indeed, unsurprisingly, there is much overlap with 
Linklater's concerns. However, Linklater's foundational commitments deny him 
powerful philosophical and motivational resources for an ethical and emancipatory 
cosmopolitanism, and our emancipatory cosmopolitanism can inform international 
practice in ways that Linklater's cannot. In contrast to Linklater's rationalism, our 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20. Corneliu Bjola, “Agents, Structures, and International Relations: Politics as Ontology By Colin 
Wight,” International Studies Review 9(2), no. 2 (2008): 316-18. 
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applications of our argument all proceed from an affirmation of our ethical 
immediacy, from the essentially lived character of ethics, and from a relation to the 
other as singularity rather than subject.  
 
 
Love and Praxis 
 
 Our praxeological approach to an emancipatory politics enjoins us to resist or 
overcome mediated relations between self and other, recognising that our 
independence is only ever a relative independence and soliciting us to disconnect 
from the organic community into which we are born, from our inherited places in 
the global order of things, in the name of a higher universality.21 In the context of 
world politics this might involve acting in ways that generate forms of solidarity 
beyond traditional communities, across lines that traditionally divide people. It 
might involve attempting to dissolve perceptions of mutual enmity or diffusing 
hostility between collective entities through trust building initiatives, for instance.22  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21. See for instance Žižek's article on the purpose and meaning of the E.U. as an application of this 
logic. He writes: 'Christ's "scandalous" words from Luke point in the direction of a universality 
which ignores every social hierarchy: "If anyone comes to me and does not hate his father and his 
mother, his wife and children, his brothers and sisters – yes even his own life – he cannot be my 
disciple" (14:26). Family relations stand here for any particular ethnic or hierarchic social link that 
determines our place in the global order of things. The "hatred" enjoined by Christ is therefore not 
the opposite of Christian love, but its direct expression: it is love itself that enjoins us to 
"disconnect" from our organic community into which we were born, or, as St Paul put it, for a 
Christian, there are neither men nor women, neither Jews nor Greeks. No wonder that, for those 
fully identified with a particular way of life, the appearance of Christ was perceived as ridiculous or 
traumatic.' Slavoj Žižek, “I Have a Dream,” The Guardian 4th February (2011). 
22. A recent anti-war initiative, 'Israel Loves Iran,' launched by Tel Aviv resident Ronny Edry and 
his wife Michal Tamirm is a heartening example of such a venture. See www.israelovesiran.com; 
Elizabeth Flock, “‘Israel Loves Iran’ Anti-War Initiative Takes Off,” The Washington Post. 19th 
March 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/blogpost/post/israel-loves-iran-anti-war-
initiative-takes-off/2012/03/19/gIQA1qWXNS_blog.html (accessed 20th June 2012).  Ruth 
Margalit, “Israel Loves Iran (on Facebook),” The New Yorker. March 23rd, 2012 
http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/culture/2012/03/israel-loves-iran-on-facebook.html 
(accessed 20th June 2012).   
Indeed, given that Muhammad was a descendant of Ishmael, himself a son of Abraham (and half 
brother of Isaac), Israel and Iran may be seen as branches from the same trunk; relations between 
them might then prove to be an interesting example of Hegel's argument for the reconciliation in 
love of differentiated spheres of life that have split from an underlying unity. See (Genesis 12:4-7; 
13:12-18; 15:1-21; 17:1-22; 21:1-14; 25:19-26; 26:1-6; 35:9-12); (Sura 19:54; Sura 37:83-109 cf. 
Genesis 22:1-19) 
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 It also encourages us to actively participate in ethical life (domestic and 
global) with the aim of ameliorating injustices, which might involve the 
vindication of acts of conscience. As a recent article on the activities of the hacker 
collective Anonymous succinctly states, 'in more naïve times, one might naturally 
prefer a law-bound state deciding which power abuses should be reined in and 
which information exposed. But these are no longer naïve times.'23 In a decade that 
saw the normalisation of policies of lawless detention, torture, extraordinary 
rendition, targeted assassinations, along with the instigation of wars of 
questionable legitimacy or legality, and a persistent refusal to bring those now or 
formerly in power, in both public and private sectors, to account for their 
transgressions, and political systems that increasingly favour the rich and powerful, 
it is unsurprising that there is growing public mistrust of authority and increasing 
suspicion that those with formal authority cannot be trusted to decide what wrongs 
should be righted, what social ills should be addressed, what information should be 
shared, or what actions are in the best interests of either of their own constituents 
or those of a broader humanity.24  
 
 In light of these developments it should be unsurprising that individuals 
acting collectively in networks and organisations such as Anonymous, Wikileaks, 
or Sea Shepherd feel that they are able to make decisions based on the activity of 
their own consciences and act on them with greater legitimacy than those 
occupying positions in traditional structures of authority. These developments are 
at once disconcerting and hopeful, and in their positive mode they are examples of 
engaged, ethical, and emancipatory praxis. 
 
 Another, more pressing and disturbing example of love as a potential guide 
for ethical and emancipatory praxis relates to an ongoing situation in Western 
Burma.25 The Rohingya, a stateless people who have lived in Burma for at least 60 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23. Yochai Benkler, “Hacks of Valour: Why Anonymous is Not a Threat to National Security,” 
Foreign Affairs, 4th April 2012 http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137382/yochai-
benkler/hacks-of-valor. (accessed April 4, 2012).  
24. Several of these examples are Benklers, several my own. Ibid. 
25. See Moshahida Sultana Ritu, “Ethnic Cleansing in Myanmar,” New York Times, 12th July 2012 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/13/opinion/ethnic-cleansing-of-myanmars-rohingyas.html 
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years (and perhaps centuries), have faced torture, neglect and repression since 
Burma's independence from Britain in 1948. They are denied even the possibility 
of citizenship by the country's constitution. Following recent unrest in Arakan 
state, the Burmese are now trying to push them out of the country all together. 
Rohingya people have been driven off their land, raped, beaten and starved to 
death, and forced to flee to Bangladesh where they have simply been turned back 
to Burma – the Burmese President Thein Sein even recently submitted a proposal 
to the UN to have approximately all 800,000 Rohingya resettled in a third 
country.26 
 
 Acts of love and compassion enjoin us to reconcile perceived differences 
between self and other, to extend our trust and to take other's interests as our own, 
in a process that is transformative of both; Bangladeshis who hid Rohingya 
refugees from the authorities in their homes are lustrous examples. An ethical and 
emancipatory response to this situation does not simply call for the establishment 
of mutually agreeable principles of coexistence, nor does it call for the separation 
of these communities; for even if all the Rohingya were resettled, those who forced 
them to leave their lands would remain snared in their own hateful, xenophobic 
subjectivity. Rather, our argument is that an ethical and emancipatory response 
requires a revolution in the spirit or the ethos that governs such relations: a 
revolution with the ultimate aim of reconciling these bitter divisions, reconciliation 
that would constitute transcendence for both Rohingya and for other ethnic 
Burmese.  
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
(accessed 12th July 2012, 2012). and Benedict Rogers, “Is Burma Ready to Embrace Diversity?,” 
Democratic Voice of Burma. 7th August, 2012 (accessed 12/08/2012). 
26. Human Rights Watch, “The Government Could Have Stopped This,” Human Rights Watch. 1st 
August (2012). 
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Love as Evaluative Tool27  
 
 Clearly actions do not occur outside of a social and historical context and 
human freedom operates, at least partially, through social institutions and practices. 
For this reason these institutions and practices should be subject to our own 
standards of ethics and freedom; those that block or undermine the conditions of 
our own freedom, or hamper fully ethical relations with others, are not fully 
rational and should be subject to reform. This normative standard represents the 
second practical application of our commitment to love as a cosmopolitan ethos: 
love as a basis of critique.  
 
 Offering a cosmopolitan ethos of love as an evaluative tool for critical social 
theory involves committing to the critique and transformation of practices and 
institutions that pervert the dynamic of ethical life (Sittlichkeit). It provides us with 
a normative standard with which to indict forms of ethical habituation, institutions 
and practices, for being obstacles to a full appropriation of that which makes us 
human: the depth phenomena of our existence – our experiences of freedom, our 
self-actualisation, and our participation in different communities. 
 
 One obvious target for such criticism would be the exclusivity of the 
nation-state, since it relies on the exclusion of non-citizens in order to safeguard 
the protections that it can provide its own subjects, often forcibly and violently. 
Yet criticism would also be extended to other material and ideational structures 
that foster divisions between people, alienate self from other, and stand as 
obstacles to fully free and ethical relations between people. As well as the state, 
poverty and extreme inequality are examples of the latter, while exclusive religions 
or political ideologies that suppose self-regarding traditional communities and their 
institutional expressions to be natural and eternal (structural realism, for instance) 
or those which treat particularist identities as singular, exclusive and superordinate 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27. Frederick Neuhouser makes a related argument for using Hegel's characteristic understanding of 
freedom, which Neuhouser refers to as 'social freedom' as an evaluative tool for critical social 
theory. See Frederik Neuhouser, Foundations of Hegel’s Social Theory: Actualizing Freedom 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000); Frederik Neuhouser, “Hegel on Life, Freedom, 
and Social Pathology” (Paper presented at the Philosophies of Right: Philosophical Conceptions of 
Right from German Idealism to Critical Theory, New York, 2011). 
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to the extension of empathy and solidarity across cultural boundaries, can also be 
subject to critique.  
 
 
Material and Ideational Practices of Indifference  
 
 Affirming love as a cosmopolitan ethos also invites criticism to be directed 
towards material and ideational practices that generate and sustain forms of 
indifference towards others. We saw in Chapter 7 that a radical degree of co-
responsibility arises on account of our being bound together in a community of 
fate. This co-responsibility does not compromise the autonomy of the individual - 
every person remains fully responsible for his or her own actions - but, as for 
Scheler, this co-responsibility must lead to a form of a radical questioning:  
 
When another person commits an act of hate or violence, the questions implied in 
solidarity are how such acts are possible and how have I participated in creating a world 
wherein such acts are possible. The existence of hate necessarily implies that I have not 
loved enough.28 
 
The central idea is that social space is always constituted ethically and 
normatively, it is a space in which human beings are formed or deformed, freed or 
oppressed, through the structures in which we interact with others. Within this 
space we cannot ethically harm another without ethically harming ourselves, and 
others cannot be harmed without ourselves bearing co-responsibility for that 
harm.29  
 
 In light of this, material and ideational practices that disavow this radical 
co-responsibility and foster feelings of indifference towards others, or discourage 
us from feeling obliged to those beyond our immediate circle of concern, confining 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28. Max Scheler. Gesammelte Werke. Edited by Maria Scheler and Manfred S. Frings., Bonn: 
Bouvier Verlag, 1986., II,526. Zachary Davis and Anthony Steinbock, Max Scheler, Winter 2011 
ed., The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
(http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2011/entries/scheler/, 2011). 
29. J.M. Bernstein, “Early Theological Writings,” Lectures on Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit 
The New School. New York City. 13th September (2006): 
http://bernsteintapes.com/lectures/Hegel/03EarlyTheologicalWritingA.mp3. 
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our attentive care only to our local groups – towards compatriots or towards fellow 
believers – are liable to censure. As are more individualistic social ideologies such 
as libertarian ideas of absolute individual responsibility, extending even to those 
cosmopolitanisms predicated on the idea of the individual as subject, where the 
subject has to be moved into action in order to comply with universal duties or 
obligations that have been theoretically derived.  
 
 
No Stale Fraternity 
 
 Advocating the role of love in responding to our current actuality should 
not then be considered a romantic idealism inappropriate to the public realm and 
hopelessly diluted when applied to world politics, but rather as an argument 
concerning the appropriate response to the singular others that we encounter in our 
day-to-day existences; one that compels us to act in spite of our limited ability to 
do so wholly effectively and alleviate these conditions. It should be thought of as 
an antidote to the temptation to over-rationalise our responses to migrants, 
refugees, the global poor, or towards those with whom we perceive a relation of 
enmity, since this over-rationalisation often leads to a practical paralysis due the 
overwhelming nature of the response (such as the case in the alleviation of global 
poverty): an alienation from the other that results in our acquiesces to their 
detainment in detention facilities (such as in the case of migrants or asylum 
seekers); or the sanctioning of their inhumane treatment (such as in cases of the 
torture or extra-judicial killings of 'enemy non-combatants'). While this is a first 
order ethical concern, it is also politically relevant since, through the recognition of 
life as life in its separated yet connected forms, love 'upholds life in its manifold 
differences' and thus 'constitutes the vehicle of future cognitive determination 
between the philosophical, the political and the economic, and there from, the 
active promise of future polity.'30  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30. Richard Beardsworth, “A Note to a Political Understanding of Love in Our Global Age,” 
Contretemps (2006), 8. 
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 It should also be clear that this is not a pacifying and conciliatory vision of 
human relations. Love does not lead to the preaching of a stale fraternity, nor does 
it ignore the existence of relations of power and exploitation: rather, it demands 
that 'the injustice and cowardice of power must be denounced and, in their turn, 
negated.'31 Loving is risky, it involves linking ourselves to the interests of another, 
'exposing oneself to another's vicissitudes,' and it manifests itself as struggle.32 Yet 
it is love that constitutes perhaps the deepest phenomena of our existences, and we 
have argued that it represents the highest appropriation of our freedom. This makes 
it an integral, yet hitherto neglected, part of any emancipatory politics - a crucial 
and central aspect of an emancipatory cosmopolitanism. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31. Jean-Luc Nancy, Hegel: The Restlessness of the Negative (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2002), 62. 
32. Harry G. Frankfurt, “Taking Ourselves Seriously and Getting it Right” (Paper presented at the 
Tanner Lectures on Human Values, Stanford University, 2004), 195. 
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